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Abstract 
 
This thesis develops a novel account of the emerging tension between economic theory 
and accounting practice brought about by the ‘beyond GDP’ agenda. Following the 
report of the Stiglitz Commission in 2009, the global statistical community has sought to 
reform accounting systems to correct for the flaws of GDP as a metric of welfare and 
progress. These measurement initiatives present an apparently radical challenge to the 
foundational assumptions of neoclassical synthesis economics. Yet the interaction 
between this accounting agenda and the theoretical vision of the economy which 
underpins the national accounts has yet to be extensively explored. After locating this 
deficiency in the critical assumption of an identity between accounting practice and 
economic rationality, the thesis draws upon the work of Karl Polanyi to ground a novel 
account of the politics of this agenda. Polanyi’s work provides a sophisticated account of 
how the idea of economic growth itself was predicated on the emergence of a mode of 
economic thinking that equated the economy with an autonomous and self-regulating 
system of markets: the ‘market mentality’. Drawing on official methodological sources, 
reports and expert interviews (at the OECD, Eurostat and the ONS), the thesis traces the 
numerous practical and conceptual difficulties which statisticians and accountants face in 
reconciling beyond GDP reforms with this market-centric vision of the economy and 
human nature. Analysing four prominent strands of the beyond GDP agenda – inequality 
measurement; the valuation of unpaid work; human and natural capital accounting; and 
the pricing of non-market goods – it illustrates how the practical demands of 
implementing these reforms are leading to an increasingly complicated and fraught 
relationship between national accounting practice and the theoretical vision of the 
economy inherited from industrial society. As accountants and statisticians are 
discovering, moving beyond GDP involves more than overcoming the priority placed 
upon economic growth in policy-making; rather, it involves problematising this broader 
mode of political reasoning about ‘the economy’ and a more fundamental re-constitution 
of its borders with society, nature and politics. These findings contribute to wider debates 
about the changing role of economic expertise in the governance of post-industrial 
societies, and the role of statistical representation in mediating this. 
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 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
We find ourselves stultified by the legacy of a market-economy which bequeathed us 
oversimplified views of the function and role of the economic system in society. If the crisis is 
to be overcome, we must recapture a more realistic vision of the human world. – Karl 
Polanyi, 1947 
 
Our statistics and accounts reflect our aspirations, the values that we assign things. They are 
inseparable from our vision of the world and the economy, of society, and our conception of 
human beings… behind all our statistical and accounting representations, there lies the cult 
of the market…but a project for society or civilisation cannot be based solely on the market. 
– Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
Social Progress, 2009 
 
 
There is an intimate connection between statistical practice and economic reasoning 
(Mitchell 1998; Hirschmann 2016). The figures produced by national accounting systems 
underpin everyday political discourse on the economy: ‘GDP grew by 2.5% this year’; 
‘real wages are rising’; ‘the financial services sector comprises 7.2% of the UK economy’. 
These facts appear natural, but the ability to talk about the economic system as a unified 
whole is surprisingly recent, made possible largely by the development of centralised 
statistical agencies and national income accounting in the mid-20th century (Karabell 
2014; Hirschmann 2016). This statistical creation, in turn, was made possible by a 
theoretical vision of the economy as a system of interlocking, which had emerged over 
the late 19th and early 20th century (Breslau 2003; Philipsen 2015). As Timothy Mitchell 
has argued:  
 
Only towards the end of the 1930s was the new idea of “the economy” realized …as the 
sphere of rational and numerical calculation, it was the one most easily represented in 
statistical and algebraic forms. For this reason, the most abstract and mathematical of the 
social sciences, economics, claimed the task of representing what seemed the most real 
aspect of the social world (Mitchell 1998, 82). 
 
This thesis offers an account of the challenge to this vision of ‘the economy’ inherited 
from the industrial age that is posed by contemporary global reforms to national 
accounting systems aimed at addressing the problems of post-industrial society. 
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The conception of an autonomous economic system constructed by centralised national 
accounting systems emerged alongside historical changes in industrial societies and 
economic theory over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
(Backhouse 2002; Philipsen 2015). The enclosure of common land, the creation of 
national labour markets and the emergence of complex financial infrastructure meant 
that more and more aspects of economic relations came under the influence of market 
forces and the price mechanism (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). The rise of market society (ibid, 
60), in turn, gave rise to the appearance of a distinct field of social life – ‘the economy’ 
– that seemed to contain its own laws and regularities. These became the subject of a 
new field of knowledge: political economy. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
economics (now purified of the ‘political’) was increasingly remodelled in deductive, 
naturalistic terms as the science of the rational allocation of scarce resources between 
alternative market goods (Heilbroner 2011). In the mid-twentieth century, this was 
supplemented by the development of macroeconomics and econometrics, which 
conceived of the national economy as an aggregate system of interlocking market flows 
(Clarke 1990).  
 
After the war, the development of the UN System of National Accounting (SNA), which 
underpins the global system of national accounts, naturalised this emerging theoretical 
understanding of the economy as a closed, law-bound system (UN 1953). This statistical 
apparatus underpinned a distinct set of political priorities: it allowed certain problems to 
be grasped and acted on, and others silenced. For instance, it promoted a focus on 
aggregate market growth rather than distributional questions, the invisibility of 
economic phenomena which lie outside the market system – including social 
reproduction (Laslett and Brenner 1989; Katz 2001) and ecological systems (Daly 1997) 
– and the conflation of the growth of commodified transactions with gains in 
substantive welfare (Philipsen 2015). These political priorities have been referred to as 
the ‘growth paradigm’, shaping post-war conceptions of development and progress 
(Dale 2012; Schmelzer 2015).  
 
But the SNA, and GDP in particular, have faced an increasing array of critiques in recent 
decades (Coyle 2014; Fioramonti 2017). Even Simon Kuznets, founder of national 
income accounting, warned that: ‘a national total facilitates the ascription of independent 
significance to that vague entity called the national economy’ (Kuznets 1941, xxvi). 
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Subsequent decades have witnessed growing concerns over problems characteristic of 
post-industrial societies: rising inequality; financial instability; ecological crisis and 
climate change; employment insecurity; deteriorating work-life balance and an increase 
in mental illness; demographic change and a crisis of social reproduction. A shared 
characteristic of these problems is that they cannot be solved solely through increasing 
aggregate market growth. These issues thus pose serious questions about the adequacy 
of national accounting and measurement systems established in the post-war period to 
help policymakers respond meaningfully to the key challenges of our age.  
 
In 2009, such questions were addressed by a prominent and influential international 
commission, comprised of some of the world’s leading economists, statisticians and 
national accounting experts (Stiglitz et al. 2010). Synthesising decades of academic 
criticism of GDP and the SNA, the Commission recommended a series of wide-ranging 
reforms to national accounting and statistical systems to emphasise better measures of 
the distribution of economic resources, the sustainability of economic growth, the 
quality of life and the non-market aspects of welfare and progress into accounting 
frameworks. The implementation of this reform agenda is now well underway, with the 
Commission’s central recommendations now being operationalised by the global 
statistical agencies. It is set to shape the way in which governments and international 
organisations represent, understand and talk about some of the most pressing issues of 
the twenty-first century, and the metrics used to assess the performance of states and 
societies. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the challenge that implementing this global agenda is 
posing to the market-centric vision of the economy inherited from the industrial era. 
Given that the creation of the national accounts half a century ago was crucial to 
cementing this underlying vision of the economy, how seriously do statistical reforms 
aimed at questioning the primacy of market growth undermine it? In other words, can 
we move beyond GDP without moving beyond existing notions of ‘the economy’ itself? 
To answer these questions, the thesis conducts four case studies, each of which traces 
the implementation of different aspects of these accounting reforms:  
 
1. The measurement of income and wealth inequality (chapter 4);  
2. The valuation of non-market activities (chapter 5);  
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3. The measurement of the sustainability of growth over time (chapter 6), and;  
4. The monetisation of non-market goods in national accounting and cost-benefit 
analysis (chapter 7).  
 
Drawing upon accounting methodological sources, statistical reports and expert 
interviews at the OECD, Eurostat and the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS), it 
analyses how officials have responded to the task of reconciling the radical implications 
of this measurement agenda with the economic concepts and theory which underpin the 
national accounts framework.  
 
The central argument developed is two-fold. Firstly, I trace how accountants have 
creatively drawn upon various concepts from economic theory to frame beyond GDP 
measurement reforms in ways compatible with the terms and categories of economic 
analysis. Secondly, I demonstrate how the practical demands of implementation of these 
reforms has increasingly in practice diverged from these theoretical constructs. A set of 
detailed empirical case studies is developed to illustrate how national accounting practice 
in fact shares an increasingly conflictual and complicated relationship with many of the 
central ontological and epistemic tenets of the market-based theoretical conception of 
the economy inherited from the industrial era.  These reforms constantly threaten the 
borders between the economy and what is outside of it (society or the household or 
nature or politics, for example), thus threatening to compromise its ontological unity 
and coherence. They also bring into doubt the conflation of value with price, and the 
utilitarian psychology upon which the naturalistic vision of the economy is constructed. 
 
As I show, what is emerging from these accounting reforms is consequently a more 
plural, heterogeneous and fragmented accounting representation of ‘the economy’, 
which is increasingly incompatible with both the unitary ontology of macroeconomic 
theory and the utilitarian and choice-theoretic underpinnings of neoclassical 
microeconomics. The practical implementation of these reforms is creating growing 
tensions between economic theory and national accounting and statistical practice, 
which have been insufficiently explored in existing literature. These findings therefore 
contribute to wider debates about the changing role of economics in the politics of 
affluent, post-industrial societies, and the role of accounting and measurement systems 
in mediating this. 
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In the rest of this introductory chapter specifies in greater detail the central problem and 
research questions which the thesis answers. It outlines the theoretical framework used 
to ground this investigation, developed through a reading of Karl Polanyi’s historicist 
critique of market ideology, discusses the methodology and empirical sources drawn 
upon to develop the central arguments, and outlines the contribution the thesis makes 
to existing scholarship. Finally, it gives an overview of the structure of the thesis and a 
summary of the different chapters.  
 
1.1 Research Question and Theoretical Approach 
 
This thesis sets out to empirically understand a basic tension between a set of received 
theoretical ideas about the economy and modern developments in official statistical and 
accounting systems. The founders of economic sociology such as Weber and Sombart 
argued that the development of accounting and double-entry book-keeping was central 
to historical development of economic rationality and even capitalism itself (Weber 2004 
[1905]; Chiapello 2007). Moreover, developments in economic theory underpinned the 
more recent development of national accounting in the mid-20th century. Thus, 
accounting practice and economic reasoning have generally been viewed as mutually 
reinforcing (Carruthers and Espeland 1991; Chiapello 2007; Miller 2008). Yet through 
asking national accountants to measure and value phenomena outside the market 
system, the reforms being implemented globally in the wake of the Stiglitz report appear 
to threaten the representation of the economy as an autonomous object subject to its 
own laws and regularities, assumptions which underpin the discipline of economics and 
its political authority. This problematic informs the central research question that the 
thesis answers. 
 
Central Research Question 
 
• How significant is the challenge posed by the beyond GDP agenda to market-centric 
understandings of the economy? 
 
This question is accompanied by a series of sub-questions, which help to specify the 
dynamics that must be understood to provide a convincing answer to this question. 
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1. What concepts from economic theory are being used to integrate beyond GDP 
concerns into national accounting systems; how successful are these theoretical 
concepts in enabling accountants to implement these measurement reforms? 
2. How have accountants and statisticians resolved the tensions between the 
technical and practical demands of this measurement agenda and the analytical 
demands of economists? 
3. What representations of non-market economic phenomena are emerging as part 
of these reforms; and how are these reconciled with the core framework of the 
UN SNA and its market-bound vision of the economic system? 
4. In what ways, and to what extent, is the theoretical conflation of the economy 
with market exchange challenged by the implementation of contemporary 
reforms to economic statistics?  
 
Answering such questions is vital to assessing the long-term political significance of this 
global agenda, and the influence it can have as a resource for political projects which 
aim to shift the terms of the debate on economic policymaking away from the 
intellectual orthodoxies that have characterised the last few decades of global economic 
management. It is also crucial to assessing its ability to solve the significant challenges 
facing global society, from aging populations and the crisis of social reproduction, to 
rising inequality, climate change and the quality of life. If solving these challenges 
involves escaping from an economic discourse centred around the reification of the 
market (as I argue below), then the success of this agenda must involve a challenge to 
the equation of the human economy with exchange relations; establishing the extent to 
which the global beyond GDP agenda is promoting this is the core concern of the thesis. 
 
Empirical Scope 
 
This broad central research question requires some clarification before it can form a 
secure basis for empirical investigation. Firstly, we must clarify the terms being used and 
the empirical scope of the study: what exactly do we mean by the ‘beyond GDP agenda’?  
As outlined in chapter 2, a vast amount of intellectual work has gone into critiquing 
GDP over the last few decades which informs the contemporary beyond GDP agenda 
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(Cassiers 2007). Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of alternative indicators of progress, welfare 
or sustainability have been disseminated by researchers, NGOs, think tanks and other 
actors, at an accelerating rate since the 1990s (see Kroll 2011; Bleys 2012). To establish 
a practical scope, the bounds of the inquiry were set by the 2009 publication of the 
report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress, commissioned by then French President Nicholas Sarkozy and chaired by 
Joseph Stiglitz, Amaryta Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (Stiglitz et al. 2010). It traces the 
national and international work streams that have emerged in the wake of its 
recommendations. This is not an arbitrary decision, but rather emerged inductively from 
the data collection process. The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report forms the central reference 
point orienting the contemporary beyond GDP agenda, and is cited consistently by 
interview participants and reports as the key catalyst for these initiatives.  
This also provides a clear temporal scope: this thesis studies measurement reforms and 
statistical initiatives which have emerged since the 2009 publication of the Commission’s 
report. While it has drawn upon material which pre-dates its publication, this is 
predominantly where existing work in a certain field has been a crucial point of reference 
for later work. Likewise, the end of the study is marked by the publication of the review 
report on the beyond GDP programme in 2017, by the OECD’s ‘High Level Expert 
Group’. This represents the first major global review of this statistical agenda, and in 
this sense bookends the first major implementation phase of beyond GDP reforms. 
Many of the central figures involved in the original Commission were involved, 
including Stiglitz and Fitoussi.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis will therefore only deal with the responses to the 
recommendations of the Commission by official statistical agencies and national 
accountants. This means firstly that the work of NGOs and think tanks (such as the 
New Economics Foundation (NEF) or the Genuine Progress Initiative (GPI)), while 
they have been important to promoting this agenda, will not be treated in any detail; nor 
is the thesis concerned with the use of this measurement agenda by charities or the third 
sector. The focus is primarily on how post-GDP concerns have been integrated into 
national accounting methodologies and data infrastructure. The first three substantive 
chapters address national accounting reforms on inequality, non-market work and 
sustainability. The last chapter concerns the valuation of non-market goods, exploring 
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this through a focus on cost-benefit analysis. While not strictly part of the national 
accounts, this discussion has implications for the national accounting treatment of many 
other issues such as unpaid work and the natural capital valuation. Furthermore, the 
national accounts are embedded in the wider activities of statistical agencies and borrow 
from these methodological discussions. However, I do not cover in detail the production 
indicators and statistics which have no bearing on national accounting methodology.  
 
Theoretical Approach: Karl Polanyi’s Critique of the “Market Mentality” 
 
Before proceeding, we must also specify both what is meant by ‘market-centric 
conceptions of the economy’ and justify the significance this concept is given in the 
following analysis. To answer these questions, the thesis draws theoretically upon the 
work of the mid-20th century political economist Karl Polanyi. I mobilise Polanyi’s work 
both as a theoretical justification of the importance and significance of understanding 
the challenge to market-based thinking in light of the global critique of GDP, and as a 
way of bringing clarity to the terms under discussion.  
 
My reading of Polanyi – unpacked in greater depth in chapter 3 – emphasises his 
ideational critique of what he called the ‘market mentality’ (Polanyi 1968, 59-77). This 
reflects interventions in contemporary Polanyian scholarship that have emphasised how 
his work is concerned with the constraining effects of the market view of the economy 
on political agency and the social imagination (See e.g. Watson 2005, 143-160; Dale 2010, 
19-44; Block and Somers 2014). This work has highlighted his critique of market-bound 
views of the economic process as a species of wider critique of the universalising, 
foundationalist claims that characterise modernist thinking more generally (Holmes 
2012, 2013). In the reading I mobilise here, I understand the value of Polanyi’s work to 
lie primarily in his critique of the whole vision of humanity and the social world that 
grew up in economic theory in response to the emergence of market societies. His 
primary value as a social theorist is to highlight how the contingent historical institutions, 
behaviour and norms of modern Western societies were universalised, how ‘strictly time-
bound phenomena came to be regarded as timeless, as transcending the age of the 
market’ (Polanyi 1968, 61).  
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For Polanyi, this reification of the market view of economy and society had a number 
of pathological consequences for society, politics and personal ethical action. This 
naturalised vision of economy and society – the ‘market mentality’ (Polanyi 1968, 59) – 
serves to constrain how society can understand and reason about political economic 
problems, narrowing the political space for ‘adjustment’ (ibid) available to societies in 
dealing with the pressing social, ecological and economic problems they confront. This 
gives us a distinctive lens through which to analyse the politics of economic ideas that 
shape contemporary debates generally and, in particular, to explore how economic ideas 
come to frame post-industrial and post-growth politics projects. 
 
Analytically, for instance, the market mentality encourages an understanding of 
economic and political phenomena as separate, and an elision of the various 
psychological and sociological links between these spheres (Block and Somers 2014). In 
the contemporary world, for instance, populist mobilisation can be posited as a ‘political’ 
or ‘cultural’ phenomenon external to the economic process (Yarrow 2017). The links 
between the existential and psychological insecurity associated with the commodity 
treatment of human beings, on the one hand, and social illiberalism and political 
intolerance on the other  (Polanyi 2001 [1944], 218-28; see also Fromm 2001 [1942]), 
cannot be grasped as an ‘economic’ problem; and the effects of populism on markets 
themselves can only be understood as a regrettable external interference with the market 
system. Through isolating the economy in analytical terms as a self-adjusting system of 
markets, the political and ethical content of market relations are insulated from political 
discussion, and a naturalistic economics installed as the sole discipline qualified to 
understand the laws which govern this system (Peck 2005). More instrumentally, the 
market mentality precludes various solutions to social and ecological problems which 
rely upon de-commodified relationships or commons-based institutions, even where 
these might be effective or useful to society (Ostrom 2015).  
 
Thus, Polanyi’s theory gives us pressing reasons to investigate the significance of the 
challenge beyond GDP reforms present to market-based assumptions about the 
economy and the ontological vision they are associated with. Without this, we are 
unlikely to be able to overturn many of the theoretical and analytical pathologies which 
are crucial to solving the problems this agenda sets out to address. Indeed, the Stiglitz 
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report itself pointed at the need for this shift in thinking about what constituted the 
economy. The preface to the report argued that: 
 
Our statistics and accounts reflect our aspirations, the values that we assign things. They 
are inseparable from our vision of the world and the economy, of society, and our 
conception of human beings… [B]ehind all our statistical and accounting representations, 
there lies the cult of the market…but a project for society or civilisation cannot be based 
solely on the market (Stiglitz et al. 2010, vi; xvi). 
 
A shift in thinking about the market and its place in the human economy is thus an 
explicit objective of the official beyond GDP statistical agenda, and so assessing it from 
this perspective is justified as it allows us to establish how far this objective is being been 
achieved in practice. 
 
Reading Polanyi in this way also allows us to identify what we mean by ‘market-centric 
understandings of the economy’, and develop precise criteria for assessing the extent to 
which beyond GDP accounting and statistical reforms challenge and disrupt this vision. 
In particular, to orientate the empirical content of the thesis I draw upon Karl Polanyi’s 
distinction between ‘formalist’ and ‘substantive’ understandings of the economy 
(Polanyi 1977, 19-25). Formalist reasoning, for Polanyi, was a tradition of thought that 
conflated the human economy with an instrumental, economising rationality, narrowing 
the conception of what constituted economic theory down to choices between the 
alternative uses of goods in conditions of scarcity (Holton 1992, 7-22; Dale 2010, 89-
136). This was exemplified by Robbins’ famous inter-war definition of economics, as 
‘the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce 
means which have alternative uses’ (Robbins 2008 [1934]). In this way, an analytical 
division was upheld by which ‘the economy’ could be constructed as a free-standing 
object encompassing the co-ordination of production and the allocation of resources 
through the price mechanism, and ‘politics’ could be understood as an equally distinct 
process through which ethical considerations and the need for social protection and 
justice were debated (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). Polanyi argued that escaping this simplistic 
vision of the economy was as important as simply ameliorating the effects of 
commodification on people, nature and institutions. 
 
This view of the economy was, in turn, dependent upon an ‘economistic fallacy’ (Polanyi 
1977, 5-15), a mode of reasoning through which the economic process in general was 
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conflated with market institutions. As I argue in greater detail in chapter 3, Polanyi’s 
work allows us to identify central aspects of this fallacy, on which this ‘formalist’ 
reasoning was predicated: the concept of the economy as a cohesive and self-regulating 
system, centred on interlocking price-forming markets; the separation of the economic 
calculation from the private sphere of social reproduction and the household; the elision 
of the various distinct functions of money into a narrow focus on its use in market 
exchange; and the construal of a distinctively economic ‘motive’ and rationality, separate 
from political or social behaviour. Mainstream economic analysis is predicated on these 
assumptions (Polanyi 1968). Furthermore, they were inscribed into official statistical 
representations of the economy through the SNA system as it developed in the 1940s 
and 1950s.  
 
This perspective provides us with a novel lens to assess the implementation of post-
GDP reforms to national accounting systems, in terms of the precise challenge they 
pose to the key assumptions on which the formalist mode of reasoning is based. This 
also gives us a set of broad criteria to evaluate what ‘significance’ means in relation to 
the central research question. Broadly, this encapsulates how far, and in what ways, these 
different aspects of the economistic fallacy are upheld or problematised through the 
implementation of post-GDP measures. As we will see in the empirical chapters of the 
thesis, this agenda has been characterised by efforts to align and translate these concepts 
into market-based categories and concepts, so that the disruption to formalist analysis is 
contained. Nevertheless, the practical demands of implementing this measurement 
agenda have simultaneously revealed the problematic or arbitrary nature of many of 
these assumptions, which is providing important resources in which a more substantive 
economic imaginary could draw.  
 
Thus specified, we are now able to establish the objectives of this inquiry and specify 
what a satisfactory answer to the central research question involves. Firstly, to what 
extent has the implementation of recommendations contained in the 2009 report by the 
global Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress challenged 
the central assumptions which Polanyi saw as crucial to ‘formalist’ economic reasoning? 
Secondly, how have these challenges been framed and managed by the experts working 
to implement the central planks of this agenda, and with what results? 
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1.2 Argument and Contribution 
 
In developing an answer to this question, the thesis provides an original contribution to 
the beyond GDP literature, focused on an empirically rich and historically situated 
assessment of the changing relationship between economic reasoning and statistical 
practice. Primarily, its originality stems from two sources: firstly, its empirical and 
historical depth, which allows for a detailed tracing of the genealogies of the ideas used 
to implement this agenda and the way in which accounting and statistical methodologies 
draw upon these creatively to operationalise beyond GDP concepts; secondly, its 
demonstration of how the implementation of this agenda is exposing the practical and 
epistemic limitations of exchange-based assumptions about the economy. This 
argument is original in that is identifies emergent tensions between statistical and 
accounting practice and economic reasoning, which in much critical and de-growth 
scholarship have been assumed to be complementary.  
 
More practically, it allows us to better understand the political and theoretical 
assumptions that are embedded in the changing national accounting representations of 
the economy, and the differential way in which they escape market-based assumptions 
about the economy; this can help social movements, journalists, citizens and other 
political actors in using the wealth of data being produced by the beyond GDP agenda 
in a reflexive and politically aware manner.  
 
Existing Literature 
 
In chapter two, I group the existing literature on the politics of the beyond GDP agenda 
into two main categories with relation to how they understand the challenge moving 
beyond GDP represents to the market-based view of economy. In the first, the beyond 
GDP agenda should focus on re-embedding the market economy in social and 
environmental systems, and a re-thinking of economy in substantive terms is not 
thought to be essential to achieving these goals; in the second perspective, a more 
fundamental challenge to mainstream economic reasoning is advocated, but accounting 
systems and centralised statistics are thought to offer no resources in this political 
project, and may indeed serve to co-opt its transformative potential.  
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The first category of literature, which I characterise as ‘managerialist’, represents the 
mainstream position on the beyond GDP agenda, which we find in much of the policy 
literature and beyond GDP advocacy by think tanks (Kubiszewski et al. 2013; Chancel 
et al. 2014; Seaford 2014). This position tends to assume that the problem that beyond 
GDP reforms should address is that the economy has come to dominate the political 
debate, and other fields of life are given insufficient attention and visibility. This means 
that the negative externalities of economic growth are not measured, and so do not enter 
the metrics and calculations of decision-makers, including governments and 
corporations.  
 
By this account, beyond GDP reforms will address this by better quantifying social, 
environmental and psychological dimensions of wellbeing, which can then be weighed 
against the benefits of market goods. In this view, what we need is a more complete 
picture of progress in which the ‘economic’ dimension, still centred on the market 
system, is placed alongside a greater emphasis on the social, environmental or political 
dimensions of progress. Consequently, this literature sees no need for a more 
fundamental change in our conception of the economy or the analytical tools and 
language used to theorise it; we simply need less economy and GDP growth vis-à-vis the 
‘social’ and ‘environmental’ externalities that the market economy produces.  
 
The second strand of literature emerges from ‘de-growth’ political theory and critical 
accounting literature. Unlike the managerialist mainstream, this literature frequently does 
have at its core a fundamental critique of market-centric thinking, the understanding of 
economy and society it naturalises and the constraints this exercises on democratic 
politics. Takis Fotopoulos, for instance, that de-growth politics ‘implies going beyond 
the economy by challenging its domination of present life, in theory and in practice, and 
above all in our mind’ (Fotopoulos 2007, 2).  
 
However, de-growth literature in general argues that the locus for this transformation 
must be local, and the change must be effected through a re-localisation of economic 
decision-making and citizenship (e.g. Latouche 2009; Rees 2015, 43-52). The spatial and 
political imaginary of de-growth politics is the local and the communal, contrasted with 
a liberal globalist imaginary that is incapable of delivering this transformation in the 
terms of economic discourse (Fioramonti 2013; Quilley 2013, 119-144). Therefore, 
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national accounting and centralised statistical systems are rarely explored as potential 
resources which may promote the shift away from the market-centric vision of the 
economy which dominates political discourse. As we will explore more fully in chapter 
2, this reflects a broader critical and hostility to quantification and accounting rationality 
as well as reifying a spatial metaphor which contrasts the complex and global with the 
simple and local (see Brassett and Higgott 2003; Law 2004).  
 
Common to both of these perspectives is a basic assumption that accounting systems 
share an identity with market-based economic theory: in managerialist accounts, this 
manifests itself in the assumption that accounting systems should remain focussed on 
the ‘economic’ components of progress while other social and environmental data can 
be used to tell us about the social and environmental consequences of economic growth 
and the political trade-offs these imply; in de-growth accounts, this is used to critique 
the beyond GDP agenda as a technocratic project which reproduces the globalist, 
reformist assumptions about the economy that national accounting systems reflect. 
Neither provide a starting point to assess the increasingly complicated and conflictual 
relationship between economic theory and national accounting systems, and how these 
articulate at various scales and through methodological and technical considerations. 
The first sees no reason to look for this, and the second assumes it away.  
 
Argument and Contribution 
 
The first central empirical contribution is to investigate how far a more fundamental 
rethinking of the categories used to analyse economic life is advanced by the 
implementation of the beyond GDP statistical agenda.  
 
Through developing a series of in-depth case studies on the implementation of key 
aspects of these reforms, I show how these measurement agendas are creating spaces in 
which unitary views of the economy (centred on abstracted models of human behaviour 
and market exchange) are rendered contestable in new ways. Secondly, however, the 
case studies also illustrate how the impact of beyond GDP statistical reform processes 
on market-based understandings of the economic is ambiguous and differentiated. We 
can understand this well if we grasp that the market view of economy rests upon a 
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number of interlocking assumptions – the economistic fallacies outlined above – which 
can be challenged in various ways and to varying degrees.  
 
This also contests a prevalent critique (Fioramonti 2013, 114) that such reforms are 
being done primarily as window-dressing or a PR exercise. In many ways, it is the exact 
opposite. Accountants would often be more comfortable adhering to the smooth vision 
of the economy reflected in the SNA; but the realities of implementing beyond GDP 
reforms are making this increasingly difficult to sustain, which is fragmenting this 
system. Rather than actively setting out to challenge market assumptions about 
development, I argue the partial and incomplete attempts to extend these modes of 
reasoning to the problems of post-industrial society are revealing the practical limitations 
of market-based theoretical constructs in understanding and representing these 
phenomena. Through these attempts, the economic significance of non-market values 
is more salient than ever, but so is the impossibility of adequately integrating them into 
national accounting methods using market-centric theoretical resources. Accountants 
indeed often appear reluctant about the need to depart from the smooth image of the 
economy which the SNA represents. Interviews and documentary sources reveal the ad 
hoc nature of the methodological and technical solutions adopted, and how it is often 
practical expediency is forcing them to diverge from a theoretical ideal.  
 
Consequently, the case studies I explore also illustrate how these emerging tensions are 
not simply leading to a substantive vision of the economy displacing the formalist one 
developed by the SNA in the mid-twentieth century. Often, what is emerging in 
response to the failure of integrating these reforms into the central SNA framework is a 
multitude of methodological approaches, offering more or less radical challenges to 
market-based forms of reasoning. Understanding the apparently technical or practical 
details of these methodological debates is central to grasping their wider political 
significance. Teasing out the different ideational lineages at play in these reforms reveals 
how political movements might reflexively draw on and mobilise this agenda, and the 
implicit theoretical assumptions are reproduced or contested by different beyond GDP 
accounting methodologies. 
 
Finally, this analysis help shed light on the changing nature of the relationship between 
statistical systems and democratic politics. The conventional model of ‘evidence-based 
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policy making’, which statistical agencies generally adhere to, is that a neutral and 
apolitical body of facts can be produced about the economic and social world. These 
can mediate the ideological positions advanced in party-political debates. In this model, 
statistical facts about the economy are developed outside and above democratic politics. 
But the analysis presented in this thesis highlights how accountants are discovering in 
newly explicit ways the intrinsically normative and value-laden nature of the 
representations of economic value they produce. In many instances this also implies that 
new deliberative valuation processes may be needed as inputs into post-GDP accounting 
valuations. This points to one of the most fruitful lines of enquiry in this field going 
forward: how novel forms of accounting and statistical representation could be brought 
into conversation with debates around new forms of economic citizenship and 
deliberative democracy.  
 
As such, the core contribution of the thesis is to develop and apply a Polanyian 
perspective to advance existing theoretical understandings of the post-2009 global 
statistical reform agenda. It provides a novel assessment of the significance of integrating 
beyond GDP reforms into national accounting systems for the foundational 
assumptions of market-based economic theory. This has wider implications for 
understanding the evolving and contested role of economic ideas in political reasoning.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Source Material  
 
The research design and methodology of the study was informed both by the nature of 
the question and the constructivist and historicist theoretical orientations adopted (Hay 
2002, 194-215).1 These suggested a research strategy that was qualitative, inductive and 
interpretivist (Clift 2014; Silverman 2016). It was not seeking to generate rigid causal 
explanations or generalizable laws. A large-N quantitative study involving survey data or 
similar would not have been appropriate to answering the sorts of questions being 
investigated (Marsh and Stoker 2010, 255-257). The analysis was thus developed 
inductively: the categories and concepts used emerged from the process of data 
collection, and were tested reflexively against further findings. 
 
                                                 
1 For a full description of the research methods and sources, see appendix II. 
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Selection of Case Studies 
 
The analysis in the thesis is drawn from three sites: the OECD, the EU and the UK 
government. The primary focus was on the statistical organs of these institutions – the 
OECD’s statistics directorate; Eurostat; and the Office for National Statistics, and this 
was where most of the interviews were conducted. These were selected based on 
preparatory desk research, which identified these institutions as particularly influential 
in shaping the implementation of the beyond GDP agenda after the Stiglitz report. They 
also allowed for a degree of comparative analysis between national, regional and 
international statistical systems.  
 
The OECD has been prominent in co-ordinating these efforts internationally, pursuing 
a large set of initiatives statistical initiatives through their ‘Better Life’ Agenda (OECD 
2012) and ‘New Approaches to Economic Challenges’ project (OECD 2015b). The 
UK’s ‘Measuring National Wellbeing’ programme has been a leader at the national level 
(Bache and Reardon 2013; Hicks et al. 2013). The European Commission launched a 
sponsorship group called ‘GDP and Beyond’ (European Commission 2009), co-chaired 
by the French statistical office (INSEE) and Eurostat. The report of this taskforce was 
adopted in 2011 by the European Statistical System Committee (ESSC), the highest 
organ of statistical governance in the EU, containing 50 specific recommendations 
(DGINS/ESSC 2010; Eurostat 2011a). The work streams that followed have had a 
significant afterlife within the ESS and exerted a major influence on national accounting 
within the EU and on the international debate.  
 
Data Collection and Source Material 
 
The sources material on which the substantive arguments are based fall into three main 
categories: expert interviews with national accountants and statisticians; documentary 
analysis of methodological literature, reports and working papers; and attendance of 
national accounting working parties and expert groups. Analysis of documentary sources 
was conducted prior to interviewing – to help guide the questions asked and identify 
issues especially relevant to the research question. The documentary sources were 
identified in the first year of the project, by searching the websites of statistical agencies 
and following up within-document references until saturation point was reached. 
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To supplement the documentary source material, 30 expert interviews were conducted.2 
An initial long list of targets was developed using the document authorship and online 
searches. The interviewees were selected to provide a variety of seniority and job role 
and even distribution between different internal units and divisions of different statistical 
agencies. The interviewees were either statisticians or national accountants with 
experience of implementing aspects of the beyond GDP agenda. The interviews focused 
on the main methodological, technical and conceptual issues confronted, and various 
tensions or challenges raised by their implementation, and interviewees’ understanding 
of how these were being confronted or resolved.  
 
Lastly, I was fortunate enough during my fieldwork to be invited to several expert 
statistical working parties at the OECD – specifically, the Expert Group on Disparities 
in National Accounting (EG DNA), the Working Party on Financial Statistics (WPFS), 
and the Working Party on National Accounts (WPNA). This was largely unplanned, and 
resulted from interviewing staff in the OECD’s Statistics Directorate. However, 
observing these meetings proved to be an invaluable resource for understanding the 
nature of technical accounting discussions on key issues in the beyond GDP agenda – 
particularly on inequality, unpaid work and the capitalisation of non-produced assets.  
 
Data Analysis  
 
Following data collection, the interview were grouped inductively into themes, which 
were mapped onto the topics dealt with in the chapters. These were used alongside notes 
from methodological sources, reports and documents to develop the lines of analysis 
presented in the thematic chapters. I have opted to instead structure the thesis along 
thematic lines which cut across the three cases. While the case studies have an equal 
weighting in the thesis as a whole, individual chapters draw more or less upon each one.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure  
 
Having introduced the problem framing and central contributions of the thesis, the 
second chapter sets the beyond GDP in its wider historical and intellectual context, 
                                                 
2 A full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix I. 
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providing an overview of the history of the critiques of GDP as a welfare metric over 
the post-war period. After surveying the main contours of these critiques, it shows how 
this became a distinctive governance agenda in the mid-2000s, culminating in the Stiglitz 
commission and a major global statistical effort to implement its recommendations. 
Finally, it critiques the current literature on the politics of beyond GDP reforms, 
distinguishing a managerial literature – which in general under-problematises the 
challenge implied by these developments to the basic epistemological and ontological 
assumptions of mainstream economic theory – from critical accounts which see little 
emancipatory or political potential in beyond GDP reforms as they form part of the 
technocratic, reformist apparatus of neoliberal global governance.  
 
The third chapter outlines and justifies the theoretical perspective through which my 
account of the challenge of beyond GDP reforms to market-based theory is developed. 
It outlines Polanyi’s critique of the political and ethical pathologies of the ‘market 
mentality’, and his distinction between ‘formalist’ and ‘substantive’ views of the 
economy. Formalist reasoning is show to rest on four core assumptions, each of these 
has been historically reflected in national accounting frameworks: firstly, the image of 
the self-regulating and ontologically unified economy; secondly, the image of 
unproductive ‘society’ as an unproductive realm existing outside of formal wage labour; 
thirdly, the conflation of money with its exchange use; and finally, the homo economicus 
conception of human nature and psychology which underpins neoclassical economics. 
Finally, it illustrates how the practical demands of implementing the Stiglitz commission 
recommendations have challenged each of these in different ways. This sets up the 
central question that the remainder of the thesis sets out to answer at the empirical level. 
 
The fourth chapter assesses the global statistical agenda on inequality measurement.  The 
first section examines ongoing work in the UK and OECD to create harmonised 
‘distributional national accounts’ (DiNA). In practice, this has required bringing two 
previously distinct statistical pictures of ‘the economy’ into collision: micro-level 
surveying data and macro-level national accounting aggregates. However, these statistics 
give different pictures of the overall size of ‘the economy’. This has been framed as a 
problem about how to reconcile these ‘micro-macro gaps’ and provide a unified 
accounting description of the economy. I situate this project within the broader post-
war project to ‘micro-found’ macroeconomic models of the economy, which 
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increasingly after the crisis has involved the incorporation of inequality into DSGE 
models. However, I show how through these efforts accountants are discovering that 
these two representations of the economy are not simply two lenses onto the same 
unified economic reality. Measuring inequality brings the macroeconomic representation 
of the economy into contact with the empirical reality of households’ economic 
relationships, revealing how these are entangled in their wider social existence. For this 
reason, accountants are entertaining the possibility that the ontological assumption of a 
unified economic sphere itself must be abandoned. This has involved the emergence, 
for instance, of multiple and hybrid definitions of core accounting concepts such as 
‘income’, ‘consumption’ and ‘wealth’, destabilising the prior unity of national accounting 
categories which is premised on the ontological vision of a unified system of interlocking 
markets. 
 
This fifth chapter explores the accounting agenda on the measurement of unpaid work 
since 2009. A key recommendation of the Stiglitz report was to address the invisibility 
of unpaid activity in conventional national accounting aggregates. This agenda has been 
implemented through the development of valuation methods based upon comparing 
population-wide time-use surveys with market wage rates. This, in turn, is grounded on 
Margaret Reid’s ‘third-party criterion’ (Reid 1934), a definition of productive work that 
reflects neoclassical concerns to contain the economic sphere within the realm of choice, 
scarcity and exchange. The chapter illustrates how implementing this agenda in practice 
has exposed the limitations of this principle, and the difficulty of understanding the 
economic significance and value of social reproduction through reference to wage 
labour. This has led to alternative methods which abandon the attempt to ground the 
value of unpaid work through comparison with units of labour time and instead try to 
value the overall provisioning needs of society. This, I argue, amounts to a recognition 
of the impossibility of individualising or isolating the value of social reproduction and 
the difficulty of drawing a neat boundary between economy and society.  
 
This sixth chapter examines the developments in the field of sustainability measurement 
since the Stiglitz report. I show how the ‘capital stocks’ approach has emerged as the 
dominant conceptual framework through which sustainability measurement is 
understood globally. In this vision, the measurement of sustainability can be understood 
in terms of whether the value of extended national wealth stocks – including natural and 
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human capital – are depreciating. In developing measures of these non-economic wealth 
stocks, however, statisticians have faced problems related to whether and how to 
monetise the value of assets with no direct relationship to market transactions, and how 
exactly to separate out their ‘non-economic’ from their ‘economic’ components. This 
involves drawing unstable and shifting demarcations between the economic, monetised 
components of these stocks and the non-economic components, measured by physical 
units. While the implementation of methodological standards to capture these non-
market assets have largely focused on attempts to painstakingly isolate the market-
relevant components of nature and knowledge, these have not been completely 
successful and have produced counter-vailing tendencies. Examples include the 
emergence of politically determined target-driven carbon pricing and the increasing 
separation of the exchange and accounting uses of money in the field of natural capital 
measurement. These, I argue, amounts to a growing acceptance of the non-exchange 
functions of money as a pure unit of account. 
 
The final empirical chapter explores the growing use of subjective wellbeing data for 
valuing non-market goods in cost-benefit analysis, as encouraged in the Stiglitz 
commission. It places this in the wider ideational context of the growing influence of 
behavioural economics and ‘positive psychology’ in policymaking. Since the 1990s, 
techniques have emerged for monetising the non-market impacts of government action 
and incorporating these values into the evaluation of policy options based on these 
methods. They are presented by their advocates as a radical critique of the revealed 
preference assumptions of orthodox utility theory. However, I argue that these 
techniques have not secured widespread approval, partly because of methodological 
limitations and partly as they are not seen as adhering to the behavioural conditions 
imposed by markets, and hence valuations produced by these are not seen as robust. 
One consequence of these developments has been the rise of more participatory and 
deliberative approaches to non-market valuation, such as multi-criteria analysis. I argue 
these have emerged partly in response to the limitations of wellbeing-based methods 
and the hedonic view of human nature they reproduce.  
 
Finally, I draw these case studies together and offer concluding remarks. The case studies 
show how across four prominent aspects of the global beyond accounting GDP agenda 
– on inequality, the valuation of unpaid production, sustainability measurement and non-
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market valuation –the practical demands of implementing these measurement reforms 
have led accountants to qualify the market-centric vision of the economy in significant 
ways. This agenda is therefore leading to an increasingly complicated relationship 
between accounting practice and the theoretical vision of the economy inherited from 
industrial society. As accountants and statisticians are discovering, moving beyond GDP 
involves more than challenging the priority placed upon economic objectives in policy-
making; rather, it involves problematising a whole way of thinking about ‘the economy’ 
and a re-constitution of its borders with society, nature and politics.   
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2. Debating ‘Beyond GDP’: Origins and Contemporary 
Assessments of a Global Accounting Agenda 
 
 
Critiques of economic growth, and visions of a post-growth future, have been present 
since the emergence of political economy in the late 18th century. Adam Smith, for 
instance, worried about the debilitating effects of the advancing division of labour, 
which accompanied expanding markets, on the mental and spiritual life of the worker 
(Smith 1993 [1776], 429-432). Ricardian analysis gloomily suggested that rents would 
gradually erode capitalist profits as growth progressed, leading to an eventual end to 
capital accumulation, with wages eternally stuck at subsistence level (Ricardo 2004 
[1817]). More optimistically, Mill looked forward to a utopian ‘stationary state’ in which, 
with basic material necessities met, increasingly educated workers would afford more 
time to ‘moral and social progress’: aesthetic pursuits, solitude and the enjoyment of 
nature (Mill 2008 [1848], 124-130). Keynes similarly suggested that the marginal utility 
of leisure relative to additional units of consumption would increase with growing 
affluence, forecasting 15 hour working weeks by the 21st century (Keynes 2015 [1930]). 
Visions of a post-growth future thus have a long lineage, often containing radical 
predictions of an eventual limitation of the sphere of market activity in human society.  
 
However, this chapter is concerned more specifically with how these broader post-
growth impulses have manifested in recent years as a distinctive global measurement 
agenda, which seeks to overturn the prominence of GDP – the central indicator of 
growth – in global political economic governance (Kroll 2011; Fioramonti 2017). To 
contextualise the central argument, this chapter firstly reviews the various critiques of 
the national accounts and GDP since the formation of the SNA in the 1950s. These are 
linked to the emergence of ecological, feminist and anti-consumerist thinking, and 
related to changes in the structure of post-industrial economies. Secondly, it outlines 
how these critiques were reformulated into a mainstream governance over the 1990s 
and 2000s, culminating in the Stiglitz Commission’s report in 2009 and a concerted set 
of international reforms to the accounting and statistical frameworks (Stiglitz et al. 2010). 
This agenda has posed the question of whether these reforms should take place primarily 
outside the national accounts system, which measures the market economy, or whether 
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this framework itself must be reformed: in other words, whether the agenda aims at 
better measuring the ‘non-economic’ dimensions of progress, or whether statistical 
representations of ‘the economy’ itself must also be reformed to meet these challenges.  
 
Finally, the chapter reviews the secondary literature on the political significance and 
transformative potential of this measurement agenda. It argues that the challenges its 
implementation has posed to the idea of the economy, and the key theoretical 
assumptions on which this vision rests, has yet to be studied in depth. A first set of 
perspectives see statistical indicators as representing a pre-existing and ontologically 
stable set of dimensions (economic, social, political etc.), and so rarely de-naturalise the 
category of the economy or its conflation with the market system. The second 
understand de-growth politics as implying a more fundamental transformation in how 
the economy is understood and represented, but sees the political locus of this 
transformation as lying in the re-localisation of economic relationships; thus, national 
accounting and statistics can never help in the re-politicisation of the economy as they 
are implicated in forms of technocratic governance and reasoning that reproduce these 
modes of thinking in the first place.  
 
This signals the distinctive contribution the present thesis makes to the literature. While 
beyond GDP have posed distinct challenges to the national accounts framework which 
are posing fundamental questions about the borders of the economy and the theoretical 
apparatus upon which national accounts concepts are based, this has yet to be explored 
in empirical depth. Existing accounts tend to neglect the distinctive practical and 
methodological challenges that implementing these reforms has raised for the very 
ability to represent the economy as a legible statistical object within national accounting 
systems. Understanding these dynamics and their political implications, through 
developing in-depth empirical case studies on the implementation of beyond GDP 
accounting reforms, constitutes the central objective of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
2.1 Critiques of GDP since 1953 
 
Critiques of GDP have originated from many different academic disciplines and reflect 
many different epistemological and political commitments. Here I group these critical 
literatures into three main categories. The first group highlights how, even as a narrow 
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representation of the performance of market economies, GDP reflects industrial, 
Fordist production regimes and is increasingly flawed as a way of measuring globalised, 
service-based and post-industrial economies. The second emphasise the ways in which 
GDP inadequately reflects welfare more generally: firstly, welfare-eroding ‘bads’ (rising 
inequality, financial speculation, environmental and ecological destruction, the social and 
psychological dis-amenities of urbanisation) can accompany healthy GDP growth, and 
may even directly contribute to it; secondly. many welfare-producing ‘goods’ are also 
unrecorded in GDP (unpaid labour, leisure time, happiness). Thirdly, GDP measures 
only present welfare and therefore tells us nothing about the sustainability of current 
socio-economic arrangements. The cumulative result of these various critiques has 
meant that the assumption of a linear relationship between GDP growth and welfare or 
development more generally has become increasingly untenable.  
 
GPD as a Flawed Measure of Economic Performance 
 
The first strand of critiques relates to GDP’s ability to represent the complex dynamics 
of a modern economy characterised by several features: the rise of information 
technology and data as a key source of value creation; the displacement of manufacturing 
by services; the rise of immaterial assets like human capital and brand reputation, versus 
traditional physical assets which dominate manufacturing activities; and the globalisation 
of production chains (Coyle 2014, 123-145). It has frequently been argued that, while 
GDP may have been a reasonably appropriate measure of economic activity for the 
industrial age dominated by Fordist manufacturing (Fioramonti 2013), it has become 
anachronistic in a globalised world of information-led automation, intangible intellectual 
property assets and services (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 107-124; Rifkin 2014, 24-
27). 
 
GDP is firstly accused of representing the value of high-tech economic activity less 
accurately than traditional manufacturing output. This is partly because GDP focusses 
on aggregating the exchange value of products sold, taking no account of quality 
increases (Gordon 2017, 8-13). As an example, many modern technological gadgets 
(such as the iPhone) undergo enhancements in quality between models, even as their 
market price remains the same or even decreases (Coyle 2017). This means that GDP 
will register as static in these sectors but, qualitatively, economic output has been 
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increased in the sense that the quality of the products made has improved. There have 
been attempts to use ‘hedonic price’ indexes to deflate GDP measures based on quality 
changes; but quality is often difficult to assess in complex products (Triplett 2004, 62-
64; Fioramonti 2013). This problem is even more acute for services, where the ‘quality’ 
is less objective. For instance, in the case of healthcare it is harder to assess aspects such 
as the friendliness of the care received or how caring the staff who treated you were in 
one instance or another. Similarly, comparing the ambience of a café and how much 
‘quality’ this adds to the purchase of a coffee is not easy. As economies shift from the 
production of standardised units of manufactured goods to the rendering of services 
and experiences (Block 1990; Amin 2011), such issues arguably make real GDP less 
meaningful even as a narrow indicator of economic output. Furthermore, the shift to 
information-driven economies has led to apparently ‘free’ services from networked 
digital platforms, new forms of peer-to-peer consumption and sharing services (Rifkin 
2014, 19-31), many if which go unrecorded in official GDP estimates. 
 
GDP, as a gross measure, also fails to account for the losses suffered on assets due to 
depreciation. Since GDP fails to account for depreciation, it has been argued that it is 
badly equipped to measure an economy in which intangible information assets play a 
large role, as these assets tend to depreciate faster than those in traditional forms of 
manufacturing (Coyle 2015; Gordon 2017). It is therefore suggested that GDP figures 
may be systematically under-stating the level of inflation (Stiglitz et al. 2010). Net 
Domestic Product, which factors in capital consumption and depreciation to correct for 
this, has been suggested as a more appropriate measure. However, since this is costly 
and difficult to arrive at – especially for immaterial assets such as intellectual property, 
brand reputation and goodwill – GDP retains its dominant status and NDP is rarely 
quoted (Chiripanhura 2010). The difference between net and gross figures has diverged 
further since the 1980s and the changing composition capital and business investment 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, 119-122). Indeed, this led to R and D spending being 
re-classified in the 2008 SNA as an investment in capital formation rather than a 
contributor to GDP. 
 
The globalisation of production and investment chains and the rise of Multi-National 
Corporations (MNCs) has also led to an increasingly complex pattern of FDI and asset 
ownership across borders, as well as the internal shifting of resources and profits 
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between the various subsidiaries of MNCs. GDP, as a measure of domestic market 
production, is badly designed to capture these trends. This is exacerbated by the shift in 
the composition of the assets held by large corporations from fixed capital and 
machinery to intellectual property goods. These are much easier to transfer between 
jurisdictions for tax efficiency and accounting purposes. This problem was dramatically 
evidenced in 2015, when the Irish statistical agency recorded GDP growth for the Irish 
economy of 26.3% (Whelan 2017). This was largely due to Apple relocating its 
intellectual property assets from the USA to Ireland for tax purposes. Thus, the Irish 
‘economy’ became more than a quarter larger almost overnight. When considering that 
GDP is embedded in political targets such as the EU’s Maastricht debt and deficit rules, 
this has raised serious doubt over the adequacy of GDP in its current form. 
  
GDP as a Flawed Measure of Welfare 
 
Aside from these growing questions about the ability of GDP to accurately reflect 
economic output, more searching critiques of GDP highlight its limitations as a measure 
of welfare. The debate about whether the aim of national income accounting should in 
fact be a measurement of social welfare dates to early discussions of national accounting 
and the measurement of national income (Hicks 1940; Kuznets 1942). Kuznets himself 
was acutely aware of the normative implications of any definition of national income 
(Kuznets 1941, 3-5), stressing that the first measures of national income developed by 
the department of commerce should not be misunderstood as a measure of welfare more 
broadly (Masood 2016).  
 
Kuznets’s concerns to develop national accounting along more welfare-based lines were 
forgotten as the imperatives of war planning and the subsequent development of 
Keynesian macroeconomics and demand management took precedent (Coyle 2014, 7-
24). These placed the issue of gross levels of production estimated via final sales rather 
than economic welfare per se at the centre of national accounting systems, as this was 
the data most relevant to state-driven demand management and the planning of the war 
economy (Lepenies 2016). This output-based approach continued to be criticised for 
the myriad ways in which it distorts and misrepresent welfare gains, leading to a myopic 
understanding of progress. Broadly, we can further divide these groups of critiques into 
those highlighting the various ‘bad things’ which may accompany healthy GDP growth, 
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and those that stress the various ‘good things’ that GDP takes no account of and that 
therefore remain undervalued in GDP-based assessments of policy. 
 
Firstly, many ‘bad’ consequences of market activity for society and the environment are 
included in GDP growth figures. Large categories of expenditure in modern society do 
not appear to render any intrinsic utility or welfare but are instead needed to offset 
undesirable aspects of industrialisation. These are often called ‘defensive expenditures’ 
(Leipert 1989a, 1989b). For instance, an environmental catastrophe such as an oil spill 
will show up favourably in GDP, as it will generate many additional market transactions 
(the clean-up operation, insurance and legal fees, PR services to manage reputational 
damage). Many dis-amenities associated with urbanisation and economic development 
likewise generate market transactions that are arguably not welfare enhancing 
(Abramovitz 1959, 59-60; Fioramonti 2013). Lengthening commuter times created by 
urban sprawl – causing widespread tedium and eroding the leisure and family time of 
millions – stimulate the construction sector and drive up demand for transport services.  
The pace, stress and anxiety of modern urban life keep many psychiatrists in steady 
business and support a burgeoning self-help industry (Cederström and Spicer 2015; 
Davies 2015a). Rises in violent crime will increase demand for locks, burglar alarms and 
security services.  
 
In the national account these are classified as final consumption expenditure, and 
generate GDP, but may actively erode the quality of life understood in a more 
substantive sense. As Van den Berg has argued: ‘if a commercial company were to 
employ the method that is the basis for calculating GDP, its accounts would not be 
legally approved…[W]hereas firms employ separate accounts for benefits (revenues) and 
costs (outlays), the GDP adds benefits and costs together’ (Van den Bergh 2009, 128). 
These arguments quickly lead to radical suggestions – for example, that spending on 
locks and police services should not be counted positively towards GDP figures on the 
grounds that these types of expenditure represent not additional utility but, in the words 
of Nordhaus and Tobin, ‘the necessary overhead costs of a complex industrial nation 
state’ (Nordhaus and Tobin 1973, 7). Some authors have argued that such defensive 
expenditures may represent between 10-20% of the entire GDP in advanced economies 
(Leipert 1989b). This critique was well summarised in a speech given by Robert Kennedy 
in 1968, in which he argued that GNP (GDP’s forerunner): 
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Counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of 
carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and jails for the people who break them. It 
counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic 
sprawl…it measures everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile 
(Quoted in Fioramonti 2013, 81). 
 
As we shall see in the next section these critiques have informed the development of 
many of the more prominent alternatives to GDP suggested over the years. 
 
A related argument highlights the psychological and social costs of GDP growth in 
affluent societies (Galbraith 1958; James 2007). Avner Offer has suggested economic 
development confronts the individual with an ever-increasing array of choices over 
products and lifestyles, which manifests itself – contra the psychological assumptions 
underpinning orthodox consumer theory – in an increased sense of existential anxiety 
(Offer 2007). Tibor Scitovsky has similarly analysed the psychological pathologies which 
accompany highly developed consumer society (Scitovsky 1992), a phenomenon which 
Oliver James has referred to as ‘affluenza’ (James 2007). These arguments amount to a 
critique of the assumptions of ‘revealed preference’ upon which modern consumer 
theory is based (see section 2.2 below, and the detailed discussion in chapter 8) and 
which supports the widespread use of GDP as a metric of progress: that utility can be 
reduced to the satisfaction of additional desires and so the generation of market growth 
increases satisfaction and welfare by providing additional choices and satisfying 
additional desires. 
 
Likewise, as Galbraith observed as long ago as the 1950s, a sizeable (and increasing) 
proportion of economic activity in affluent societies consists of advertising, marketing 
and PR services (Galbraith 1958). It is not clear that these contribute to satisfying pre-
existing desires but rather synthesising new ones which the market system can then 
profit from providing (Packard 2007 [1957]; Marcuse 2013). Similarly, modern products 
are often deliberately designed to ensure predictable future consumption, either through 
shortening product lifespans (‘planned obsolescence’) or planning small, incremental 
changes in functionality and design which mean products go out of fashion rapidly 
(Packard 2011 [1960]). These practices generate additional GDP growth, as they lead to 
additional market transactions, but may simply reflect the increasing wastefulness of 
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modern consumption patterns. Similarly, GDP includes expenditure on a wide array of 
‘positional goods’, which are related not to meeting basic needs but rather to 
conspicuously displaying wealth and establishing status (Hirsch 1976; Veblen 2007 
[1899]). Indeed, these critiques are linked: the proportion of positional goods in overall 
GDP may increase as basic needs are met, and in highly consumerist societies in which 
advertising is pervasive people may increasingly compare themselves to others on the 
basis of external consumption patterns (Schor 1998). 
 
Another ‘bad’ which GDP cannot account for is the unequal distribution of resources 
across society.3 On equity and social welfare grounds, GDP is accused of failing to reflect 
the various negative social consequences of rising inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 
2010) and of therefore naturalising an implicit normative claim that all types of growth 
are of equal social value and justness. Van den Berg, for instance, has emphasised how 
GDP fails to draw any distinction between luxury and basic goods, so the production of 
a few high-end products is seen as equivalent to the widespread extension of access to 
cheap necessities (Van den Bergh 2009). Since GDP simply sums all market transactions, 
it implicitly considers the production of $100 of yachts, Rolex watches or exotic holidays 
– used only by the wealthiest few percent of the population – as yielding the equivalent 
welfare of $100 of basic foods or medical services, enjoyed by most of society. An 
additional dollar spent on cosmetic surgery to improve the waistline of a millionaire is 
identical (in GDP terms) to a dollar spent on life-saving antimalarial drugs.4 
 
Conversely, GDP excludes many ‘goods’ which are welfare-producing, economically 
meaningful and/or essential to well-being more broadly conceived. This includes, firstly, 
the economic contribution of unpaid work and leisure, non-market aspects of the quality 
of life and levels of subjective happiness produced by increasing affluence. As explored 
in depth in chapter 5, the SNA production boundary deems everything which does not 
                                                 
3 The response to these critiques will be explored in depth in chapter 4. 
4 This problem is understood in welfare economics using the notion of consumer surplus: the amount 
over the actual market price that consumers would be hypothetically willing to spend to obtain a good. 
Through this lens, basic products, such as water of bread, typically render a much higher consumer surplus 
than luxury or status goods, as we would all have to buy water and food no matter how expensive these 
became. However, this difference cannot be reflected in unadjusted GDP, which pays no attention to the 
distribution of national income. Hence, societies with a higher or lower consumer surplus are depicted as 
equivalent and identical in welfare terms if GDP is used as the dominant metric of living standards. 
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have a market price to fall outside of properly economic activity. As feminist authors 
have long recognised (Reid 1934; Waring 1988; Hoskyns and Rai 2007), this exclusive 
focus on market exchange effectively excludes all the unpaid labour performed outside 
the market - unpaid caring and housework, and also activities such as gardening or 
volunteering - from our understanding of the economy, despite the essential nature of 
that labour to the successful reproduction of society and the labour force (Katz 2001). 
Moreover, by some estimates unpaid labour represents 50% of all economic activity 
(Goldschmidt‐Clermont and Pagnossin‐Aligisakis 1999). 
 
This leads to several paradoxical results. For instance, if childcare is provided by family 
members for free, it is excluded from ‘the economy’; but if the same person was paid to 
perform the same service for a stranger on the market, it generates GDP (Beneria 1999). 
It also creates differences in comparing living standards, both between countries and 
over time. It has been shown, for instance, that a considerable proportion of the ‘growth’ 
generated since the 1970s can be attributed to the greater participation of women in the 
workforce and a formalisation of labour which was once provided outside of the market, 
in the home or community (Bridgman et al. 2012). Likewise, the exclusion of unpaid 
work from the national accounts means that cross-country comparisons of economic 
welfare are essentially arbitrary, reflecting the degree of formalisation of activity as much 
as ‘growth’ in living standards (OECD 2011b). GDP is, in this sense, as much an 
indicator of the intensity of labour commodification as of the level of economic welfare 
in any substantive sense. Moreover, this exclusion has potentially very significant 
political consequences. A government seeking to maximise GDP growth may be 
encouraged to implement policies which push informal activities into a formal wage-
based economy. This promotes a reductionist conflation of progress and the market, 
meaning commons-based solutions to education, care or other service provision are 
neglected in political discourse, even where they may be more effective or equitable (see 
Ostrom 2015). 
 
A similar problem attaches to the value of leisure time. The choice to reduce the 
production and consumption of commodities to increase the leisure time available to 
pursue hobbies or creative projects may lead to a better quality of life. But if economic 
performance is assessed through GDP, choosing to spend more time outside of 
commodified relationships will show up as a reduction in economic welfare. Since the 
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1980s we have seen a reversal of the trend towards shorter working hours that began 
with the early successes of the labour movement in the late 19th century (Schor 1993). 
Not only have formal working hours increased, but there is evidence that work has 
intensified and that increasing time is spent outside of formal working hours on work-
related tasks, such as commuting (Green 2004). Furthermore, the rise of information 
technology has caused work to intrude upon formal ‘leisure’ time in new ways, and 
blurred the distinction between these realms (Bowring 2002; Berry and Kenny 2008). 
The exclusion of the value of leisure time from GDP therefore results in insufficient 
attention being paid to the way in which output may be increasingly simply due to work 
intensification at the expense of free time. 
 
Looking at the economy through the lens of GDP also encourages certain types of leisure 
over other. Commodity-intensive activities – golf, foreign travel, retail therapy – are 
highly GDP-generative, whereas walking in nature or playing card games do not 
contribute significantly to GDP. One critical literature has thus stressed how the nature 
of leisure itself has had to become more commodity-intensive as society develops in 
order for it to absorb the surplus of goods and services produced by the market economy 
(Linder 1970; Lefebvre 2014 [1947], 51-64). People must be urged into ever more costly 
leisure pursuits so that the ever more productive economy can find a market for the 
goods it produces. A single-minded focus upon GDP at a societal level can therefore 
result in the impoverishment of free time, and the erosion of space for simpler pleasures 
(Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012). 
 
Another long-standing debate concerns the measurement of public sector output and 
the value of in-kind services provided by the State. Since much of the value created by 
public institutions is not accompanied by a market transaction, market values for these 
services must be imputed in various other ways. These services are included in GDP, 
through an imputation which measures the labour inputs employed in their production, 
using public sector employment and wage data (Hicks 1940). But using the input/wage 
method makes it impossible to capture public sector productivity gains and innovation: 
labour is assumed to be converted into outputs at a constant level and these outputs are 
not directly measured (Stiglitz et al. 2010). This is a politically salient issue, as it links 
directly to the question of the worth of active industrial policies. This critique has 
implications, for instance, in light of recent neo-Schumpeterian literature which suggests 
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the role of state-led innovation is systematically under-appreciated and frequently 
appropriated by (and attributed to) private firms (Mazzucato 2015). 
 
Moreover, which components of government spending represent final consumption, 
intermediate consumption or investment? Tobin and Nordhaus, for instance, criticised 
GDP figures for categorising spending on military forces as final consumption, arguing 
that no one would spend money on it ‘for its own sake’ (Nordhaus and Tobin 1973, 5) 
and so it is best treated as an intermediate input into production (see also Fioramonti 
2013). They therefore created a revised estimate of GDP in the early 1970s, which 
introduced the distinction between ‘consumption, investment and intermediate’ and 
applied this to items of government expenditure (Nordhaus and Tobin 1973). In the 
1980s Robert Eisner also critiqued the inclusion of government spending on policing 
and security infrastructure as final consumption, arguing it should instead be classed as 
intermediate consumption (Eisner 1988, 1989).  
 
A final perspective, relating to the divergence between growth and subjective well-being, 
emerged from the now famous studies conducted by Richard Easterlin in the 1970s 
(Easterlin 1974; Easterlin et al. 2010). Easterlin set out to test orthodox consumer 
theory, which suggested people should get happier as their income increases and 
therefore more of their preferences are satisfied, against empirical data. To do this, he 
compared the growth of average income with survey data on reported levels of life 
satisfaction in America over the 1950s and 1960s. The result was that happiness 
appeared to rise in line with increased income until a certain threshold, after which the 
relationship broke down (Easterlin 2001). On the back of this, there has emerged a 
burgeoning field of happiness economics, which tries to integrate psychological evidence 
of subjective states into economic analysis to demonstrate how markets can produce 
sub-optimal hedonic outcomes (Frey 2008; Stutzer and Frey 2012). This fed directly into 
a critique of the use of national income measures such as GDP, as these theories 
suggested that GDP had become an increasingly bad proxy of social welfare more 
generally.5 
 
                                                 
5 The use of subjective well-being data to monetise non-market goods is explored in depth in chapter 8. 
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GDP as a Flawed Measure of Sustainability 
 
Finally, besides its various limitations of a measure of present welfare, GDP has also 
been criticised for failing to take account of the stocks of accumulated wealth on which 
this growth may draw from and deplete. GDP growth therefore fails to account for how 
sustainable current rates of growth are in the longer term.  
 
For example, perhaps the earliest and most influential critique of GDP was based upon 
its failure to take into account the biophysical, ecological and natural resource limits 
which market growth encounters in the long run. Such arguments were popularised by 
the influential 1972 report by the Club of Rome (Meadows et al. 1972) which highlighted 
how economic growth runs into natural resource limits and so is unsustainable in the 
long run. Ecological economists such as Daly (Daly 1987, 1997) have updated and 
fleshed out these insights, criticising GDP for failure to measure or account for the 
‘ecosystem resources’ or ‘natural capital’ which the reproduction of the human economy 
and manufactured economy relies upon. Focussing on GDP thus encourages 
ecologically unsustainable and thermodynamically illiterate (Georgescu-Roegen 1971) 
short term expansion of the human economy, failing to view this as a subsystem of the 
wider environment which this growth is necessarily embedded in and dependent upon. 
Thus, GDP has long been criticised for encouraging ecologically unsustainable models 
of development (Feigl et al. 2013; Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). 
 
Furthermore, GDP masks the type of growth being generated and the structural 
constraints which this may put on continued growth in the future. For instance, post-
Keynesian growth theory highlights how inequality acts to restrain growth in the long 
run, on the basis that the marginal propensity to consume out of income is higher for 
those with less income and wealth (Reich 2010; Stockhammer 2018). Hence, a growth 
model which generates widening inequality results in a fall in investment opportunities 
and demand as wealth is hoarded by the rich rather than redistributed and spent. GDP, 
as a metric which takes no account of wealth distribution, provides no means to assess 
this. Politically, this may incentivise governments to maximise growth rather than 
analysing the balance between growth and equality. This critique has gained in 
prominence in recent decades, as neoliberal restructuring has resulted in gains accruing 
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disproportionately to those at the very top of the income spectrum (Alvaredo et al. 2013; 
Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015). 
 
Of note here is also the way in which national income methodologies treat financial 
sector output and intermediation services: is this activity to be considered ‘productive’ 
(Christophers 2011)? If it is, then the expansion of the financial services sector shows 
up as an economic good equivalent to any other sector. However, a sizeable literature, 
drawing on endogenous theories of money and finance developed in the early 20th 
century (Wicksell 1962 [1898]), has argued that larger financial sectors increase the 
volatility of economies, acting more like a ‘pump’ encouraging financialisation and debt 
than a neutral plumbing system passively transmitting savings to investment 
opportunities (Minsky 2008 [1986]).  
 
The inclusion of financial services in GDP has generated significant controversy 
(Christophers 2011, 2013; Assa 2015, 2016). It is often unclear that financial 
intermediation services are a ‘product’ comparable to other consumption items, or that 
the increase in the financial services sector represents an expansion of the economy 
which can be simply compared un-problematically to other sectors (Haldane et al. 2010; 
Burgess 2011; Philippon 2015).6 This has informed Marxist critiques of GDP which 
argue it systematically misrepresents finance as a productive activity when it is, in reality, 
merely recirculating existing value (Shaikh and Tonak 1997), and constructivist readings 
which argue GDP calculations participated in stabilising the idea of finance as a 
productive activity, with powerful political effects (Christophers 2011). Assa has argued 
we have witnessed an increasing ‘financialisation of GDP’ (Assa 2016) as a result of the 
way in which the value added and productivity of financial services output is considered. 
Many have thus argued that the pre-2008 affluence was partly a statistical mirage which 
masked the instability and volatility of the growth model underlying it. 
 
GDP is also accused of failing to account for the social sustainability which is needed 
for the reproduction of growth. Such critiques have a long history, dating back to 
Hirsch’s argument that growth is limited ultimately by the strains it places upon society 
                                                 
6 This touches on the vast debates within the financialisation literature about the (un)productive nature of 
financial services sector output and its relation to the ‘real’ economy, which cannot be elaborated upon 
here (Stockhammer 2004; McNally 2009; Streeck 2014). 
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rather than merely by environmental or economic constraints (Hirsch 1976). More 
recently, scholars such have Putnam have analysed the importance of social networks 
and the norms of interpersonal trust which accompany them on national life (Putnam 
2001). Such arguments have crystallised around the concept of ‘social capital’, a 
hypothesised stock of non-economic relationships and norms which facilitate both 
efficient market exchange and good governance (Helliwell 2006). Thus, high levels of 
short-term GDP expansion may be bought only at the expense of eroding these social 
structures and norms, if it leads to an erosion of the time and energy needed to sustain 
them.  
 
To summarise this section, academic critiques of GDP since the formation of the SNA 
in 1953 have shown convincingly that a healthy GDP growth rate can go hand in hand 
with a society which is: polarised into extremes of income and wealth; commodifying 
activities which used to be outside of the market and privatising the provision of social 
reproduction; depleting its natural and social resources; characterised by increasing 
stress, anxiety and the erosion of leisure time; prone to financial and ecological crises; 
and undersupplying public goods (Galbraith 1958). These criticisms underpin the 
contemporary global agenda to move beyond GDP, which the rest of the thesis 
examines.  
 
2.2 Implementing a Global Statistical Agenda: The Stiglitz Commission 
and the Challenge to National Accounting 
 
In recent decades, the concerns reviewed in section 1 have been formulated into a 
practical global agenda aimed at reforming how socio-economic progress is measured. 
The critique of GDP entered the political mainstream in the late 2000s, with a flurry of 
international conferences, increasingly prominent political buy-in and the formation of 
the Stiglitz Commission in 2008 by president Sarkozy (Cassiers 2007; Kroll 2011; Bache 
2013), with the explicit mandate to suggest ways of addressing the critiques of GDP 
outlined in section 1. This section reviews some the central measurement initiatives 
which have been enacted by national and global statistical agencies in response to the 
recommendations in the Stiglitz report.  
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While many of these reforms have taken place outside national accounting systems, and 
essentially understand the problem of moving beyond GDP as developing 
supplementary indicators, others raise significant questions about the scope, integrity 
and borders of the national accounting description of ‘the economy’. In introducing the 
four agendas which will be examined in detail in the substantive chapters of the thesis, 
I show how each of these reforms raises important questions about the ability of national 
accounts to constitute the economy as a legible statistical object. They are thus 
encountering growing tensions with the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
underpinning market-centric economic theory on which the SNA system itself relies. As 
I show in the final section, however, the nature of the growing tensions between the 
beyond GDP accounting agenda and market-based economic theory has yet to be 
explored fully in existing accounts of the politics of the beyond GDP agenda.  
 
Embedding Inequality into the National Accounts 
 
As we’ve seen, the issue of inequality has been fundamental to the critique of GDP as a 
measure of welfare; consequently, the better measurement of inequality has received a 
great deal of attention within the contemporary beyond GDP reform agenda. Measuring 
how market resources are divided up between citizens does not on the face of it appear 
to challenge the idea that the economy can be understood by analysing these market 
flows. But, as will be explored in chapter 4, this agenda raises a key challenge to the 
national accounting systems: how the statistical picture of household-level inequality can 
be reconciled with the aggregate representation of the economy studied by 
macroeconomics.  
 
Since the development of centralised official statistical systems from the mid-20th 
century, the measurement of inequality between individual households and the 
measurement of economy-wide macroeconomic performance within the SNA 
framework has been conducted largely independently (Eurostat 2013; Kavonius and 
Honkkila 2013). The national accounts, from which GDP and national income figures 
are calculated, present the economy as several large sectors, with monetary flows 
between them that perfectly balance across the whole system. This is the ‘macro’ 
statistical picture of the economy constructed by neo-Keynesian macroeconomic theory 
and post-war planning departments. It is used extensively by central banks and financial 
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ministries for forecasting and the analysis of macroeconomic policy interventions. As a 
Eurostat manual on the SNA system explains: 
 
A national economy represents a closed space (a country), the outside is the rest of the 
world…the economic circuit presents the distribution of income within a national 
economy, and between a national economy and the rest of the world (Eurostat 2014, 
22).7 
 
This picture of the economy relies for its construction on aggregated information given 
by tax records, administrative data and business registers, based on centralised reporting 
of accounts from banks, companies and state agencies. These are then ‘balanced’ against 
one another within the national accounting divisions in statistical agencies. The market 
economy is here described as a unitary whole, with each positive showing up a negative 
somewhere else in the system, providing, in the words of the ONS, a ‘single picture of 
the economy which is consistent, coherent and fully integrated’ (ONS 2011: 4).  
 
 
Figure 1: ‘‘The Economy’ as Represented by the National Accounts (from: Eurostat 2014). 
 
Within national accounting frameworks, the ‘household sector’ is thus represented as 
one unit of the economy, with an aggregate statistical relationship to the ‘business 
sector’, ‘financial institutions’ and ‘government’ and an aggregated balance sheet.8 It has, 
however, no internal inter-household flows or relationships (these are ‘netted out’), and 
                                                 
7 ‘Distribution’ here means at the aggregate level – distribution to the factors of production via different 
income categories (profits, wages etc.). 
8 The national accounts provide ‘input-output tables’, based on the work of Leontief, which trace flows 
between business sectors and allow for the value added of these sectors to be summed. These do not 
extend to the household sector. 
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is often calculated indirectly as a ‘residual’ of the other sectors (governments, 
corporations, banks), rather than being observed directly (Interview RT). It appears as 
an internally homogenous black box. This is largely because direct data on households 
is lacking from the centralised data infrastructure which form the backbone of national 
accounts (ONS 2011; Eurostat 2014): administrative tax records and the business 
register. The distribution of resources within the household sector therefore cannot be 
gleaned from national accounting data, such as GDP. 
 
Meanwhile, a different statistical picture of the economy – focused on the internal 
distribution of resources within the household sector – is generated by ‘micro’ data 
(Eurostat 2013). This has historically relied upon surveys sent out by statistical agencies 
and filled in by households. While micro data is used as an input into the national 
accounts balancing process, this is mainly to check and adjust the overall residual totals 
for the household sector (Interview JZ). It typically relies upon people self-reporting the 
income they receive from various sources over a given period (not always the same as 
the national accounts year), what items they consume and – usually in different surveys 
– their assets and liabilities owed (real and financial). Historically they have tended to 
also vary quite dramatically in composition between countries, and before the crisis there 
was no international standard for micro data equivalent to the SNA framework. These 
data are associated with social policy and labour economics and have been used 
historically within government departments to analyse the functioning of welfare and 
benefits systems. Scaling up the incomes reported in the surveys to the total population 
gives another estimate of household living standards.  
 
The measurement of inequality remains one of the most active strands of the global 
statistical project catalysed by the beyond GDP agenda. The UN Statistical Commission 
had been involved in the production of inequality data as early as 1966; this work stalled 
for lack of resources and interest in the 1980s (OECD 2013b, 19-20). From the 1990s 
onwards, neoliberal restructuring led to a renewed interest in the measurement of 
inequality, a problem brought into sharper focus by the impact of the global financial 
crisis (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015; Saez 2017). A review 
of the issue by the Conference of European Statisticians (CES), in 2008, led to the 
formation of the ‘Canberra Group’ taskforce, which updated international guidelines on 
income inequality measurement in 2011 (UNECE 2011). This growing interest 
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influenced the recommendations by Stiglitz Commission in 2009, which emphasised 
that statistical systems should pay more attention to distributional data and ‘the 
household perspective’ should be emphasised in analyses of economic performance 
(Stiglitz et al. 2010).  
 
Part of this effort has simply focussed on creating harmonised international standards 
for the collection of basic micro data on inequality, and highlighting the connections 
between income, consumption, saving and wealth data. Internationally, the OECD has 
taken the lead on this by compiling an international framework in which such data is to 
be collected so as to improve cross-country comparability (OECD 2013b). Furthermore, 
the G20 Data Gaps Initiative, overseen by the IMF and FSB, has prioritised improving 
the statistical base on inequality internationally.9 Another thread of this agenda has 
focussed on improving the visibility and timeliness of indicators such as household 
disposable income which can be derived from existing national accounts data (Eurostat 
2011b; OECD 2015d).   
 
However, one of the most active strands of this agenda has focussed on the question of 
bringing data on economic inequalities into line with the macroeconomic framework of 
the national accounts. This goal was reflected from the outset, with the Stiglitz report 
recommendation that ‘distributional measures should be compatible in scope with 
average measures from the national accounts’ (Stiglitz et al., 2009: i43), and it has 
occupied an increasingly prominent place in recent reforms on inequality measurement.  
 
The main institutions overseeing this work are the OECD, Eurostat and the ECB. The 
OECD acts as a forum to co-ordinate international efforts to construct such 
‘distributional national accounts’ (Piketty et al. 2016) and have created a dedicated cross-
country working party (in collaboration with Eurostat) of senior statisticians and 
national accountants from across OECD countries to oversee these efforts and share 
results and best practice (Eurostat 2011b, 2013; OECD 2017).10 At the European level, 
                                                 
9 Recommendation #16 of the G20 DGI was that: ‘statistical experts (should) seek to compile 
distributional information (such as ranges and quartile information) alongside aggregate figures, wherever 
this is relevant…the OECD is encouraged to continue in its efforts to link national accounts data with 
distributional information’ (IMF and FSB 2009, 8). 
10 Known officially as the Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounting (EG DNA). 
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in 2010 the Directors General of the National Statistical Institutes (DGINS) declared 
that: ‘there is a strong need to reconcile National Accounts aggregates with household 
survey data’ (DGINS/ESSC 2010, 2). This was echoed in the 2011 Eurostat taskforce 
convened in response to the Commission’s communication ‘GDP and Beyond’, which 
set out the EU’s response to the recommendations of the Stiglitz commission and the 
wider beyond GDP agenda. Eurostat threw its resources behind the OECD’s work, 
committing European statistical agencies to the medium-term goal of: 
 
Publishing at least every ten years a satellite account for the household sector where 
households’ accounts as described by national accounts…are disaggregated by several 
categories of households (Eurostat 2011b, 19). 
  
These priorities were re-affirmed in the Vienna Memorandum, issued after the 2016 
DGINS meeting, which was dedicated specifically to the issue of distributional national 
accounts, and pledged ‘to work towards the development of a comprehensive 
methodology for linking micro and macro data’ and the ‘reconciliation and integration 
of information at the macro and micro levels’ (DGINS/ESSC 2016, 3).  
 
A work stream has been launched by the ECB (Kavonius and Honkkila 2013; ECB 
2016), specifically ‘to investigate the comparability and integration of these two data 
sources in order to provide distributional information on wealth embedded in the 
household sector accounts’ (ECB 2016, 5). This followed the launch of the Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and the related research network, specifically 
to better measure wealth inequality in Europe. Similar initiatives have also been 
conducted by national agencies, for instance at the UK’s Office for National Statistics, 
often explicitly in support of these international initiatives (ONS 2015a).   
 
These initiatives demonstrate how the specific issue of aligning data on inequality with 
national accounting frameworks has come to form a major component of the 
international statistical agenda on measuring inequality, forming a major part of the 
official statistical work conducted in response to the Stiglitz recommendations. At stake 
here is whether the micro and macro statistical descriptions of the economy can be held 
together as a unified whole. The implementation of this agenda, and its interaction with 
post-crisis developments in macroeconomic theory, will be the subject of chapter 4. 
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Valuing Unpaid Work 
 
Critiques of the exclusion of unpaid work from GDP (see section 1) have led to 
increased efforts to extend national accounts to include such non-market activities as 
part of the beyond GDP agenda. Indeed, the fifth key recommendation of the Stiglitz 
Commission stated that: 
 
Many services that households produce for themselves are not recognized in official 
income and production measures, yet they constitute an important part of economic 
activity…Comprehensive and periodic accounts of household activity as satellites to the 
core national accounts should complement the picture (Stiglitz et al. 2010, 14).  
 
An example of this being put into practice is the system of ‘household satellite accounts’ 
developed by the UK ONS since 2011 (ONS 2016b). These seek to measure the value 
to the UK economy of various types of non-market activity, including volunteering, 
unpaid care work for children and adults, and even laundry.  
 
Such a move, however, presents a radical challenge to existing national accounting terms 
and concepts. The SNA explicitly defines ‘economic’ activity as that which falls within 
a clearly defined ‘production boundary’ (UN 2008, 6-7). This boundary refers to the 
criteria used to distinguish between economically productive activities, included within 
the national accounting system and aggregate indicators such as GDP, and activities 
which fall outside of this boundary and are classed as non-economic. Beyond GDP 
accounting efforts have thus focused on developing practical tools to impute values for 
household services, in an attempt to extend this production boundary.  
 
These efforts developed from the 1970s onwards, partly animated by wider changes in 
social structures and norms – which, as Kuznets himself had argued, should be the basis 
for national accounting definitions. For instance, the entry of women into the workforce 
in significant numbers from the 1960s jeopardised the inter-temporal validity of GNP 
growth rates for the post-war period. Eisner argued: 
 
The vast increases in conventional GNP associated with the major movement of women 
into the labour force may signify a much lesser gain in total output, as nonmarket child 
care gives way to the paid babysitter and nursery school, care of the aged to nursing 
homes, care of the sick to hospitals, and home cooking to MacDonald’s (Eisner 1989, 3). 
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Methodologies for valuing this work focus on large government time-use surveys (ONS 
2013a: 11-15; Goldschmidt-Clermont and Pagnossin-Aligisakis 1999) to obtain figures 
for the hours people spend in different productive activates outside labour markets– 
such as caring for children or volunteering with a charity. These are then compared with 
reference wages for similarly skilled market work (for instance, a paid childminder), to 
obtain a figure for the amount which would have to have been spent to delegate this 
work to a third party on the market. Improving these estimates and including them in 
national accounting representations of the economy has become a key plank of recent 
beyond GPD reforms in the wake of the Stiglitz commission (Eurostat 2011b; OECD 
2011a; ONS 2016b). 
 
Thus, the extension of the national accounts production boundary to include unpaid 
activity is a second key challenge to constitution of the economy and its boundaries with 
‘society’ that the beyond GDP agenda poses. As chapter 5 will explore, however, 
integrating these methodologies into the national accounts is not a simple task. The 
practicalities of how these activities might be measured are revealing the complicated 
entanglements between ‘the economy’ and ‘society’ and the difficulties of comparing the 
incommensurable values of market and non-market forms of economic life.  
 
Measuring Sustainability: Accounting for ‘Comprehensive Wealth’ 
 
A third key series of accounting initiatives has revolved around the extension of the 
SNA asset boundary to better measure the ‘comprehensive wealth’ of nations (World 
Bank 2018). As reviewed in section 1, a major component of the critique of GDP is that 
it ignores the effect of growth on the natural and social processes that sustain it. The 
1953 SNA, for instance, simply stated (without further justification) that: ‘charges made 
for the depletion of exhaustible natural resources are not included in the provisions for 
the consumption of fixed capital’ (UN 1953, 7). Hence at the founding of the national 
accounts the economic value of the natural environment, as well as knowledge and social 
institutions, was implicitly placed at zero.  
 
Over the post-war years, the limitations of the asset boundary established by the SNA 
became increasingly evident. The Limits to Growth report in 1972 (Meadows et al. 1972), 
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as well as the work of economists such as Georgescu-Rogen (Georgescu-Roegen 1971) 
placed growth of the economic system within biophysical environmental constraints. 
The framework of capital was increasingly used to theorise these shifts (see Akerman 
2003), with ‘natural capital’ emerging as a term to theorise the various services provided 
to the economy by the natural environment, and which depended on the maintenance 
of scarce ecological resources (Pearce 1988; Daly 1997). Around the same time, there 
was a shift in economics towards focussing on skills, knowledge and innovation. 
Economists such as Gary Becker began to think about education and skill acquisition as 
a form of investment in future income and wage generation (Schultz 1961; Becker 
1962).11 Later, exogenous neoclassical models of growth, which had posited 
technological change as an external variable, were replaced by endogenous models which 
emphasised the institutional drivers of innovation. This prompted a change to thinking 
about education spending and skill development as an investment in the human capital 
base of a society (Caballé and Santos 1993; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Romer 1994).12 
 
Thus, over the post-war period, economists, ecologists and sociologists began to think 
of natural capital, human capital and social capital as additional components of national 
wealth, in addition to produced and financial capital stocks included in the SNA. 
However, the accounting-based capital approach has become the dominant framework 
for measuring sustainability only in recent decades. 
 
The 1980s saw the concept of ‘sustainable development’ gain prominence in global 
governance discourse. The term was popularised by the 1987 report of the World 
Commission on Environment (WCED) and Development, convened by the UN 
General Assembly and chaired by Harlem Brundtland (WCED 1987). The Brundtland 
report defined sustainable development in open-ended and equivocal terms, as that 
                                                 
11 Indeed, according to critical readings, notably Foucault, these shifts were a distinguishing feature of the 
development of neoliberal reasoning as a whole, as the individual was reconstituted as a rational 
entrepreneurial subject (Miller and Rose 1990; Foucault 2010). 
12 The role of institutions, legal structures and social norms in economic development also became the 
object of increasing research. The work of sociologist Robert Putnam was influential in this regard 
(Putnam, 2001). Putnam’s work highlighted the post-war tendency towards more privatised and 
individualised forms of leisure and the erosion of ‘bridging capital’, which underpinned a functioning civil 
society. These literatures gave rise to the notion of ‘social capital’, the idea that interpersonal norms and 
trust can be thought of as a national resource which smooths economic development. 
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which ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ (ibid, 41). In the 1990s, the search was on for ways 
of operationalising and monitoring the concept of sustainable development and 
integrating it into mainstream policy-making. The notion of the natural world as an 
additional capital stock was mentioned in the Brundtland report, which said for example 
that:  
 
The process of economic development must be more soundly based upon the realities of 
the stock of capital that sustains it. This is rarely done in either developed or developing 
countries…incomplete accounting occurs in the exploitation of other natural resources, 
especially in the case of resources that are not capitalized in enterprise or national 
accounts: air, water, and soil (WCED 1987, 48). 
 
However, despite this there were few concerted attempts at formally integrating 
extended capital stocks into national accounts or valuing extended capital stocks in the 
1990s.  
 
Immediately after Brundtland, two main approaches were taken to the measurement of 
sustainable development: sustainable development indicator dashboards and adjusted 
national income measures (or green GDP). Both, however, encountered growing 
resistance during the 2000s. 
 
Firstly, policy-based indicator sets, usually called sustainable development indicators 
(SDIs), were produced on a mainly national basis from the late 1990s to monitor 
sustainable development strategies. The UN set up a Commission on sustainable 
development following Brundtland, with a mandate to explore monitoring approaches. 
The Agenda 21 of declaration issued by the UN General Assembly at the 1992 Rio Earth 
Summit stated that: 
 
Indicators of sustainable development need to be developed to provide solid bases for 
decision-making at all levels and to contribute to a self-regulating sustainability of 
integrated environment and development systems (UNGA 1992, 346).  
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The first set of SDIs were produced by the UK in 1995, followed by many others over 
the following decade.13 There was little agreement or standardisation on the content of 
these, but most reproduced a conceptual separation between the three ‘pillars’ of 
sustainable development established by Brundtland: economic, environmental and 
social.  However, SDIs were increasingly discarded as an adequate framework for 
measuring sustainability during the 2000s. Partly this move was rooted in a critique of 
the inconsistent theoretical foundations of earlier generations of sustainable 
development indicators. For instance, the UNECE, OECD and Eurostat report on 
measuring sustainable development argued that: 
 
It is relatively rare that such strategies have been based on an explicitly defined conceptual 
framework…Where a framework for the indicators has been expressed explicitly, it 
sometimes very simply takes the form of the “three pillars” approach, where the pillars 
are usually economy, society and the environment….the capital framework can be found 
explicitly behind only a handful of indicator sets (UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 3). 
 
SDIs were also seen as being idiosyncratic, bound up with the passing priorities of the 
government of the day. The same report argued that ‘an obvious drawback to indicators 
that are strongly aligned with a policy framework is that changes in the policy framework 
can mean the indicators have to follow suit’, and that ‘only minor consideration has been 
given to international comparability in the development of national indicator sets’ (ibid, 
4). Moreover, the Stiglitz report argued that: 
 
[D]ashboards…suffer because of their heterogeneity…most lack indications about causal 
links, their relationship to sustainability and/or hierarchies among the indicators used. 
Further, they lack…the powerful attraction of a single headline figure allowing simple 
comparisons of socioeconomic performance (Stiglitz et al. 2010, 63). 
 
This illustrates how the SDIs that had proliferated in the 2000s were increasingly seen 
to be conceptually flawed and in need of more formal integration into accounting and 
decision-making structures.14 
 
                                                 
13 Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and Belgium, to name a few in Europe, were 
among those to establish SDIs in the late 1990s. 
14 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) held also in Rio de Janeiro, in 2012, 
reiterated that: ‘integrated social, economic and environmental data and information ... are important to 
decision-making processes’ (UN 2012, 27). 
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Secondly, many composite development indicators or adjusted GDP figures were 
compiled in the 1990s, usually by NGOs or think tanks rather than official statistical 
agencies. The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) was the most prominent example of 
these (Neumayer 1999; Lawn 2003; A. J. Brennan 2013). This measure takes GDP – a 
flow measure of national income, not a stock measure of capital – and then re-arranges 
its components to deduct ‘bads’ and adds imputations for non-market work. For 
instance, money spent on pollution abatement is moved from a positive income item to 
a negative deduction. These composite indicators also faced criticism for being flawed 
or theoretically inconsistent approaches to sustainability measurement. The Stiglitz 
report itself, for example, argued that adjusted GDP measures ‘fail to distinguish clearly 
between the measurement of current welfare and the assessment of its sustainability’. It 
suggested that they are really an adjusted measure of present welfare, which factors into 
this the negative or welfare-destroying externalities of market activity on the 
environment and society.15 Measures like the GPI and Green GDP are thus increasingly 
criticised as they do not focus on measuring changes to the value of the environment, 
knowledge or social institutions as a capital stock, visualised as part of an extended 
national balance sheet, but rather confuse the distinction between a flow of present 
welfare with the stock of capital that produces this (see chapter 6).  
 
Consequently, in the late 2000s the global approach to measuring sustainability was 
increasingly re-oriented around a more formal accounting framework rooted in the 
concept of capital. The Stiglitz commission recommendations were again influential in 
effecting this shift. The report deployed the analogy of a car’s dashboard – in which 
both the speed and the amount of petrol are displayed as distinct indicators – to promote 
the distinction between ‘flow’ measures of present wellbeing and measures of the ‘stock’ 
of capital that this depends on as a way of approaching sustainability measurement. It 
stated that:  
 
We firmly believe that sustainability deserves a separate measurement…focusing on what 
the literature calls a “wealth” or “stock-based” approach to sustainability…Sustainability 
requires the simultaneous preservation or increase in several “stocks”: quantities and 
qualities not only of natural resources but also of human, social and physical capital 
(Stiglitz et al. 2010, 61; 77-68) 
                                                 
15 It was also in this period that the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) was created, along similar 
lines. 
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Thus, the Stiglitz approach formalised the conceptual addition of natural, human and 
social capital to a broader accounting treatment of national wealth and made it the 
dominant framework in which GDP work has been approached. But the Stiglitz report 
must be situated within broader developments around the measurement of sustainability 
that pointed in the same direction while predating the Commission’s recommendations.  
 
Influential in this respect (and directly cited by the Stiglitz report) has been the work of 
the joint UNECE, OECD and Eurostat taskforce on measuring sustainable 
development set up by the UN in 2005. The mandate of this taskforce was explicitly to 
integrate and formalise the concept of sustainable development, and to review the 
various monitoring and measurement approaches that had emerged since Brundtland. 
This report also strongly advocated the capitals approach to sustainability, positing 
stocks of natural, human and social capital as components of extended national balance 
sheets: 
 
[T]o assess the potential of future generations to pursue their well-being, information is 
needed on the changes in the stocks of economic, natural, human and social capital. If 
these stocks are calculated using a common measure and assumptions are made about the 
substitutability of various capital stocks, changes in the total stock of wealth (per capita) 
will provide information on the sustainability of the development path of each country 
(UNECE et al. 2013, 63). 
 
Furthermore, earlier work by both the World Bank (World Bank 2006) and OECD 
(OECD 2001) had influenced the growing interest in treating sustainability through the 
perspective of capital. In a recent report it argued that:  
 
Comprehensive wealth accounts show the value of various assets at a particular time and 
they can also be used to monitor whether per capita wealth is maintained or is increasing 
over time. This is a simple criterion for sustainable, long-term growth (World Bank 2018, 
31). 
 
The World Bank has been active globally in this sphere though its Wealth Accounting 
and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) programme (World Bank 2018), 
based on natural capital measurement, and its work on the concept of adjusted net 
savings, a total measure of the aggregate change in the wealth of a nation across all capital 
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stocks.16 This approach has also been influential in the UK, both at the ONS (2012a) 
and the dedicated Natural Capital Committee which oversees the greening of the UK’s 
national accounts (NCC 2013). Perhaps most influentially, at least regarding natural 
capital, this is the approach instituted through the UN’s System of Environmental-
Economic Accounts (SEEA), accepted as a new global statistical standard in 2012. The 
SEEA states, for instance, that: 
 
One purpose of accounting for environmental assets is to assess whether current patterns 
of economic activity are depleting and degrading the available environmental 
assets…valuations of natural resources and land can be combined with valuations of 
produced and financial assets to provide broader estimates of national wealth (UN 2014a, 
19). 
 
 
Figure 2: The Capital Stocks Approach to Measuring Sustainability (from: OECD 2001) 
 
As we can see, at the end of the 2000s the measurement of global sustainability was re-
constituted as the assessment of the depletion or maintenance of global ‘capital stocks’, 
extended beyond the produced and financial assets registered in the original SNA asset 
boundary. But this poses the problem of where the accounting boundary of ‘economic’ 
assets stops, and how to value nature and knowledge in the absence of market prices. 
 
                                                 
16 While generally focused on the measurement of natural capital, the WAVES project has also conducted 
work on the valuation of global human capital stocks.  
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The Wellbeing Agenda and Non-Market Valuation  
 
A central implication of all the critiques of GDP outlined in section 1 is that the non-
market impacts of economic policies need to be better accounted for in official 
measurement systems. Therefore, one major aspect of beyond GDP reforms has been 
the development of new valuation methods to monetise the economic value of a wide 
array of goods that are not traded on markets – from air quality, to health and friendship.  
As will be shown in chapter 8, these techniques pose a challenge to the revealed 
preference underpinnings of orthodox consumer theory, developed in the mid-20th 
century. Furthermore, these valuation methods draw increasing upon aggregate survey 
data on subjective well-being that has been generated as part of the beyond GDP agenda. 
This, it is argued, can provide a direct representation of the utility generated by various 
non-market goods, and underpin monetary valuations as inputs into accounting systems 
and cost-benefit analysis.    
 
Survey data on life satisfaction had played a key role in the origins of the economic 
critique of GDP, as we saw in section 1. For instance, Easterlin drew upon Gallup 
polling data to ground his arguments about the declining utility of income and the 
observed breakdown of the relationship between wealth and wellbeing in affluent 
countries (Easterlin 1974). But before the 2000s, such studies had remained the preserve 
of private polling organisations, and thus lacked the credibility and international 
comparability of official statistical sources. They were also conducted on a largely ad hoc 
and often irregular basis. This made them poor candidates as socio-economic indicators 
both on comparability and temporal grounds and limited their use. 
 
However, the post-Stiglitz international statistical agenda has heralded both the rapid 
standardisation of the measurement of subjective wellbeing and the large-scale 
incorporation of subjective variables into official, regularly produced surveys with large 
sample sizes (Hicks et al. 2013; OECD 2013c). The production of subjective data on a 
large scale by all governments was one of the central recommendations of the Stiglitz 
commission in 2009 (Stiglitz et al. 2010; White et al. 2012). Subsequently, high profile 
interventions in favour of producing wellbeing statistics and incorporating it into 
decision-making, notably in a speech by then UK Prime Minister David Cameron in 
2010. Such support was crucial in legitimising subjective data and the science 
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underpinning it (Interview AS). This has since been reflected in the creation of a 
dedicated institutional unit inside the UK government in 2015 (Interview DS).  
 
At the international level, meanwhile, the OECD was given the task of creating a set of 
standardised methodological guidance for the measurement of subjective wellbeing and 
promoting its harmonisation and cross-country comparability (OECD 2013c). This 
formed a part of its wider embrace of ‘wellbeing’ as an organisational response to the 
crisis of 2008, and the apparent failure of its traditional growth-focused policy advice, 
under the banner of its internal ‘New Approaches to Economic Challenges’ programme 
(Mahon 2015; OECD 2015b, 2015c). The first decade of the beyond GDP agenda has 
therefore precipitated an avalanche of official statistical data on populations’ subjective 
mental states; these are now accepted as never before as a legitimate object of official 
measurement and governmental scrutiny.  
 
There remained a stubborn question, however: what exactly is the relevance of such 
subjective data to economic analysis, and how can it be made tractable to policy 
problems (Hicks et al. 2013)? In extreme versions, it has been argued subjective 
wellbeing should become the central metric within new public ‘accounts of wellbeing’ 
(Kahneman et al. 2004), which would gradually supplant traditional national accounts of 
the market economy and become the overarching objective of all public policy. This has 
been generally rejected as too radical a paradigm shift in statistical and accounting 
communities. The use of aggregate wellbeing data as a headline indicator as one 
dimension within multi-dimensional dashboards has become common (Eurostat 2011c; 
OECD 2014; ONS 2016c), but faces continued resistance. Since these emotions are 
usually captured using 10-point scales, built into their measurement is an upper bound 
and long-term temporal stability (Ormerod 2012). This means that headline figures do 
not move up or down appreciably over time: while they fluctuate somewhat in response 
to sudden sharp shocks such as economic crises, they generally cluster around stable 
long-term national averages. Such stability clashes with the acceptable temporality of a 
policy indicator – which should move up and down appreciably to assess governmental 
performance (Hicks et al. 2013). There are also fears that if used as an explicit political 
target it would lose its informational content (Frey and Gallus 2013a). The rise of official 
subjective well-being measurement can therefore be characterised as a data revolution 
in search of a policy application. 
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However, wellbeing data has found new applications as part of the broader beyond GDP 
critique of the revealed preference assumptions of economic consumer choice theory, 
that has emerged within policymaking discourse alongside the behavioural economics 
revolution and the rise of positive psychology.17 In this context, wellbeing data is 
presented as a solution to the practical political problem of pricing diverse non-market 
goods in cost-benefit analysis (Frey et al. 2004), informing well-being based policy 
interventions that will address the hedonic failures of the market. Well-being data has 
found a new lease of life as a means of practically addressing criticisms of GDP through 
a scientifically robust demonstration of the gap between market prices and experienced 
utility. An increasingly influential use of this data is to derive accounting values for non-
market goods as an input into cost-benefit analysis (SIT 2011); this agenda will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
 
2.3 Assessing Beyond GDP: Managerialism and De-Growth Critique 
 
As we can see, the measurement reforms catalysed by the beyond GDP agenda go right 
to the heart of the question of what the economy is, raising questions about its 
ontological unity and borders with society and the environment, as well as about the 
meaning and extent of apparently core economic concepts like capital, value and 
production. Nevertheless, a comprehensive empirical investigation of the exact nature 
of the challenge posed by these reforms to economic theory, and how this challenge is 
managed by the global statistical and accounting community, has yet to be conducted. 
Mapping the nascent literature this agenda onto broader philosophical and 
epistemological positions on the role of quantification and measurement in the 
governance of economic life, we can identify two distinct positions in the literature on 
the beyond GPD agenda. Each of them, I suggest, is characterised by the assumption 
that accounting practice shares an identity with market-based economic reasoning. 
 
                                                 
17 Economists with a background in positive psychology, such as Richard Layard and Paul Dolan, have 
become key advisers to the UK government, while also gaining important roles in developing 
methodological guidelines for subjective wellbeing measurement internationally (Dolan and Metcalfe 
2012; O'Donnell et al. 2014). 
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Managerial Perspectives on Beyond GDP 
 
A first set of perspectives, ‘managerialism’, offer a cautiously optimistic perspective 
on the potential of beyond GDP measurement reforms to effect incremental yet 
transformative top-down change, which can overturn the growth paradigm in politics 
and development discourse. The economy is still often conflated with the market system 
in such literature, but ‘economic’ outcomes are to be nested within a broader multi-
dimensional information system in which the trade-offs between the ‘economic’ and 
‘non-economic’ (‘social’, ‘environmental’ or ‘political’) dimensions of progress become 
more transparent.  
 
Managerialist perspectives tend to originate in disciplines which are more positivist in 
orientation, originating in the work of accountants, statisticians or ecological 
economists, many of whom have been key to formulating the mature critique of GDP 
and inspiring the contemporary reform efforts. Consequently, they tend also to write 
with an advocacy voice (Costanza et al. 2009). In their political orientation, these 
accounts tends to be managerial and gradualist, focussing on institutional adjustments 
that can effect incremental change which amounts, over time, to a substantive paradigm 
shift in thinking about social progress (Chancel et al. 2014).  
 
The mechanism by which managerialist accounts imagine change away from an 
obsession with market-led economic growth being affected is often through incentive 
structures. Through a gradual re-wiring of the targets and performance metrics set in 
key decision-making sites, it is argued that this agenda can readjust the priorities that 
governments and businesses pursue. Donella Meadows, one of the authors of the Club 
of Rome’s original 1972 Limits to Growth report, which helped raised the profile of the 
critique of GDP and catalysed the search for alternative metrics, has argued (writing 
before the current agenda took shape) that: 
 
Changing indicators can be one of the most powerful and at the same time one of the 
easiest ways of making system changes—it does not require firing people, ripping up 
physical structures, inventing new technologies, or enforcing new regulations. It only 
requires delivering new information to new places…if there are good indicators of 
sustainable development, it will be almost impossible not to make decisions and take 
actions that make the indicators improve (Meadows 1998, 5). 
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On similar lines Kroll argues that ‘the possible consequence of the new sets of indicators 
if they are set up in a prominent position would be nothing less than a reorientation of 
politics in accordance with the information brought to light’ (Kroll 2011, 23). This is not 
to suggest that such accounts are politically naïve, or do not appreciate the scale of the 
challenges involved in contesting the hegemony of GDP in governance thinking. 
However they construct this relationship in a particular way: while GDP does present a 
formidable institutional orthodoxy, generating considerable inertia (Hayden and Wilson 
2016), this is largely due to its long-established position in the common-sense metrics 
used to assess governmental and business performance.  
 
These perspectives mobilise representationalist or descriptive (see Austin 1975, 1-3; 
Rorty 1989, 3-21) epistemological claims about the connection between statistics and 
reality. GDP, in this account, is akin to a vast information failure, which distorts political 
debate by putting a biased emphasis on the growth of the economy. Kroll, for instance, 
argues that measuring other dimensions of progress and displaying this information 
alongside information on ‘economic’ performance will be a ‘victory for evidenced-based 
policymaking’, and bring ‘more transparency and accountability’ (Kroll 2011, 23); while 
Whitby et al. suggest that ‘if our measurements are flawed or incomplete, decisions are 
likely to be distorted’ (Whitby et al. 2014, 13) This outlook is reflected in the preface to 
the Stiglitz report itself, which argued: ‘We have wound up mistaking…our 
representations of reality for reality itself. But reality always ends up having the last word’ 
(Stiglitz et al. 2010, ix). 
 
Consequently, debates about the political significance of beyond GDP reforms in this 
literature thus to be focused on methodological rigour: the aim is to develop ‘more 
robust’ measures, to gradually test and validate these, harmonising and standardising 
indicators until they gain credibility and comparability. This also provides an explanation 
for lack of change in these perspectives: beyond GDP measures simply need time to 
establish themselves as reliable and credible (Seaford 2014; Whitby et al. 2014); they will 
gradually diffuse as their validity is recognised, and with a sufficient supporting 
communications strategy (Whitby et al. 2014). It is pointed out, for instance, that the 
national accounts themselves went through a similarly experimental phase before their 
methodologies were harmonised and accepted (Lepenies 2016). 
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In this view beyond GDP reforms, in emphasising non-economic factors, by definition 
challenge the ideological hegemony of markets, as they allow governments and citizens 
to better understand the trade-offs between economic and non-economic objectives. 
Implicit in this perspective is that the beyond GDP reforms predominantly involve 
having less of the economy vis other spheres of life. Using the common metaphor of 
dimensionality Dheret, for instance, suggests that: 
 
[T]here is no single factor which determines well-being. An individual’s life satisfaction 
depends on a wide range of factors, which embrace health, labour-market participation, 
education, housing, security, income, work-life balance, working conditions, social 
relationships, access to public services, having a role in decision-making, etc….an 
individual’s sense of well-being depends on both economic and social factors (Dhéret 
2011, 2). 
 
Kubiszewski et al. similarly argue that: ‘Nations need indicators that measure progress 
towards achieving their goals - economic, social, and environmental. Standard economic 
indicators like gross domestic product (GDP) are useful for measuring just one limited 
aspect’ (Kubiszewski et al. 2013, 58). 
 
As such, the challenge to the very idea of the economy and its construction as an 
accounting and statistical object implied by moving beyond GPD is rarely a subject of 
analytical interest. The question is generally how they can best be mainstreamed into the 
day to day decision-making processes of powerful institutions (Chancel et al. 2014; 
Whitby et al. 2014; Bleys and Whitby 2015). What tends to be underplayed in these 
accounts is any sense that ‘the economy’ itself is an unstable, historical notion that 
changes over time and that does not constitute a realm constituted a priori of the ideas, 
modes of reasoning and measurement technologies used to understand it (Çalışkan and 
Callon 2009). Consequently, while a more inter-disciplinary, joined up policy-making 
process is advocated – supported by more ‘horizonal’ working across issues (Seaford 
2014) – this is only because economic objectives will play a less important role in policy 
deliberation. The economy is still understood to be largely a discrete domain of statistical 
representation; however, its scope and importance is seen as in urgent need of curtailing.  
 
To summarise, managerialist perspectives consider that the economy, understood as a 
largely self-contained system of markets, can continue to be construed as a discrete 
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dimension of governmental intervention, understood using the market-centric analytical 
tools and concepts of post-neoclassical economics. GDP and the national accounts will 
continue to represent this object. However, the importance of the growth of the 
economy needs to nested within a richer, multi-dimensional picture of human well-
being. Through bringing non-market metrics into public and private incentive structures 
and decision-making systems, the growth of the market economy will be placed on parity 
with other ‘non-economic’ goals. Such perspectives thus downplay the challenge that is 
implied by beyond GDP accounting reforms to the historical theoretical categories and 
assumptions that allow the economy to be constructed as a ‘dimension’ of existence 
(that can grow or shrink) in the first place. As we have seen above, however, moving 
beyond GDP has created a series of initiatives and reforms that pose radical questions 
about the boundaries it draws between the economy and society or nature, and the 
unitary ontological vision of the economy that the national accounts are based upon.  
 
De-Growth and Critical Accounting Perspectives on Beyond GDP 
 
The second broad set of perspectives on the beyond GDP programme – originating in 
the ‘de-growth’ political theory (Latouche 2009) and critical accounting studies 
(Carter and Toms 2010) – are much more radical in their assessment of the ideational 
changes needed to move beyond the growth paradigm. Unlike managerialist accounts, 
they insist that moving beyond GDP must involve problematising the naturalistic 
conceptual categories and language market-based economic theory used to frame 
political economic problems. However, they tend to assume that the translation of the 
beyond GDP agenda into accounting systems and methodologies can offer no resources 
in this broader problematisation of economic knowledge and the language of the market. 
Two aspects of this can be detected: firstly, the scepticism in de-growth accounts that 
the challenge to economic renderings of political problems can come from centralised 
or globalist institutions; and secondly, the general assumption in critical accounting 
studies that accounting technologies necessarily support economistic, market-based 
reasoning. 
 
Unlike the managerialist mainstream, the political philosophy of ‘de-growth’ (Latouche 
2009; D'alisa et al. 2014) does have at its core a fundamental critique of market-centric 
understanding of economy and society, and the constraints this ideational structure 
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exercises on political discourse. Takis Fotopoulos, for instance, suggests that de-growth 
politics ‘implies going beyond the economy by challenging its domination of present life, 
in theory and in practice, and above all in our mind’ (Fotopoulos 2007, 2). Similarly, 
Valerie Fournier has argued that:  
 
[T]he movement’s main emphasis is not merely on calling for less growth, consumption 
or production, but more fundamentally, in inviting one to shift and re‐politicise the terms 
in which economic relations and identities are considered …  it is first and foremost about 
providing a critique of the economy and its colonising effect, and pointing to escape 
routes … maybe the main contribution of the degrowth movement to environmental 
politics and debates is that through its emphasis on ‘‘escaping from the economy’’ it 
provides both conceptual and practical strategies for challenging the growth economy 
(Fournier 2008, 528). 
 
Thus, clearly de-growth perspectives are interested in the wider ideational 
transformation involved in moving beyond the growth paradigm and the challenges it 
represents to the dominance of economic theory in political life. 
 
However, de-growth literature in general argues that the locus for this transformation 
must be local. Transition to a democratic de-growth politics must be effected through a 
re-localisation of economic decision-making and citizenship (e.g. Latouche 2009; Rees 
2015, 43-52). The spatial and political imaginary of de-growth politics therefore 
contrasts the local and the communal with a liberal globalist imaginary that is incapable 
of delivering this transformation in the terms of economic discourse (Fioramonti 2013; 
Quilley 2013, 119-144). As such, de-growth perspectives on the beyond GDP agenda 
tend to mobilise a spatial metaphor that John Law has described as ‘romantic 
complexity’ (Law 2004), which contrasts the complex and global with the simple and 
local (see also Law and Hetherington 2000; Brassett and Higgott 2003). Law has argued 
that this focuses attention away from the way the categories of political space are 
constructed and contested, and should be replaced by a more ‘baroque’ sense of the 
global in which ‘there is no final coherence. There is no system, global order, or 
network…Instead there are local complexities and local globalities’ (Law 2004, 24).  
 
In consequence, national accounting and centralised statistical systems are rarely 
explored as potential resources which may promote the shift away from the market-
centric vision of the economy which dominates political discourse. Fioramonti, for 
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instance, largely dismisses beyond GDP accounting reforms as a technocratic fix, 
arguing that genuine political alternatives to GDP growth must come ‘from below’ 
(Fioramonti 2013, 82-144). Furthermore, beyond GPD accounting efforts are generally 
dismissed as window-dressing or a PR exercise: ‘a smokescreen exercise to “humanize” 
statistical accounting’ (ibid, 114), and one indeed through which ‘the market mentality 
has expanded its reach’ (ibid, 116). Such an attitude generally precludes a fine-grained 
empirical investigation of the methodological debates and changes in accounting 
reasoning that accompany such changes. 
 
The suspicion of de-growth perspectives towards the beyond GDP agenda reflects a 
broader critical hostility to quantification and accounting rationality. It is rooted in a 
long critical lineage which implicates quantification, measurement and calculation in 
rationalistic, impersonal, abstract logics of power unique to post-enlightenment society 
– both within the modern bureaucratic state and the disciplinary accounting technologies 
of capitalist enterprise (Miller 1990; Klamer and McCloskey 1992; Miller and Napier 
1993; Porter 2001).  
 
This assumption of an identity between accounting practice and economic reasoning 
can be seen in early historicist sociological work on the origins of capitalism. Weber and 
Sombart both emphasised the importance of techniques such as double-entry 
bookkeeping to the rise of the capitalist mentality, and the centrality of impersonal 
measurement systems to the rationalistic ‘iron cage’ of modern bureaucracy (Weber 2004 
[1905]; Chiapello 2007). This suspicion of quantification tout court is reflected in many 
later critical and anti-capitalist traditions, including much Frankfurt School (Horkheimer 
2013 [1947], 58-59; Marcuse 2013, 168; 236) and later autonomist and post-Marxist 
literature – which sees the escape from capitalist forms of work as predicated on the 
crisis of capitalist accounting and measurement that immaterial labour has created 
(Hardt and Negri 2005; Spence and Carter 2011). The attitude of the critical theorist 
Andre Gorz is instructive: 
 
Economic rationalisation begins with counting and calculating. So long as they are not 
subjected to it, human activities are free from economic rationality: they are at one with 
the time, movement, and rhythm of life…from the moment I am no longer producing 
for my own consumption but for the market, everything changes. Then I need to learn 
to calculate…Calculation allowed an emancipation from all external tutelage while at the 
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same time generating an order against whose objective laws there was no appeal (Gorz 
1989, 109-112). 
 
Since quantification in general can only further depoliticise the process of economic 
governance, re-locating it away from the immediate lived experiences of individuals and 
into centres of rationalised calculation, statistics offer no real route to contesting or 
destabilising market-based expertise or formalist reasoning on economic matters. 
Indeed, in reproducing the idea of the social world as amenable to quantified control 
and measurement, they further entrench many of the tenets of abstract, market-based 
thinking about the economy and help extend this reasoning to new areas of social life.  
 
More recently, since the 1980s, quantified targets and indicators have been viewed as a 
form of political technology particularly suited to neoliberal, market-based modes of 
governance. They fit with a culture of auditing (Power 1997) and a managerial obsession 
with targets and performance metrics (Power 2004a) characteristic of the extension of 
competitive market logics into new areas of life and the privatisation of public activities. 
This means that quantification is considered mainly in terms of a technocratic tool which 
serves to de-politicise economic knowledge, extend market-based, financialised notions 
of value, and thus entrench broader neoliberal governing logics (Miller and Rose 1990; 
Rose 1991; Miller 2008; Lehtonen 2015). For instance, Merry and Conley argue that: 
 
The deployment of statistical measures tends to replace political debate with technical 
expertise. The growing reliance on indicators provides an example of the dissemination 
of the corporate form of thinking and governance into broader social spheres. (Merry and 
Conley 2011, 83). 
 
Applied to the sphere of statistics at the level of global governance, they are implicated 
in a form of state ranking and surveillance which internalises and propagates liberal 
norms and penalises states which may attempt to take a course which diverges from 
deregulatory, free market principles, and which generally reconstitute states as 
competing destinations for capital investment (Monk 2002; Löwenheim 2008; Davis et 
al. 2012; Broome and Quirk 2015; Kelley and Simmons 2015). 
 
This critical orientation has been applied to almost all of the specific planks of the 
beyond GDP agenda, despite their ostensible aim of challenging the hegemony of 
market-based measures of performance. This general perspective can be detected in 
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analyses of the rise of wellbeing data (Binkley 2011; Wright 2013; Davies 2015a, 2015b), 
the measurement and valuation of environmental sustainability (Rydin 2007; Bell and 
Morse 2008; Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011) and human capital (Van Doorn 
2014), health indicators (Wahlberg and Rose 2015) and attempts to measure poverty and 
inequality (Ilcan and Lacey 2011, 64-65). 
 
My contention is not that these critiques are wrong per se – the intimate connections 
between calculation and accounting technologies and the rise of capitalist rationality are 
well-established and clear – but they tend to preclude a finer understanding of the 
surprising, contradictory logics at work in the way beyond GDP statistical reforms are 
re-constructing the relationship between accounting practice and economic forms of 
reasoning. They underplay the contradictory and often re-politicising (Porter 1996; Barry 
2002; Desrosières 2015) results of the technical implementation of such reforms.  
 
They also tend to assume that attempts to translate beyond GDP measurement concepts 
into the language of the market will work. The assumption is that economic theory has 
the technical and practical means to colonise ever more areas of life, including through 
the extension of measurement to apparently non-market issues. While, as the evidence 
I develop in this thesis shows, it is undoubtedly true that the demands and assumptions 
of market-based analysis do play a role in conditioning the implementation of this 
agenda, this perspective stops us from understanding how the very efforts to extend 
market concepts into new domains and fields of governance (and the limited and partial 
nature of these accommodations) creates important resources for contesting and 
politicising our understandings of the economic process. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the central critiques of GDP that have emerged since 
the formation of the UN SNA in the 1950s. We then saw how these have been 
formulated into a mainstream governance agenda, that is posing new challenges for 
national accounting systems and the market-based assumptions about the economy on 
which they are built. However, neither of the two predominant perspectives on beyond 
GDP politics have investigated how fundamentally these statistical reforms are 
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challenging market-based understandings of the human economy and the historical 
concepts and assumptions which underpin this vision.  
 
In the managerialist vision, this broader challenge to the terms and categories through 
which ‘the economy’ is naturalised as a discrete field of existence is assumed to be 
unnecessary. Through supplementing measures of economic growth with a richer set of 
indicators, beyond GDP reforms necessarily contest the hegemony of the market in 
political life, allowing a richer democratic discussion over the blend of social, economic 
and environmental goods that will provide optimal sustainable wellbeing. Moreover, 
they can help us deliver this version of the good life through re-calibrating the metrics 
and incentives that structure institutional incentives and decision-making processes. 
Against this, critical scholars warn that statistical and accounting systems are necessarily 
depoliticising and impersonal form of governance, implicated in the abstract, rationalist 
modern schemes of thought which reproduce and naturalise formal market-based 
assumptions about the world. From such a perspective, the translation of the radical 
potential of beyond GDP politics into the technocratic terms and categories of national 
accounting systems can only serve to co-opt the movement and undermine the 
prospects of a more fundamental democratisation and localisation of economic life. 
 
As a consequence, we still lack qualitatively rich understanding of the ways in which 
these accounting and statistical initiatives are reconfiguring ‘the economy’ as a site of 
governmental knowledge. In the next chapter, I introduce Polanyi’s historical 
perspective on the place of economy in society as a means of grounding such an 
investigation. The Polanyian approach I develop suggests that achieving the goals that 
the beyond GDP agenda has set itself will demand a wider ideational transformation in 
the very understanding and conception of what the economy is, and its status as a 
discrete realm of price-forming markets. Polanyi saw this shift in thinking as essential to 
recovering a substantive sense of the economy and the proper place of market exchange 
in economic processes. However, he also believed that accounting practices and 
valuation could play a foundational role in this transition. His work thus gives us a set 
of criteria for assessing whether beyond GDP reforms challenge market-centric modes 
of economic reasoning. This sets up the empirical contribution of the thesis, developed 
in the remaining chapters, by analysing to extent to which the practical implementation 
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of the beyond GPD agenda is problematising this historical understanding of the 
economy and its statistical construction.  
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3. Freedom from the Economy: A Polanyian Framework for 
Assessing Beyond GDP Accounting Reform 
 
 
In this chapter, I present a framework to evaluate the challenge efforts to move beyond 
GDP represent to the theoretical idea of the economy constructed by market-centric 
theory. I ground this in Karl Polanyi’s critique of the intellectual legacy of market society 
(Polanyi 1968, 1977, 2001 [1944]). As we saw in chapter 2, in the existing literature there 
has yet to be a sustained investigation of the challenge to the market-based view of 
economy which these accounting reforms present. Yet this agenda has been 
characterised by struggles about the very meaning and boundaries of the economy. 
Tensions over what is included ‘inside’ the economy and what things fall outside of it 
are at the heart of contemporary debates about how we conceptualise progress in 
contemporary societies. In this chapter I therefore make the case for the value of 
understanding the agenda through an engagement with Polanyi’s critique of the ‘market 
mentality’, and the impact of post-GDP accounting on the assumptions which underpin 
this view of the economy. 
 
To develop this approach, I draw upon recent currents in Polanyian literature that have 
placed greater emphasis on the ideational aspects of Polanyi’s critique of markets 
(Watson 2005; Dale 2010; Block and Somers 2014; Holmes 2018). These are drawn 
upon to suggest that a Polanyian approach to moving beyond GDP requires moving 
beyond the structure of thought that equates the human economy with the market 
system, and the assumptions about human nature that accompanied this vision. 
However, Polanyi’s work also emphasises how accounting and monetary valuation can 
play a role in such a transformation in economic reasoning (Polanyi 2016 [1922]). The 
empirical contribution in the remainder of the thesis is thus to provides an in-depth 
assessment of how far beyond GDP reforms to national accounting are exposing the 
need for this more fundamental re-assessment of the nature of the economy. 
 
In the first section, I introduce my reading of Polanyi’s thought and situate this in the 
secondary literature on Polanyi’s ideas. I show how there has been a turn to emphasising 
Polanyi’s later comparative and historical work on economic institutions, over his 
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analysis of the dis-embedding of the market system in The Great Transformation (Block 
2003; Watson 2014a). Polanyi’s work has increasingly been read as a critique of the 
universalisation of forms of economic reasoning developed to understand the 
historically contingent institutions and norms of Western market societies (Holmes 
2014). In this context, I introduce the important distinction Polanyi drew between 
‘formalist’ and ‘substantive’ representations of the economy which underpins the 
remainder of the thesis. I suggest that Polanyi’s work was centrally concerned with 
overcoming the distorting picture of human society reproduced by ‘formalist’ forms of 
economic thinking, which narrowed understandings of economic relations to the 
process of means-end calculations under scarcity conditions (Polanyi 1968, 142-148). 
When market-based modes of reasoning are generalised, they narrow societies’ sense of 
political agency and impoverish the social imagination. Thus, a Polanyian reading of the 
agenda suggests that it will be impossible to fulfil the objectives it has set itself without 
problematising this broader vision of economy and humanity on which it rests. A project 
to move ‘beyond GDP’ must involve moving beyond the structure of language and 
representation that create ‘the economy’ as a distinct field of governmental reasoning. 
 
In the second section, I unpack in more depth what recovering a ‘substantive’ vision of 
the economy demands. I show how formalist reasoning, in Polanyi’s thought, rests on 
an ‘economistic fallacy’ (Polanyi 1977, 5): a complex of assumptions about economy and 
society that make it possible to conceive of the economic process as a closed, law-bound 
system of market transactions. In particular, I identify four characteristic features of this 
way of thinking: firstly, it assumes that the economy is an autonomous, self-adjusting 
system possessing internal ontological unity; secondly, this unity rests on upholding a 
boundary between the economic and the non-economic sphere of life; thirdly, it 
naturalises a view of money as functioning purely to facilitate market exchanges, 
therefore precluding the independent use of money as a unit of account; finally, it is 
associated with a naturalistic and hedonic vision of human nature, which reduces 
economic behaviour to a rational behaviour in response to price stimuli and conflates 
‘value’ and price with utility.  Finally, I show how beyond GDP reforms to the 
production of the national accounts increasingly challenge their ability to uphold the 
economistic fallacy. Thus, beyond GDP reforms are increasingly at odds with some of 
the fundamental tenets of ‘formalist’ economic theory. This chapter thereby sets up the 
remainder of the thesis and its substantive contribution.  
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3.1 Pathologies of the ‘Market Mentality’: Polanyi and the Critique of 
‘Formalist’ Economic Thought 
 
In this section I outline and situate Polanyi’s critique of economic ideas and economistic 
modes of reasoning, and the effects of these in disciplining how political and ethical 
problems are understood. Firstly, I make the broad case for understanding Polanyi’s 
work in terms of the political effect of economic ideas, locating this both in relation to 
wider contemporary currents in political economy and economic sociology and the 
secondary literature on Polanyi. Secondly, I unpack Polanyi’s key distinction between 
formalist and substantive definitions of the economy, and the various pathologies which 
he ascribed to formalist modes of reasoning. Thus, I show how the question of what 
‘the economy’ is, and how it emerged as a discrete and separately instituted field of 
human action and reasoning, lies at the core of Polanyi’s thought. 
 
Polanyi as a Critic of Economic Ideas 
 
Before we proceed to discuss Polanyi’s account of how the modern conception of the 
economy came into being, and to specify the distinctive features which he saw as 
accompanying this historically unprecedented intellectual development, it is thus helpful 
to briefly locate Polanyi’s work within the broader history of economic thought. The 
economy emerged as a distinct object of theoretical speculation only with the rise of 
commercial society (Backhouse 2002); before that thinking on economic matters was 
bound up with moral and theological discussions, particularly natural law and just price 
theory (Foucault 2010). In the 17th century, with the rise of commercial society and the 
first global commodity markets, this evolved into a distinctive mode of governmental 
reason concerned with maximising the power of the sovereign, associated with 
mercantilism. Classical political economy was thus grounded within these broader 
currents of thought, partly as a solution to the post-Hobbesian question of what holds 
society together and partly evolving out of theological ideas of ‘nature’ and the natural 
order (Tawney 1920, 8-19). Liberal theory secularised these ideas, through the harmony 
of human reason with a just natural order. In the work of Smith, economics thus remains 
inseparable from moral philosophy (Smith 2010 [1759]; Watson 2012).  
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Gradually, over the course of the 19th century, mainstream economic theory became 
more formal and deductive (Yonay 1998; Watson 2018). The empirical, ethnographic 
richness of Smith’s work evolved into the faceless workers, capitalists and landowners 
of Ricardo, and mathematical reasoning gradually replaced empirical and historical 
analysis. This process was further advanced by the development of marginalism in the 
late 19th century (Howey 1960). Many different strands of thought emerged in reaction 
to this development. A heterodox tradition emerged with the German Historical School, 
institutional analysis (with the work of Veblen and later Commons), and the sociological 
approach of Weber, Simmel and Tonnies (see Dale 2011a; 2016b, 13-54), who sought 
to show how modern capitalism came into being as a result of ideational and ethical 
shifts associated with the European reformation.18 In the late nineteenth century there 
thus appear two traditions of economic analysis: one, which came to be called simply 
‘economics’, was based on marginal utility theory and the notion of equilibrium and 
viewed the economy as a natural, ordered and rule-bound system (Dale 2018); the other 
sought to locate the market system in the historical, social, political and institutional 
context within which the appearance of an economic realm became possible.  
 
Polanyi sits within this second tradition of economic thought, synthesising many of its 
aspects and drawing eclectically from other intellectual resources such as economic 
anthropology (Dale 2016a, 2016b). He understood the economy as a historically specific 
and contingent creation, and as inseparable from broader political and social institutions 
(Cangiani 2011). He insisted on taking a broad historical perspective, and refused to 
accept the notion of economic behaviour as fully reducible to the question of rational 
decision making in response to price signals (Watson 2005, 141-160). But he was eclectic 
in re-interpreting the theoretical currents which informed his thinking. For instance, 
while he took from Marx’s earlier work the humanist ethical critique of the institution 
of wage labour, he combined this with a functionalist approach to society, understanding 
that there are social imperatives which transcend class interests and how class 
movements can take on, in given historical moments, a wider protective function (Dale 
2011b). Furthermore, he accepted marginalism within the confines of market society, contra 
the Marxian labour theory of value, but argued this understanding is only valid within 
the institutional conditions particular to this historical formation.   
                                                 
18 Marx of course also offered a radical critique of the assumptions of classical ‘bourgeois’ political 
economy, through accepting and inverting many of the categories and distinctions it was built upon. 
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Polanyi thus understood the economy as a distinctly modern construction, rooted in the 
idea of interlinked and self-adjusting markets for all factors of production (Polanyi 2001 
[1944], 71-80). But there are two different ways in which the significance of this 
construction can be understood: at the level of historical fact – that is, analysing the 
actual emergence of a dis-embedded and self-regulating market system as a successfully 
ontological accomplishment – and at the level of theoretical representation, as a parallel 
ideational response to certain historical tendencies, leading to the development of a body 
of theory and common sense understandings, a complex nexus of ideas about human 
nature and society. The relationship between these two different aspects of the creation 
of market society in Polanyi’s work is complex and requires clarification. In particular, 
it is important to distinguish the effects of this idea of the economy and its 
representation from the analysis of the historical developments which gave rise to it.  
 
Drawing upon recent interpretations of Polanyi (Block and Somers 2014; Holmes 2014), 
I argue his work is best interpreted as implying that ontological dis-embeddedness is 
never fully achieved, but that epistemic dis-embeddedness creates powerful effects, 
making it possible to produce representations of the economy as a distinct object or 
sphere (Block and Somers 2014). This interpretation is based upon the argument that 
there is a tension between the ‘ontological’ conception of the dis-embedded economy 
emphasised in The Great Transformation and the ‘ideational’ focus of his later work (see 
Block 2003). This move is made mainly to avoid the difficulties which arise from 
considering Polanyi’s empirical and historical account of the rise of market society in the 
19th century alongside his later work on comparative economic institutions (Holmes 
2010).  
 
Concerning the first of these, Polanyi is widely associated with developing the concept 
of the ‘dis-embedding’ of the market system from its social moorings over the course of 
the 19th century, and the protective ‘double movements’ which emerged to protect 
society against the consequences of commodification. In The Great Transformation, 
Polanyi described the historical development of market society and linked this to the 
commodification of the key factors of production: land, labour and money (Polanyi 2001 
[1944], 71-80). These, according to Polanyi are ‘fictitious commodities’, in the sense that 
they are not produced for sale on the market. But they must be treated as commodities 
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like any other for the idea of a society integrated purely by the mechanism of market 
prices to function. This fiction can never succeed for any length of time, however, 
because it results in the organic substance of society being subjected to the whims of 
market forces (ibid, 136-40). This argument is mobilised to oppose the liberal 
interpretation of the rise of protectionist institutions and policies in the late 19th century 
as a conspiracy on the part of vested interests which guaranteed laissez faire principles 
were never in fact truly put into practice (ibid, 218-228). Rather, they are impossible to 
ever realise due to their utopian nature and the fact that they rely on extensive political 
intervention to bring into being in the first place. This ‘utopian’ project of an economy 
free of political regulation provokes an inevitable and spontaneous response: a ‘double 
movement’ on the part of society as it moves to protect itself from the strains this 
produces. Such a movement (in opposition to some strands of Marxism) transcended 
the narrow interests of any single economic class.19 
 
This what I will call the ‘ontological’ components of Polanyi’s critique of market society. 
The implications of this argument about the rise of market society have proved 
enormously problematic and have provoked a prolonged debate in economic sociology, 
economic anthropology and recent Polanyian scholarship (Krippner 2002; Gemici 
2008). I will not attempt to extensively review this debate. The crux of it focuses around 
whether this movement – to commodify the factors of production and produce a self-
regulating market system in which society itself became embedded – was ever actually 
accomplished in historical reality, and the precise nature and timing of the double 
movement against it (Dale 2010, 188-206). On the one hand, economic sociologists have 
argued that the economy, even in modern market societies, is still interwoven into social 
and cultural ties and supported by non-economic institutions Thus, at no point could 
the economy have been ‘really’ dis-embedded, as Polanyi is purported to have claimed.20 
                                                 
19 This point should not be overstated. In the work of Marx and Engels, the working class was posited as 
advancing universal interests, and contemporary Marxist social movement theory has developed more 
nuanced accounts of class alliances, coalitions and cleavages that move beyond earlier accounts of binary 
class struggle.  
20 The claim of dis-embedding is ambiguous, especially in later writing. For instance, in a 1947 essay he 
argued that ‘in actual fact, man was never as selfish as the theory demanded…In vain was he exhorted by 
economists and utilitarian moralists alike to discount in business all other motives that “material” ones. 
On closer inspection, he was still found to be acting on remarkably “mixed” motives…[and] maybe, 
secretly, even enjoying work for its own sake’ (Polanyi 1968, 69).  
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On the other hand, economic anthropologists have suggested that the pre-capitalist 
economy was never as ‘embedded’ as Polanyi has claimed, that markets had a more 
independent existence in pre-commercial society than implied by the idea of a 
historically unprecedented dis-embedding in Polanyi’s account (see also Holmes 2010, 
44-57). These problems highlight the limitations of dis-embeddedness understood at the 
ontological level.  
 
However, this does not invalidate Polanyi’s arguments about the ‘ideational’ 
consequences of the transformation to market society. Polanyi can be read as primarily 
concerned with understanding the interaction between the historical and institutional 
developments associated with the rise of commodity markets and the evolution of 
market-bound representations about human nature and society which emerged in 
tandem with these. It is these representations, how they came about, and their political  
consequences, that he is concerned with understanding, particularly in his later work 
while in the USA in the 1950s (Dale 2016a, 200-255). As he argued in The Livelihood of 
Man: 
 
[O]nce man’s everyday activities have been organized through markets of various kinds, 
based on profit motives, determined by competitive attitudes, and governed by a 
utilitarian value scale, his society becomes an organism that is, in all essential regards, 
subservient to gainful purposes. Having thus absolutized the motive of economic gain in 
practice, he loses the capacity of mentally relativizing it again. His imagination is bounded 
by stultifying limits…Not the permanent and abiding features of all human economies 
but the merely transitory and contingent ones appear to him as the essentials…Such 
obsessive economy-centred notions, reflecting time bound conditions, must prove a 
hindrance to the solution of wider problems, including those of the adjustment of the 
economy to new social surroundings (Polanyi 1977, xlvi-xlvii). 
 
Such a passage gets to the heart of the tension described above. On the one hand, it 
could be read as suggesting that the institutional structures of market society did achieve 
a dis-embedded state. But another reading is that theoretical and ideational 
developments were internal to the process of creating a market society in the first place: 
the values created by certain representations of these emerging institutions participated 
in their construction and solidification. Economic theory and ideas thus become 
constitutive. 
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Polanyi was thus centrally concerned with understanding not only how the idea of the 
economy came about in the first place, but also how this construction conditions ethical 
and political projects to think past the market-orientated view of human nature and 
society engendered by economic theory (see Holmes 2013). A key aspect of his thought 
was an attempt to uncover and analyse the normative implications of taking a contingent 
set of institutions and socialised norms as the basis for a universal scientific model of 
human society, and how this placed artificial limits on political and ethical projects 
aiming to transcend the confines set by market society. He was among the first theorists 
to critique the conditions set by economistic representations of the world on political 
reasoning and discourse. 
 
Situating Polanyi in Contemporary Political Economy Scholarship 
 
Read in this way, we can relate Polanyi’s work to various modern trends in political 
economy and IPE scholarship. For instance, there has been a trend towards questioning 
the starting point of IPE in Susan Strange’s work (Strange 1975), as it naturalises the 
field of the economy even as it seeks to problematise a narrow focus on national 
economies in isolation from geopolitics and the international order (Watson 2005; 
Rosamond and Clift 2009). This recovery of the holistic classical political sensibility has 
sometimes been referred to as ‘pre-disciplinary’ or even ‘post-disciplinary’ IPE (Jessop 
and Sum 2001), or as ‘moral economy’ (Sayer 2000); indeed, the rise in popularity of 
Polanyi’s work in recent decades partly reflects these wider theoretical currents. 
Likewise, Polanyi’s insistence that the economy must be understood in relation to the 
cultural and social processes it is imbricated in marries with the literature on cultural 
political economy, ‘everyday IPE’ and feminist political economy (Waring 1988; Marilyn 
Power 2004b; Hobson and Seabrooke 2009; Best and Paterson 2010) Elsewhere, these 
shifts are mirrored in disciplines such as economic anthropology, for example in the 
‘human economy’ project which is also influenced by Polanyi’s work (Hart et al. 2010; 
Graeber 2014).  
 
This constructivist (Abdelal 2009) and historicist orientation to the politics of economic 
ideas also tallies with recent moves towards viewing economic theory as ‘performative’ 
of economic reality (Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2008; Butler 2010). In this literature, the 
emphasis is not on how economic theory is wrong or right in its representation of the 
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world, but how this representation produces effects, constructing and remaking the 
world in its image (Mitchell 2005; Muniesa 2014). Polanyi directly foreshadowed 
performative understanding of economic theory avant la lettre, suggesting that: 
‘indisputably the social sciences have a massive influence on man’s wishes and 
purposes…by creating the very phenomena on the existence of which they were 
insisting – such as the utilitarian psychology of the businessman’ (Polanyi 2014, 114-
115).  Indeed, foundational works of this tradition cite Polanyi as inspiration (Callon 
1998, 2; Mitchell 2008, 118; Çalışkan and Callon 2009, 370; Butler 2010, 148). These 
literatures, in line with Polanyi, suggest that the notion of ‘the economy’ is a remarkably 
recent and unstable achievement associated with a certain view of human nature and 
society which emerged in the 18th century and was subsequently solidified and 
reproduced by (among other things) official statistical and accounting systems, 
econometric modelling, macroeconomic management and development expertise by the 
20th (Hirschmann 2016). They help supplement Polanyian theory with an appreciation 
of how the theories, ideas and methods which produce this reality are always suspended 
within the substrate of socio-technical practices (see Latour 1990, 1993; Butler 2010).  
 
Freedom from the Economy: The Pathologies of Formalism 
 
We have established that, for Polanyi, the question of what the economy is for cannot be 
separated from the definitional question of what the economy is. Crucial to reading 
Polanyi in this way is the distinction he draws between two different definitions of the 
economic system: formalist and substantive (Polanyi 1968, 142-57).21  
 
Polanyi argued that the central logical error of 19th century economic rationalism was 
to equate human economy in general with its historically recent market form. This he 
termed the ‘economistic fallacy’ (Polanyi 1977, 5). The classical theorists imagined that 
they were developing universal and timeless laws, which once specified would be 
applicable to economic institutions in all places and times. But, in reality, they had only 
theorised the economy in the historically unique market form in which it manifested 
itself in Western societies in the wake of the industrial revolution. In making this point, 
                                                 
21 These terms were of Weberian heritage but were given an idiosyncratic meaning in Polanyi’s writings 
(see Dale 2010, 109). 
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Polanyi elaborated two distinct definitions of the word ‘economy’: the substantive and 
the formal (Holton 1992; Dale 2010).  
 
The substantive definition of economy referred to ‘the elemental fact that human beings, 
like all other things, cannot exist for any length of time without a physical environment 
that sustains them...Man’s patent dependence for his livelihood upon nature and his 
fellows’ (Polanyi 1977, 19-20). To study the economy in the substantive sense therefore 
meant to study the ‘institutionalised interaction between [man] and his natural 
surroundings’ (Polanyi 1977, 20). This mode of inquiry left questions of the ends to 
which economic institutions were directed and their moral and political underpinnings 
open. On this basis he went on to specify four ideal-type ‘modes of integration’ through 
which economic production has been embedded in social relationships historically: 
institutions based on the logic of reciprocity, redistribution, house-holding or exchange 
(Polanyi 1966). 
 
The formal definition, on the other hand, restricts the meaning of the economy to the 
calculation of the optimum use of resources under conditions of scarcity, and so can 
only conceive of economic institutions based on the logic of exchange. This mirrors the 
neoclassical conception, most famously articulated by Robbins (Robbins 2008 [1934], 
75). Under this definition, markets are spontaneously self-generating given the 
inevitability of scarcity. Polanyi thought this idea of a distinctly economic incentive 
originating in the motivations of hunger and gain provoked by the reality of scarcity was 
only empirically permissible within the historically recent conditions of market society. 
It was only once market structures based on exchange had been made the basis of society 
that such motives became dominant.  
 
However, Polanyi’s central argument was not simply that the formalist perspective was 
‘wrong’, but rather that it produced an idea of humanity which constricted our political 
imagination. He criticised this understanding of the economy for closing off broader 
moral and political questions that are inseparable from economic life, an impermissible 
‘eclipse of political thinking’, through which questions of ‘what should be the end of 
man, and how should he choose his means’ were circumvented (Polanyi 1977: 13). There 
were, for Polanyi, thus both analytical and political justifications for contesting the 
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restriction of our understanding of the economy to formalist terms, despite the ‘logically 
irresistible’ (ibid) appeal of such parsimony. 
 
Polanyi’s central critique of formalism was that it hinders our ability to think creatively 
and holistically about the problems of complex (post-)industrial civilisation, restricting 
political imagination and ethical agency (Polanyi 1968, 59-77). Thus, political projects 
which retain it will reproduce these pathologies, and be unable to step outside the 
discursive and ideational limits of market society. As an example, take the contemporary 
crisis of care and demographic transition to an older population. If the commodity 
understanding of ‘work’ and production is assumed, then there is no way of seeing 
possible solutions to this problem that look beyond the expansion of wage labour (Gorz 
1989; Lutz 2017; Tronto 2017). Community-based service provision or the 
redistribution of working time to make space for care outside the market cannot be 
considered as ‘economic’ solutions at all. Such policies must necessarily harm ‘the 
economy’, if it is assumed to consist only of price forming markets extended to labour, 
nature and money. As Polanyi argued:  
 
Only since the market was permitted to grind the human fabric of society in to the 
uniformity of selenic erosion has man’s institutional creativeness been in abeyance. No 
wonder that his social imagination shows signs of fatigue (Polanyi, 1968, 71-2). 
 
The market vision of economy restricts analytical and imaginative space for institutional 
and political experimentation (Block and Somers 2014, 58-72), and so has deleterious 
effects on political discourse and democratic life; it also precludes solutions to problems 
that are at the very heart of the beyond GDP agenda.  
 
Hence, we need not to just question the empirical objective of ‘growth’, but the broader 
mode of thinking about the economy itself which makes it possible to conceive of the 
economy as a discrete object that can grow, and the forms of reasoning which reproduce 
this. To fulfil the aspirations of the beyond GDP agenda, a different understanding of 
what the economy is would be needed. We would need to recover a form of economic 
reasoning that re-integrates the political and the economic, that dissolves the idea of the 
economy as a contained, autonomous realm of markets which can be analysed as a 
natural-scientific process, using foundationalist and deductive reasoning. Without this, 
we will not be able to think clearly about the ‘urgent problems [that] spring from the 
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need of adjusting the forms of our social life to the technology we have adopted’ (Polanyi 
2014, 48). Indeed, ‘such an endeavour cannot be successful unless it is disciplines by a 
total view of man and society very different from that we have inherited from market 
economy (Polanyi 1968, 77). 
 
3.2 Escaping the Market Mentality: Criteria for Recovering a 
‘Substantive’ View of Economy 
 
Before operationalising this framework as a means of analysing the implementation of 
the beyond GDP accounting and statistical agenda, we need to first unpack in greater 
depths the specific forms of economistic fallacy that, for Polanyi, underpinned formalist 
thinking. Then, we will be in a position to assess how far the implantation of this agenda 
reproduces or contests these premises and assumptions. In this section I outline the key 
features that Polanyi saw as distinctive about the place of economy in modern society 
and the ‘market mentality’ which developed as a theoretical response to these. In 
particular, I will show that there are four distinctive features of the formalist 
representation of the economy which emerged in response to the rise of market society 
from the late 18th century. Specifically, these are: 1) the idea of the economy as a self-
regulating internally sufficient system of exchange co-ordinated through the price 
mechanism; 2) the corresponding separation of the economic from both the political 
and the social spheres of society; 3) the reduction of the conception of the use of money 
to its role in commodity exchange, thus ignoring its other social functions; 4) the 
identification of a distinctly ‘economic’ or ‘material’ component of human nature, 
namely rational utility maximisation under conditions of scarcity, and the reduction of 
such behaviour to the automatic response to price stimuli at the moment of exchange.  
 
Economy: Neither Autonomous nor Unitary 
 
In this first section we will deal with the first and most crucial feature of formalist 
thought: the idea of economy as an ontologically unified and autonomous sphere, 
subject to natural scientific analysis and theory (Polanyi 1968, 59-77).  
 
This vision was linked to the generalisation of the exchange process, which gave the 
appearance that the economy was completely enclosed within the system of inter-
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locking price-forming markets – a system which, of course, in fact took considerable 
political action to create (Watson 2005, 143-6). Moreover, monetary resources could 
now be considered as commensurable and fungible units of value, so that the economy 
became a system which could be summed up into an overall aggregate representation. 
As Polanyi argued: ‘The properties of unity and stability, structure and function, history 
and policy accrue to the economy through its institutional vestment’ (Polanyi 1977, 30). 
This appearance of unity was made possible by the extension of the market system to 
labour, money and land during the 18th century. This enabled it to be theorised as a self-
regulating and self-adjusting mechanism which operated independently of other ‘non-
economic’ institutions, which it did not depend upon for its reproduction (Jessop 2001).  
 
It was only when market exchange was made the dominant mode of integration that it 
became possible to speak of an identifiable economic sphere of society which was 
governed by economic laws and could be studied by a discipline called ‘economics’. A 
powerful representation of the economy was thus made possible, whereby it could be 
understood as existing above conscious human agency and which was self-adjusting if 
freed from external interference. As Polanyi argued: 
 
The commodity fiction handed over the fate of man and nature to the play of an 
automaton that ran in its own grooves and was governed by its own laws…So long as no 
property-less person could satisfy his [sic] craving for food without first selling his labour 
in the market, and so long as no propertied person was prevented from buying in the 
cheapest market and selling in the dearest, the blind mill would turn out ever-increasing 
amount of commodities for the benefit of the worker (Polanyi 1977, 10-11). 
 
This idea was later combined with the development of national accounting systems and 
econometric modelling in the mid-20th century, so that a single size could be attributed 
to this object (Mitchell 1998; Hirschmann 2016). It was only at this point that this size 
could be portrayed as expanding or contracting, in terms of the quarterly GDP figures 
which still dominate economic reporting today, and economic growth could become the 
central object of economic policy and the assessment of state performance.  
 
Indeed, Polanyi anticipated later analyses of the role of quantification and statistical 
practice in constructing this sense of a unitary and cohesive economic sphere, 
suggesting: 
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We have an institutionally separate economic system in our society, and an important 
integrating concept in our economy is that of an aggregate of interchangeable economic 
units. Hence the quantitative aspect of economic life…[W]ithout such a quantitative 
concept, the notion of an economy is hardly meaningful (Polanyi 1977, 53). 
 
A necessary corollary of this cohesive unity is that the economy came to be understood 
as located within, and coextensive with, a defined and internally self-contained set of 
institutions. No longer were economic processes interwoven with social, cultural and 
political institutions which they were inseparable and indistinguishable from. Instead, 
they had become encompassed within a separate and discrete set of institutions.  
 
The problem with this vision, as discussed above, was that it encouraged an apolitical 
and naturalistic style of reasoning about the economy. Once it was seen as a discrete, 
law-bound object, this suggested it could be studied in isolation from political and 
normative questions (Polanyi 2001 [1944], 321-44). Moreover, it is this sense of unity 
that made it possible to think of the economy as a system that could grow or shrink, and 
so paved the way to the technocratic growth paradigm which emerged in the 20th 
century. An important criteria for recovering a substantive understanding of economy 
was the abandonment of this unified and homogenous economic sphere. 
 
Society: Inseparable from the Economic Process 
 
A necessary consequence of the above point – that the economy is contained within a 
distinct and identifiable set of institutions and had a coherence, unity and size – is that 
the economy has an outside. Defining the characteristics of this outside – the ‘non-
economic’ sphere of life – is essential to formalist representations of the economy as 
what falls inside it (Mitchell 1998, 92-3).  
 
The first sphere of life which is thus systematically excluded from the economy is all the 
productive activity and work which is done outside of formal employment, in the 
‘private’ household sphere. In the formalist conception of economy, the economy is 
represented as encompassing contractually mediated exchanges between the holders of 
property rights. Consequently, any form of production or activity which does not 
involve a transaction or an exchange of contract between individuals, cannot be included 
in the way in which the economic process is represented and understood. As Polanyi 
observed: 
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The economy comprises man as a collector, grower, carrier, and maker of useful things 
…Yet such a process has no separate existence. The thread of interaction may branch 
off, interlock, form a web; but whether the mesh of cause and effect is simple or complex, 
it can no more be physically detached from the ecological, technical, and societal tissue 
than can the life process from the animal organism (Polanyi 1977, 33). 
 
Thus, formalist conceptions of the economy exclude vast swathes of (re)productive 
activity which are clearly of economic benefit and which furthermore are essential to the 
reproduction and stability of the sphere of commodity exchange, which could not exist 
without this reproductive labour. This historical exclusion of the ‘social’ or ‘domestic’ 
realm from the sphere of the economy is not limited to the private household. It also 
extends to informal relations within the community, or to commons-based property 
where rights are not individualised and are linked to certain positions and functions with 
attendant duties and responsibilities (Cole 1920; Tawney 1920).  
 
A related process involves the separate institutionalisation of ‘politics’ – public law and 
decision-making procedures – which with the entrenchment and extension of 
individualised property rights was institutionalised within the separate sphere of the 
formal State institutions, as a ‘non-economic’ process.22 The first two features of the 
modern conception of the economy led to the development of the belief in then natural 
order which these economic institutions, if left to themselves and freed of external 
interference, would spontaneously produce (Holton 1992, 62-67). This required that 
political deliberation and decision making could not in itself be understood as internal 
to the economic process; it could only be conceived as something exogenous, which 
happened in the formal process of parliamentary and judicial deliberation. The economic 
sphere could be regulated by politics, but it was not itself a site of political rationality. 
 
                                                 
22 We encounter here similar problems concerning the ‘ontological’ dimension of this process versus its 
‘ideational’ consequences. While there was a process by which political institutions were formalised and 
separated from the private contractual relations which came to be called the economy, the economy never 
‘really’ – i.e. as a matter of ontological fact – attained this independence. Again, I stress how Polanyi allows 
us to theorise the effects of these representations independently of an analysis of their achievement as a 
historical fact, which we can bracket in this analysis. 
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Again, Polanyi sought to historicise this notion and show it to be a recent and contingent 
construction rather than a timeless ontological divide. This forms some of the most 
interesting sections of his analysis in The Great Transformation (Polanyi 2001 [1944]). He 
sought to demonstrate how political processes were, at all points, intimately connected 
to the rise of market institutions, and in particular to create the institutions needed to 
support the commodification of land, labour and money (Watson 2005, 145). This 
required the active breaking down of traditional relationships and structures which 
protected the ‘substance of society’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944, 75) from exposure to market 
mechanisms. At the same time, slowly over the course of the late 19th and 20th century, 
the state gradually grew up and took on more and more regulatory functions as society 
reacted so as to mitigate the devastating effects which this produced, developing 
protective political institutions in the process which further entrenched the division 
between ‘politics’ and the economy (Holmes 2018).  
 
Consequently, a second criterion for the recovery of a substantive understanding of the 
economy was contesting the designation of ‘society’ and ‘politics’ as external to 
economic processes. Activities outside the market are both economically meaningful 
and productive and interact in crucial ways with the market system itself. Any form of 
representation or discourse which reproduces these separations is unable to fully 
overturn the vestiges of formalist thinking. 
 
The Recovery of Special Purpose Monies 
 
Polanyi’s analysis helps to interrogate another crucial component of the ‘market 
mentality’, namely the (historically recent) narrowing of the conception of the role of 
money and monetary prices to its use in commodity exchange. Polanyi referred to this 
as the ‘catallactic fallacy’, a rather ungainly term for a straightforward idea which he 
termed ‘among the most powerful in the field of modern economic thought’ (Polanyi 
1968, 180). The classical political economists tended to assume that money grew up as 
a natural and spontaneous consequence of individual acts of exchange and barter 
(Graeber 2014, 21-43), and that money’s primary and essential purpose was to facilitate 
market exchange.  
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Polanyi sought to contest this assumption using comparative and historical analysis. He 
viewed money in much broader terms, as akin to a ‘semantic system’ which functioned 
like other measurement systems, only with the function of gauging value: ‘what it gauges 
is not how long, large or heavy an object is, but how great its importance is to us in a 
definite situation’ (Polanyi 1977, 57). He argued that, in many historical societies, trade 
and markets were not synonymous. Much trade was external rather than domestic, and 
it was not conducted via competitive haggling based on fluctuating prices (Polanyi 1966). 
Rather, prices were set politically before the trading took place. He further shows how 
many ancient economies utilised large scale accounting systems to plan the allocation of 
resources before money was commonly used in exchange. Thus, a complex division of 
labour and trade in goods, mediated by politically administered monetary values, was 
achieved without market institutions (see Dale 2010, 137-85). Both trade and money 
predate, and are independent of, the supply/demand/price mechanism. The presence 
of money was thus wrongly taken as evidence of market exchange by classical economics 
because in market societies the exchange use had become dominant, but this was a recent 
development (Polanyi 1968, 175-203). 
 
One consequence of denaturalising this assumption using Polanyi’s analysis is that it 
becomes possible to liberate monetary values from their frequent conflation with 
competitive exchange in contemporary contexts. As we will see in later chapters, in 
national accounting monetary prices are traditionally assumed to necessarily emerge 
from a process of exchange, which tends towards discovering the ‘true’ value of a given 
good (Hayek 1945). Therefore, only market goods can properly be assigned a true 
monetary value; anything else will represent a false or irrational price. But this 
assumption obscures the many other independent roles which money can plays in 
societies, both historical and present – for instance, as a pure representation of the value 
placed on a resource, which could be established by public authority or democratic 
deliberation (Polanyi 2016 [1922]). 
 
This can be better understood if placed in the context of Polanyi’s interventions into the 
inter-war socialist calculation debate (Chaloupek 1990; Becchio 2007). The early 
exchanges in this debate ran along binary lines: Mises argued that prices were needed for 
economic decision making, and that prices must necessarily be formed within markets 
(Mises 1935 [1920]; see also Hayek 1948, 119-208); Neurath argued prices were not 
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needed and that in-kind planning by the state could take place in physical, 
incommensurable units (Neurath 2004 [1919]). Against this, Polanyi provided a vision 
of price formation that did not rely on either state calculation or market exchange and 
which was intimately connected to his wider political philosophy and view of human 
nature (see Dale 2010, 19-39).  
 
In fact, Hayek and Polanyi agreed on one important point: a centralised authority cannot 
gain oversight of the diverse, heterogeneous and distributed sorts of considerations 
needed to organise the economic process (Polanyi 2016 [1922]). But Hayek concluded 
that only contractual market exchange between atomised individuals can therefore 
deliver this. 
 
Polanyi’s critique of this assumption was related to his political philosophy, which 
centred in the interwar period around the possibility of achieving freedom in modern 
societies with a complex division of labour (Cangiani 2012). For Polanyi, freedom under 
such conditions paradoxically implied a clear-sighted and precise recognition of the 
various (potentially contradictory) constraints which participation in a complex society 
placed upon individual action. According to this viewpoint, both in natura calculation by 
the state and market prices offer equally flawed basis for transparent, responsible ethical 
action by people in their various diverse economic roles – as workers, consumers, 
citizens and so on. The processes through which market prices formed under 
competitive capitalism and private property happened just as much ‘behind the backs’ 
of the people as in opaque state bureaucracies. Rather than objective economic values, 
market prices merely reflect the contingent imperatives of a society based around private 
property; they consequently ignored the social, ethical and environmental externalities 
that market interactions produce, and the complex moral and social relationships in 
which market exchanges are situated (Polanyi 2016 [1920]). Hence, market price signals 
could not give individuals an ‘overview’ of the effects and consequences of the 
economic, social and ecological relationships they were a part of. Neither could 
delegation of such decision making to a central planning body.  
 
Polanyi suggested a way out of this dilemma, which implied a radically different 
approach to price formation. It imagined prices and values as the outcome of an 
explicitly political process of collective deliberation (Rosner 1990). This would mean 
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that prices for key commodities and resources would reflect the social preferences and 
priorities worked out in conscious deliberative processes, which could only happen by 
embedding prices in participatory democratic institutions within the economic process 
itself (Polanyi 2016 [1920]).  
 
This discussion, while apparently arcane, will be vital to the analysis in the remainder of 
the thesis. The contemporary challenge to GDP can be understood primarily as a 
challenge to the idea that monetary values arrived at through market exchange represent 
an adequate account of social progress. Thus, much of this agenda is, in one way or 
another, concerned with accounting for non-market goods, be these the benefits of good 
governance, tolerable level of inequality, adequate education, non-market services or 
household production, good quality jobs and employment (rather than merely 
quantitative expansion of wage labour), environmental quality, or the sustainability of 
present levels of wellbeing. Such an agenda runs into the same inevitable questions, 
which will continually crop up in the following discussions: should these non-market 
values be monetised, and if so how? Practical attempts to confront these questions in 
the beyond GDP agenda run into the exact problems which Polanyi foresaw.  
 
In the marketing view of money use, money is only a means of facilitating exchange, and 
therefore monetary values are synonymous with commodified markets; their calculation 
cannot be understood in any other way. But if we understand the other functions money 
can play, in particular its use as a unit of account, such discussions become much more 
open. This means that markets are not privileged as the site for establishing values, and 
that politically negotiated values and goals can be reflected in the prices assigned to 
crucial natural and social resources. Acknowledging this fact frees us from the necessity 
of referring all monetary valuation back to competitive exchange in the marketplace. 
This has the potential effect of allowing political and normative considerations to enter 
the sphere of economic calculation and reasoning, thereby encouraging a more 
substantive approach to the allocation of resources.  
 
Value after Homo Economicus: A Substantive view of Human Nature 
 
The final, but perhaps most profound, characteristic of modern modes of representing 
the economy is that it is underpinned by and reproduces a particular understanding of 
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human nature, agency and rationality. The perspective on the relationship of value and 
prices outlined above also implies a radical critique of the psychological underpinnings 
of neoclassical theory, and the view of human nature and economy it was based upon. 
According to this view, humans have a nature (and a set of preferences and interests) 
which pre-exists their participation in social institutions. It is only on the basis of this 
assumption that individual utility can appear as something satisfied or delivered by 
economic institutions: preferences form before the individual’s engagement in society 
and political processes, originating in a self-interested human nature which pre-exists 
these (Carver 1918; Veblen 2007 [1898], 73-78). Market exchange (in this view) simply 
reveals the outcome of these individual preferences. While there is a sense of volition in 
this theory – active choice between alternatives is the bedrock of such analysis – these 
choices can be read off an underlying and objective utility function which pre-exists the 
individual’s participation in social processes.  
 
Political, collective and deliberative processes are here seen to be a hindrance to the 
discovery of true economic values, which prevent us from knowing the real values which 
emerge from the unconscious, behavioural response to price stimuli in markets (Hayek 
1948). Hayek’s suspicion of conscious interference in price formation is reflective of a 
suspicion of political behaviour polluting the pure, instinctive responses which should 
characterise market exchange and which will reveal information about underlying 
preferences. The psychological and political consequences are clear: 
 
Those who clamour for “conscious direction”…should remember this: the problem is 
precisely how to extend the span of our utilization of resources beyond the span of the 
control of any one mind; and, therefore, how to dispense with the need of conscious 
control and how to provide inducements that will make the individuals do the desirable 
things without anyone having to tell them what to do (Hayek 1948, 87-8). 
 
Polanyi’s critique of Hayek’s view of the price mechanism thus reflects a broader 
opposition to this deeper asocial, behaviourist and universal view of human nature (see 
Dale 2010), in a line of argument which Polanyi’s admirers such as Marshall Sahlins have 
developed (Sahlins 2008), analysing this view as a key tenet of a specifically Western and 
modernist mode of political thought (Dumont 1979; Siedentop 2014).  
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The central problem here, again, is the narrowing of ethical and social imagination that 
results from naturalising contingent values, norms and preferences. Sahlins has argued, 
for instance, that: 
 
The development of culture would have to be complemented by the deprogramming of 
genetic imperatives or what used to be called instinctual behaviours. The effect was the 
organisation of biological functions in various cultural forms, such that the expression of 
biological necessities depended upon meaningful logics. We have the equipment to live a 
thousand different lives…although we end up living only one. This is only possible on 
the condition that biological needs and drives do not specify the particular means of their 
realization… the issue is not whether human nature is basically this or that. The issue is 
biologism itself…There is no such pre-social individual, no such thing as a human being 
existing before or apart from society…born neither good or bad, human beings make 
themselves in social activity as it unfolds in given historical circumstances (Sahlins 2008, 
106-109). 
 
Such an understanding of human nature, which the neoclassical view of value and price 
is built upon, deprives people of the ability to reflexively re-make themselves in this way, 
to consciously confront and challenge their preferences. It undermines our collective 
capacity to grasp the contingency of the institutions we are part of and how these 
condition our received preferences and behaviour. It thus impoverishes our capacity to 
imagine how things might be differently structured, weakening our collective sense of 
political agency and responsibility. It implies that adding a critical, reflexive space 
between instinctive responses and price formation is essential to avoiding the 
‘formalism’ that Polanyi criticised as the flaw in modernist economic reasoning more 
generally. 
 
3.3. Exploring the Limits to Formalist Reason after GDP 
 
Thus, Polanyi’s work allows us to identify four key aspects of the formalist conception 
of ‘the economy’. In Polanyi’s account, recognising their historicity and contingency 
allows us to see past naturalised ideas about economic reality. This is thus essential to 
analysing the significance of political projects – such as the beyond GDP agenda – which 
aim to think about development, progress and human livelihood in a more open-ended 
way. The Polanyian critique of formalism developed in section 1 and 2 allows us to ask 
a new set of questions about the political significance of the contemporary moves to 
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supplant GDP. It suggests their significance lies, not primarily in how they shift attention 
away from ‘economic’ objectives to other dimensions of progress, but in the challenge 
they present to the broader market-bound modes of theorising and representing the 
economy which emerged alongside the birth of market society and condition 
contemporary attempts to think beyond its institutional structures. Exploring this 
challenge constitutes the substantive contribution of the thesis, which will be developed 
in the remaining case studies. This section briefly reviews the central lines of these 
problems to orient the empirical chapters that follow, by linking each of the forms of 
thought discussed above to specific beyond GDP measurement agendas which 
challenge them in various ways.  
 
A specific recommendation of the Stiglitz report was to ‘give more prominence to the 
distribution of income, consumption and wealth’ (Stiglitz et al. 2010, 13). This is 
associated with the call to pay more attention to data on inequalities in living standards 
based on ‘micro data’ from household surveys, rather than the averages provided in the 
SNA macro-data aggregates such as GDP per capita (see chapter 2). The consequence 
of this move is that it generates a wider problem of holding together the integrity and 
cohesion of the idea of the economy itself. The problems emerge when these different 
measurements no longer provide the same picture of the object known as ‘the economy’. 
As the Commission report highlighted: ‘A major effort of statistical reconciliation will 
also be required to understand why certain measures such as household income move 
differently depending on the underlying statistical source’ (ibid, 12). This directly 
threatens the representation of the economy as a unitary object with a single ‘size’ that 
we can depict as growing or shrinking.  
 
The key question posed by this challenge of representing the economy is thus that of 
managing the resulting proliferation of different statistical representations of the 
economy. If this is not achieved, then the coherence, integrity and authority of the SNA 
system itself is brought into question. How these tensions manifest, and the interaction 
of these reforms with the ontological vision of macroeconomic theory which underpins 
the SNA framework are the central questions which will be addressed in chapter 4. 
 
The second feature of formalist reasoning discussed in the first section was the 
assumption that the domestic household and informal sector are external to the 
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economic process. The ability to uphold this boundary is challenged by the 
recommendation to measure non-market production when analysing living standards. 
This was included in the Commission report, under recommendation 5: ‘broaden 
income measures to non-market activities’ (ibid, 14). It is a prominent theme of much 
post-Stiglitz statistical work, justified based on the numerous critiques of GDP’s 
exclusion of non-market activities reviewed in chapter 2.  
 
Such moves raise problems as to the status of such non-market activity, which frequently 
blur and complicate the established boundaries between the economic and the non-
economic within global statistical systems and the SNA framework. This tension shows 
up in numerous forms. The Commission claims that ‘their exclusion from official 
measures reflects uncertainty about data more than conceptual difficulties’ (ibid, 14). But 
by threatening to bring the domestic sphere into ‘the economy’ proper, key income 
concepts upon which national accounting is based are called into question. If accepted, 
these would mean radical change to the entire SNA system and threaten its integrity as 
a cohesive representation of ‘the economy’. Furthermore, as chapter 5 will demonstrate, 
such a claim simplifies the extent to which these two issues can be separated from each 
other in practice, and the extent to which broader analytical concerns condition what is 
considered ‘good data’ in the first place. Accounting efforts to value non-market activity 
must grapple with the fundamental question of where the economy ‘stops’, and on what 
grounds. These challenges and their management will be examined in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
 
The challenge to the third aspect of the economistic fallacy outlined above is presented 
by the need of the statistical initiatives emerging from the Commission’s proposals to 
capitalise the ‘non-economic’ assets upon which the sustainability of growth depends. 
These non-material assets include the skill base of the human population (human capital) 
and the value of finite natural resources and ecosystem services (natural capital).23  
 
The need to develop such measures, and therefore extend the statistical representation 
of national wealth and the asset base beyond physical manufactured capital, forms the 
third pillar of the Commission’s recommendations, and has attracted much work and 
attention since 2009. This brings with it, however, the tricky question of whether (and 
                                                 
23 The history of, and the debate surrounding, these concepts was discussed in more depth in chapter 2. 
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how) to value these capital stocks, or whether to instead leave them as incommensurable 
physical units. Once again, we find that such questions are intimately connected with 
the problem of the boundary between the economic and the non-economic, and 
interfere with the constitution of this boundary in accounting practice. For instance, 
recommendation 11 of the Commission’s report suggested that: 
 
Sustainability assessment requires a well-identified dashboard of indicators. The 
distinctive feature of the components of this dashboard should be that they are 
interpretable as variations of some underlying “stocks”. A monetary index of 
sustainability has its place in such a dashboard but, under the current state of the art, it 
should remain essentially focused on the economic aspects of sustainability (ibid, 19). 
 
But what are the ‘economic aspects of sustainability’, and how are they to be identified 
and separated from the non-economic ones?  
 
In theory, this should be a relatively straightforward matter for formalist economic 
analysis to determine: where there is a market price, there is a ‘true’ monetary value 
arrived at through competitive exchange, and therefore we are dealing with ‘the 
economy’. Indeed, this is the approach tentatively endorsed by the Commission: 
 
[Converting] all these assets into a monetary equivalent, thereby implicitly assuming 
substitutability between the different types of capital…has significant potential, but also 
several limitations, the most important being the absence of many markets on which the 
valuation of assets may be based. Even when there are market values, there is no 
guarantee that they adequately reflect how the different assets matter for future well-
being. The monetary approach requires imputations and modelling which raise 
informational difficulties. All this suggests starting with a more modest approach, i.e. 
focussing the monetary aggregation on items for which reasonable valuation techniques 
exist (ibid, 17). 
 
However, this quickly becomes problematic in practice, and is connected to far bigger 
issue that the euphemistic phrase ‘informational difficulties’ implies. As we will explore 
fully in chapter 6, separating the ‘economic’ bit of such assets from their ‘non-economic’ 
residue along market lines is not straightforward.  
 
In relation to natural capital, for instance, actors constructing and using these values 
must determine which sorts of natural resources and services are truly ‘economic’; 
unfortunately, these do not always match up with those connected to markets. How are 
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we to value the sink services provided by the global atmosphere, for which there are no 
markets? In relation to human capital, the tensions concern the link between education 
and the job market. It is difficult to defend the claim that even the purely ‘economic’ 
benefits of education are fully encompassed by the increased income it affords the 
student on the job market; and such connections are almost impossible to isolate. But 
to abandon this claim and attempt to value other goods derived from education in 
monetary terms is to abandon the link between money and market exchange. Each of 
these suggests that the acknowledgement of the function of money as a unit of account, 
as distinct and detached from its role in market exchange, is becoming increasingly hard 
to contain or suppress. The consequences of these developments may have much 
further-reaching effects. These issues will be the subject of chapter 6 of this thesis. 
 
Finally, the issues of non-market valuation interfere with the fourth feature of formalist 
reasoning identified in section 2: that instinctive choices between alternate ends, in 
response to price signals in the market, is the distinctively economic form of behaviour. 
This property of formalist reasoning comes under threat from various techniques 
developed to value non-market goods within the post-GDP agenda. Generally, these 
rely upon using information about the value placed on a non-market good to be 
generated in a way which is entirely decoupled from a formal market transaction, and 
which can then be used to develop a monetary estimation for these goods. They raise 
problems, however, in that they involve establishing values in the absence of the 
behavioural and institutional conditions of market exchange, often involving people 
making reflexive and considered judgements. But since the information they produce is 
subsequently used in the formation of monetary values, they potentially interfere with 
various assumptions about the nature of rational behaviour which are essential to the 
modern representation of the economy, and risk bringing the sphere of conscious 
deliberation into the monetary values arrived at through the market.  
 
This tension manifests itself most acutely in relation to the development of subjective 
wellbeing data and the nascent use of this data in cost-benefit analysis. Development of 
well-being data and their use in non-market valuation were key recommendations of the 
Commission, which argued both: that ‘measures of both objective and subjective well-
being provide key information about people’s quality of life. Statistical offices should 
incorporate questions to capture people’s life-evaluations, hedonic experiences and 
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priorities in their own survey’ (ibid, 18); and that ‘measuring these features requires the 
use of types of data (i.e., responses to questionnaires and non-market observations of 
personal states) that are not captured by market transactions’ (ibid, 64). 
 
The use of this data to infer monetary prices is still experimental, but is gaining in 
prominence and sophistication. This is raising concern among many statisticians and 
economic analysts about the quality of the underlying data; but the line between the ‘data 
quality’, or ‘technical’, aspects of these controversies and the broader conceptual and 
ideational politics surrounding it again proves fuzzy and complex. Such concerns often 
revolve around the idea that market price data are ‘objective’, whereas reported data on 
people’s experiences of life are merely ‘subjective’. What this distinction means in 
practice is that market prices are understood to be the largely un-reflexive behavioural 
consequences of an innate economic rationality; whereas the sort of behaviour that 
informs subjective life evaluations is the outcome of reflexive processes, and therefore 
originate in the ‘non-economic’ component of human nature. This distinction therefore 
relates, at base, to the representation of properly economic behaviour outlined in section 
one.  
 
The responses by those defending the use of such measures are equally instructive and 
interesting: they often seek to show how the measures do in fact correlate with objective 
biophysical or behavioural outcomes. As the Commission highlighted: ‘A rich literature 
on these subjective measures concludes that they help to predict people’s 
behaviour…these self-reports are also correlated with electrical readings of the brain’ 
(ibid, 65). Other non-market valuation methods attempt to bypass the problematic 
presence of conscious thought that supposedly distort subjective data, by stimulating 
market-like choice environments through artificial surveys and other constructed 
environments. But these also depart in various ways from the ideal behavioural 
conditions of markets in orthodox consumer theory. This provides us with the final 
source of tension between the tenets of formalist reasoning and the post-GDP 
accounting agenda in this thesis: the extension of valuation technique to non-market 
goods challenges the formalist representation of human nature and its relationship to 
value and price formation. The management of these tensions will be the subject of the 
analysis in chapter 7. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter introduced key concepts from Polanyi’s work as a lens through which to 
assess the challenge that the beyond GDP agenda represents to modern theoretical 
constructions of the economy. Polanyi’s work suggests that the objectives of the beyond 
GDP agenda imply a fundamental shift in how we understand and represent ‘the 
economy’ and its place in human societies. Notably, this can be achieved by overcoming 
a series of market-centric modes of thinking which constrain our ability to view 
economic relations as a site for ethically oriented, conscious collective action and 
valuation. Since the ideology of growth was predicated on these modes of reasoning, 
moving beyond growth potentially necessitates moving beyond formalist 
understandings of the economy itself. These ideational criteria suggest a fundamental 
shift to a substantive conception of the economy, and not simply shrinking the priority 
‘the economy’ occupies in political deliberation or balancing growth against other (social, 
environmental or political) goals.  
 
Having identified a series of tensions between the ambitions of the beyond GDP agenda 
and the assumptions of modern economic theory, the empirical core of the thesis 
explores the role of formalist economic ideas in framing how post-growth statistical 
problems have come to be defined and understood. In the rest of the thesis I develop 
four in-depth empirical case studies of post-GDP statistical reforms – informed by 
expert interviews and documentary sources – and use these to evaluate and assess the 
extent to which the agenda is contributing to the re-imagining of the economy on 
substantive lines. These encompass the agenda to better measure inequality and 
distributional questions (chapter 4), moves to value non-market work and activities 
(chapter 5), the field of sustainability measurement and the valuation of non-economic 
capital stocks (chapter 6), and finally the development of tools to value non-market 
goods using wellbeing data and the incorporation of non-market goods into cost-benefit 
calculations (chapter 8).  
 
In each of these areas, we will see how, in practice, the technical and methodological 
challenge of defining and measuring these concepts in accordance with formalist 
economic theory have generally frustrated these framings and exposed the limitations of 
defining and measuring post-growth objectives and goals in this way. This, I argue, is 
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creating a tension between statistical and economic reason, which in turn is providing 
resources with which to recover a more ‘substantive’ political understanding of the place 
of the economy in human society. 
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4. Economy after GDP: Inequality, ‘Micro-Macro Gaps’ 
and the Limits to Macroeconomic Ontology  
 
 
Under a market system…the vast comprehensive mechanism of the economy can be conceived of 
working without the conscious intervention of human authority, state or government …[but] 
before modern times…the economy as such remained nameless…For the series of interactions 
between man and their natural surroundings will, as a rule, carry various significances, of which 
economic dependence is only one – Karl Polanyi  
 
National accounts…provide an accounting framework that tracks households’ economic resources 
in a consistent way, from their generation (for instance via wages), via their (re)distribution (for 
instance via interest, dividends, taxes and social benefits) to final disposable income. However, 
national accounts provide no information on how income, consumption and wealth are distributed 
across households…A logical way forward would appear to be to integrate the distributional 
information from household micro-surveys with the consistent and standardised macro-
information from the national accounts. This is easier said than done, however…While 
“income”, “consumption” or “wealth” seem to be well-defined measures, closer inspection shows 
that they hold many meanings – OECD 
 
 
In 2016, when statisticians from the ECB and OECD compared estimates of total 
household wealth in the national accounts with data on wealth inequality, they found 
that vast swathes (up to 80%) of the economic assets measured in national accounting 
systems appeared to be missing from the data on inequality between households (ECB, 
2016). This was accompanied by the frank acknowledgement that: ‘a full reconciliation 
and even a full explanation of the differences…are likely to be impossible’ (ibid, 50: 
emphasis added).24 Historically, ‘micro’ statistics on inequality and the national accounts 
were produced in isolation; moreover, for much of the post-war period this didn’t 
appear to bother anybody very much. However, as we saw in chapter 2 the significant 
differences between these two statistical representations of the economy are increasingly 
framed as ‘micro-macro gaps’ (Kavonius and Honkkila 2013; ONS 2015a; OECD 2017), 
in need of closing. Following the Stiglitz report recommendations on inequality, a series 
of statistical initiatives have been established to reconcile ‘micro’ data on household 
living standards with macroeconomic aggregates derived from the system of national 
                                                 
24 Similar gaps were identified for income and consumption data in related OECD studies (ONS 2015a; 
OECD 2017). 
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accounts, such as per capita GDP (Eurostat 2011b; OECD 2013b; ONS 2015a; 
DGINS/ESSC 2016; ECB 2016).  
 
How is it possible to mislay up to 80% of the economy, and why has it proved so difficult 
to put back together again? Operationalising the Polanyian framework developed in 
chapter 3, this chapter traces contemporary efforts of national accountants and 
statisticians to address these questions, which form a vital component of post-GDP 
efforts to embed inequality into the heart of economic policy (Stiglitz et al. 2010; 
Eurostat 2011b). It uses this as a first case study to answer the question of how seriously 
GDP statistical reforms challenge the foundational assumptions of ‘formalist’ economic 
reasoning. Specifically, it explores the challenge that incorporating inequality data into 
macroeconomic analysis is presenting to the idea of ‘the economy’ as an autonomous, 
unitary and self-contained system (see chapter 3). It demonstrates how the construction 
of this object within national accounts systems (Polanyi 1968, 78-114; Mitchell 1998) is 
challenged by the practical requirements of reconciling micro and macro data statistics.  
 
The first section of the chapter traces how post-war developments within economic 
theory have influenced the framing of the current beyond GDP agenda on inequality 
measurement around the problem of micro-macro data gaps, showing how these 
concerns are influenced by recent developments in the broader project to provide 
‘micro-foundations’ to macroeconomics. Specifically, the failure of the DSGE paradigm 
during the global financial crisis, and resultant moves to incorporate agent heterogeneity 
into macroeconomic models, has driven contemporary demands for household-level 
data which are ‘reconciled’ with the macroeconomic national accounting description of 
the economy. The very ability to conceive of these differences as ‘gaps’ in need of 
closing, is thus predicated on the first key aspect of the formalist view of economy 
identified by Polanyi: that the economy is an autonomous system, fully contained within 
an interconnected series of price-forming markets. The second and third sections 
present an empirically grounded analysis of this contemporary statistical agenda, in order 
to assess how far these statistical initiatives interfere with such macroeconomic 
understandings of ‘the economy, and the construction of these within national 
accounting systems. Drawing on interviews and documentary sources, they demonstrate 
how the practical efforts by national accountants and statisticians to unify these two 
pictures of the economy is demonstrating the impossibility of fully reconciling the 
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realities of households’ economic relationships and experiences with the vision of the 
economy as a self-contained mechanism produced by the centralised data infrastructure 
of the national accounts.  
 
As we will see, measuring household inequality necessarily brings macroeconomic theory 
into empirical contact with the messier realities of economic relations at the household 
level, which are increasingly found to be incompatible and incommensurable with the 
economy as represented by the national accounts. This is resulting in a growing 
recognition of the impossibility of a unified statistical description of the economy. In 
turn, such initiatives are leading national accountants to embrace a more ‘substantive’ 
and plural understanding of accounting concepts – which, as is becoming evident, 
necessarily overflow macroeconomic understandings of the economy as a unitary system 
of markets. 
 
4.1 Formalist Reason and Inequality Measurement: Macroeconomics 
beyond the Representative Agent 
 
As outlined in chapter 2, the issue of closing the ‘gaps’ between the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ 
statistical representations of the economy has become a principal component of official 
statistical work on inequality since the Stiglitz report. This section traces the wider 
theoretical currents which inform this project, placing it within broader changes to 
macroeconomic analysis in the wake of the financial crisis. Specifically, the critique of 
the representative agent assumptions of DSGE models has led to the new demands for 
harmonised distributional data consistent with national accounts aggregates. 
Consequently, these recent statistical reforms can be understood as the latest phase of 
the post-war quest to provide ‘micro-foundations’ to aggregate mathematical 
descriptions of the economy developed by mainstream post-War Keynesianism. 
Significantly, these new micro-foundations necessitate empirical contact with the 
measurement of households’ livelihood, where previously abstract theoretical 
consistency was considered sufficient.  
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Macroeconomics beyond the Representative Agent  
 
Statistical production does not take place in a vacuum: statistical agencies are embedded 
in a wider ideational and political context, being informed by and informing theoretical 
developments and forms of economic analysis. Statistical agencies increasingly conceive 
of themselves as a data hub, bringing together new information sources and presenting 
them in a way to meet ever-changing needs of users, or ‘policy customers’ (see e.g. ESSC 
2014a). One of the most important constituencies statistical systems serve is the 
macroeconomic organs of central government: central banks and finance ministries. 
These agencies generally look at the economy from a macroeconomic perspective, 
informed by the neoclassical synthesis – which, as we have seen, is also intimately 
connected with the development of national accounting and GDP. This section shows 
how macroeconomic theory has influenced the priorities of the beyond GDP statistical 
work on inequality data, helping to channel these efforts into the quest to reconcile the 
picture of the economy given by the national accounts with micro survey data. This is 
worth considering in some detail, as it represents a significant means through which 
formalist ontological assumptions about the economy have influenced beyond GDP 
work in the field of inequality measurement.  
 
Macroeconomic policymaking is informed by forecasting and modelling techniques 
which first emerged in the post-war period. The orthodox IS/LM Keynesianism of the 
neoclassical synthesis – pioneered by economists such as Harrod, Hicks and Hawtree 
and popularised by Samuelson, Solow and Hansen (Young 1987; Clarke 1990) – 
interpreted Keynes’ work (2017 [1936]) as a demonstration of market failure through 
the stickiness of money wages in the face of adjustments, rather than focussing on 
fundamental uncertainties and the possibility of permanent disequilibrium in market 
economies (Patinkin 1990; Mann 2017, 309-317). These theories carved out an 
important, if carefully delimited, role for discretionary fiscal policy interventions, to 
ensure full employment through downturns, as wages failed to adjust to equilibrium 
under new conditions. In analytical terms, they also created the need for econometric 
data and computer models which would inform the timing and magnitude of fiscal 
interventions (Coyle 2014, 18-24). Traditionally based on tracking statistical 
relationships between aggregate macroeconomic variables across the whole of ‘the 
economy’, these models – known as ‘structural econometric models’ (SEMs) – were 
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instrumental to the design of post-war demand management policies. National accounts 
aggregates formed vital data inputs for these models. Indeed, as Timothy Mitchell has 
argued, it was these developments which allowed the economy to be constructed as a 
discrete object with a ‘size’, and for its growth to be taken as the central object of 
developmental expertise (Mitchell 1998, 2002; Breslau 2003). 
 
Neo-Keynesian macroeconomics came under attack in the 1960s and 1970s (the period 
of stagflation), for lacking ‘micro-foundations’ (Backhouse and Boianovsky 2012). It was 
criticised for its lack of consistency with post-Walrasian microeconomic theory, and thus 
for its inability to grasp how relationships could change or break down as rational agents 
adapted to new policy settings or anticipated their monetary effects, rendering them 
ineffective. As Skidelsky argues: 
 
The neoclassical synthesis was intellectually unstable. It left the relationship between 
macroeconomics and microeconomics in a mess. There seemed no logical way of getting 
from the optimizing behaviour which microeconomics attributed to the individual to the 
perverse outcomes in the macro sphere which justified…counter-cyclical policy 
(Skidelsky 2009, 104). 
 
At this point, the quest for ‘micro-foundations’, and the supposed gap between the 
micro and macro picture of the economy, had little to do with the empirical realities of 
household living standards or the measurement of inequality. It was rather related to the 
lack of theoretical consistency between microeconomic models of behaviour and 
macroeconomic theory. Specifically, monetarists such as Friedman and Lucas attacked 
neo-Keynesian mathematical models of the economy for being at odds with the concept 
of rational behaviour and expectations. Echoing Ricardian equivalence, Friedman’s 
permanent income hypothesis suggested that individuals will always anticipate probable 
future losses of income and will smooth over consumption in relation to long-term 
income expectations rather than short term monetary stimuli (Friedman 1957). Such 
arguments appeared to undermine the neo-Keynesian emphasis on counter-cyclical 
deficit spending. Later, Lucas’s critique of Keynesian econometric modelling also 
stressed that agents would respond to changing policy settings and internalise these into 
their behaviour, so that past macroeconomic data could not be used as an unchanging 
guide to the future effects of policy interventions (Lucas 1976; Lucas and Sargent 2003 
[1978]).  
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These and subsequent critiques led to the quest to ‘micro-found’ macroeconomic 
models – by rooting them in the modelled behaviour of representative rational agents 
(Hoover 2008). This paradigm continues to shape mainstream macroeconomic policy 
analysis. Divided between ‘freshwater’ New Classical or real business cycle theory and 
‘saltwater’ new Keynesian approaches, these nevertheless work within what Willem 
Buiter describes as a shared ‘complete markets paradigm’ (quoted in Skidelsky 2009, 
31).25 Skidelsky agrees that New Keynesians ‘inhabit the same theoretical house as the 
New Classical economists, differing from them only in their view that it takes longer for 
economies to adjust to shocks’ (ibid). The most notable analytical shift these critiques 
produced was the development of DSGE modelling from the 1980s, based on 
predicting the behaviour of representative rational agents rather than relying on 
historical econometric variables. These became influential in central banks through the 
1990s and 2000s: in 2004, for example, the Bank of England replaced its structural 
‘medium term macro model’ with the DSGE Bank of England Quarterly Model (Hendry 
and Muellbauer 2018).  
 
DSGE models have themselves come under fierce recent criticism for failing to predict 
the global financial crisis of 2008 and the unrealistic assumptions underpinning them 
(Caballero 2010; Krugman 2018; Stiglitz 2018). At stake in post-crisis critiques of DSGE 
models is the rational representative agent as an adequate ‘micro-foundation’ for 
macroeconomic theory (Davidson 1982). One strand of these critiques centre around 
the conception of rationality which DSGE modelling assumes: many recent new 
Keynesians, such as Stiglitz (2018), have instead stressed how these models ignore the 
behavioural realities of information asymmetry, irrational exuberance and herding 
behaviour which Keynes identified as crucial to understanding the behaviour of financial 
market participants under conditions of real world uncertainty. Such critiques have 
prompted the emergence of models incorporating bounded rationality, collective 
exuberance and herding dynamics (Haldane and Turrell 2018).  
 
                                                 
25 Similarly, Spahn suggests that: ‘the purported strength of NKM is its firm anchoring in micro decisions; 
competing theories that introduce macro variables without direct derivations from utility are excluded 
from the Econ Tribe on account of using “ad hoc” theories without “proper micro-foundations”’ (Spahn 
2009, 1). 
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However, crucially for the present discussion, another central target of recent critiques 
of DSGE modelling was the ‘representative’ aspect of the rational representative agent. 
As an example, Muelbauer has argued that the ‘underlying conceptual reasons for the 
failure of central bank models of the DSGE type include their typical assumptions about 
representative agents’ (quoted in Hendry and Muellbauer 2018, 288). This is especially 
significant, as these critiques have influenced the current quest to generate better data 
on wealth and income distribution, and specifically statistical efforts to harmonise them 
with national accounting aggregates. The SEMs developed after the war only tracked 
aggregate accounting identities and were not concerned with the effects of household 
inequalities in income or wealth. But likewise, the DSGE models developed in response 
to the critiques of Lucas and others were not interested in ‘micro’ empirical data either 
(Hoover 2008). They sought to model the responses of representative agents to changes 
in prices and incentives, based on a priori and deductive behavioural assumptions about 
utility maximisation and rational expectations. In other words, they had sought purely 
abstract ‘micro-foundations’ for macroeconomics, which left the statistical description 
of the economy constructed by the national accounts intact (Watson 2014b, 13-14). 
Models based on these assumptions, however, failed dramatically during the financial 
crisis – both in terms of predicting (or even acknowledging the possibility of) the crisis 
in the first place, and in terms of modelling the subsequent effects of unconventional 
monetary policy and fiscal stimulus.  
 
At the core of recent criticisms of the DGSE paradigm is the fact that individuals with 
different levels of income or assets will respond differently to changes in the 
macroeconomic climate, interest rates or income. This ‘agent heterogeneity’ is 
increasingly recognised as having important implications for how financial shocks 
develop and are transmitted, and therefore also to macroeconomic policy interventions 
aimed at addressing these (Constancio 2017; Debortoli and Galí 2018). For instance, 
many of the most asset poor families may be forced to behave in ‘hand-to-mouth’ ways, 
whereas asset-rich households may have the luxury of smoothing consumption in 
response to short-term changes in income. This point is invoked in numerous papers 
published since the crisis, to explain aspects of the 2008 crisis which representative agent 
models missed., while Stiglitz has also attacked DSGE models on the basis that:  
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Some individuals are credit constrained, others are not. Moreover, numerous studies … 
have emphasized the importance of debt for aggregative behaviour; but in a 
representative agent model, debt (held domestically) nets out, and therefore should have 
no role … The central problems of finance – bankruptcy, debt, and asymmetric 
information – simply cannot arise in a representative agent model (Stiglitz 2018, 76-78). 
 
These dynamics are recognised as having vital implications for monetary policy. Andy 
Haldane and Arthur Turrell, prominent economists at the Bank of England, suggest that: 
‘for monetary policy, one of the important practical channels for influencing 
consumption relies for its effectiveness on agent heterogeneity: those who gain from 
policy easing have higher marginal propensities to consume than those who lose’ 
(Haldane and Turrell 2018, 238). This highlights how the representative agent 
assumption underlying DSGE models have come under heavy criticism from prominent 
economists since the financial crisis.  
 
This academic critique has found support in senior central bank elites, leading to the 
introduction of various reforms to the forecasting and modelling instruments used to 
guide monetary policy. Vitor Constancio, vice president of the ECB, chose this as a 
prominent theme in a speech delivered to the ECB’s 2017 annual research conference, 
a forum that brings together senior macroeconomists and monetary policy analysts. In 
this address, he stressed that: 
 
[T]he standard DSGE framework imposes unrealistic micro-foundations for the 
behaviour of households as embodied in the “rational expectations permanent income” 
model of consumption … in stark contrast to recent research that emphasises the 
importance of precautionary saving, liquidity constraints, leverage and heterogeneity, 
including heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume (Constancio 2017). 
 
Janet Yellen, former head of the US Federal Reserve, echoed these sentiments about the 
serious limitations of representative agent DGSE models (quoted in Haldane and 
Turrell, 2018, 238). Such prominent support indicates the degree of pressure that 
representative agent DSGE modelling is now under.  
 
Aside from calls simply to return to SEMs and relax new classical demands for theory 
consistency (Krugman 2018), two specific new approaches have emerged in response to 
these critiques. Attempts to introduce reforms to basic ‘representative agent’ New 
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Keynesian models (‘RANK’), which are based upon aggregate consumption functions 
derived from a Euler equation, have led to the adoption of Heterogeneous Agent New 
Keynesian models (‘HANK’), in which ‘the economy is populated by a continuum of 
households indexed by their holdings of illiquid assets a, liquid assets b, and their 
idiosyncratic labour productivity (Kaplan et al. 2016, 708; see also Debortoli and Galí 
2018).26 Since the risk of unemployment and income shocks is considered to be 
‘uninsurable’ in these models, it is argued that they depart from the complete markets 
paradigm of mainstream new classical macroeconomics (Haldane and Turrell 2018).27  
 
Another approach has been agent-based modelling (ABM) techniques, advocated by 
Andy Haldane among others. Drawing analogies to the rise of complexity and systems 
thinking in the natural sciences, Haldane and Turrell argue that:  
 
Modern physics research deals with complex systems, emergent behaviours, vast 
simulations, and outcomes which are probabilistic and stochastic beyond what is implied 
by the Gaussian distribution …. [A]n ABM could be used to look at how heterogeneity 
along several inter-related dimensions affects policy transmission—for instance, marginal 
propensity to consume as a function of net assets (Haldane and Turrell 2018, 230). 
 
These reforms are still underway, and it is unclear whether the traditional DSGE models 
will be thrown out entirely. More likely, they will be supplemented by a wider modelling 
ecosystem including this plurality of approaches, with their use also constrained to more 
particular questions and confidence in the results they deliver more heavily qualified 
(Lindé 2018). This has already begun to occur, with the adoption of the ECB-MC and 
the Bank of England’s ‘suite of models’ approach (Hendry and Muellbauer 2018). 
Nevertheless, these statements reveal the extent to which prominent policymaking elites 
are now seriously questioning the representative agent assumption underpinning pre-
crisis DSGE models and developing alternative approaches which can accommodate 
household-level inequality into macroeconomic theory.  
                                                 
 
 
27 Kaplan et al., outlining the HANK, do nevertheless still depend upon some rather heroic assumptions, 
including the rather dystopian vision of a world in which: ‘Households die with an exogenous Poisson 
intensity ζ, and upon death give birth to an offspring with zero wealth and labour productivity equal to a 
random draw from its ergodic distribution.’ (Kaplan et al. 2016, 708). 
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Influence of Macroeconomics on the Inequality Measurement Agenda  
 
These analytical changes have created an urgent new need for distributional household 
balance sheet data on inequalities with which to empirically ground and test the 
parameters used to define the new models. This has been influential in shaping the 
priorities of the beyond GDP statistical agenda on inequality. This impetus is leading 
macroeconomists to seek empirical micro-foundations which are tested and validated by 
household level micro-data – these will, it is hoped, finally provide the robust grounding 
for the quest to model the economy in a unified way. The ambition of this vision is 
illustrated in a recent article by Hendy and Muellbauer, who suggest that ‘to improve 
policy models, central banks need research that merges theory-driven and data-driven 
approaches, rather than treating them as adversaries’ and: 
 
[I]t is possible that, in future, the generation of vast amounts of micro-data from 
administrative sources rather than surveys subject to selection bias and large measurement 
errors, may allow quantitative models for the whole economy to be constructed. Ideally, 
such macro-models would be based on statistically tested models of micro-behaviour, 
aggregated up from micro-data on millions of households and many thousands of firms 
(Hendry and Muellbauer 2018, 312). 
 
These sentiments have brought micro data into the consciousness of macroeconomists 
in new ways (Ahn et al. 2017), in turn influencing beyond GDP efforts on inequality 
measurement. 
 
The ECB has been at the forefront of these activities in relation to data on wealth 
inequalities – introducing the new Household Finance and Consumption survey 
(HFCS), specifically to generate more regular and harmonised data on wealth inequality 
across the Eurozone. The creation of the HFCS is justified explicitly in relation to the 
analytical developments outlined above. A report on the HFCS first wave summarised 
its use and application: 
 
Household-level data make it possible to evaluate the impact of shocks, policies and 
institutional changes across households…[which] yields important insights about issues 
like monetary policy transmission or financial stability… For instance, the recent financial 
crisis has demonstrated that a relatively small fraction of households (in this case the ones 
that are highly indebted) can have important effects on market outcomes.… On a number 
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of occasions, central banks have been able to infer relevant information from the surveys 
that could not be recovered from aggregate statistics (ECB 2009, 5). 
 
The description of the HFCS and its use on the ECB website similarly stresses, for 
instance, how ‘survey data are key to…building and calibrating realistic economic 
models incorporating heterogeneous agents’.28 This illustrates the way in which the 
critique of representative agent models has sparked new interest in distributional data in 
the macroeconomic policy spheres, collapsing old distinctions between the uses of micro 
and macro data that allowed the ‘gaps’ between them to remain uncontroversial. 
Macroeconomists are now searching for new, more empirically validated ‘micro-
foundations’, where previously, under the DGSE regime, only abstract formal 
consistency with microeconomic theoretical assumptions was sought (Watson 2014b).  
 
More directly, these developments have provided much of the impetus for the current 
efforts to create harmonised distributional national accounts, by closing ‘micro-macro’ 
statistical gaps, has come to be such an important part of the beyond GDP agenda. As 
well as launching the HFCS survey itself, for example, the ECB is also spearheading an 
expert group on aligning micro and macro data on wealth (with the OECD). It is 
significant that these statistical matching exercises are overseen by central banks, as this 
points to the intimate connection between new demands of monetary policy analysis 
and macroeconomic theory and the micro-macro gaps agenda. This is also given as an 
explicit justification for producing harmonised macro and micro data. Prominent 
members of the ECB expert group on micro-macro wealth gaps stated that: ‘In view of 
the potential role that distributional data can play in explaining macroeconomic 
developments, the European System of Central Banks Statistics Committee established 
an Expert Group on Linking Macro and Micro Data for the Household Sector’ 
(Kavonius and Honkkila 2013), and that: 
 
The current financial crisis has emphasised the need of household data and preferably, 
data with clear links between micro and macro level, as, for instance financial stability 
analysis focuses increasingly on the transmission mechanism of shocks and risks between and across the 
different agents in the economy (Kavonius and Tormalehto 2010, 4). 
 
                                                 
28http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/research-
networks/html/researcher_hfcn.en.html 
 102 
 
This imperative is not limited purely to efforts in the field of wealth inequality, although 
this is of greatest interest to central banking. It also depends upon linkages with income 
and consumption data, motivating the agenda create harmonised micro and macro 
statistics in these fields as well. Jorrit Zwijnenburg, who heads the OECD’s efforts on 
linking micro data to national accounts totals for income and consumption, explains the 
use and demand for distributional data aligned to the national accounts in these terms: 
 
[A]s results are consistent with national accounts totals, the distributional results can also 
be linked to relevant macroeconomic indicators, such as gross domestic product and 
household disposable income, therewith broadening the scope for various forms of policy 
analysis (OECD 2017, 8-9). 
 
The Eurostat taskforce which was influential in founding this group similarly described 
the purpose of such data as: ‘to give more credibility to the macro figures by offering 
distributional information and bringing discussions on inequalities to the attention of 
economic and finance ministries’ (Eurostat 2011b). Interviews confirmed that these 
reforms respond partly to new demands in policymaking associated with the increased 
attention to household heterogeneity, with a senior statistician at the ECB stating there 
was a ‘lot of demand for micro-data on wealth, especially after the crisis. Here at the 
ECB, when you look at the speeches of our governors, inequality is really being talked 
up. Five years ago is was not really an issue’ (Interview JH). 
 
We can see from this discussion how the distribution of economic resources has become 
a newly urgent concern of macroeconomic analysis, as part of the post-crisis criticism 
of the new classical DSGE paradigm and the representative agent on which these have 
been ‘micro-founded’. The production of consistent data on the distribution of 
household wealth and assets has become an important global statistical agenda largely in 
support of these analytical developments. Thus, the contemporary statistical agenda on 
inequality directly relates to a longer project to formulate a unified theoretical synthesis 
which can describe and model ‘the economy’ in its entirety. Consequently, the current 
agenda to close micro and macro gaps rest on what Polanyi referred to as a ‘formalist’ 
vision of the economy. The final two sections shift the analysis to the practical success 
of the contemporary statistical work on reconciling inequality and national accounts 
data, in order to examine the implications of this agenda for such a conception of the 
economy. 
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4.2. Inequality and the Limits to Formalism: The Frustrated Promise of a 
Technical Solution to Micro-Macro Gaps 
 
This section details how, as part of recent attempts to unite the micro and macro 
descriptions of the economy, statisticians and national accountants have firstly 
attempted to develop a technical solution to harmonising the micro and macro 
representations of the economy, as demanded by developments in macroeconomic 
analysis. This has centred primarily on the growing use of administrative data in new 
and innovative ways to construct distributions which can be used to measure household 
inequality. By reducing the dependence on surveying data traditionally used to measure 
inequality – and aligning the technical and infrastructural base on which these two 
pictures of the economy depend – the discrepancies between them will be overcome. 
However, this project is encountering a number of difficulties: in the process, 
statisticians are realising that the differences between micro and macro data cannot be 
reduced to purely technical issues or measurement bias, as they relate to fundamentally 
different views of the economic system, which do not overlap.  
 
The Limits of Admin Data for Representing Household Livelihood 
 
A first strand of contemporary efforts to close ‘micro-macro gaps’ is to align the data 
sources from which micro statistics and the national accounts are calculated. This in 
practice means moving beyond the use of survey data to produce distributional 
information, drawing instead upon the centralised administrative data used in national 
accounts, matched with demographic from registers and other databases. This is being 
made possible partly by technological developments. A senior staff member in the 
ONS’s national accounts division explains that: 
 
Some of the reasons why you see slightly different figures for income components in the 
micro and macro sources is to do with the fact that different data sources are used ... 
Historically, micro stats have relied almost exclusively on household surveys. But within 
the ONS there’s a number of big transformation programmes which are underway, which 
are radically changing the way we produce statistics. Admin data is integral to that. I think 
what we’ll see in the future is that micro and macro will be using more comparable 
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sources… the use of admin data will make it substantially easier to achieve those 
reconciliations (Interview RT). 
 
These administrative sources thus appear to present a ready-made technical solution to 
the newly urgent problem of micro-macro gaps: aligning the data sources used to 
compile information on inequality with those used to compile the national accounts will 
close the gaps between them.  
 
This move away from surveys and towards the greater use of administrative data is linked 
to recent problems with declining survey response rates, itself associated with socio-
economic changes which have made ‘the household’ a less stable statistical unit, 
unamenable to surveying. Households have become more mobile; the single income 
nuclear family has declined; people lead busier lives. These changes in social structure 
also raise epistemic problems for statisticians, making it harder to survey households. 
Pierre LaMarche, a former INSEE statistician now working for Eurostat, explains how 
within statistics agencies: 
 
There is a movement now which is really strong – a scepticism about surveys, which is 
growing and growing, especially as response rates are declining in many countries. At 
some point this leads NSIs to try alternative sources. Until the 80s or the 90s surveys were 
working fine – the response rates were good, and no one were complaining about the 
quality. But things tended to get worse (Interview PL). 
 
Beyond declining response rates, there is a wider epistemic politics at work here, relating 
to the trustworthiness ascribed to centralised records as opposed to survey data. There 
is a powerful sense that official databases, maintained by banks or the State, can be trusted 
more than people filling in surveys. This is linked partly to worries about recall bias and 
errors of self-reporting that surveys are prone to. But it is also linked to a broader 
ontological vision of the economy, as contained within the financial and fiscal transfers 
which are legible to centralised state bureaucracies. Generally, the national accounts are 
considered to provide a more ‘complete’ representation of the totality of economic 
transactions than a sample survey ever can. This view is linked, in turn, to a financialised 
economic imaginary. An expert on the subject at the OECD, who began his career at 
the Dutch statistical agency, explains: 
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The problem with survey results is that, if you have the information from banks – for 
instance, in the Netherlands you have five or six very large banks – if you capture those 
in your statistics you cover 95% of all the income flows. On the other hand, you have a 
sample survey of households which only contains nine thousand – for the population for 
the Netherlands of 20 million! So what are you going to trust: the 95% of banks that have 
to report to all kinds of institutions, or the sample survey that has been scaled up? 
(Interview JZ). 
 
LaMarche echoes these sentiments, but links them in interesting ways to the epistemic 
limitations of households themselves to know the ever-changing reality of their own 
financialised economic situation. The temporality of the human mind simply cannot 
compete with the frenetic pace of financial markets, which places limits on the ability of 
surveys to compete epistemically with the national accounting description of modern 
economies:  
 
We know that for financial assets there is a strong under-reporting from the households, 
because financial assets may be very uncertain in terms of value. If you have stocks, for 
instance, people are not really able to say how much they are worth on a day-to-day basis 
(Interview PL). 
 
In this view, common sense for most national accountants, the economy is routed 
through the centralised recording systems of financial institutions and the fiscal 
structures of the state. Banks maintain centralised, audited accounting systems which 
capture all monetary flows; the state levies tax on the income of all households. These 
data sources are therefore seen as almost comprehensive representations of economic 
reality. Survey data are incomplete, partial, and distorted pictures of this reality.  
 
This move is partly related to technological changes and the use of information 
technology within statistical agencies. The rise of more powerful software as well as 
larger and more interlinked databases with richer metadata, has expanded the 
possibilities for combining and reusing information across diverse sources. A statistician 
in the OECD’s national accounts division reflects on these changes, also connecting 
them to budget cuts and wider institutional re-structuring: 
 
25 years ago, every statistic could have its own survey. Money was not an issue, response 
burden was not an issue. If you wanted to have a specific definition, you just sent out a 
new survey, and if your colleagues sitting next door wanted to have a slightly different 
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definition of the same variable, they just send out a survey as well. Nowadays you’re not 
allowed to survey everything anymore. You must first ask “okay, is this already available 
in admin data?”…So nowadays statistical offices are forced to use whatever is out there… 
statistical offices have a larger IT department and also more methodologically skilled 
people. If they hire new staff, they're looking for “what are your IT skills? Do you know 
programmes like AR and SPSS?” – just to handle all the data (Interview JZ). 
 
This illustrated that a major way in which statistical agencies have responded to the 
imperatives of aligning macroeconomic data with data in household inequality is to draw 
increasingly upon admin data rather than traditional survey instruments to perform 
distributional analyses. This is often narrated as a technical fix to the reconciliation 
problems they are confronting in relation to the imperatives of the beyond GDP agenda. 
 
Nevertheless, these developments have led to some surprising and largely unintended 
effects. For instance, the growing use of admin data has changed and strengthened the 
role of micro-data experts within the process of compiling the national accounts totals 
themselves, which is causing new epistemic conflicts. By encouraging micro-statisticians 
to use administrative data in new and creative ways, one effect has been to empower 
them in the ongoing negotiations over balancing national accounts items. As one 
statistician describes, this is not simply an abstract confrontation between statistical 
sources and reality, but a negotiation process between different experts armed with their 
different data sources: ‘You start with the sector specialists. They do the first estimate, 
then the transaction specialists balance each transaction … then the sector specialists 
want to look at the results again. Usually, when balancing the transaction, they are already 
negotiating, discussing’ (Interview JZ). Micro-statisticians working on the ‘household 
sector’ were previously regarded as having a lowly status in these negotiations. Their 
data were modified at will during the balancing process. But the growing embrace of 
admin data by micro-statistics has empowered micro-statisticians within the national 
accounts balancing process. And this in turn is creating new conflicts over the size of 
the totals given for the household sector in the national accounts themselves: 
 
Now the person responsible for the household sector has a very strong negotiation 
starting point, because he [sic] has a very strong underlying data. 15 years ago, it was 
“okay, the banks say this, the balance of payment says that, so I am going to adjust your 
estimate by minus 20” – and you had to say “hmm, well, okay”…But now, when they 
approach you, saying “I want to reduce your number by 20”, you can reply, “actually I 
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don't think this looks correct. I think the non-financial corporations might have an error, 
if you look at time series”. So the negotiation starting point is now much stronger. If we 
are discussing micro-macro gaps 20 years ago, 15 years ago, it was “the national accounts 
are good, we have to adjust the micro”…Now the micro people are saying, “okay, come 
on, bring us what you got there!” (Interview JZ). 
 
This illustrates how an attempt to subsume household-level measurement of inequality 
under national accounts frameworks via technological alignment of data sources has in 
turn fed back onto the unity and cohesion of the national accounts themselves, and led 
to new sites of conflict in negotiations over the size of national income.  
 
When Micro is Bigger than Macro: The Contested Ontology of National Accounting  
 
More fundamentally, however, this attempt to subsume the measurement of inequality 
under the rubric of centralised administrative records has revealed the fundamental 
limits of the basic picture of the economy that the national accounts sources can provide. 
For a start, the very sense that data drawn from the financial sector and tax data can 
more accurately capture the value of assets is problematic in the view of many types of 
spatially distributed real assets, such as housing or land, which may have idiosyncratic 
features or are traded infrequently. In these cases, surveys by people observing these 
assets ‘on the ground’ in fact provide a more accurate view of their value than the 
financial transactions which tend to be legible in official registers and administrative 
data:  
 
Usually people are quite good in evaluating their real assets. It’s related to the fact that if 
you are a household you have this face-to-face interview, so the interviewer is coming 
into your home and is able in a way to assess the value of your home. So it’s something 
that the interviewee has in mind, and of course he will adapt his answer to this knowledge 
(Interview PL). 
 
So, while administrative data may work well for capturing some aspects of wealth 
inequality, especially financial assets, they are not particularly good at representing real 
assets such as land or property (Interview JH). The picture of surveys as distorted and 
untrustworthy representations of the centralised records is problematised by such facts. 
A picture of wealth inequality which wants to include these assets, in their specific 
materiality, has not been able to escape the need for direct empirical observation that 
survey instruments provide.  
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Moreover, statisticians are realising that this embrace of admin data cannot solve the 
problem of capturing household inequality in its various dimensions, because ‘the 
economy’ does not appear to be contained within the administrative systems of banks 
and the State after all. For instance, because national accounts data is predominantly 
collected from central administrative records, it cannot contain any information on 
transfers between households. Even if statisticians could map the income and wealth 
contained in admin data such as tax records perfectly to every household, this would still 
not be able to provide any sense of how households interact with each other in ways 
which are not routed through financial institutions or the state: 
 
The thing to remember is that there are differences between the micro distributional 
statistics and the national accounts aggregates for sensible conceptual reasons as well. 
One example is transfers between households, where you’ve got one household providing 
another household with money, whether that’s students living away from home or 
maintenance payments or whatever. These household-to-household transfers aren’t 
reflected in the national accounts as they obviously all fall within the household sector, 
whereas for individual households, when you’re looking at distributions they play an 
important part (Interview RT). 
 
A core underlying assumption on which much of the debate over micro-macro gaps 
rests is that the micro-data give a partial, incomplete approximation of the economy, 
which is more fully grasped – ‘95% of all income flows’ (Interview JZ) – by the sources 
drawn upon by the national accounts. But this assumption has been undermined by 
efforts to close the micro-macro gaps with admin data.  
 
The importance of the whole constellation of more informal inter-household 
relationships, as well as the impossibility of measuring this realm of activity from 
calculative centres, is becoming increasingly evident. In the case of many developing 
countries, where informal transactions between households or unrecorded remittances 
compose a very significant means through which economic relations are co-ordinated, 
micro-data actually produces larger estimates. Mexico is a prominent example of this 
within the OECD: 
 
For Mexico, informality and remittances are important. [Flows between households are] 
under-valued in the national accounts, but the micro-survey is reporting that the current 
transfers are coming and going from the same household sector…when we investigated 
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this, we realised that the national accounts is lower than the micro-survey! (EG DNA 
Meeting, 2016). 
 
As a result of attempts to close micro and macro gaps, the idea of the national accounts 
as a larger more representative example of a single object – ‘the economy’ – has come 
unfixed. The issue is made even more serious when other definitions of income start to 
be used. For instance, the income concept used in much surveying data includes 
informal income earned outside of salaried employment, often in cash and unregistered 
by banks. Again, quoting a senior representative from the Mexican statistical office at an 
OECD working group: 
 
We have a lot of money going from children to parents. Yes, obviously, because in Mexico 
we have a certain kind of family…but those transfers are not visible [in the national 
accounts], because they are inside the household sector. The micro-survey lets us 
understand what is happening. One aspect of this, that’s really amazing, is that most 
households are buying dwellings from the family – not from a bank. When you start to 
think about this, you start to understand there are many relationships that you are not 
revealing if you’re not looking at the micro-survey… if you are only using counterparty 
information from the financial sector or the government. There are some issues that are 
very important, happening inside the same sector, that you cannot see. Informality in 
Mexico is almost 20% of the economy – but informal employment happens within the 
household sector (EG DNA, 2016). 
 
Attempting to unify these two representations of ‘the economy’ has increasingly revealed 
the fuzziness and ambiguity which surround its boundaries, and the presence of a myriad 
of interactions and institutions of economic relevance which are illegible to the 
centralised information systems from which national accounts are constructed. People 
share things, create goods and services for their own use, employee their families and 
friends. The individual cannot always be taken as the self-evident unit of analysis; 
families and communities structure these interactions in complex ways. ‘Income’ flows, 
understood in this broader sense, could in fact be far larger than those given in the 
national accounts. The issue of epistemic authority has been reversed. Perhaps it is the 
macro data – that appears to offer the authoritative and complete picture of the economy 
– that is incomplete after all. Households and their economic relationships are not 
nested ‘inside’ the economy as understood by national accounts, because their economic 
experiences overflow their interactions with financial markets or the state, which is all 
that the administrative data infrastructure on which the national accounts are 
constructed makes visible.  
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4.3 Substantivism and Inequality Measurement: Towards a Plural 
Understanding of ‘Income’ and ‘Wealth’  
 
Given the limitations of admin data to create a unified representation of the economy 
through technical means, this section examines statistical efforts to reconcile these data 
sources through methodological and conceptual reconciliation. It demonstrates how, 
because of this work, leading global statisticians are confronting fundamental differences 
between the economic interactions relevant to households and the picture of the 
economy given by national accounts frameworks. Moreover, it is increasingly recognised 
that aligning these is not a technical statistical problem – rather, it relates to the fact that 
‘the economy’ being described in each case it not the same thing: on the one hand, it 
refers to the ‘formalist’ understanding of the economy as contained within a complete 
system of market transactions, and on the other a ‘substantive’ understanding of 
household livelihood. Thus, I suggest the statistical work increasingly exposes the fallacy 
of assuming macroeconomics can be empirically ‘micro-founded’ at the household level, 
because the economic interactions of households are not reducible to the 
macroeconomic vision of a closed system of price-forming markets described by 
national accounts. 
 
The Incommensurability of National Accounts and Household Livelihood 
 
Efforts to develop harmonised methodological frameworks in which the measurement 
of micro-level inequality can be reconciled with national accounts standards have been 
undertaken by international working groups, co-ordinated through the OECD and 
ECB. These working groups gather statisticians skilled in both areas from national 
statistical agencies, in attempt to develop methodologies to achieve this reconciliation 
(OECD EGDNA 2016; OECD WPNA 2016; ECB 2016). The discussions centre 
around apparently dry, technical matters: the similarities and differences between sub-
items as they may be defined in the national accounts and relevant micro-data variables 
from household surveys; how best to match up survey items to national accounting 
entities; the reasons for the ‘under-reporting’ of particular items in micro data (alcohol, 
for instance) or their complete absence. Through confronting these issues through 
detailed, item-level definitional and conceptual comparisons, it is hoped to arrive at a 
reconciled set of data on inequality which is consistent with national accounts totals and 
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can be presented side-by side. Two main approaches to the issue are emerging (Interview 
JH; Interview PL), both of which have ultimately come to accept that the economic 
concepts relevant to measuring household living standards are not ultimately compatible 
with, and do not fully overlap, those drawn upon in the national accounts; however, they 
manage this fact in different ways.  
 
The first, favoured by the OECD in its approach to income and consumption 
inequalities (OECD 2017), has been to treat the national account definitions and totals 
as correct and ‘complete’, and from this try to match the survey data onto these results. 
This is achieved by scaling up the micro-data totals to the national accounts aggregates, 
and by making assumptions about how the distribution of the ‘gaps’ influences the 
overall level of inequality in the household sector of the national accounts. The key 
questions to be resolved here are which of the national accounts items the survey items 
correspond to, and (where micro data is missing) how the imputed income for these 
gaps should be allocated across households. Through these discussions, and various 
experimental statistical exercises, standardised principles are beginning to be developed 
for allocating the gaps so that inequality and macroeconomic figures can be presented 
in a unified way. The outcome of these discussions how these issues are handled has a 
significant impact on the picture of inequality that is produced, and that will be used in 
economic analyses and political discourse.  
 
We might understand this technical work as a process of methodological alignment 
towards a more complete account of economic activity and its distribution. And this is 
indeed how national accountants sometimes narrate it. A staff member at the OECD 
national accounts division indicated that: 
 
We have the national account total and this is the starting point, and then you say, “okay, 
what are the gaps, what is the quality of this, what is the quality of that?”…You make 
adjustments, and with every step you come closer to the national accounts…you start 
distributing in line with national accounts totals (Interview JZ). 
 
But again, the story is more complicated than this suggests. Statisticians are more 
reflexive than anybody about the links between data and the practicalities of its 
collection, and about the inherent differences which result from constructing 
measurement of phenomena via one instrument or another. One ONS staff member 
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explains that the differences between micro and macro sources reflect not just 
measurement error but: ‘the fact that with the micro statistics, obviously the main object 
of interest is the household, whereas in the national accounts they are looking at things 
from a whole economy basis’ (Interview RT); an OECD publication similarly notes that: 
‘both frameworks are influenced by the practicalities of collecting data relevant to the 
concepts to be measured’ (OECD 2013, 15). This is another way of saying that these are 
not gaps between measurements and a unified economic reality, but rather reflect the 
measurement of different economic phenomena, implied by different perspectives on 
what ‘the economy’ constitutes: in Polanyian terms, between economy in its substantive 
and formal sense.  
 
This inescapable fact has resulted in considerable practical difficulties in aligning these 
concepts: many of the items missing from the national accounts have turned out not to 
be ‘gaps’ per se, but rather economic phenomena that either do not make sense to 
measure from the perspective of household living standards or prove almost impossible 
to measure in household surveys, as they are so far removed from the everyday realities 
of people’s economic experience. Most of these items stem from finance. A prominent 
example of this is ‘Financial Intermediary Services Indirectly Measured’ (FISIM). FISIM 
is an important income concept within the national accounts, used to represent the 
‘value’ created by the financial services sector. But it is not registered as an expenditure 
item in micro surveys. Households could not be expected to report upon the extent to 
which they personally benefit from a fictional abstraction created to represent the 
national income generated by the entire financial sector. As a Eurostat statistician 
explains: ‘if you turn up to someone’s door and ask them how much FISIM they receive, 
they have no idea what you are talking about’ (Interview PL). This point is echoed in an 
ONS study: 
 
Some national accounts variables have no equivalent in income microdata, either due to 
their conceptual nature or practical considerations. For example, FISIM and investment 
income attributed to insurance policy holders both have no counterpart in micro-data 
(ONS 2015a, 4). 
 
During a discussion of the OECD’s expert group, one of the OECD national accounts 
team, while agreeing that ‘from an income perspective FISIM is probably one of the less 
ingenious ideas in the national accounts’, nevertheless emphasised the: 
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Importance of FISIM is to the total framework of the national accounts. I mean, you 
need some imputation for this item. One could argue that here, where we focus on the 
disposable income of households, it is less important, so we should reason without 
FISIM. That was done for France. But I understand that in previous meetings we agreed 
to try to estimate FISIM…it’s important to be aligned with the national accounts, so we 
have to find a way to include FISIM, whether it’s a good idea or a bad idea. (EG DNA 2016, 
emphasis added). 
 
This raises interesting questions about whether this is indeed an ‘under-reporting’ of 
income at the household level (as sometimes implied), or not: FISIM itself is a recent 
and highly artificial accounting construct with a tortured, contested post-war history 
within the SNA itself (Christophers 2011, 2013). Recent scholarship has argued that it 
has been invented simply to ensure that the non-productive nature of finance was not 
revealed by the national accounts, and serves to legitimise finance-driven growth models 
(Assa 2016). The matter of incorporating FISIM into household income for the 
purposes of inequality measurements thus remains unresolved. 
 
A similar issue arises with income from share dividends, which in technical national 
accounts terminology are referred to as ‘distributed income of corporations’. Again, 
measuring such an income concept in surveys has proven impossible, and statisticians 
explicitly link this to the remoteness of this form of financial remuneration to the daily 
economic experience of most households. The head of the Austrian statistical agency 
told the OECD’s expert group that for share dividends there is: 
 
Massive under-reporting in the surveys… [and] there is no tax data, because these things 
are not taxed…so we have no solution at the moment. Those people that are asked in the 
survey simply don’t give an answer – they don’t know it, it’s not important to them, they 
don’t give the right answer (EG DNA 2016). 
 
This partly relates to a point discussed above – that the temporality of financial markets 
simply makes it impossible for most people to truly comprehend their own economic 
position at a given moment in time, if asked in a survey. But it also points to a bigger 
issue: that in advanced and highly financialised economies many of the income concepts 
that have become important to national income and macroeconomic analysis, that 
simply do not feature in the everyday lives of people, and are thus immeasurable when 
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considering inequality at the household level. This in turn frustrates statistical attempts 
to give a harmonised description of ‘the economy’: the ‘practical’ limitations of surveying 
actually have to do with the fundamental disjuncture between households’ everyday 
experience of the economy and the way in which modern economies function at the 
macro level: the growing disconnect between the measurement of livelihood and 
habitation and of improvement. The fact that there are moves to impute and scale up 
these concepts, on the basis they are ‘missing from the micro data’, therefore has 
significant political implications for how inequality comes to be defined and which 
actions might best reduce it: if FISIM and share dividends are included in this way, then 
policies of financial inclusion might begin to seem an effective route to inclusive growth; 
in not, the efficacy of these actions might seem less evident.  
 
Emergence of Hybrid Definitions of National Accounting Concepts 
 
The second approach to this issue more explicitly rejects the assumption that national 
accounts concepts are the definitive standard, and that micro data should be scaled up 
to match these. Instead, new hybrid definitions of these concepts are being developed. 
This has been favoured by the ECB in its work on aligning wealth inequality data aligned 
to national accounts balance sheets (Interview JH; ECB 2016). Here, the focus has been 
painstakingly working through the different classes of assets and liabilities found in 
national accounts balance sheets, to assess the extent to which they can meaningfully be 
compared with items from household wealth surveys such as the HFCS. This might be 
either because they are completely excluded from surveys, or are defined so differently 
in conceptual terms at the household level that comparison is considered meaningless. 
A paper laying out this approach: 
 
Concludes that it is not reasonable to stick to one wealth concept…it is almost impossible to 
apply a standardised concept as the wealth as well as income concept applied in both statistics are 
considerably different…some concepts do not necessarily make sense at the balanced macro 
system level…the micro survey focuses only on one individual households, which forces 
one to define the concepts from the household point of view…there are severe coherence 
problems with some of the components (Kavonius and Honkkila 2013, 3; 6; 14; 19 
emphasis added). 
 
 115 
 
This involved working through different categories of wealth and assessing their 
definitions and the comparability between the two sources. Thus, such moves represent 
the insistence by the statisticians and accountants working on these programmes that 
the quest to reconcile the household view of living standards with the macroeconomic 
vision of the national accounts is a futile endeavour, as they are representing 
fundamentally different views of the economic process.   
 
Again, interestingly, this acceptance is partly driven by the difference between financial 
assets and real assets. As a member of the ECB expert group explained, the coverage of 
real assets is patchy in national accounting systems and that ‘definitely the coverage of 
non-financial assets is better in the survey than the coverage of financial assets’ 
(Interview JH). A working paper substantiates this point further:  
 
Non-financial assets, i.e. predominantly housing wealth, are relatively easy to estimate at 
the micro level … [However] the financial flows at the macro level are more reliable than 
in the surveys. Consequently, in wealth surveys the share of non-financial wealth has been 
recorded as significantly higher compared to the national accounts (Kavonius and 
Honkkila 2013, 14). 
 
For this reason, the ‘hybrid’ wealth concept adopted to use to build harmonised DiNA 
in these exercises excludes real assets ‘as non-financial assets are not available at country 
level’ (Kavonius and Honkkila 2013, 6). This is a rather extraordinary conclusion. It 
essentially concedes that many of the assets most central to households’ livelihoods, 
such as property or land, are to be excluded from the measurement of wealth inequality 
because the national accounts data on these assets is incomplete. 
 
The issues also extend to the complex entanglements between the public and private, 
‘business’ and ‘household’ aspects of wealth. This particularly affects small businesses 
run from a family or by a few self-employed individuals. The national accounts draw a 
distinction between ‘unincorporated enterprises’, which are situated within the private 
household sector, and ‘quasi-corporations’, which count as ‘separate institutional units’ 
that ‘function as if they were corporations’ (UN 2008, 440). The ECB methodology 
outlines some of the problems that emerge from the entanglement between the private 
and the public that this involves: 
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Financial and non-financial assets, as well as liabilities, are spread over the various items 
of the household balance sheet…and it is thus not possible to distinguish between the 
wealth of the unincorporated enterprise and the wealth of the household…If, however, 
the economic activity is considered to be a separate unit, any property rights are classified 
in national accounts as equity participation held by the household... In general, the 
distinction between households and business wealth was considered problematic for 
respondents, particularly in the case of small businesses (ECB 2016, 54). 
 
Of course, such a problem only makes sense or can be comprehended given the 
framework of the national accounts, which are required to sort these things out into neat 
sectors called ‘household’ and ‘business’; and this in turn can be traced back to the 
separation of the corporation as a legal person in Western legal systems. A member of 
the ECB team illustrates this point further: 
 
We have something called business wealth … the problem with business wealth in the 
survey is that it’s not very comparable across countries, because it’s something that’s not 
very easy to collect. the household does not think in terms of national accounts definitions 
when they report their business wealth. So part of it may be classified, for example, as 
household deposits in the national accounts, but the households consider that they are 
self-entrepreneurs and consider it as business assets (Interview JH). 
 
As we see, the economic activities of households tend to overflow macroeconomic 
accounting categories; it is these messier realities that the wealth surveys must deal with. 
As a result of these and other issues, the ECB has constructed a hybrid wealth concept 
which it uses to construct its reconciled distributional wealth national accounts which 
excludes all these areas of incompatibility. This is restricted to widespread, commonly 
held and stable assets such as bank deposits, publicly listed equity, bonds and mutual 
funds. Even pensions were excluded, because of valuation problems. It was only on this 
basis that the ECB could get the micro data ‘coverage ratios’ to the national accounts to 
acceptable levels (27-62% of national accounts data), and ‘wealth’ could be made to look 
like an almost stable object once more.  
 
To summarise, both methods discussed above represent a means for statisticians to 
confront and manage the fundamental incompatibilities between the formalist vision of 
the economy given in national accounts frameworks with the realities of the economy 
as experienced by households. Accepting that no single measure can capture both the 
aggregate economy and household-level inequalities, they bring into question the 
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national accounts view of the economy as a closed and unitary system, and the economic 
dimensions of inequality as neatly contained within this system. 
 
Summary  
 
This chapter has surveyed recent statistical attempts to address one of the major critiques 
levelled at GDP – that it fails to account for the negative effects of rising inequality and 
social exclusion that may prevail even during periods of aggregate economic expansion. 
In line with the rest of the thesis, its central interest has been not in assessing how far 
this agenda is undermining the value placed on growth relative to other political or social 
objectives, but rather how it is interacting with and disrupting modes of economic 
reasoning which make the economy appear to be an autonomous and unified sphere 
which can grow and shrink in the first place. As argued in chapter 3, in Polanyian terms 
this represents the test of whether the beyond GDP agenda holds the potential to 
challenge the formalist understanding of the economy as fully contained within a closed 
system of price-forming markets. 
 
The first section outlined how this agenda has been framed in terms of the need to close 
the gaps between measures of inequality and the national accounts, and the influence of 
economic theory on this. The recent focus on harmonised data on inequality and 
macroeconomic aggregates is bound up with a rethinking of the ‘micro-foundations’ on 
which new classical macroeconomic models are based. Whereas until the crisis adequate 
micro-foundations were assumed to consist of theoretical reconciliation with rational 
representative agent assumptions of microeconomics, there are now serious moves to 
reconcile macroeconomic theory with household-level heterogeneity, grounded in 
empirical data. Part of this project is an attempt to show how micro and macro pictures 
of the economy can be reconciled so that inequality can be seamlessly integrated into 
macroeconomic models. This agenda is predicated on the formalist assumption that the 
empirical living standards of households and national accounts aggregates represent 
different measurements of what is ultimately a single unified object - ‘the economy’ – that 
can therefore be brought into alignment. The current interest in distributional data as 
part of the post-Stiglitz beyond GDP agenda can be situated within this broader project: 
both in the abstract, as another attempt to bring micro and macro representations of the 
economy into alignment; and more directly as an analytical imperative linked to new 
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forms of monetary policy analysis in response to critiques of the representative agent 
underpinning DSGE models.  
 
The central argument developed in sections 2 and 3 was that the practical 
implementation of this statistical reconciliation project is revealing the limitations of this 
historical vision of the economy in new ways. It is showing, for instance, that the 
informal relationships households conduct between themselves outside of market 
exchange cannot be understood through using centralised administrative data that the 
national accounts rely upon. It has also demonstrated that many of the income and 
wealth constructs represented in the national accounts have no meaningful equivalent 
at the household level. This is leading to a more plural and context-dependent 
understanding of the accounting concepts used to define economic categories like 
‘income’, ‘consumption’ or ‘wealth’ within official statistical systems. While predicated 
on formalist assumptions, what is emerging from this agenda is therefore something 
more interesting: a new awareness of the fundamental multiplicity of economic reality. 
A project to shore up macroeconomics by integrating distributional issues into its 
models has in fact exposed the limitations of such a vision for comprehending economic 
reality. 
 
Having examined the challenge that the beyond GDP agenda poses to the vision of ‘the 
economy’ underpinning the national accounts in this chapter, through the prism of 
inequality measurement, the next assessed how new measurement ideas are interacting 
with a second foundational feature of formalist economic reasoning: that ‘society’ is 
something that takes place outside of the economic sphere of production represented by 
GDP and the national accounts. 
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5. Society after GDP: Unpaid Activity and the Limits of the 
Production Boundary 
 
 
The criterion of rationality assumes a person striking a choice between uses of scarce means…it 
follows that the only economic activity of the worker is that of selling his labour power…[But] 
the exclusion of everyday activities of producers from the scope of economic activities is utterly 
unacceptable to the student of economic institutions – Karl Polanyi 
 
There is little contention that many of the services produced by households for their own-use, such 
as cleaning services, preparation of meals, child-care etc contribute to material well-being…recent 
improvements in the statistical infrastructure of many countries (e.g. more detailed data on wages, 
improved data on non-market activities, and time-use surveys) have led many countries to produce 
household production satellite accounts that complement the traditional estimates of economic 
activity - OECD 
 
 
In 2014, when statisticians at the Office for National Statistics calculated the significance 
of unpaid work to the UK economy, it was estimated to generate £1.02 trillion annually: 
56% of the value of the entire market economy captured by GDP; 8.5 times the income 
produced by the UK’s financial services sector (ONS 2016b, 3). Such values are not just 
vast in absolute terms; they greatly impact the measurement of relative living standards 
between countries. For instance, an OECD study found that China’s per capita GDP 
looked 50% higher relative to the US if non-market services were included in the 
comparison (OECD 2011b). These findings are something of an embarrassment for the 
national accounts system, which purports to provide ‘a comprehensive and detailed 
record of the complex economic activities taking place within an economy’ (UN 2008, 
1). A major recommendation of the Stiglitz commission was that the value of this unpaid 
labour and leisure time should be measured more regularly and consistently, so that the 
relationship between labour markets and non-market activities could be brought into 
the analysis of economic welfare and living standards (Stiglitz et al. 2010). Better 
valuation of these services has consequently become a key strand of beyond GDP 
statistical work since 2009 (ONS 2008; Eurostat 2011b; ONS 2013b, 2013a).  
 
In the previous chapter we investigated how the internal unity of ‘the economy’ has been 
fragmented by attempts to integrate distributional measures of living standards into the 
national accounts. This chapter examines how seriously its external borders with 
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‘society’ are increasingly threatened by the problem of accounting for the value of non-
market activities. Using the Polanyian perspective outlined in chapter 3, the chapter 
helps us to further answer the question of how far these statistical reforms challenge 
‘formalist’, market-centric representations of the economy. This is a more puzzling issue 
than it may first appear. After all, the very fact that this agenda seeks to value production 
outside labour markets appears to offer a more ‘substantive’ vision of economic 
production. On the other hand, efforts to monetise the value of social reproduction and 
affective labour using the standards of labour markets reflects a formalist impulse to 
commensurate all human activity with the logic of exchange relations. 
 
To illuminate this question, the first section provides a conceptual history of how 
economic theory has approached the problem of defining productive activities. 
Specifically, it shows how the ‘third-party criterion’ (Reid 1934, 11) – developed by 
Margaret Reid in the 1930s to determine which activities are considered as ‘economic’, 
on the basis of whether they could be delegated to another person on the market – arose 
from a specific moment of post-neoclassical problematisation about how to define 
production and labour. This principle was subsequently incorporated into accounting 
methodologies for valuing unpaid work, which revolve around the comparison of time-
use data with ‘equivalent’ market wages. The second section shows how the project of 
integrating these valuations into the SNA has encountered persistent challenges, ranging 
from apparently technical problems to more fundamental conceptual issues, resulting in 
their continued exclusion from GDP. The third section explores the consequent rise of 
alternative, output-based valuation approaches, as well as the proliferation of these 
measures in a growing system of ‘satellite accounts’. These enjoy increasing political 
salience due to the digital disintermediation of services, the rise of the platform and 
sharing economies and the blurring of work and leisure these entail. I argue that these 
trends offer productive political resources for a ‘substantive’ view of economy, as they 
reflect a growing acknowledgement of both the economic significance of non-market 
work and social reproduction and the impossibility of meaningfully individualising this 
value or understanding it through the lens of exchange relations.  
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5.1 Formalist Reason and Unpaid Work: Reid’s Third-Party Criterion in 
Contemporary Accounting Practice 
 
This section traces how the problem of productive activity outside markets has been 
dealt with in the history of economic thought, specifically through Margaret Reid’s third-
party criterion, showing how this principle informs contemporary beyond GDP 
accounting practice. It situates Reid’s work in a specific moment of problematisation, in 
which neoclassical value theory had unfixed the boundary between productive economic 
activities and society. Reid’s work reflects the concern of neoclassical thinkers to 
demarcate economic activity as relating to allocative choice between present disutility 
and future utility, grounding the notion of labour in alienability and exchange. This led 
Reid to formulate the re-integration of non-market work into the economy in specific 
terms: while she broadened the concept of labour to include unpaid work, she did so 
with reference to whether a market existed for delegating these activities. Current 
methodologies for valuing unpaid work – based upon Reid’s work – consequently 
represent an ambiguous terrain in which substantive objectives are practically advanced 
through a continued methodological privileging of exchange relations as the 
foundational site of the economic. They reproduce the concerns of neoclassical thinkers 
to explicitly contain the economy within the sphere of calculation, scarcity and exchange, 
after subjective value theory had threatened to compromise its boundaries.  
 
Defining Productive Labour from Classical to Neoclassical Economics 
 
Classical political economists famously worked with a labour theory of value; but this 
might also be described as a value theory of labour. Labour was activity that produced 
goods with exchange value. Smith often defined labour in open-ended terms, as: ‘the 
fund which originally supplies [the nation] with all the necessaries and conveniences of 
life’ (Smith 1993 [1776], 8), or elsewhere simply the ‘toil and trouble’ of initially 
producing useful goods. Smith did, however, draw a crucial distinction between 
productive and unproductive labour, based on whether its value was consumed in the 
process of creating it or stored up in a tangible good with exchange value: 
 
The labour of the manufacturer fixes itself in some particular vendible commodity, which 
lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a certain quantity of 
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labour stocked and stored up to be employed, if necessary, upon some other occasion. 
That subject, or what is the same thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put 
into motion a quantity of labour equal to that which has originally produced it (Smith 
1993 [1776], 191; emphasis added).  
 
In doing so, Smith coupled productive labour to the ability to bring the resultant good 
to market– i.e., generally to the manufacture of physical, tradeable objects. The 
distinction was used, moreover, to explicitly exclude the work of domestic servants as 
economically unproductive.29  
 
Nevertheless, while the productive nature of labour is indeed grounded in the ability to 
exchange or barter the resultant products, Smith’s distinction did not imply that the 
dividing line between productive and unproductive work was the labour market. Smith’s 
definition excluded many activities which are traded on markets for a wage: even the 
services of a paid domestic servant were considered unproductive, as they were 
consumed immediately. Conversely, the unpaid production of exchangeable capital 
goods would be considered productive labour. Smith rather defined all affective service 
work as consumption (Brennan 2006). Until the late 19th century, this provided a secure 
principle on which to demarcate productive economic activities from unproductive 
consumption or society.30 
 
With the marginalist shift to a subjective theory of value, definitions of productive labour 
evolved. Value was now considered in utilitarian terms, as anything that satisfies a desire 
or want rather than as physical goods produced by units of labour time. This potentially 
engendered much more expansive definitions of what constituted productive economic 
activity, which in turn threatened to overflow manufacturing work to encompass almost 
every human action (see Brennan 2006). Marshall, for instance, explicitly contested 
Smith’s definition of productive labour, arguing that ‘man cannot create material things 
                                                 
29 ‘The labour of the menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing… [it] does not fix or 
realise itself in any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish in the very 
instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace or value behind them for which an equal quantity 
of service could afterwards be procured’ (ibid, 191-2). 
30 This focus must be understood not as representing a fundamental ontological divide, however, but as 
inspired by his concern with the ethical underpinnings of commercial society and transactions (see Watson 
2018, 21-23). 
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… [W]hen he is said to produce material things, he really only creates utilities’ (Marshall 
2011 [1890/1930], 45). On this basis he entertained the notion that ‘it would be best to 
regard all labour as productive except that which failed to promote the aim towards 
which it was directed, and so produced no utility (Marshall 2011 [1890/1930], 41). 
Likewise, in Taussig:  
 
Since the essence of production is that it leads to satisfactions or utilities, it follows that 
any labour or effort which yields utilities is productive. The musician whose performance 
brings us pleasure does precisely the same sort of thing as the florist whose blossoms last 
a few hours. The domestic servant contributes to our ease just as does the artisan who 
supplies the furniture for our dwellings…[The] services of those whom Adam Smith and 
his followers called unproductive labourers…are desired and prized; and they are yielded 
by human effort. The rewards earned by these efforts are an important topic in economic 
science (Taussig 1911, 18-20). 
 
However, since almost any purposive human activity arguably engenders utility, this 
potentially implied that productive work could no longer be confined to market-oriented 
activity. Thus, the first objective of neoclassical theorists – to ground economics in a 
utilitarian theory of value – threatened to compromise the second, i.e. to turn economics 
into the mathematical study of choice and allocative efficiency under scarcity conditions.  
 
Anxiety about the potential implications of this proliferation in the concept of labour is 
evident in the writings of neoclassical theorists. In particular, we see a concern to exclude 
from the economy activities which were done simply for their own amusement and 
yielded transitory pleasures. This was done through two central demarcation strategies: 
firstly, to re-define labour as only encompassing activities which did not themselves 
render utility for the person doing them; and secondly, to thereby re-connect labour 
conceptually with the exchange of an alienable and transferrable good. Wages could thus 
be reconstituted as the marginal price needed to offset the disutility of the labour 
involved with compensatory consumption possibilities. These moves were vital to Reid’s 
subsequent efforts to re-include non-market work in the economy through the third-
party criterion, which underpins modern accounting methodologies. 
 
Firstly, labour was carefully distinguished from leisure and consumption in neoclassical 
theory through an emphasis on its essential disutility. Jevons, for example, worried that: 
‘In defining labour…we may, if we like, include in it all exertion of body and mind. A 
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game of cricket would, in this case, be labour’ (Jevons 1965 [1871], 168). Rejecting this 
as absurd, he provided a definition of labour as the temporary endurance of disutility 
and hardship to produce future utility: ‘Labour is the painful exertion which we undergo 
to ward off pains of greater amount, or to procure pleasures which leave a balance in 
our favour’ (ibid). Marshall agreed with Jevons, and for similar reasons: 
 
Though some exertions are undertaken merely for their own sake, as when a game is 
played for amusement, they are not counted as labour. We may define labour as any 
exertion of body or mind undergone partly or wholly for with a view to some good other 
than the pleasure derived directly from work (Marshall 2011 [1890/1930], 46). 
 
Through this emphasis on disutility, labour was re-connected to future-oriented activity: 
consumption, leisure and society became things that were done for their own right by 
the doer, and which yield no future utility; productive labour is activity that is, by 
contrast, inherently painful and unpleasant but stores up future utilities. Importantly, 
this focus on disutility also allowed neoclassical thinkers to connect labour with the 
marginalist methodological focus on rational calculation over the allocation of scarce 
resources. This allowed for a de facto analytical focus on labour markets and wages as the 
price we receive to endure disutility in order to produce future consumption possibilities. 
Revealingly, Jevons decided against a more inclusive conception of labour precisely 
because, since such activities are ‘undertaken solely for the sake of the enjoyment 
attaching to it’, they ‘demand no calculus’ (Jevons 1965 [1871], 168).31  
 
Thus, neoclassical authors restored Smith’s principle that productive activity was 
something yielding a future exchange benefit, but expanded it to apply to service work 
as well as ‘vendible commodities’ (Smith 1993 [1776], 191). They did so by delineating 
labour as temporary disutility which produces a store of utility that can be transferred to 
others on the labour market (the site where decisions over how to allocate this future-
oriented disutility were made).  
 
                                                 
31 The sense of labour as a disutility also underpins the development of compensating wage differential 
theory, which see wages as the marginal benefit needed to offset the disutility represented by the work 
performed. Furthermore, when Jevons considers how we might make economics a quantitative science, 
he admits that since no unit of pleasure and pain exist, so we must look to price movements as the visible 
effects of these hedonic calculi. 
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Margaret Reid, the Third-Party Criterion and the Incomplete Escape from Formalism 
 
It is in this intellectual context – in which the scope of the economic and its boundaries 
with the social had been unfixed by neoclassical value theory – that we should situate 
Margaret Reid’s canonical work in the 1930s on household production. Foreshadowing 
Polanyi’s critique of formalist economics avant la lettre, Reid observed that: 
 
With few exceptions the interest of economists has been concentrated on that part of our 
economic system which is organized on a price basis. The productive work of the 
household has been overlooked, even though more workers are engaged in it than in any 
other single industry (Reid, 1934, v).  
 
It was on this basis that Reid sought to clarify the economically productive aspects of 
non-market activity and secure its status within economic analysis. It is important to 
consider her work in some detail, as the way in which she approached this has provided 
the motivating force for beyond GDP efforts to integrate unpaid labour into national 
accounting, and the methodologies used to do so.  
 
Reid’s work directly engages with and reflects the concern of neoclassical thinkers to 
keep the economic within its proper bounds: exchange and allocative choice. Thus, while 
her thought is motivated by the desire to extend the definition of production to include 
unpaid work, she sought to keep it clearly demarcated from the ‘social’ activities of 
leisure and consumption. Discussing the expansive utility-based definitions of 
production introduced by neoclassical authors, she agreed: 
 
To define production merely as the creation of utility is to identify it with purposeful 
activity…Such a definition of production leaves production and consumption in a state 
of hopeless confusion and makes no distinction between economic, personal and social 
activities. A cheery “good morning”, a swim in the lake, a game of golf, and social 
intercourse at the family table are production along with the cultivation of the soil, the 
making of shoes, the care of the sick (Reid 1934, 8). 
 
Reid thus accepted the need for the demarcation work done by neoclassical thinkers, 
seeking to show how this might coherently justify incorporating many aspects of 
household labour as valuable and rendering it visible to economists. In doing so, she 
was committed to defending the idea of a clear boundary between economic and social 
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activities, and the idea that these can be meaningfully disentangled; however, she wanted 
to annex more territory for ‘the economy’, so that it now securely extended to productive 
labour in the household. 
 
Moreover, Reid drew upon many of the same arguments outlined above to draw these 
distinctions in the context of unpaid household work. Firstly, she adopted the arguments 
of Jevons, Marshall and others that labour must not include activities done for their own 
sake: ‘if the utility is derived only through the “doing” or by the participation of the one 
who uses the good, then the activity is consumption’ (Reid, 1934, 10). Crucially, she also 
followed neoclassical theory in grounding labour in the storing up of alienable services 
which could be transferred and used by others. Reid explicitly ruled out activities which 
stay within the immediate social relations of the people doing them. Doing otherwise 
ran the risk of: 
 
Classifying as production many activities of a purely social nature. It is true that some of 
the deepest, most fundamental and lasting satisfactions arise from our associations with 
people…in the groups to which they belong.... [But] it seems that production is something 
apart from activities having to do with purely personal relationships (Reid, 1934, 11).  
 
Thus, for Reid it was the ability to disentangle goods and utility from the idiosyncratic 
interactions and relationships of the group who created them that separated productive 
economy from personal ‘consumption’ and inter-personal ‘society’. The economy was 
the sphere of (at least potentially) impersonal exchange.32  
 
This led Reid to formulate a precise definition of which unpaid activities are to be 
counted as labour, based around the possibility of these unpaid activities being obtained 
on the market. This has become known as the ‘third-party criterion’, and underpins 
modern accounting methodologies for valuing unpaid labour: 
 
[T]he test which may be applied in order to separate production from consumption and 
social activities: If an activity is of such a character that it might be delegated to a paid 
                                                 
32 Moor and Lury (Moor and Lury 2018, 5) argue that it was only around 1800 we get the ‘orientation 
toward the impersonal’ in markets and trade practices, which ‘contributed to the differentiation of 
economic relations from other types of more personalised relationship’ (See also Carrier 1994; Slater 
2002). 
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worker, then that activity shall be deemed productive…[H]ousehold  
production…consists of those unpaid activities which are carried on by and for the 
members, which might be replaced by market goods or paid services (Reid, 1934, 11). 
 
This definition has been extremely influential in formulating the contemporary critique 
of the SNA production boundary and recent attempts to value household labour, as we 
will explore below. Specifically, it informs input-based estimates arrived at by comparing 
time-use data with equivalent market wages for similar activities.  
 
The third-party criterion has been critiqued in recent years. Important feminist 
interventions, notably by Wood and Himmelweit (Himmelweit 1995; Wood 1997), have 
pointed to the masculine and western assumptions reproduced by this understanding of 
production, modelled as it is on ‘first world economies, with interesting (if problematic) 
results for the treatment of third world women’s labour…[through] an overriding 
exclusion of the personal’ (Wood 1997, 48). Here I build upon these existing arguments 
to address the specific concerns of this thesis, namely: in formulating the economic value 
of non-market labour in these terms, how far did Reid escape exchange-based 
assumptions about economic activity which Polanyi defined as ‘formalist’? I show how, 
since Reid’s third-party criterion bears the legacy of the neoclassical theory which it 
responded to, it represents a partial and incomplete escape from formalist renderings of 
labour, as it continues to privilege exchange as the locus of the economy and is unable 
to fully conceive of non-commodity forms of economic integration as independent.  
 
To understand this, it helps to re-emphasise two aspects of Polanyi’s ‘substantive’ 
definition of economy.33 
 
Firstly, Polanyi argued in several places that economic and social relationships generally 
exist in hybrid forms, and that they are often in practice impossible to disentangle. He 
famously argued for instance that ‘man’s economy is, as a rule, submerged in his social 
relations’ (Polanyi 1968, 65). Moreover, there was no specific motive – such as desire 
for gain – that could be isolated as the source of economic action: ‘In vain was [man] 
exhorted by economists and utilitarian moralists alike to discount in business all other 
motives than “material” ones. On closer investigation, he was still found to be acting on 
                                                 
33 This is more fully elaborated on in chapter 3. 
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remarkably “mixed” motives, not excluding duty toward himself and others – and 
maybe, secretly, even enjoying work for the sake of it’ (ibid, 69). Thus, a substantive 
definition of economy arguably implies a rejection of disutility as the essence of labour 
as well as the idea that personal relationships should be isolated from productive 
activities. Indeed, it was for this very reason that ‘the economy’ itself was hard to discern 
before the 18th century when markets for the major factors of production became 
common. Fully adopting a substantive outlook would mean accepting that the border 
between economy and society cannot be hard and fast.34 
 
As we saw in chapter 3, this was based on Polanyi’s notion of independently instituted 
modes of economic integration. Economic activity can be co-ordinated in a number of 
viable and discretely instituted ways, which were inextricably bound up with personal, 
symbolic and familial ties, social duties and status. Exchange represented only one of 
these, which moreover had until the 18th century tended to be marginal and heavily 
circumscribed. Indeed, in reciprocal or householding arrangements, many of the 
activities Reid hives off as ‘social’ – including, for instance, ‘working out for themselves 
and others satisfactory relationships in the groups to which they belong’ (Reid, 1934, 
p.11) – would be essential to the co-ordination of economic activity. Thus, in Polanyi 
we get a vision of economy and society as multiple, heterogeneous and hybrid; whereas 
in Reid we continue to encounter the neoclassical concern that ‘a satisfactory means of 
distinguishing between economic and social activities must be sought’ (Reid, 1934, p. 
10), even while the boundary of this is now to be set beyond the formal labour market 
within the family and the household.  
 
Secondly, Reid makes labour markets the dominant standard through which non-
exchange relationships might be considered valuable and productive (Wood 1997). This 
is sought because the existence of markets for these activities brings with it the 
possibility of an alternative allocation of this time to others, and thus brings these 
activities into relationship with economising allocative decisions. But as Polanyi argued, 
whereas ‘The formal meaning [of economy] implies a set of rules referring to the choice 
between the alternative uses of insufficient means’:  
                                                 
34 For Polanyi, if we do not take this step, and simply seek to include activity into the economy on the 
basis of its exchangeable and alienable character, we are likely to preclude an understanding of different 
and distinct types of work/value or their specificity and uniqueness. 
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The substantive meaning implies neither choice nor insufficiency of means; man’s 
livelihood may or may not involve the necessity of choice…indeed, some of the most 
important physical and social conditions of livelihood…are not, as a rule, so limiting 
(Polanyi 1968, 140). 
 
Reid, conversely does not just accept the need to clearly delineate the economic from 
the social, therefore conceptually precluding the possibility of independent non-
exchange modes of integration; she also suggests that the only terms on which unpaid 
activities might be brought within the category of the economic is by virtue of their 
relationship with exchange relations established through formal labour markets. Thus, 
it is not clear that Reid’s third-party criterion escapes Polanyi’s critique of formalist 
understandings of the economy. It rather appears the case that it reproduces certain 
aspects of this thinking, i.e. ‘by generalizing the use of price-making markets’ (Polanyi 
1968, 144) to other distinct modes of value creation. 
 
This was to have important repercussions when her work was integrated with accounting 
practices. Through her definitional focus on the possibility of delegating activity to a 
third party on the market, it became impossible to imagine a way in which activities are 
valuable if not commodified. This implies that commodification will expand both the 
realm of the market and the realm of the economy outside markets – constituted as a 
mirror image of what is happening on markets. As an example, Reid considers shopping 
to have become a productive activity only recently (when she was writing), precisely 
because of the emergence of ‘professional shopping services’, and so this was activity 
which could now be delegated to the market (Reid 1934, 14).  
 
Hence, according to the third-party criterion, the growth of household economy is 
linked conceptually to the growth of labour markets and its value cannot be 
independently theorised. As commodity markets develop for more and more activities 
and services, the scope of what is considered productive even outside the market sphere 
expands accordingly. Conversely, by this standard, almost nothing could have been 
considered ‘economic’ before the development of national labour markets in the 17th 
and 18th century, or in many contemporary non-Western societies. It also implied that 
the grounds on which these social provisioning activities are valued are the individual’s 
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possibility of choosing to sacrifice consumption possibilities by delegating them to paid 
workers. 
 
Thus, while Polanyi might have wholeheartedly endorsed Reid’s desire to broaden the 
concept of work and production beyond markets, we must question whether the 
conceptual moves Reid used to achieve this support the demands of a ‘substantive’ 
understanding of the economy or social reproduction.35 Reid was concerned to keep the 
boundary between economy and society tightly defined, extending it to include unpaid 
productive work done by individuals in the household only where this has a market 
equivalent. The substantive understanding of the human economy as outlined by Polanyi 
implies a more open and heterogeneous conception of production and economic value.   
 
The Third-Party Criterion, Accounting Methodologies and the Beyond GDP Agenda 
 
Despite Reid’s theoretical work predating the 1953 formulation of the SNA by some 
two decades, the original SNA production boundary nevertheless excluded unpaid 
labour from national income.36 As we saw more fully in chapter 2, this problem has 
plagued the SNA ever since, as following Reid’s work the continued exclusion of this 
component of economic welfare has always lacked a consistent theoretical basis. 
Furthermore, the SNA has long included imputations for certain categories of non-
market services and goods. For instance, estimations of the output of the government 
sector (Hicks 1940), imputation of the rents of owner-occupied houses and estimates 
for the production of own-produced goods (such as food and agricultural products) 
have long found their way into GDP figures (UN 1953) – further highlighting the 
arbitrariness of the exclusion of unpaid services.37  
                                                 
35 Reid herself was wary of the potential consequences of any reductionist misuse of her criteria of 
production, stressing how ‘by including in household production only those activities which might be 
delegated to a paid worker no ethical connotation is inferred; the social relations and activities and 
activities of the family are of the greatest importance to human satisfaction and social well-being’ (Reid 
1934, 16). Nevertheless, given the force that the economic has in public discourse this distinction, and its 
use in accounting methodology, remains politically important. 
36 See chapter 2. 
37 More recently, estimates for illegal activities such as the drug trade and prostitution have also been 
included. 
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Importantly, to confront this problem most studies have drawn on Reid’s third-party 
criterion to develop practical methodologies which can overcome these measurement 
and valuation problems. Specifically, this problem has generally been confronted by 
estimating the labour inputs to market work, using a combination of time-use surveys 
and wage data. Evolution of this methodology gained pace in the 1970s amongst more 
critical accountants looking to construct the fuller, more welfare-based measure of 
national income that Kuznets had earlier sketched out, and overcome valuation and 
measurement challenges which had led to the exclusion of social reproductive work 
from the original production boundary.  
 
Methodologies for valuing unpaid work began to evolve early in the post-war period. 
Reid herself, using the third-party criterion she had developed in the 1930s, drew upon 
time-surveys and data for domestic servants to construct a crude estimate of the value 
of household production of $34 billion for 1945 (Reid 1947).38 This set the template for 
later studies. Tobin and Nordhaus, in developing their Measure of Economic Welfare 
in the early 1970s, adopted an input-based approach, arguing that ‘The majority of those 
keeping house are women, and we thus choose the average hourly earnings for women 
as the proper valuation’ (Nordhaus and Tobin 1973, 45). However, they did not 
differentiate further than this between different sorts of activities for lack of granular 
time-use data. This method was also accepted by Eisner in estimating his total income 
system of accounts (Eisner 1989), and by Hawrylshyn – again directly citing Reid’s third-
party criterion: 
 
An economic service is one which may be done by someone other than the person 
benefiting therefrom. The question can be asked; can one hire labour to achieve the same 
results? If not, the activity is a direct utility one and cannot be measured in any meaningful 
way. In effect, this criterion is exactly the same as that always used by national income 
accounts (namely the market criterion) simply extended to its full logical possibilities 
(Hawrylshyn 1977, 87). 
 
                                                 
38 Reid looked back, in fact, to even earlier estimates made by Hildegaard Kneeland in the late 1920s 
(Kneeland 1929). 
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Similar studies were conducted in the 1970s by Gauger and Walker (1973), Murphy 
(1976), Edwards (1979) and others, consolidating the third-party criterion as the 
principle underlying practical methods for imputing the value of non-market time.  
 
This methodological approach, fleshed out in the 1970s partly in support of Becker’s 
theory of the household production function, was further cemented through its embrace 
during the late 1980s and 1990s by scholars with a very different normative and political 
agenda. Feminist political economists, notably Waring (1988, 1999), were concerned to 
make the value of social reproductive activity traditionally excluded from national 
accounts visible, and thus to ground political arguments for the redistribution of wealth 
and power and a recognition of this work in models of citizenship. To do this, Waring 
drew on Reid’s criteria, and the earlier methodological work, to ground a feminist 
critique of the production boundary and the arbitrariness of the exclusion of non-market 
work. The valuation of unpaid time based on comparable wages subsequently became 
commonplace in many feminist economic studies (Goldschmidt-Clermont 1990; 
Benería 1992; Beneria 1999; Landefeld and McCulla 2000; Van den Berg et al. 2004). 
Calls to extend the production boundary using imputations based on such methods has 
become an important component of wider political and social movements calling for a 
greater awareness of the gender biases in economic measurement and a fuller 
recognition of the unequal distribution of social reproductive labour (Sangolt 1999; Van 
den Bergh 2007; Rai et al. 2014).  
 
The post-war development of valuation methodologies based conceptually on the third-
party criterion and empirically upon time-use data and wage comparisons has 
underpinned the official response to the growing salience of non-market work. Even 
before the Stiglitz report in 2009, the ONS and OECD produced experimental estimates 
and methodological guidance for measuring unpaid services in the early 2000s (OECD 
2002; ONS 2002). These was subsequently taken as the standard for the official response 
to the Stiglitz recommendations. In the ONS, the Stiglitz recommendation influenced a 
major programme to update and regularise the ‘household satellite account’, produced 
only once before as a one-off exercise in 2002 (ONS 2008). It has shaped the statistical 
response of the European Statistical System to the Commission’s findings (Eurostat 
2011b), and also been used in OECD studies and working papers on the issue (OECD 
2011a). 
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Figure 3: Representation of an Expanded Production Boundary (from: Hawrylshyn 1977, 80) 
 
Through offering practical tools to impute values for unpaid activity, such methods have 
offered the promise of a more embedded, substantive view of the market economy and 
its relationship to social reproduction beyond the market. As figure 3 - taken from a 
1970s study - graphically illustrates, these methods pose the problem of non-market 
work in a certain way. Reflecting the influence of Reid’s work (and its post-neoclassical 
context), the boundary between 'economy' and 'society' is still a fixed and stable line. 
However, it has been moved to encompass certain defined non-market activities, viewed 
under the SNA as part of unproductive 'society'. Moreover, this move is grounded 
conceptually in the ability to compare such activities with commodified market activities, 
which underpins the valuation of these activities through using the time spent on them 
with an equivalent unit of wage labour.  
 
5.2 Unpaid Work and the Limits of Formalism: Practical Problems 
Disentangling Economy and Society  
 
Having investigated the historical ideas underpinning how non-market work has been 
brought into economic reasoning and accounting practice, this section outlines the 
contemporary problems encountered with integrating such estimates of this work into 
the SNA production boundary. Both aspects of this project – the time-use data on which 
they are based and the comparisons with wages in the market economy – are 
encountering various technical and conceptual challenges which have prevented a simple 
extension of the production boundary. In other words, a consequence of these reforms 
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is that the limitations of formalist attempts to comprehend the value of such activities 
with reference to a market equivalence are becoming increasingly evident.   
 
Time-Use Data 
 
The development of input-based methodologies using the third-party criterion as a 
conceptual yardstick deeply influenced the priorities of the post-Stiglitz agenda on non-
market work. Primarily, this has focussed on the improvement of time-use survey data 
which underpins such valuation methods. In the process it is becoming increasingly clear 
that time-use data can never provide imputations that will be capable of being integrated 
into the SNA production boundary and GDP estimates. Indeed, the very possibility of 
categorising time-use outside of markets in a way which can map onto the temporal 
structure of wage labour is being problematised.  
 
Input-based methods derived from Reid’s third-party criterion rely on the generation of 
extensive data on how individuals use their time outside the labour market. This is not 
only a rather intrusive process, but also expensive – it has generally been done through 
intensive time-use diaries filled in by a sample of representative households. A 
statistician at the ONS stated that: 
 
It is quite costly… it’s also quite burden on respondents as well. To be really useful you 
need to know 10-minute slots of how people are spending their time, so it’s a lot of 
response burden, and I think as a result response rates are traditionally not quite so high 
as with other surveys (Interview AS).39 
 
Consequently, population-wide time-use studies have historically been produced 
infrequently and sporadically. They also often lack the international standardisation that 
can underwrite stable international comparisons, and the granularity needed to conduct 
input-based valuations of non-market work. The head of the OECD’s national accounts 
division explained: ‘The time use survey data are simply not detailed enough. The quality 
of it absolutely needs to be improved to do this kind of analysis… it’s a resources 
                                                 
39 Another interviewee agreed: ‘they tend to be done on a very infrequent basis and they are very expensive 
to actually run, so they’re not run that frequently which makes it quite challenging for  producing outputs 
for the HHSAs (Interview DW). 
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problem: these surveys on time use are expensive’ (Interview PV).40 Therefore, much 
beyond GDP work has focussed on devoting more resources into time-use data that will 
improve its timeliness, detail and comparability (for more background on pre-Stiglitz 
efforts to improve time-use data see Esquivel 2011).41 
 
This has been a focus of statistical efforts at the European level. For instance, the 
Eurostat taskforce charged with co-ordinating the EU Statistical System’s response to 
the beyond GDP agenda made this a central priority for research: 
 
Broadening income measurement to non-market domestic activities and leisure time 
necessitates information on the time spent by households on such 
activities…Considering, in the longer term, developing European legislation for 
Harmonised European Time-Use Surveys … [and] ensuring the regular availability of 
comparable data on time spent for non-market household production (Eurostat 2011b, 
33). 
 
Similarly, the Conference of European Statisticians conducted an in-depth review of 
time-use survey data in 2009, which ‘drew attention to the limits of existing TUS in terms 
of frequency, classifications and other survey features’ (Eurostat 2011b, 33). This led to 
the formation of an international task force (including the OECD and Eurostat) to 
harmonise time-use surveys, which published guidelines under the auspices of the UN 
in 2013 (UNECE 2013). However, these efforts have exposed the practical difficulties 
in measuring time in a way which might underpin regular and reliable imputations into 
GDP or their integration with the SNA framework. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Another interviewee put it bluntly: ‘the time you survey is rubbish ... well, it’s really not stable over time, 
and the variables differ across countries. One country has it for 2010, the other for 2012, the other one 
for 2003. If you really want to use the time use survey, the quality has to be improved a lot’ (Interview 
JZ).  
41 The Beijing Platform for Action in 1996 proposed: ‘Developing methods quantifying the value of 
unremunerated work that is outside national accounts, such as caring for dependants and preparing food, 
for possible reflection in satellite or other official accounts’ (UN 1995, 87). 
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Social Time and Market Time 
 
One major challenge to using time-use surveys is that the temporality of their production 
does not align with the fluctuations of the market economy observed in quarterly GDP 
releases. Such data takes much longer to collect and analyse than the quarterly updates 
to the GDP, which are transmitted directly from corporate accounting information, and 
thus cannot be simply integrated into the same time-frame as GDP releases. Up to 2009, 
few countries had a regularised time-use survey at all, conducting them on an ad hoc 
basis.42 Even after the statistical efforts since 2009, moreover, harmonised time-use data 
is not anticipated as being available even on an annual basis. The Eurostat task force, 
for instance, recommended merely that: 
 
TUS should be conducted every ten years at least. This is considered an adequate interval 
to assess significant changes in time-use patterns and to detect possible shifts of the locus 
of production between households and the market (Eurostat 2011b, 35). 
 
The UK has only conducted one major time-use survey since the crisis, which was co-
ordinated by researchers at the University of Oxford rather than the ONS (Interview 
DW).  
 
The head of the OECD’s national accounting highlighted this as a major obstacle to 
producing regularised imputations for non-market work in GDP estimates: 
 
Many countries only have a more detailed time use survey every five years. Well, if you 
want to have quarterly GDP estimates, I’m sorry but it doesn't work. Then we would be 
extrapolating half of GDP based on nothing! That’s a big problem (Interview PV). 
 
The lack of timely time-use data is partly linked to the cost of conducting them. In the 
Netherlands the cost of the time-use survey was estimated at €1m. It is also related to 
the detail needed to construct granular time-use diaries, and the response burden this 
places on respondents.  
 
                                                 
42 The notable exception to this pattern is the USA, which conducts annual time-use surveys.  
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There are several attempts to develop technical and methodological solutions to this 
problem. One way is to use general stylised questions about time-use rather than using 
dedicated time-use surveys, or to conduct lighter time-use diaries, which could: ‘help to 
detect particular trends in time use or shifts of the locus of production even between 
the benchmarks of regular TUS’ (Eurostat 2011b, 36). Another proposal is to expand 
the use of internet-based surveys (which are quicker to produce) to speed the timeliness 
of time-use data transmission.43 The problem with these solutions is that, in attempting 
to generate speedier data, such methods tend to sacrifice the level of granularity and 
detail which input-based valuation methods require to impute monetary values for 
unpaid work using wage comparisons. The reliability of these questions as an input into 
national accounts totals is also questioned: 
 
Stylized questions can be used to ask about time used for main activities only, but not 
about parallel activities, being with someone else or the timing of activities, which can be 
done with the diary method. Studying time use by using stylized questions also has 
measurement problems. It has been observed that stylized measures of time use 
overestimate the time used for gainful and domestic work (UNECE 2013, 43). 
 
In other words, full time-use data has proven unable to match the temporality needed 
for integration with mainstream national accounts production, but timelier data are 
incompatible with valuation methods grounded in the third-party criterion. Attempts to 
generalise to improve the timeliness of time-use data in turn compromise the robustness 
of the imputations.  
 
These methodological discussions highlight a much bigger issue with the whole concept 
of extending the production boundary further into ‘society’. This is that the temporal 
dynamics of social reproduction simply do not match the temporal dynamics of capitalist 
labour markets. One persistent finding of much research on time-use is that changes to 
the basic reproductive fabric of human relations are relatively stable relative to the 
frenetic changes in market employment and wages. Arguably, this should lead to the 
conclusion that more attention should be paid to this enduring and resilient sphere of 
                                                 
43 Such efforts mirror a broader movement triggered by the beyond GDP movement and the efforts to 
better integrate social and economic indicators towards flash-estimating or ‘nowcasting’ social data. It is 
hope this will improve the timeliness at which social trends can be observed, bringing them close to the 
near real-time release of economic indicators and the core measures of the market economy.  
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activity. However, the difference between the temporality of the market and the 
temporality of social provisioning activity is often used as a justification for the 
continued focus of the national accounts on tracking movements in the market economy 
which exhibit sufficient short-term change to warrant regular measurement. 
 
Disentangling Work from Life: Time-Use Survey Categories and the Construction of 
Market-Like Time 
 
Input-based methods based on the third-party criterion rely upon a precise classification 
of time into discrete categories. Moreover, these categories need to be of a nature that 
permits them to be brought into comparison with the ‘measuring rod of money’, i.e. 
comparable chunks of waged activity. However, in practice this demands that the time-
use survey instruments disentangle and isolate the ‘work-like’ bits of people’s lives from 
the background, ‘social’ and ‘leisure’ activities. This has proved to be a consistent 
problem for such methods, which the methodological design of international time-use 
surveys is increasingly attempting to address. Three key issues stand out in this respect: 
simultaneous activities, measuring passive forms of productive activity, and 
disentangling leisure from work.  
 
Problematically for input-based methods, people in their everyday lives often do many 
different activities at once (Quah 1986). Indeed, it may not even be clear to them that 
these constitute discrete ‘activities’ (each with a neat market equivalent), which can be 
separated from a continuous life-world in which they are situated. For instance, parents 
may cook a meal while responsible for supervising children: ‘Another issue that needs 
addressing is simultaneous activities. People look after children…but as they get older 
you can look after the child and cook a meal at the same time, you can do simultaneous 
tasking’ (Interview DW).44 Time-use surveys thus face the problem of isolating, from 
this complex milieu in which productive life outsides market may be situated, discrete 
classes of productive activity and the number of hours spent on them. This problem is 
not new; it has been highlighted by feminist scholarship for decades (Waring 1988; 
                                                 
44 Another interviewee concurred: ‘in some countries a secondary activity is recorded, so you might be 
able to distinguish between carrying out the primary activity on childcare or carrying out another activity 
with childcare as a secondary activity. There’s discussions around how to look at and treat simultaneous 
events within the accounts, particularly in the UNECE group’ (Interview CP). 
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Folbre 2006). But the Stiglitz report and the drive for more robust imputations of non-
market production have brought them to the consciousness of statisticians and 
accountants as they look to improve the time-use data infrastructure on which valuation 
methods rest. It is evident that this simultaneous, overlapping use of time is hard to 
measure or categorise, but failing to do so compromises input-based methods for 
valuing non-market activity. 
 
This is compounded by the fact that the meaning of time is so intrinsically bound up 
with cultural norms. If asked to simply describe the way they are spending time, 
respondents in different countries and from different cultures may give widely divergent 
descriptions. In the methodological literature on time-use surveying, this is ascribed to 
different ways of ‘interpreting’ certain activities, which are assumed to be essentially 
universal. But it potentially goes deeper, reflecting different constructions of time and 
its meaning across time and place (Gagnier and Dupré 1995; Floro 1997). Over the years, 
this problem has been approached through re-coding descriptions given in time-use 
diaries into fixed and stable categories, that can be neatly distinguished into work, leisure, 
and personal care. Recent work has seen a growing standardization of the categories 
used to designate time in official time-use studies. Specifically, over the years a distinct 
categorisation system based on 6 broad and universal types of ‘time’ has emerged, which 
was formalised by the UN in 2015 (UNSC 2017).45  
 
Moreover, the categories which are imprinted into time-use data in the coding process 
are explicitly derived from the valuation methods (based upon the third-party criterion 
regarding what is economic activity) which have developed to impute monetary figures 
for unpaid labour. Thus, they are linked to categories of time which can be mapped 
onto. The arbitrariness of this is explicitly recognised in methodological documents: 
 
The conceptual design of TUS should take account of the requirements for these 
estimates…the underlying data should allow compilation of these estimates according to 
                                                 
45 ‘The International Classification of Activities for Time Use Statistics (ICATUS) is a classification of all 
the activities a person may spend time on during the 24 hours in a day. Its  purpose is to serve as a standard 
framework for time-use statistics … a three-level hierarchical classification (composed of major divisions, 
divisions, and groups) of all possible activities undertaken by the general population during the 24 hours 
in a day’ (UNSC 2017, 5). 
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accounting principles. The reconciliation of TUS data with complementary sources 
requires the terms and classifications to be comparable. If not in detail, it should at least 
be possible to match the data at the requisite level. The variables for labour market 
categories in the HETUS 2008 guidelines are, for example, basically the same as in the 
Labour Force Statistics (Eurostat 2011b, 35). 
 
In other words, the methodological approach developed to value non-market work now 
pre-structures the way in which the data that it is based upon is collected and organised, 
ordering our sense of time and its categories based upon the wage-based institutions of 
market society. In this sense, we should not confuse this data for a passive representation 
of how people use or experience their lives outside of labour markets. Time-use surveys 
constructively perform time-use, ordering and organising understandings of time into 
categories that can be classified and compared to the market economy (Law, 2009; 
Osborne & Rose, 1999).46 
 
In this way the priority of wage labour as the source of the economy penetrates right 
down into the design of time measurement instruments and categories of time-use that 
are produced. This performative function of time-use surveys can also be particularly 
seen with the problem of leisure. For instance, it has been argued that the very idea of 
leisure as a distinctive activity is a relatively recent product of industrial societies and the 
specific family and social structures associated with capitalist modernity (Gorz 1989; 
Lefebvre 2014 [1947]). Time-use data arguably reify these categories, derived from the 
industrial economy and the rhythms of wage labour, and naturalise them as adequate 
descriptors of the temporality of social reproduction.47 Valuation methods deductively 
drive how time-use is coded and categorised, rather than the categorisation of time 
following inductively from how people understand it. This is of course essential to the 
viability of these valuation methods. 
 
                                                 
46 Moreover, these categories are further naturalised when they are imported into valuation methodologies 
which then yield objective and precise monetary figures (the figures which allow us to make claims such 
as ‘non-market work is worth 50% of GDP’). The pre-figurative work done by the survey categories and 
their procrustean coding of self-descriptions of time given by the individuals surveyed is here further 
removed from view. 
47 This getting more of a problem even in formal labour markets, with rise of concerns over the 
phenomena of presenteeism. 
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Even given this standardised system for coding of time, there remains the problem of 
how to handle differing intensities of activity and the types of passive care or 
responsibility associated with many types of social reproductive work (Peterson 1978, 
239). A significant example is child care (Floro 1995, 1920). Children must clearly be 
looked after 24 hours a day, and indeed if a parent is not there to do this it must be 
managed by another person (either in an unpaid capacity or through formal child care). 
However, this work nevertheless involves divergent levels of intensity and changes 
continually at different ages. This problem has been dealt with by constructing time-use 
surveys in such a way that respondents can record ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ activities 
for the same period. However, this leads to the double counting of time, so that 
valuations based on this data would be skewed upwards versus market activity. In 
addition, time-use methodologies again encounter problems of with how this notion of 
primary and secondary activities are interpreted in different contexts. An OECD 
document on time-use classification argues that: 
 
Obviously, the same care activity can be coded as either a primary or secondary activity 
by two different respondents, depending on his/her perception and on cultural norms. 
Accounting for the presence of children during an activity, which is sometimes defined 
as “passive” childcare, for example having dinner with children, more than doubles time 
spent on caring for most of the countries for which data is available (OECD 2018, 6-7).48 
 
This further emphasises how it is impossible to coherently disentangle productive time-
use from unproductive time, and to portion it up into separate units of activity which 
can be compared to wages.49  
                                                 
48 Elsewhere, the document states: ‘In some cases, surveys include separate questions designed to learn 
about simultaneous activities (i.e.  watching television while cooking, or caring for children while 
performing other activities) … However, the reality is that while “primary” activities are comprehensively 
tracked, the recording of “secondary” is more prone to error because they are often omitted by the 
respondents. The comparability of estimates on secondary activities also suffers because some activities 
only take a few minutes of one’s time (for example, moving laundry from the washer to the dryer) so that 
they are not reported consistently enough to produce reliable estimates’ (OECD 2018, 10). 
49 Another interviewee supported this point, stating: ‘Simultaneous activities is of those issues within this 
sphere that generates a lot of debate, it’s not an easy thing to deal with. We will be aiming to publish some 
guidance to actually provide more concrete recommendations, but now we’re still exploring varying 
different methodologies and trying to pin down which one would be the best approach, or whether you 
can’t really pin that down’ (Interview CP). 
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Thus, even given methodological adjustments and the development of standardised 
categories and the primary/secondary activity distinction, time-use appears to be too 
intrinsically enmeshed in other cultural processes and institutions that it is impossible to 
isolate its market-like elements precisely through methodological design. Its non-
commodity dimensions overflow the attempts to time-use surveys to map them onto 
the industrial sense of work and time associated with wage labour. This highlights once 
again the arbitrariness of construing the value of non-market activity in terms of their 
relation to labour market wages, and the limitations of the project started by Reid and 
neoclassical theory to neatly isolate the economic from the social, using the criteria of 
delegability, choice and allocation.  
 
The Paradoxes of Equivalent Incomes 
 
Beyond these data collection issues, even more fundamental conceptual difficulties are 
encountered with valuing non-market work. Issues arise here both in relation to 
determining the appropriate wage to use in valuing non-market time, and adjusting for 
factors like the quality of output and intrinsic satisfaction gained from the work.  
 
‘The Measuring Rod of Money’: Opportunity Cost and Replacement Cost Valuation 
 
Once time-use data has been collected, if it is to inform and accounting valuation it must 
be brought into some sort of relationship to wages in the labour market. As Pigou stated, 
the fundamental valuation problem with non-market work is how to bring it into relation 
with ‘the measuring rod of money’ (Pigou 2013 [1920], 9), in the absence of market 
prices – in this case, a wage. But how should comparisons between non-market services 
and wage labour be approached? Two general approaches to this problem have been 
developed: the opportunity cost methods and the replacement cost method (Peterson 
1978; Beneria 1999). Both of these concepts are drawn squarely from neoclassical 
economic thought – indeed, according to Wieser, Menger’s main contribution was his 
marginalist theory of opportunity costs (Wieser 2009 [1895]). Each, however, is 
associated with a number of paradoxes. 
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Let’s say a corporate lawyer or an investment banker bakes a cake in her home. Should 
the time this took be valued at her own market wage rate, in other words the price of 
the consumption possibilities she could have generated by working as a lawyer but has 
foregone in order to bake the cake instead? This is the opportunity cost approach, 
favoured in early methodological work (during the 1970s) on non-market valuation. The 
context is interesting, as these methods were proposed as being more ‘theoretically 
consistent’ during the era in which Becker’s work on time-use in the household was 
popularised in economics (Becker 1965; Ferber and Birnbaum 1977; Stigler and Becker 
1977). Becker was concerned with how households make allocative decisions between 
the labour market and the home. For Becker, rational agents are constantly determining 
how to optimise their use of time to produce consumption goods and utility. As stated 
by Hawrylshyn: 
 
The theory states that in equilibrium the value of time spent at home equals its "opportunity cost" 
elsewhere, which clearly is its wage on the market. The rational household applying the 
optimization rule will use the factor "time" in the household to the point where its 
marginal product equals its price. Thus, its own valuation of non-market time at the 
margin is revealed as being equal to its hourly market wage (Hawrylshyn 1977, 83). 
 
This requires us to assume, for instance, an infinitely available supply of work, an 
infinitely elastic labour market for the activities which might be outsourced to the 
market, and an absence of cultural norms or expectations which might weigh on 
decisions over how to structure one’s time. 
 
However, this approach would result in a cake baked by a lawyer being assigned a higher 
value than a cake produced by a skilled baker. This seems intuitively absurd, and 
generates very high values for non-market work – values which moreover would 
increase as more basic jobs are automated and the workforce moves into higher skilled 
professions. Conversely, it also places the value of unpaid work done by the unemployed 
at zero (Gronau 1973, 164-165) – as there is no wage opportunity sacrificed to perform 
it. National accounting literature has generally found this unacceptable. In other words, 
the approach that seems to be most ‘theoretically consistent’ with neoclassical 
economics is increasingly regarded both as nonsensical and inaccurate.  
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This has led to the general eclipse of opportunity cost methods by replacement cost 
methods.50 These compare non-market time not with the wage of the person doing it, 
but the wage of somebody who this might be outsourced to on the market (Rosen 1974). 
Here, the time of the lawyer who chooses to bake a cake themselves is set at the wage 
of the baker who could be paid to do it instead. While less consistent with the principles 
of Becker’s new household economics, it is more in line with the thrust of the third-
party criterion we discussed in section 1 – here the allocative decision being modelled is 
not whether to give up one’s own potential labour time, and the consumption 
possibilities it affords, but whether to forego consumption possibilities of already 
generated income by using some of it to outsource household chores to the market.   
 
However, even with this approach a number of problems are encountered. For instance, 
it requires more granular time-use data which can inform comparisons between hours 
of non-market work and appropriate sort of market work (Beneria 1999, 96). But it is 
often unclear exactly which market work to compare them to, both in terms of its 
content and also geographically. Where there are sizeable differences in regional wages 
for different types of employment, accountants would require geo-tagging of time-use 
data which could locate where the time was being spent as well as what was being done. 
As a statistician at the ONS expressed it (referring to the inflated wage in London 
compared with the rest of the UK): 
 
The best source for occupational wage rates is the annual survey of hours and earnings, 
and they do give a sort of wage rate by occupation, but it’s not detailed enough to do it 
by occupation and location, and to capture the London effect (Interview DW). 
 
The problems discussed above, with parallel activities and passive forms of labour only 
compound these valuation problems: 
 
It can be represented on time-use surveys, where you list a primary activity and a 
secondary activity. So you can start getting around that. But again, how do you value that: 
do you value the primary activity more than the secondary activity, do you halve the 
                                                 
50 As a statistician at the ONS stated: ‘the opportunity cost…has been largely discounted. I mean the 
classic example is if you had a baker and a lawyer bake a cake, it would value the lawyer’s cake much 
higher than the baker’s cake even though the quality of the cake is probably much better from the baker. 
So that’s largely been discounted, and the preferred approach is the replacement cost’ (Interview DW). 
 145 
 
hourly wage rate? It’s all very much developmental and experimental at this stage, there’s 
no real sort of set way of doing it…we haven’t got to the bottom of it (Interview DW).51 
 
Mapping these sorts of time – which are embedded in broader social processes and 
represent varying levels of intensity, involvement and so on – becomes problematic, 
precisely because they are being compared with the specific institutional conditions of 
competitive labour market, an entirely different ‘form of integration’ (Polanyi 1968, 149), 
in Polanyian terms – but no less economic for that. 
 
Quality and Intrinsic Utility 
 
This problem of comparing non-market work to wage labour is not simply limited to 
selecting the correct reference wage. It is also affected by the problem of assessing the 
quality of work outside markets, and furthermore by the notion that this work contains 
an aspect of intrinsic utility or leisure, which makes it incomparable with the disutility 
that wages represent a compensation for in neoclassical wage theory. 
 
If we return to the example of the lawyer baking a cake, their skill level is likely to be 
lower, and the cake of worse quality. This has led to concerns from some national 
accountants that these methods give an inflated picture of the economic value of non-
market outputs, as they assume them to be of a similar quality to those provided in the 
marketplace. As an OECD national accountant explained: ‘a meal at home is quite 
different from something which you get in a restaurant and how do you deal with the 
quality differences…there you get into a lot of trouble’ (Interview PV). One response is 
that time should be valued using a general manual labourer’s wage, or the national 
minimum wage – to reflect the unskilled nature of the work. This is an approach 
considered by the ONS: 
 
                                                 
51 Peterson’s work in the 1970s worried about the problem of double counting such activities when valuing 
non-market work. He argued that: ‘A major problem with such a method is that it can lead to a gross 
exaggeration of the total amount of time spent performing household work. It is thus quite possible for 
households to report that they spend more than 168 hours a week performing household chores’ 
(Peterson 1978). In response he suggested simply ignoring everything apart from the primary reported 
activity. 
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If we want to measure the amount of DIY that people are doing at home and value that, 
and you say you’re doing a bit of work as an electrician at home yourself, is it appropriate 
to use a professional carpenter’s wage or a professional electrician’s wage – given that 
you’re going to have massive disparities in quality? One of the nice features of the ASHE 
is that we can get percentiles and deciles of wage information, so what we might do is use 
a wage lower down the distribution for some of the more skilled occupations (Interview 
DW). 
 
This approach is feasible when one is considering work with an obvious material 
outcome, such as DIY or cooking. However, it becomes a much more complicated 
question when considering more immaterial types of service, even where these in theory 
have a market equivalent.  
 
For instance, how are we to assess the ‘quality’ of family members looking after their 
own grandparents, rather than putting them into a care home, or of parents spending 
quality time with their children as opposed to sending them to a boarding school? Of 
course, one could argue that the ‘skill level’, training and human capital of those 
providing the service on the market might be higher. But the sorts of affective bonds 
and personal emotional connections which such an arrangement provides are 
incommensurable with the notion of ‘quality’ used to assess market services.52 Indeed, it 
would be possible to argue that the quality of these non-market services is in fact higher 
than their non-market equivalents. Quoting the most senior national accountant at the 
OECD: 
 
It’s a philosophical issue as well… You don't want to put a market price on everything, 
because then you change the whole nature of the thing. Perhaps for me there is also a 
fundamental difference, take the example of taking care of your children, between taking 
care of your own children or outsourcing that…It’s a different product, in a different 
context ... I hate the word service even, it feels uncomfortable (Interview PV). 
 
                                                 
52 This also interacts with the issue of price indexes and inflation adjusting. Even with market services, 
assessing quality changes is a hugely problematic issue (e.g. have waiters got politer at restaurants or not?), 
which seriously hinders the use of hedonic pricing to deflate for quality changes in this sector of activity. 
Applying this to the care services offered outside of the market, often by family members, seems 
impossible. See chapter 2. 
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This touches on another problem, which is the ‘non-elasticity’ of unpaid activity. This is 
the way economic discourse describes the fact that it would be, for instance, 
unacceptable in many cultural or social contexts to spend no time with your children or 
looking after your extended family, or to dine out every meal and be completely unable 
to cook for oneself. This demonstrates the essentiality of choice to the representation 
of the economy in national accounts. Unpaid services are excluded not because they are 
unproductive per se, but because due to this inelasticity they do not enter into economic 
calculus: there is seen to be a non-fungible residue to non-market services, fixed by their 
embeddedness in social and cultural processes not bound up with the logic of exchange. 
Thus, the influence of Jevons and the neoclassical definition of the economy – filtered 
through Reid’s work – remain fundamental to the contemporary discussion of non-
market work. 
 
Then again, what about the fact that the lawyer may derive enjoyment from baking their 
cake and view it as a leisure activity. Or consider someone playing music in their own 
home. It is possible to pay to hear a professional musician play, but it would seem absurd 
to consider this in the same terms, and using the same conceptual apparatus, as the 
personal pursuit of an artistic or musical project. At the same time, this activity provides 
pleasure and welfare. It is therefore a contributor to welfare, and moreover one that the 
expansion of market activity may erode or sacrifice.  
 
Reflecting Reid’s original insistence to exclude social, interpersonal and leisure activities 
from the definition of the economy, all measures of activity based on the third-party 
criterion have been hostile to any suggestion of valuing leisure activities. Echoing 
neoclassical theory such as Jevons, with work defined as short-term disutility endured 
for future utility, this is generally approached by regarding the ‘work’ aspects off non-
market activity as that which yields some indirect and alienable benefit. This approach 
is found in the work of post-war economists. For instance, Hawrylshyn argued that: 
 
The direct utility components are not and should not be subject to dollar valuation, and 
that any dollar valuation of non-market activities should be limited to the indirect utility 
components. Thus, "results" of household behaviour which are themselves utility, such 
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as parental pride, cultural and aesthetic satisfaction, should be explicitly excluded from 
evaluation (Hawrylshyn 1977, 86).53 
 
These arguments are echoed by contemporary national accounting experts in discussing 
the status of leisure in the SNA, and in rejecting the notion of imputing it monetary 
value in the national accounts. Thus, a clear line is drawn between work, as disutility that 
renders future utilities that could be exchanged, and ‘leisure’, defined as intrinsic 
enjoyment derived from an activity. 
 
Nevertheless, the grounds on which this exclusion are based are far from secure – as 
national accountants readily admit.  In discussing the issue, the head of the OECD’s 
national accounting team posed the problem in these terms: 
 
What is leisure? You have a big question about leisure versus work. At some stage you 
might like to have somebody who walks the dog for you, but on most occasions if you 
can do it yourself I think people prefer to do it themselves (Interview PV). 
 
This points to the extent to which, firstly, leisure and production often exist in hybrid 
forms, with activities often done partly for pleasure but partly with a view to displacing 
market activity. Decorating one’s own house might be an example. Secondly, the status 
of an activity as ‘work’ or ‘leisure’ is context-dependent. A person may enjoy walking 
their dog on a balmy afternoon, but on a rainy evening may wish they could pay someone 
to do it for them. This is compounded by the fact that these arguments can all apply 
symmetrically to market work, which is often a source of utility, pleasure and meaning. 
Applying the above arguments consistently, should accountants deduct from GDP 
estimates an amount for the ‘leisure’ component of market work, whenever workers 
derive intrinsic pleasure from their occupation? Likewise, should a person who enjoys 
their vocation so much that they would not want somebody else doing it for them, or 
                                                 
53 Similarly, Gronau suggested: ‘An intuitive distinction between work at home (i.e., home production 
time) and leisure (i.e., home consumption time) is that work at home (like work in the market) is something 
one would rather have somebody else do for one (if the cost were low enough), while it would be almost 
impossible to enjoy leisure through a surrogate. Thus…leisure has only poor market substitutes’ (Gronau 
1977, 1104). 
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might do it for free even if they couldn’t secure a livelihood from it, be excluded from 
employment figures?54 
 
Indeed, an even trickier issue is raised here, which is that non-market work often serves 
more as a positional consumption good than a substitute for market production in 
advanced industrial societies (Hirsch 1976; see also Veblen 2007 [1899]). One may show 
off one’s cooking skills, using vegetables freshly picked from your kitchen garden or 
allotment, not primarily to enjoy the meal it yields but because of the status it affords, 
or the positional lifestyle signals it sends out. Similarly, many forms of leisure act to 
display taste, and accumulate cultural capital, and are often bound up with things such 
as the class background or interests of the profession one is socialised into (Bourdieu 
2010 [1979]). This may have productive aspects, but production doesn’t encompass the 
economic essence of these acts – which also include the conspicuous, vicarious display 
of taste and lifestyle, or the accumulation of cultural and social capital.  
 
As we can see from these problems, which the beyond GDP agenda has forced 
statisticians and accountants to confront in newly explicit ways, the attempt to 
understand unpaid activities using the formalist language of the labour market, and to 
frame their economic value using the third-party criterion, encounter practical limits and 
lose coherence. 
 
5.3 Substantivism and the Measurement of Unpaid Activity: Valuing 
Social Provisioning beyond Labour Markets  
 
This section outlines how, partly in response to the limitations of input-based techniques 
explored in section 2, accountants are turning to alternative methods for estimating these 
values. Firstly, statisticians at the UK’s ONS have embraced an output-based approach 
to the value of non-market work. While this has predominantly been driven by practical 
expediency, I argue it also has important political implications. These methods decouple 
the value of non-market work from the exchange of labour in the marketplace. They 
thus accept the intrinsically social, relational and non-commodity aspect of social 
                                                 
54 A further issue concerns whether leisure can be seen as improving in quality with technological advance 
(see Nordhaus and Tobin 1973). 
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provisioning activity. Consequently, they point towards and make visible different 
solutions to the welfare problems of contemporary societies, which focus more on de-
commodified and collective provision of needs. Thus, these developments point to the 
growing embrace of a substantive conception of the economy, in response to the limits 
of framing the value and economic significance of unpaid activity through the 
conceptual lens of the market.  
 
Decoupling Production from Work: The Rise of Output-Based Estimates of Social Provisioning  
 
In response to the various problems with using time-use based methods to measure 
unpaid work, statisticians are exploring alternative methods which measure and value 
the overall output of non-market services generated by society, independently of the 
labour inputs that generate these. This is not an entirely novel approach. Discussions of 
measuring unpaid work via its outputs have been around for some decades (Fitzgerald 
and Wicks 1990; Goldschmidt‐Clermont and Pagnossin‐Aligisakis 1999). However, the 
vast majority of academic studies as well as early official methodologies embraced the 
input-based approach, discussed above.55 Output-based approaches seek to derive a 
value for non-market activity and social provisioning, not through summing the 
individual inputs of time devoted to these (which are then compared to equivalent 
wages), but rather calculating the aggregate needs which have been met with this work, 
and thus the output of services produced across society beyond the market sector.  
 
Somewhat ironically, this was initially assumed to be the more demanding and 
complicated method (e.g. Beneria 1999, 96). However, statisticians at the ONS have 
recently moved towards this method precisely as a practical expedient, because it allows 
them to circumvent some of the problems with time-use data and wage comparison 
discussed in section 2. As the co-ordinator of the UK’s satellite accounting system 
explained: 
                                                 
55 Ironically, however, this approach is more consistent with the approach of the rest of the SNA 
framework, where output of final goods is the central unit of analysis. The other major component 
measured by cost-of production (i.e. labour and capital goods) is the government sector. Here too there 
have been recent calls to move to output-based measures, including in the Stiglitz report itself, as this 
ignores any productivity increase or innovation that may occur in the public sector (Caplan 1998; Stiglitz 
et al. 2010). 
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I think the fact the UK uses the output approach is just reflecting the fact that, well, we’re 
not going to have regular time-use information, so what else can we do?! We want to 
develop methodologies that allow us still to get these estimates out. Because even though 
we don’t have time-use information, for example, for childcare, there’s a lot of published 
information on childcare that allows us to estimate it. It’s just reflecting the fact that we’re 
not just going to sit on our hands and wait for time-use survey data to come out, we’d 
rather try and develop different methodologies and explore other ways of doing it… we 
can do this approach every year, whereas for time-use we can only do a one off (Interview 
DW). 
 
The output method also gets around some other problems described in section 2, such 
as the problem of quality adjustment for the time (‘labour’) that goes into meeting these 
provisioning needs, assessing the efficiency of the work or worrying about whether it 
has been conducted in discrete chunks of time or as part of a series of overlapping 
parallel activities. Quoting the same source: ‘that’s one of the advantages of the output 
approach: you don’t need to worry so much about adjusting for quality. You know what 
you’ve produced, you know what it costs to produce that, regardless of how much time 
you spend doing it’ (Interview DW). Thus, the practical measurement and valuation 
problems associated with deriving the value of unpaid labour with reference to labour 
markets has driven the embrace of output-based approaches by the ONS. 
 
Interestingly, interviews reveal how the UK is something of an international outlier in 
this respect. The European statistical system has historically favoured developing time-
use data as the solution to measuring unpaid work, while the ONS has generally been 
lukewarm about the value of devoting resources to time-use surveys. This is influenced 
by the resources and funding climate of the UK, as opposed to Eurostat. A member of 
the UK’s economic well-being team explained that: 
 
There are lots of issues with time use surveys and they are quite expensive to run…there 
might be an [EU] regulation of time-use surveys in a few years’ time… Eurostat are big 
supporters of it. Their attitude is: “if only we had a time-use survey we’d have answers to 
all our questions” – but I think implementing it and paying for it almost outweigh the 
benefits you get (Interview AS). 
 
The head of the UK’s household satellite accounts agreed: 
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The UK stands out. I can’t say exactly how many other countries do the output method 
but the UK is one of the only countries that does the output method and most use the 
input method, and use time-use data…instead of looking at what’s produced they look at 
the inputs to produce that, and that’s principally done via time-use surveys…but they are 
very expensive to actually run, which makes it quite challenging for producing the 
household satellite accounts. That’s why the UK has tended to favour the output 
approach… I mean, I think the last time that there was time-use information for the UK 
was 2005. Other countries have more regular time-use information that the UK. That 
would be the driving factor (Interview DW). 
 
This suggests that the shift to output based measures is far from universally embraced, 
and we cannot say that these methods are displacing input-based approaches. What we 
rather have is a valuation ecosystem which is increasingly fragmented and characterised 
by different emergent and experimental approaches which depart from time-use based 
methods. 
 
On the other hand, the ONS also has an influential role in shaping this area of beyond 
GDP measurement reforms. It has the most developed system of household satellite 
accounts, and a long history of pioneering work on the accounting treatment of the 
unpaid sector. Moreover, statisticians from the ONS are influential in the international 
formulation of accounting guidelines and principles. For instance, the UN Statistical 
Committee on measuring unpaid work is chaired by the ONS. Consequently, there is 
some reason to believe the UK might act as a norm setter in this rapidly evolving field 
of statistical production.  
 
One thing that is most striking about the shift (at least in the UK) towards output-based 
methods is the distinct way they construct the nature and value of social reproductive 
work, and the political implications of this. This is rarely explicitly discussed by 
accountants themselves, who tend to view the issue as a practical response to problems 
with input-based valuation. But two things are notable about how differently the value 
of unpaid work is framed: firstly, they decouple social reproduction from individual units 
of work, accepting in essence that this activity is intrinsically social in character and 
embedded in the tissue of social life; secondly, they work back from the total care and 
reproductive needs of society and attempt to calculate how the meeting of these needs 
is allocated between the market and non-market spheres; thus, the attempt to establish 
the value of social provisioning activities with reference to wages is abandoned. 
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Economic activities are understood simply as the way in which social needs are met – 
independently of their relationship to exchange. In Polanyian terms, they therefore 
represent a substantive understanding of the economy, as institutions beyond market 
exchange are considered as independent modes for co-ordinating economic life.  
 
Firstly, output-based methods attempt to estimate the total quantity level of needs which 
require meeting across society. The value of the non-market sector is calculated as a 
residual, reflecting the amount of these needs which are met outside of the sphere of 
exchange. They thus represent a ‘top-down’, needs-focused approach rather than the 
‘bottom-up’ work-based approach. For instance, rather than measuring the hours 
individuals spend on childcare, the amount of childcare required by society as a whole 
can be estimated by calculating the number of children and the time they require at 
different stages of their lives: 
 
It’s a top-down approach… there is no survey of children and how often they’re being 
looked after by their parents, but what we do have is a lot of information about the 
amount of time that children spend in formal childcare. We know for example, from the 
department of education, how much time children are spending in schools, and how many 
children are spending time at child minders and nurseries, and all the various forms of 
formal child care you can get. Our methodology takes those numbers and makes a few 
assumptions to derive the total amount of hours that children in the UK spend in formal 
childcare settings. We’re basically saying: “the total amount of children in the UK is x, 
they are alive for x hours in a given year”, and we subtract the number of hours they 
spend in formal childcare to get an estimate of informal childcare hours (Interview DW). 
 
Secondly, this in turn means that they do not face the task of isolating units of ‘work’ 
from the social activities and processes their delivery might be embedded within. 
Statisticians themselves are sometimes bashful about this: ‘this is one of the drawbacks 
– what we don’t know is who is doing this informal childcare, the output just gives a 
total amount of informal childcare out, which is one of the limitations’ (ibid). But what 
statisticians are moving towards, with this form of accounting, is an estimate of the value 
of provisioning needs across society, in a way which fully confronts the difficulties both 
of individualising the creation of this value or comparing it with distinct units of market 
work. They thus reflect a more relational and social conception of value, which is 
constructed independently of market exchange.  
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It is important, of course, not to overstate the implications of this change. For instance, 
currently the units of ‘output’ are still valued by comparing them with similar market 
goods. Once the amount of childcare has been deduced, this is valued using the rate of 
final childcare services (ONS 2014). However, this comparison is now with goods 
markets, and does not assume the commodity treatment of labour. Furthermore, there is 
no intrinsic reason these valuations could not instead be determined through a more 
political or democratic process of valuation, as their value is now methodologically 
independent of labour markets. These methods therefore reflect an important shift in 
how the relationship between market and non-market activities is constructed. In 
decoupling social provisioning from wage labour, output-oriented approaches accept 
both the irreducibly valuable and economic nature of such activities and their public, 
social and collective character. As such, they represent a much more fundamental escape 
from ‘formalist’ understandings of the economy than the third-party paradigm inherited 
from Reid’s conceptual framework.  
 
The Political Significance of Satellite Accounting: Welfare beyond Work? 
 
What are the political implications of these shifts in the framing of unpaid work? Here, 
I briefly outline how these emerging methods are more consistent with de-commodified 
solutions to welfare and social reproduction. Let us conduct a brief thought experiment, 
based upon two political economic policies which have been proposed in recent years 
to provide welfare services to people independently of the market: Universal Basic 
Income (UBI) and time banking.  
 
The first of these, the UBI (Van Parijs 2004; Standing 2017), is based upon the principle 
of redistribution: the state collects resources from enterprises and distributes them 
unconditionally to all of its citizens. The idea of this policy is to decouple production 
from work and to allow citizens, for instance, to meet the caring needs of their families 
or engage in other useful activity in their communities. For instance, Mason argues that 
is purpose is ‘to formalise the separation of work and wages’ (Mason 2016, 284). But its 
purpose is also to move beyond a conception of value and work as grounded in 
individual acts of labour. Guy Standing, one of the leading advocates of UBI, suggests 
that: A fundamental claim is that it is an instrument of social justice that reflects the 
intrinsically social or collective character of society’s wealth (Standing 2017, 25). The 
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second of these, time-banking, is based upon the principle of reciprocity: people donate 
useful time and services for free to meet the needs of others; in turn, they can request 
others’ services when they feel they could be of use to meeting their needs. This is based 
upon the radical principle that everyone’s time and contribution is equal; i.e., that the 
provision of welfare and social reproduction is a collective affair that cannot be reduced 
to the efficiency of labour inputs (Collom and Lasker 2016).  
 
Under a system of accounting based on the third-party criterion and wage equivalence, 
neither of these policies could ever be accounted as creating economic value 
independently of the continued existence of the commodity markets for the social 
reproductive labour they seek to displace. In other words, the value of the de-
commodified work the policies are meant to facilitate would remain grounded in (or 
only able to be established and made visible with reference to) commodified labour 
markets for the same services. Take the example of the UBI. If this policy were expanded 
so that it constituted a dominant form of social protection, it would by necessity shrink 
the sphere of market provision of welfare services (such as caring). Input-based 
accounting methods, however, would have to value this work based upon wages taken 
from this shrinking market sphere. However, both the availability of this information 
and the substantive values of it would have been changed by this re-orientation of 
welfare to the non-commodity sphere. It is similar with time-banking. If such institutions 
grew in significance, they would displace and change the commodity provision of many 
services; but accounting methods based upon inputs of labour time would have to map 
these changes onto a shrinking commodity sphere to find equivalent values. Moreover, 
input-based methods reproduce the basic logic that these policies attempt to overcome: 
the idea that value creation is linked to individualised chunks of labour time.  
 
The saliency of these issues has increased in recent decades with the rise of information-
driven automation and concerns over skills-biased technological change (McAfee and 
Brynjolfsson 2016). Significantly, the scope of such unpaid work has dramatically 
expanded with the rise of the internet, while become much harder to isolate as a discrete 
activity. For instance, services which used to be conducted by estate agents in the market 
are now conducted for free by individuals browsing travel sites on the internet (ONS 
2016a). This digital disintermediation of services has led to a vast expansion of free work 
performed by people in their homes. As Standing argues: 
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The twenty-first century will be characterised by what should be called “tertiary time”, in 
which activities labelled “work” and “leisure” blur into each other…for most of us, the 
ratio of work (unpaid) to labour (paid) will probably rise…This provides another 
justification for a basic income, paid to everybody to compensate for the work they do 
that is fundamentally social in character (Standing 2017, 160-161). 
 
Even the generation of data trails as a by-product of online activity and social media 
could be considered productive economic ‘work’, in an era in which personal data has 
become a highly valuable and profitable asset generating market income through 
profiling algorithms and targeted marketing (Lanier 2014). The measurement of this 
work and the basis on which its value is established is thus set to become an ever more 
pressing issue; and the way it is framed impacts debates over the policy response to these 
changes.  
 
In other words, the valuation methods used to measure the economic contribution of 
unpaid work are not simply different technical solutions to the same problem. How we 
conceptualise the value of unpaid time is an important political matter. Methods which 
continue to focus on deriving its value from individual inputs of time valued in relation 
to market wages construct its political status in a certain way, and imply different sorts 
of solutions: micro-payments, say (Lanier, 2014), in contrast with UBI-type policies. 
Estimates of unpaid activity when approached through output method value the social 
provisioning needs of society in a way which is decoupled from labour markets. This 
approach is gaining ground through the growing awareness of the practical and 
conceptual limitations of viewing this sphere of activity using the third-party criterion, 
shaped as it was by post-neoclassical conceptions of the economy as a realm of exchange 
and scarcity.  
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has explored how the problem of valuing unpaid activity has been 
approached within beyond GPD accounting reforms. The first section outlined how the 
third-party criterion – developed in the 1930s by Margaret Reid – has become the 
dominant conceptual principle used to underpin the accounting treatment of non-
market activity. However, this reflects the neoclassical concern to delimit the economic 
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within the sphere of exchange and calculation. It thus retains aspects of the ‘formalist’ 
view of society, in that the value of economic activity is grounded in its exchange 
potential, even while it is decoupled from formal labour markets. Section 2 outlined 
how, since 2009, statisticians implementing and mainstreaming these methods as part of 
the beyond GDP agenda have encountered limitations which continue to prevent their 
incorporation into the production boundary and GDP estimates. Section 3 
demonstrated how this is creating a more plural and fragmented valuation ecosystem in 
which new output-based methods of estimation are gaining ground (especially in the 
UK). These conceptually decouple value and production from wage labour, recognising 
both the interiority of non-market services to the economy and their otherness from 
exchange relations, thus constituting a more substantive vision of work, production and 
value. This further helps us to answer the central question of the thesis, by providing a 
second case study of the complicated imbrications between ‘formalist’ and ‘substantive’ 
economic imaginaries which characterises the post-GDP accounting landscape.  
 
I have argued that it is not the case that valuing non-market work necessarily challenges 
market-based, formalist assumptions about the economy. Rather, the valuation of these 
activities constitutes an emerging political field in which different constructions of the 
relationship between the commodity and non-commodity aspects of labour co-exist. At 
stake in these competing representations is how we think about the political status of 
non-commodity work, and the distinct roles it might play in alternative models of 
economic citizenship and welfare. Nevertheless, a consequence of these reforms is that 
while the huge scale and economic importance of unpaid activity is now accepted by 
accountants, simply extending the production boundary to bring more bits of ‘society’ 
into ‘the economy’ has not proved practically possible. Instead, the very idea of a sharp 
distinction or boundary between unproductive ‘society’ and productive ‘economy’, and 
the role of market exchange in mediating this distinction, is being destabilised by these 
reforms. It is primarily this dynamic that provides resources for a genuinely ‘substantive’ 
re-thinking of non-market work and social provisioning, which could acknowledge both 
its interiority to the economy and its irreducibly non-commodity nature 
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6. Capital after GDP: Sustainability, Comprehensive Wealth 
and the Limits of the Exchange view of Money 
 
 
“Money is a means of exchange.” This presumption belongs among the most powerful in the field 
of modern thought…According to this still current view, the exchange-use to which money can be 
put is its essential criterion - Karl Polanyi 
 
By taking the perspective of capital, the challenge of sustainable development is simplified into a 
question of whether a country’s total capital base – or total national wealth – is managed in a 
way that secures its maintenance over time. To reach its full potential, the capital approach 
requires measurement of all capital stocks using a common unit. The obvious choice of unit – 
money – is problematic … it is not possible to observe market values for all capital types directly, 
so calculating economic wealth by summing just observed values is not possible – UN 
Taskforce on Measuring Sustainable Development 
 
 
In 2014, the World Bank estimated that 47% of the total wealth of low-income countries 
consisted of natural capital; meanwhile, 70% of the wealth of OECD countries was 
composed of human capital – the embodied knowledge and skills of their population 
(World Bank 2018). Neither of these stores of wealth have traditionally been included 
in national accounting balance sheets. Measures of national capital are used to construct 
important indicators of sustainability and economic performance, such as Net Domestic 
Product and multi-factor productivity. Extending measures of national wealth to include 
environmental and ecosystem resources, as well as knowledge and social institutions, 
has become a major focus of beyond GDP reforms. This has become the dominant 
approach to measuring sustainability in global governance and accounting discourse, 
reflected by the Stiglitz commission (Stiglitz et al. 2010), the UN’s joint taskforce on 
measuring sustainable development (UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008) and related 
World Bank/IMF work (World Bank/IMF 2013; World Bank 2017). It also underpins 
the UN environmental-economic accounting (SEEA) framework, adopted globally in 
2012 (UN 2014a). According to this reasoning, if the concept of capital is extended to 
natural, human and social resources, the externalities of GDP growth could be brought 
into conventional growth accounting through their effects on the depletion of total 
capital stocks. 
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In the first two chapters, we examined how the implementation of beyond GDP reforms 
to national accounting (to integrate information on inequality and unpaid activities) has 
impacted the ability to represent the economy as an autonomous and ontologically 
unified object. This chapter investigates the attempt by national accountants and 
statisticians to address critiques of the future ecological and social sustainability of GDP 
growth by extending the asset boundary to include natural and human capital stocks. 
This accounting agenda raises a central problem: how do we put a monetary value on 
such complex, vast or intangible resources as the planetary ecosystem, knowledge or 
social cohesion; resources which share a tenuous and insecure relationship to market 
transactions? Regarding the central question posed by the thesis, investigating how this 
issue is dealt with by statisticians and national accountants helps answer the question of 
whether this agenda threatens or retains the basic assumptions of the formalist vision of 
economy (in this case, the exchange view of money or ‘catallactic fallacy’), that Polanyi 
saw as essential to overcome in order to re-capture a more realistic and open view of 
human society (Polanyi 1968, 178-185).  
 
To answer this question, the first section outlines the rise of the ‘capital stocks’ approach 
to sustainability in economic theory and global governance. Based on the distinction 
between income and capital drawn by economists such as Irving Fisher, this approach 
reconstitutes sustainability as a question of whether the generation of national income 
(GDP) is net of the depreciation of total national capital stocks. This has emerged as the 
dominant approach to sustainability measurement in global economic governance over 
the last decade, displacing indicator-based approaches and adjusted GDP measures 
which dominated in the 1990s and 2000s. The second section outlines the various 
problems accountants and statisticians have encountered while trying to operationalise 
the capital stocks framework in practice. Attempts to isolate the market-relevant 
components of these resources from the human and natural context in which they are 
embedded encounter various paradoxes, hindering the development of a purely market-
based measure of the economic value of these resources. The third section traces how, 
in response to these problems, statisticians are exploring the use of politically-set prices 
and the co-existence of multiple and context-specific values for these wealth stocks. It 
is argued that these developments amount to the recognition of the need for ‘special 
purpose monies’ in global governance, and the acknowledgement that the economic 
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component of national ‘wealth’ broadly conceived cannot be isolated from its wider 
social and ecological functions. 
 
6.1 Formalist Reason and Sustainability: The Rise of the Capitals 
Approach to Sustainable Development 
 
This section traces the theoretical roots of the capital approach to measuring 
sustainability. It shows how neoclassical capital theory broadened what could be 
conceptually included in ‘capital’ beyond business stock to any objects yielding utility 
(‘income’), but simultaneously defined its monetary accounting value narrowly as the 
market profits it generated for its owner over its lifespan. This reflects, it is argued, a 
formalist image of capital as monetary value is connected with the market returns on an 
asset. It then traces how this ambiguity has both allowed for inclusion of ever more of 
the natural and human world into ‘capital’, and to problems in determining the economic 
value of these broader capital stocks. As we saw in chapter 2, recent years have seen a 
reconstitution of the measurement of ‘sustainable development’ as a question of the 
depletion or accumulation of natural and human capital stocks. But many of the benefits 
of nature and knowledge are not clearly connected with a private monetary return. 
Reflecting neoclassical theory, the way this has been dealt with is to draw a conceptual 
line demarcating the ‘economic’ components of natural and human capital stocks, which 
can be valued based on their market returns, and broader ‘social’ or wellbeing aspects, 
which are left outside of formal accounting frameworks. This, it is argued, reproduces a 
formalist conflation of the economy and money with exchange processes. 
 
Capital and Income in Neoclassical Theory: Irving Fisher and the Property Theory of Wealth 
 
As sociologists such as Weber and Sombart have argued, the development of accounting 
was fundamental to the emergence of the very notion of capital (see Carruthers and 
Espeland 1991; Chiapello 2007). The concept emerged in accounting practice and 
centred around guiding business decisions and investment. Through the 18th and 19th 
centuries, economic thought attempted to develop a formal definition of capital. 
However, it remained a vague and contested concept (see Fisher 1896). Reflecting its 
accounting origins, these early definitions revolved a combination of the concept of 
durability and the ability to yield future profits. For instance, Smith suggested that: ‘when 
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[a man] possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or years, he naturally 
endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of it…That part which, he expects, 
is to afford him this revenue, is called his capital’ (Smith 1993 [1776], 162).56 At this 
point, then, ‘capital’ referred narrowly to the stock of durable objects owned by 
merchants or enterprises and which could yield exchange value. 
 
After the rise of marginalism, however, capital theory was developed in line with 
subjective theories of value. As part of this, the definition of capital was generalised 
beyond its accounting origins to encompass utility-yielding objects. A seminal 
neoclassical treatment of capital, which highlights these developments, was developed 
by Irving Fisher. Indeed, Fisher’s work is still directly cited in contemporary literature 
on sustainability and extended wealth accounting – the UN/Eurostat/OECD taskforce 
on the measurement of sustainable development argued that: ‘The intellectual roots of 
the genuine or adjusted savings approach go back to Fisher who argued that income can 
be seen as a return to wealth’ (UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 64). Schumpeter argued 
that Fisher’s Nature of Capital and Income ‘besides presenting the first modern theory of 
accounting, is (or should be) the basis of modern income analysis’ (quoted in Tobin 
2005), illustrating the influence the book has had on contemporary accounting theory 
and practice. 
 
Analogously to the issue of non-market work discussed in the previous chapter, 
subjective value theory posed the problem of how to define ‘capital’ and where it 
stopped.  Fisher argued against classical definitions (based on an object’s ability to yield 
revenue or its durability), that he viewed as inconsistent as they attempted to draw a line 
around some aspects of total wealth and demarcate it as ‘capital’. But if income was 
considered in subjective terms as the generation of satisfactions and utility, then capital 
potentially encompassed any aspect of the material universe which produced utility or 
prevented disutility: 
 
[W]e cannot distinguish capital as that wealth which bears income. All wealth bears 
income, for income consists simply of the services of wealth. But the idea that some 
wealth bears income and some not has been persistent from the time of Adam Smith, 
who, meaning by income only money income, conceived of capital as the wealth that 
                                                 
56 Smith distinguished further between the circulating and fixed elements of capital. 
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produces income in this sense…Equally futile is any attempt definitely to mark off capital 
as that wealth which is “productive”…all wealth is productive in the sense that it yields 
services (Fisher 1906, 58). 
 
Crucial to Fisher’s definition of capital was therefore not whether the object yielded a 
monetary return, but rather the temporal distinction between economic flows and stocks 
(Tobin 2005). Fisher argued that, instead, ‘income’ should be understood not as revenue 
but more broadly the flow of desirable services (‘psychic income’) consumed over an 
accounting period, and ‘capital’ as the stock of material goods that yielded these flows 
of utility, viewed at a single snapshot in time. 
 
This led to a potentially radical and open conception of capital, that was far broader than 
the definitions embraced by classical political economy (see Tobin 2005). Fisher argued, 
for instance, that: ‘wealth is wealth only because of its services; and services are services 
only because of their desirability in the mind of man’ (Fisher 1906, 41), and that ‘in all 
cases, the essential fact is that the capital performs service – accomplishes something 
desired’ (ibid, 117). Thus, Fisher developed a very broad definition of capital, extending 
it to all physical things which yielded desirable events, or prevented undesirable events, 
including when these were not destined for exchange in the market or where the income 
they produced was non-monetary.57 Even an object used up immediately – like bread – 
was, in the Fisherian sense, capital, as it yielded psychic income (the pleasure of eating 
it). Capital had been broadened from its narrower origins in business accounting (as 
business stock that yielded income or interest to the owner), to refer to any parts of the 
material universe that yield desirable services to humans.58 However, reflecting a similar 
anxiety about the proliferation of capital as we saw in the last chapter in relation to 
neoclassical discussions of labour, Fisher’s definition also delimited capital in two 
significant ways.  
 
                                                 
57 ‘The concept of income which is the most common is that of “money-income”…As applied to 
commercial affairs, this concept is nearly adequate…for the services which a man’s business capital yields 
him usually consist exclusively of bringing him money…[But] as soon as we pass outside of commercial 
circles, we find cases in which money-receipts are evidently only a part of all receipts and money-costs 
only a part of all costs. In primitive communities, and even in highly organised communities [sic]…many 
goods considered as constituting income are not acquired by exchange at all’ (Fisher 1906, 1043-4). 
58 Including, foreshadowing the human capital literature, human beings themselves. 
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Firstly, it made wealth dependent on ownership and property rights, even if not 
necessarily to exchange of these rights. For instance, he insisted that, while it ‘is not 
necessary that it should continually change hands’, ‘it is necessary that wealth should be 
owned’, and moreover defined wealth formally as ‘all those parts of the material universe 
which have been appropriated to the uses of mankind’ (Fisher 1906, 3). Thus, an important 
caveat to the open-ended conception of capital was added, that made property rights a 
key criterion to something being considered capital. This move has important 
contemporary repercussions, especially for the measurement of natural capital as we 
shall see in later sections. Foreshadowing problems confronted by modern attempts to 
value natural resources, Fisher argued: ‘rain, wind, clouds, the Gulf Stream…are all 
useful, but are not appropriated, and so are not wealth commonly understood’ (Fisher 
1906, 3). 
 
Secondly, Fisher linked the money value of capital back to market returns. Fisher drew 
an important distinction between the physical objects which actually composed wealth 
(‘capital instruments’), and the accounting value of capital stocks in monetary units, or 
‘capital value’ (Fisher 1906, 66-67).59 He suggested that: 
 
[E]ach individual kind of wealth may be measured in its own special unit – pounds, 
gallons, yards; but for most purposes it is more important to measure the value of wealth, 
and this may be done in dollars and cents, pounds and shillings…this is also a species of 
physical measurement, but involves the principle of exchange…in the explanation which 
follows, the concept of value is made to depend on  that of price; that of price in turn on 
exchange (Fisher 1906, 9-10, emphasis added). 
 
In this manner, Fisher naturalised the exchange view of money and the conflation of 
price and value characteristic of neoclassical thought. This is partly because Fisher 
recognised the difficulty that such a broad treatment of wealth posed for business 
accounting practice; and indeed, his justification for this move was to conform to 
‘business usage’, arguing ‘…the business man ordinarily uses the term “capital” in the 
sense of capital-value, and hereafter…capital will be understood in this sense’ (Fisher 
1906, 67) Thus, Fisher’s definition of what was included in capital was theoretically 
expansive, but the value of capital stocks was linked to its discounted market returns. 
                                                 
59 ‘Capital-goods being measured in various units appropriate to the various goods…capital-value being 
measured in a single uniform manner, as in dollars or other convenient units of value’. 
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Fisher thus naturalised an understanding of exchange use of money as its essential 
criterion (Graeber 2014), something which for Polanyi was fundamental to the formalist 
view of economy (Polanyi 1968, 175-203). 
 
Hence, while neoclassical capital theory opened the door to a broader view of capital, it 
circumscribed this by linking it to property rights, and accepting that the value of a 
resource can only be established through its impact on market revenues. While the whole 
physical world had potentially become capital, the economic bits of it were confined to 
those enclosed by property rights, and its monetary value in accounting terms could only 
be established through market prices. By adopting a view of the value of capital stocks 
as rooted in discounted prices of future market income, the value of capital was in 
practice linked to the market income it can generate. This ambiguity – the coexistence 
of a theoretically expansive definition of capital, but with its economic value grounded 
in property rights and discounted market incomes – paved the way both for the 
proliferation of the concept of capital in the post-war period and contemporary 
problems encountered in valuing these, given the difficulty of isolating their market 
components.  
 
Measuring Extended Capital Stocks: Policing the ‘Monetisation Frontier’ 
 
While Fisher had established the concept of capital as the total stock of material wealth 
held by a society at a moment in time, it was only with the development of national 
accounting that regular macroeconomic measurements of capital emerged.60 At this point, 
consideration of natural and human capital was explicitly excluded from the notion of 
capital consumption. As discussed in chapter 2, the 1953 SNA stated, when defining 
fixed capital, that: ‘charges made for the depletion of exhaustible natural resources are 
not included in the provisions for the consumption of fixed capital’ (UN 1953, 7). Hence 
the economic value of the natural environment was implicitly placed at zero. Moreover, 
even by this narrow definition, thinking about capital in macroeconomic terms – as 
composed of homogeneous units that can be aggregated across an entire economic 
                                                 
60 This was influenced by neoclassical synthesis growth models (see Solow, 1957), which understood 
production as a function of homogeneous inputs of capital and labour. 
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system – caused considerable conceptual difficulties. The Cambridge capital controversy 
revolved around just this problem (see Harcourt 1972).  
 
As we saw in chapter 2, the rise of ecological critiques of growth as well as theories of 
human and social capital led to the issue of sustainability measurement being increasingly 
framed around the issue of measuring extended capital or ‘comprehensive wealth’. While 
the capital approach to measuring sustainability is attractive and theoretically elegant, 
however, implementing it in practice poses significant conceptual and valuation 
challenges. As we saw, while Fisher’s work had expanded the concept of capital in 
theoretical terms, its accounting value was tied to the discounted market income which 
capital goods yielded to their owner. But, as is widely acknowledged, many of these 
broader extended wealth stocks share an ambiguous relationship to market exchange: 
they produce collective and public benefits that contribute to market activity but are 
difficult to isolate, as well as direct benefits to human that are not mediated by the market 
at all; furthermore, the property rights surround these assets are often ambiguous, 
fragmented and plural. The welfare generating properties and value the natural world 
gives to human society extend beyond its ability to generate market income, making 
monetising the full benefits of ‘natural capital’ an impossible task. This poses a problem 
for the accounting valuation of these assets in monetary terms, as money values in the 
Fisherian neoclassical framework are conflated with prices in the marketplace.  
 
The mainstream response to the monetisation dilemma has been to draw a conceptual 
and practical line between the ‘economic’ component of extended capital stocks and 
their ‘non-economic’ aspects, with an acceptance that the non-economic benefits of 
nature cannot be monetised due to the complexity of valuing these effects. The 
monetised ‘economic’ component could then be used as a macroeconomic aggregate, to 
analyse for instance substitution between factors, multi-factor productivity or a full 
measure of net domestic product (OECD 2011c). In this schema, the economic aspects 
of capital stocks are those that can be securely ascribed a monetary value; and this value 
is established through observed prices in markets which approximate the ideals of 
neoclassical economics (competitive, with full information and so on).  
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For instance, the 2008 UNECE taskforce’s report contained an extended discussion on 
the problem of monetary valuation of natural capital resources. On the one hand, the 
taskforce argued that: 
 
[T]here is good reason to argue that market prices for capital assets come close to 
theoretically ideal accounting prices. This applies to all financial and produced capital. It 
also applies to those elements of natural capital and related products that are commonly 
traded in the market; including, timber, fish, minerals and energy. It applies as well to the 
output of human capital (labour) insofar as it is used in the market 
(UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 59). 
 
On the other hand, it accepted that many aspects of natural capital are crucial to the 
generation of social wellbeing, yet could not be linked to market transactions. These 
assets, while acknowledged as important, were clearly designated as falling outside of 
‘the economy’, as their capitalised value cannot be derived from discounted prices in the 
marketplace: 
 
It must be recognized that benefits like good companionship or the pleasure of a 
wilderness experience derived from non-marketed assets are well beyond what is included 
in economic wealth. Economic wealth measures only the capital base that contributes to 
market income. While market income is an important contributor to well-being, it is far 
from alone. Well-being is also created by “consuming” non-market flows of goods and 
services, such as breath-taking scenery on a smog-free day… [but] economic wealth is 
equal to the sum of the value of all assets that contribute to market production, including 
financial, produced, natural, human and social capital. They are called here economic 
assets (UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 60).  
 
On this basis the taskforce recommended a dual, parallel set of indicators to measure 
sustainable development: ‘economic wellbeing’, understood as the flow of market 
income, was accompanied by a fully monetised measure of economic wealth reflecting 
the market-relevant aspects of natural and human capital; ‘foundational wellbeing’, 
representing social welfare, was accompanied by a non-monetised indicators of the state 
of the environment, given in incommensurable physical units. This therefore reproduces 
the Polanyian economistic fallacy, in that it conflates the economy with its market form 
and money with its exchange function. 
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This approach – to handle the valuation problems raised by the measurement of natural 
capital by isolating its economic components, and linking these to market returns – was 
subsequently endorsed by the Stiglitz commission. The report opted for the ‘pragmatic’ 
compromise of two separate indicators, one monetary value for those natural assets 
traded on markets and one accompanying set of physical indicators displaying measures 
of critical natural capital assets (Stiglitz et al. 2010). It has subsequently become the 
mainstream approach in global measurements of sustainability – in particular, the UN’s 
SEEA framework, the OECD’s Green Growth indicators, and the World Bank’s 
adjusted net savings and WAVES programme. For instance, the OECD’s Green 
Growth monitoring framework draws the distinction between ‘natural capital’, a 
monetised index representing ‘[natural] assets that are critical for economic growth’ and 
physical indicators of the ‘environmental quality of life’, reflecting the direct services 
people enjoy from nature (OECD 2011c, 2013d).   
 
The distinction between the economic and non-economic components of natural and 
human capital has even been graphically depicted in some literature through the concept 
of the ‘monetisation possibility frontier’ (Radermacher and Steurer 2014, 5). This 
concept draws a clear boundary (see below) between ‘commodity-like’ bits of nature, 
considered amenable to monetary valuation and thus inclusion into the economic 
component of wealth, and those aspects where the link to markets is more tenuous, or 
where ‘deep ethical/cultural convictions’ stand in the way of monetisation. In this way, 
a line is draw clearly between the economic dimensions of extended wealth stocks, which 
can be monetised and aggregated, and non-economic components which are kept as 
incommensurable physical units.  
 
This approach was further consolidated with the adoption of UN SEEA central 
framework in 2012, which said: 
 
[T]here is no requirement in physical terms that environmental assets must deliver 
economic benefits to an economic owner…In physical terms, the measurement scope for 
each individual component is broad, extending to include all the resources that may 
provide benefits to humanity. However, in monetary terms, the scope is limited to those 
individual components that have an economic value based on the valuation principles of 
the SNA (UN 2014a, 128). 
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Likewise, the broader ‘ecosystem services’ rendered by the environment were not even 
included in the CF but in a separate set of experimental guidelines (UN 2014b). The 
existence of market exchange and prices is erected as the dividing line separating these 
two components of wealth.  
 
 
Figure 4: The ‘Monetisation Possibility Frontier’ (from: Radermacher and Steurer 2014, 6) 
 
Such a solution seems, on one level, to conform to Polanyian criteria for a substantive 
understanding of the economy. It accepts, firstly, that there are important aspects of 
wellbeing that cannot be included in the sphere of market exchange, and thus there are 
aspects of wealth that lie beyond exchange relations, and secondly that the value of these 
assets are fundamentally incommensurable. On the other hand, this solution reproduces 
the conflation of the economy with markets, and of money with its exchange use which is 
a fundamental tenet of modern formalist economic thought (see Graeber 2014). While 
‘capital’ is conceptually extended to include environmental and ecological resources, 
knowledge and social institutions and norms, this is kept from threatening the conflation 
of the economy with the realm of exchange by isolating the economic component of 
wealth (reflected in observed market prices) from its non-economic component (not 
observable from market prices). Therefore, the dual-track approach to measuring 
extended wealth does not in itself threaten the formalist conception of the human 
economy.  
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6.2 Limits to Formalism in Extended Wealth Accounting: The 
Embeddedness of Knowledge and Nature in Non-Market Functions 
 
This section examines attempts by statisticians and accountants to practically implement 
the capital framework to sustainability measurement, focussing on the question of 
monetary valuation. As we saw in section 1, thinking about nature and knowledge as 
stocks of capital has presented the problem of how to measure these stocks, and 
especially whether (and how) to establish their monetary value. Influenced by 
neoclassical capital theory, the approach taken to this problem has been to isolate the 
‘economic’ component of these capital stocks as the part of them directly connected to 
ownership and market returns. So far, it appears as if post-GDP accounting practice has 
been able to diffuse any broader challenge to the conception of the economy as a closed 
system of markets presented by extending the concept of capital to natural and human 
resources. In the process of implementing these measurement reforms, however, 
statisticians are discovering that their commodity-like aspects cannot be neatly 
disentangled from the social and ecological processes they are embedded in.  
 
Natural Capital Valuation: Isolating the Commodity-Like Aspects of Nature 
 
Firstly, we will consider these problems in relation to natural capital and environmental 
accounting. Here, a central problem with this approach relates to the paradoxes which 
emerge with regard to treating natural resources subject to property rights as economic, 
and those held in common as non-economic. This is true even of the apparently 
straightforward provisioning services nature provides to the market economy, and a 
fortiori the broader regulatory ecological systems that are crucial to the reproduction of 
economic activity. Even supposing that these stocks of appropriated nature could be 
neatly identified, however, valuing them using techniques taken from fixed capital 
accounting (such as net present value) encounter significant limitations when applied to 
nature. 
 
The Limits of Property Rights 
 
Under the neoclassical understanding of capital developed by Fisher, capital is that part 
of the physical universe that had been appropriated and was subject to property rights. 
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This is reflected in the UN SEEA, where ‘[A] distinction is made between whether the 
resources are cultivated or natural, based on the extent to which there is active 
management over the growth of the resource’ (UN 2014a, 126). However, when applied 
to the natural world and natural assets – which are inevitably bound up with the wider 
biosphere and complex webs of ecological processes – the boundary around the 
appropriated and managed part of nature has proven hard to uphold in practice.  
 
The problem particularly effects natural resources which are owned and traded in some 
contexts but held under collective stewardship of not subjects to property rights at all in 
other contexts, such as fish stocks, animals, forests and mineral resources. As the SEEA 
states:  
 
In some cases, the management activity is highly involved, which is the case for battery 
farming of chickens and the use of greenhouses for horticultural production. In these 
situations, the unit undertaking the production creates a controlled environment, distinct 
from the broader biological and physical environment. In other cases, there may be 
relatively little active management as is the case, for example, with broad-acre cattle 
farming and the growing of plantation timber. In these cases, the biological resource is 
exposed constantly to, and interacts as a part of, the broader biological and physical 
environment. There are also situations in which the cultivation of various areas over 
hundreds of years has transformed the natural environment. In practice, it may be difficult 
to distinguish between cultivated and natural biological resources (UN 2014a, 126). 
 
This has proven to be the case, to give two specific examples, in defining which forestry 
and marine assets should enter the SEEA.  
 
 
Figure 5: SEEA Boundary between ‘Economic Assets’ and ‘Environmental Assets’ (from: UN 2014a, 128) 
 171 
 
 
Regarding timber, the SEEA states ‘determining whether timber resources are cultivated 
or natural is important in the application of the appropriate accounting treatment’ (UN 
2014a, 177). However, a statistician working on the OECD’s headline natural resources 
index – a monetised measure of natural capital based on SEEA concepts – highlighted 
the problems of disentangling these things in practice as a barrier to the creation of such 
a measure: 
 
[F]rom an accounting perspective, it was difficult to distinguish between cultivated forest 
and natural forest, and that makes a difference in terms of production. The nice thing 
about forests, at least from the valuation side, is that forest products are quite widely 
traded. So, you can get data on that, you can get the price of timber. But the problem is 
the volume of timber trade. We don't know what percent is produced, and what 
percentage is taken from natural forests. That's a problem, because in national accounts 
cultivated things – animals like cattle for example – are capital, physical capital. Once it's 
something you don't cultivate – minerals or oil for instance – then it’s different, and you 
need to account for that (Interview MR). 
 
As this illustrates, accountants find it hard in practice to draw clear distinctions between 
timber resources that are cultivated and those that are wild, and to trace the various 
timber goods traded in markets to these distinct sources.61  
 
A similar problem occurs with determining which fish stocks are classed as economic 
capital. Here, the same attempt is made to draw a distinction between farmed fish stocks, 
that are counted as ‘fixed capital,’ and wild fish stocks that are considered to lie outside 
of the production boundary:  
 
In principle, all aquatic resources are in scope of the asset accounts in the Central 
Framework; but in practice, the scope is limited to those aquatic resources that are subject 
to commercial activity…In the case of aquatic resources, the growth of fish in fish farms 
and other aquaculture facilities is treated as a process of production…Farming implies 
                                                 
61 Furthermore, this distinction can result in the rather bizarre results. A primary forest, for example, 
suddenly becomes part of ‘economic capital’ as soon as one of its trees is chopped down: ‘The growth in 
cultivated timber resources is considered to be a process under the direct control, responsibility and 
management of institutional units…The growth of natural timber resources, on the other hand, is not 
considered to take place within the production boundary and is recorded as entering the production 
boundary only at the time a tree is removed from the forest or other land area.’ (UN 2014a, 177). 
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some form of intervention in the rearing process…[and] individual or corporate 
ownership of the stock being cultivated (UN 2014a, 184). 
 
Nevertheless, as with timber this distinction between enclosed or appropriated 
dimensions of nature is harder to establish in practice. As the SEEA goes on to explain: 
 
In some cases, the life cycle of aquatic resources may start in an aquaculture establishment 
before transfer to the wild. In other cases, fish are captured in the wild for further growth 
in aquaculture facilities…Some aquaculture is undertaken using netted areas in rivers or 
offshore; hence, there is an interaction between the fish and the aquatic environment in 
which it is situated...In practice, it may not be possible to distinguish between cultivated 
aquatic resources on the basis of the farming practice (UN 2014a, 186). 
 
As we can see, even the private ‘appropriated’ components of natural resources share a 
porous boundary with the unappropriated ecosystems with which they interact.  
 
Adding to this problem is the complex nature of the legal system of property rights 
which covers much of the world’s environmental resources. Here, an overlapping 
system of quotas and access rights exists between countries, governed by various 
international treaties and political agreements, many incompletely monitored and 
enforced. This is complicated further by migratory animals, as a statistician working on 
this problem at the OECD explained: 
 
It’s so complicated with fish and fisheries, because there’s the additional problem of 
international ownership ... Property rights are very limited, and, even if the fish was caught 
in a certain place – was it really from that place? It's another entirely different problem 
(Interview MR). 
 
Walter Radermacher – head of Eurostat – expressed similar concerns in a discussion 
paper on natural capital accounting since: 
 
The use of natural goods and services leads very often to questions related to the (unclear) 
property rights of public goods. The oceans, global atmosphere, rainforests, ecosystems 
could be seen as global public goods. Their use and degradation is first and foremost a 
difficult point for political negotiations at international level (Radermacher and Steurer 
2014, 7). 
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In other words, even for these apparently narrowly economic input and provisioning 
services that nature provides to the market economy, it is hard to draw a line around 
that bit of the natural world that is enclosed by the system of property rights and that 
which falls outside it, as the interactions between them are always complex. This 
problem is even more starkly evidenced by the issue of the broader regulatory services 
which are essential to the reproduction of market activity. It is clear that these produce 
benefits which are appropriated by private economic actors and yield tradeable market 
incomes. Nevertheless, isolating these effects and disentangling their complex webs of 
causality has proved to be extremely difficult.  
 
Sometimes, the exclusion of ecosystem accounts from the narrow economic measures 
of natural capital is justified on the basis that ecosystems are associated with wider 
‘social’ or cultural benefits. While they are accepted as essential to human society and 
welfare, they do not yield private resource rents to the owners (UN 2014b, 1-2). 
However, the discussion of the economic benefits of pollination services demonstrates 
the impossibility of drawing this distinction in any meaningful way in practice.  
 
This is illustrated by a discussion on the development of pollination service accounts in 
a report on ecosystem service accounting by the European Commission and the EEA: 
 
The demand for pollination services is generated by the decision of the farmer to plant 
crops, which profit from pollination. At this point, wild pollinators deliver economic 
value which can be measured (or modelled) and accounted for…As soon as these insects 
start foraging, ecosystems that host these insect populations have the potential to increase 
the yield of adjacent crops that are dependent on insect mediated pollination (European 
Commission 2015a, 26). 
 
As this makes clear, market yields are themselves directly generated by the services of 
ecosystems, and thus in a measure of the market income generated by natural capital 
should be included. This logic could, of course, be extended much further to the 
reproduction of stable climactic conditions. This illustrates the myriad benefits that 
market activity gets from nature, which clearly extend well beyond material resource 
inputs.  
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Thus, even when attempting to focus purely on the economic benefits of nature as co-
extensive with the generation of market profits, it is evident that these activities are 
embedded in wider ecological processes, and that the effect of these systems on 
commodified activities is hard to isolate in a narrow measure of economic natural capital. 
Even understood in this narrow sense – as the assets needed to sustain current levels of 
market income – natural capital cannot be limited to those resources enclosed by 
property rights. There is no way to practically sustain the fiction that unenclosed nature 
merely provides social or cultural services that can be treated as a ‘non-economic’ 
component of natural capital.  
 
The Limits of Valuing the Market Returns on Nature 
 
We have seen how the attempt to isolate the economic components of natural capital to 
those that are subject to ownership and yield private rents to their owner is difficult, as 
it is impossible in practice to isolate the market-relevant aspects of natural resources. 
Attempts to value stocks of natural resources based on their discounted future market 
income run into similar problems. Valuation requires both an assessment of the volume 
of resources owned, and an estimate of the price that this volume will yield to the owner 
in the future. Here accountants encounter difficulties in assessing the change in stocks 
of renewable natural resources, and in valuing the future market returns these will yield 
in conditions of wider ecological uncertainty.  
 
It might be considered that establishing whether the physical stock of a material resource 
has been depleted or increased would be straightforward. It is relatively easy in the case 
of non-renewable resources like minerals and fossil fuels. However, when attempting to 
assess whether the stock of a renewable biological resource like timber or fish is being 
depleted, it is necessary to model the broader environmental conditions in which these 
private resources are cultivated. This, in turn, necessitates an encounter with the 
conditions of ecosystems in which these resources exist. Again quoting the SEEA, in 
relation to timber stocks: 
 
For most populations of natural biological resources, the estimation of sustainable yield 
is difficult, as the natural processes of growth and death, the relationship to other species 
(including predators) and the impact of extraction are usually non-linear, variable (e.g., 
due to variations in climatic conditions) and often not fully understood…The 
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measurement of degradation is [also] complicated because the capacity of environmental 
assets to deliver ecosystem services is not attributable solely to individual assets, and 
because individual assets may deliver a number of different ecosystem services. Further, 
while individual environmental assets, such as water and soil resources, may have been 
degraded over time, separating the degradation of an individual asset from the 
degradation of the overall ecosystem may not be straightforward…Although separately 
identifying degradation in physical terms is complex, implicitly, the monetary value of 
individual environmental assets that have been degraded will be affected by the changing 
quality of the asset…(UN 2014a, 137-138). 
 
Assessing changes in stocks of biological resources is necessary to establishing whether 
these assets have been depleted, which is essential to their valuation even in a narrow 
measure of natural capital. However, as this passage highlights, this requires an 
understanding of the ecological system they are embedded in, that cannot itself be 
inferred from information contained in market prices. Thus, even establishing the 
growth or depletion of the stock of market-relevant natural assets requires information 
from outside the market system.  
 
Even once accountants have determined the scope of a resource, and estimated changes 
in its volume, there is then the problem of determining its value. If the asset is itself 
traded, then the market prices are used, on the basis that: ‘Market prices are assessed by 
investors and producers in relation to their expectations of the flows of income they can 
derive from the assets’ (UN 2014a, 139). However, many natural assets (even those 
directly related to the generation of market income and fully enclosed by private 
property rights) are not themselves traded, but rather represent stores of value that have 
yet to be extracted (such as mineral deposits). Consequently, ‘although prices can be 
found to value the output from extraction or harvest of an environmental asset, no 
values for the asset itself, in situ, are available’ (ibid, 140).  
 
In this case, techniques are given in the SEEA to impute a value for these assets based 
on the Fisherian notion of the discounted future market income it will yield – 
specifically, the net present value method, based upon estimated discounted returns on 
the future use of this asset.62 The idea of the discount rate is central to accounting 
                                                 
62 ‘The net present value (NPV) approach, uses projections of the future rate of extraction of the asset, 
together with projections of its price, to generate a time series of expected returns. Typically, these 
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valuation of capital stocks. This concept was developed in the context of conventional 
business accounting – for example, to model the future returns of investment in a capital 
asset such as machinery or equipment (Miller 1998; Muniesa et al. 2017). It reflects the 
fact that owners have a preference for returns in the present than those in the future. 
The application of net present value techniques is needed even just to construct a core 
macroeconomic measure of the value of natural capital as the market returns on natural 
resources, as demanded by the narrow approach to valuing the ‘economic’ components 
natural capital (UN 2014a, 33). Moreover, the direct application of discount rates taken 
from manufactured capital is suggested to ensure consistency with the treatment of 
produced assets in the SNA (ibid, 144). 
 
However, when applied to the natural world, where resources are embedded in a wider 
ecological context, the application of net present value and market discount rates is more 
tenuous. There is a basic problem, for example, in applying the idea of an ‘asset life’, 
taken from human-made machinery with a known lifespan and durability, to biological 
resources. In a methodological annex, the SEEA acknowledges that: 
 
[E]specially for natural biological resources such as aquatic resources, it is necessary to 
consider biological models and associated sustainable yields of biological resources such 
that the impact of changing age and sex structures is taken into account in the 
determination of the asset life.  It may be that, through the use of biological and economic 
models, optimal extraction paths can be calculated that effectively determine the asset life 
through alignment between the available stock and rates of extraction. Often implicit in 
the determination of such extraction paths, particularly for renewable natural resources, 
are assumptions regarding the sustainability of the resource – for example that future 
management of fish stocks will ensure extraction does not exceed growth. For the SEEA, 
making such assumptions regarding sustainability is problematic as it may ignore 
important environmental information and may imply the adoption of behaviour that may 
not have been evidenced in the past (UN 2014a, 144) 
 
As such, the guidance suggests that ‘[T]here is also support for the use of social discount 
rates in the valuation of environmental assets. The rationale is that environmental assets 
are of broad and long-term value to society as a whole and should be valued in that light 
rather than solely in relation to their value to a present-day extractor’ (ibid, 145).  This 
                                                 
projections are based on the history of returns earned from the use of the environmental asset’ (UN 
2014a, 140). 
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represents an acknowledgement that values taken from the market cannot be used in a 
macroeconomic assessment of the sustainability of market activity, as the information 
contained in prices reflects the short-term interests of the owners of these assets in 
generating revenue. These may not represent ‘rational’ consideration of the future 
sustainability of economic activity, considering the diverse non-commodity interactions 
these resources are enmeshed in. 
 
These problems, associated with drawing a boundary around the ‘market-like’ bits of 
nature and of valuing these using discount rates taken from the market, highlight how 
even the quest for a narrowly market-centric macroeconomic indicators of natural 
capital has proven difficult to operationalise. This is because information relevant even 
to the reproduction of commodified relationships depends upon information that is 
outside of the system of market exchange. As the UNECE task force acknowledged: 
 
By focusing on just the well-being associated with capital assets bought and sold in the 
market, economic wealth avoids the difficulty of measuring unobservable accounting 
prices for capital assets. [But] though economic wealth is much less problematic as an 
indicator than total national wealth, it is not without measurement difficulties…in the 
work to date, the sources of economic wealth have not been determined with a great deal 
of precision. The results leave a large share of economic wealth for many countries in a 
“residual” broadly defined (UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 84). 
 
Ultimately, as environmental accountants are increasingly discovering, the natural 
resources on which even private profits depends are impossible to practically isolate 
from the surrounding ecological systems in which they are entangled. 
 
Human Capital Valuation: Isolating the Commodity-Like Aspects of Knowledge 
 
Analogously to the debate over natural capital, accounting methodologies for 
monetising the value of human capital have focused on isolating the labour market 
returns to investment in formal education.63 In the process of developing these 
methodologies, statisticians and accountants working to develop human capital accounts 
                                                 
63 For instance, the UNECE guide on measuring human capital argues that its recommendations were 
‘aimed at producing estimates that are as consistent as possible with national accounting concepts’ and 
‘will thus not consider the inclusion of all kinds of non-economic returns’. 
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have encountered a similar set of problems in disentangling the appropriable 
‘commodity-like’ aspects of education from its embodied presence in the individual and 
its wider social functions. Two things stand out about this accounting treatment of 
human capital in this regard: firstly, the difficulties of focusing on formal qualifications 
as the locus of human capital ‘investment’; secondly, the focus on labour market 
outcomes as the economic ‘return’ on this investment.  
 
Isolating the Commodity Aspect of Knowledge 
 
Somewhat ironically, given the Hayekian emphasis on the importance of tacit local 
knowledge to the superiority of the market mechanism (Hayek 1945; 1948), practical 
accounting methods developed for valuing human capital have focused on the labour 
market benefits of formal qualifications. This can be related to the neoclassical definition 
of capital with its focus on ownership and exchange. While knowledge can in some 
senses be thought of as the product of investment of an individual in the formation of 
skills that they then sell on the labour market, this is complicated by the fact that these 
skills are embodied in the individual and cannot be exchanged or separated from them. 
Is this knowledge therefore an appropriated asset owned and used by its bearer, or 
simply an embodied property of this owner? This ambiguity is reflected in the asset 
boundary of the 2008 SNA, where human capital was excluded on the grounds that it 
‘become[s] embodied in the persons of the consumers’ (UN 2008, 97) and ‘is acquired 
through learning, studying and practicing, activities that cannot be undertaken by 
anybody else on behalf of the student’ (ibid, p. 8).  
 
Recent methodological work has been framed by this accounting definition of an asset, 
and the need to isolate the transferable, market-like aspects of knowledge acquisition. 
Discussing the matter, the UNECE guide critiques the narrowness of the SNA asset 
boundary, but only on the grounds that: 
 
[I]f one looks upon human capital as a separate, although embodied in a person, entity, it 
does not seem problematic to view the relevant person owning human capital which 
clearly brings future economic benefits (UNECE 2016, 20).64 
                                                 
64 The guide also notes the similarity to other accounting assets, such as brand ‘goodwill’, which are 
similarly ‘fully embodied…in the relevant enterprise’ and non-transferrable and yet included in the SNA.  
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Thus, while the notion of capital is extended to skills and knowledge, there remains a 
sense that their economic component should be in some way separate from the 
individual owning and acquiring them, to remain true to the national accounts definition 
of assets.65  
 
Consequently, all the skills, local know-how and talent of a population that cannot be 
traced to qualifications built up through investment in education are excluded from the 
valuation of human capital stocks. The scope of human capital in the UNECE guide 
‘confined to economic returns, formal education and job-related training’, while ONS 
methodological guidance agrees that: ‘human capital is measured as the value of the 
qualifications of those in the labour market…for those individuals in employment’ 
(ONS 2012b, 29). Narrowing the scope of human capital to formal education allows 
workers’ inherent or embodied talent and skills to be separated from the economic 
component of knowledge acquisition, i.e. the exchangeable units of education invested 
in and their economic returns. It allows human capital formation to enter the realm of 
choice (students’ choices to delay entry into the workforce to raise earnings potential 
and over which qualifications to acquire). This step is therefore vital to developing a 
narrowly ‘economic’ measure of human capital that could isolate the market returns of 
investment in education and training.  
 
However, this approach encounters a number of practical and conceptual problems. 
The first is that distinguishing the asset being invested in from the embodied person it 
is acquired by (and embodied in) is far from straightforward. For instance, the same unit 
of ‘education’ can produce different results in different people. This is referred to in the 
literature as the ‘heterogeneity of human capital’. The main way of dealing with this 
conceptually is to isolate an underlying genetic component of human capital (that lies 
outside of the scope of economic valuation), and distinguish this from the ‘capital’ built 
up by educational investment. The ONS stated that: 
 
A drawback which is common to all these approaches is that…formal education and 
training are not the only determinants of human capital. Some of an individual’s capital is 
                                                 
65 Indeed, the justification for considering only formal qualifications and their market benefits is partly 
due to ‘the consistency with the present framework of national accounts’. 
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innate to them and is in some sense, a non-produced asset. Thus, the asset created by 
education could be regarded as improvements in human capital by education and training 
(ONS 2012c, 9).66 
 
This heterogeneity is used by the UNECE as a basis for rejecting the ‘cost of production’ 
approach to valuing human capital, which simply focuses on calculating the inputs into 
the education system, thereby necessitating the use of labour market outcomes to 
establish the true ‘economic’ benefits of this spending. 
 
A wider problem is the size and importance of informal training, knowledge and know-
how even to the market economy, and the impossibility of individualising the common 
pool of knowledge and skills that underpin innovation. The UNECE guidance 
acknowledges, for instance, that: ‘human capital results not only from schooling and 
training, but also from general experience both at work and in leisure-time activities’ 
(UNECE 2016, 35); while the OECD notes that continued acquisition of skills by adults 
is ‘informal, experiential and interwoven with daily living and working’ and therefore 
difficult to isolate or measure (OECD 2001, 24). Another problem often discussed in 
human capital literature is ‘spill-over effects’, a term used to denote the intrinsically social 
nature of knowledge. The UNECE Guide accepts, for example, that a limitation of 
valuation methods focused on individual returns on qualifications is that they ‘focus on 
individual’s human capital and aggregate them to arrive at the population measure. This 
ignores spill-overs between workers so that the whole may be more than the sum of the 
parts’ (UNECE 2016, 52).  
 
The scale of the contribution of informal, collective and contextual forms of knowledge 
even to the market economy is huge. An OECD study, for instance, attempted to 
capture the full measure of human capital by measuring national capital as a ‘residual’, 
rather than bottom-up from valuing the return on formal education (OECD 2013a). 
Assuming GDP to be a 5% income return on the complete wealth of a society, the study 
reasoned that the value of overall wealth must be 20 times GDP. But the wealth 
observed in SNA balance sheets only accounts for between 2.6-6.6 times GDP, even 
                                                 
66 The UNECE agrees that: ‘Workers differ in their human capital skills, suggesting heterogeneity of 
human capital in the economy.… part of human capital is actually not produced, but for example 
genetically inherited’ (UNECE 2016, 13). 
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when including natural resources. Adding a measure of human capital based on the 
lifetime returns to labour still left fully 25% of this ‘total’ wealth unaccounted for. This 
was attributed in the report to an ‘intangible capital residue’ composed of total factor 
productivity: social knowledge and institutions that could not be captured in private 
returns to formal education and training (OECD 2013a). 
 
Another problem in this regard is the contextual, non-transferrable nature of much of 
the skills and experience that support the market economy. Many of the skills gained in 
employment relate to a specific environment or productive process. This is obviously 
even more the case regarding soft skills such and the specific inter-personal relationships 
built up in the process of working with others. It is hard to isolate these, for instance, 
from generic transferrable skills such as ‘team-work’ or ‘verbal communication skills’ – 
but these are lost as soon as the person moves company or sector. As an OECD report 
notes: ‘individuals are unlikely to be able to extract a full rental value from their 
organisation-specific skills since their employer is their sole potential purchaser’ (OECD 
2001). Therefore, the status of these skills as human capital is precarious since they are 
non-transferrable, and their value cannot be established through exchange on the 
market; nevertheless, they are crucial to supporting market activity and generating 
innovation.  
 
Finally, echoing the problem of unpaid labour covered in chapter 4, accountants 
devising human capital methodologies have encountered the problem of disentangling 
the ‘consumption’ aspects of education from its ‘productive’ or investment-like 
component. This fundamentally stems from the same problem – that education is 
embedded in non-economic functions and entangled with the embodied life of the 
person. Isolating its commodity-relevant aspects is almost impossible in practice. A 
quote from the UNECE guidance on human capital valuation illustrates this point: 
 
To the extent that individuals enjoy their courses or have their range of interests, tastes 
and activities extended, educational expenditures also provide some consumption 
benefits. Thus, the difficulty lies in determining which part of educational expenditure is 
investment spending and which part is consumption…In principle, investment is a clearly 
different concept from consumption. In reality, it is much harder to distinguish between 
expenditures for consumption and for investment (UNECE 2016, 36). 
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As this shows, part of the problem lies in the neoclassical assumption that productive 
work must be a disutility, and so for instance the time spent by student acquiring labour-
market skills must be conceptualised as something endured merely for the future 
enhanced consumption possibilities it renders; unfortunately, for this theory, in reality 
education provides intrinsic ‘utility’.  
 
Furthermore, formal education itself generates benefits to the individual that are not 
directly related to improving their prospects on the job market but are nevertheless 
associated with positive labour market outcomes. This is recognised in the human capital 
literature, but generally these benefits are hived off as ‘social’ and ‘non-economic’ returns 
of education. The UNECE task force states that ‘many see the personal and social well-
being effects of learning as being as important as the economic ones’ 
(UNECE/Eurostat/OECD 2008, 51). However, this very distinction is hard to sustain. 
It has been shown, for instance, that higher educational attainment is associated with 
better health (Fender 2012), and improved social networks and connections (OECD 
2001). These, in turn, are correlated with better labour market prospects. This raises the 
problem of where to stop valuing these less direct forms of market advantage that 
education provides, and how far these can be seen as a genuine form of public social 
‘investment’ instead of a zero-sum means to access networks of privilege.  
 
Consequently, even narrowing the measurement of human capital down to formal 
education, which presents a semblance of the characteristics of capital (such as 
fungibility, transferability and choice), it has not been possible to disentangle the 
economic elements of these, relevant to the labour market, from its other functions. 
Fundamentally, this relates to the fact that education is bound up with the social, 
psychological development of individuals in all their capacities: in Polanyian terms, it is 
‘embedded’ in broader social and cultural processes.  
 
Valuing the Market Returns of Knowledge 
 
A second feature of this approach is that it links the value of human capital entirely to 
the current labour market status of an individual. As the ONS argues: 
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[I]t is difficult to quantify elements of the education process that produce higher output, 
accordingly it makes sense to use labour market evaluations as representing the worth of 
an educated individual (ONS 2012c, 9). 
 
Moreover, while several studies attempt to directly assess skills through questionnaires 
and aptitude tests, valuations based on these are held in suspicion as their economic 
worth has not been validated by labour markets (ONS 2015b). Consequently, since the 
value of human capital is coupled to the generation of market wages, if a person becomes 
unemployed or retires their contribution to the ‘human capital’ of a nation immediately 
falls to zero.  
 
A first problem with this approach is that it produces some rather bizarre valuation 
results. It means, for example, that the appreciation and depreciation in human capital 
values relates more to the employment and wage conditions in a country than the 
substantive content of the skills or knowledge its population possesses. To give an 
example, according to the ONS human capital in UK fell from £19 trillion to £18 
trillion, almost entirely due to a rise in unemployment during the aftermath of the 
financial crisis (ONS 2015b). In other words, a trillion pounds worth of human capital 
wealth had been officially wiped out, not through any loss in the skill base or knowledge 
of the country, but largely because of cyclical fluctuations in the demand for labour in 
the market economy.  
 
There are also practical problems with valuing knowledge based upon the lifetime 
returns it yields to the ‘owner’, even if only considering those in employment. For this 
purpose, accountants have devised two central methods: 1) a cost-based approach, 
adapting the ‘perpetual inventory method’ used to value fixed capital assets, which 
depreciates the initial investment in education over the ‘lifetime’ of an asset, and; 2) and 
a net present value approach (discussed above regarding natural resource valuation), that 
estimates the expected value of future labour market benefits of a qualification (ONS 
2015b). As with natural resources, there are all sorts of problems with adapting these 
methods – designed for physical machinery and equipment – to knowledge embodied in 
human beings. 
 
Firstly, cost-based valuation methods require that a measure of depreciation be applied 
to the knowledge gained in formal education. This method was developed to value a 
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machine or piece of equipment, often with a second-hand re-sale market, and an obvious 
physical aging profile over its life-span and deterioration with greater use. One can detect 
an evident desire within human capital accounting literature to think of knowledge in 
these terms, indeed often using direct similes. The UNECE states that: ‘Like physical 
capital, human capital depreciates over time’, due to ‘the wear and tear of skills due to 
aging’ (UNECE 2016, 37).  
 
However, there are obvious problems with trying to apply this idea of depreciation over 
a lifespan to the knowledge embodied in humans, considered as an asset produced and 
then owned by that individual. For instance, knowledge and skills may increase with 
experience and are bound up with the wider development of the individual. The 
UNECE guidance notes, with apparent surprise, that: 
 
The value of human capital will decrease by aging, and the consequent shortening of the 
period up to retirement or death. This has clear similarities with the shortening of the 
remaining service life of more traditional assets. On the other hand, human capital is 
different in the sense that more classic “wear and tear” through the use of assets, while 
eventually evident, often exhibits quite different patterns of change with use. As stated 
before, embodied knowledge may actually increase as a result of using it in practice, as a 
result of gaining more experience, etc. Or vice versa, the stock of human capital may 
depreciate quicker because of non-use, for example as a result of long-term 
unemployment (UNECE 2016, 28) 
 
Elsewhere the ONS notes that ‘the appreciation of human capital is often ignored in the 
literature, despite some empirical evidence that showed that human capital can 
appreciate at younger ages’ (ONS 2015b, 8). The UNECE guidance ultimately accepts, 
based on this, that: ‘The choice of depreciation for measuring human capital is essentially 
arbitrary because of a lack of empirical evidence’ (UNECE 2016, 37). In other words, 
because the idea of an asset as something that is steadily worn down through use is so 
ingrained in the accounting treatment of manufactured capital, depreciation and 
discount rates developed for machines are applied to the knowledge and skills embodied 
in humans even though the empirical evidence suggests that this has no bearing on the 
reality of how skills are acquired and lost.  
 
Likewise, the income-based approach rests upon applying a lifetime discount rate, which 
rests upon a host of assumptions about future demographic and labour market 
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conditions. One result of the approach is also that the human capital of older people is 
much smaller than those of recent graduates, a finding that even statisticians working 
on human capital valuation find counter-intuitive and problematic. For instance, a 
member of the ONS team working on human capital measurement said that: 
 
My difficulty with the way that we do it was that I would think human capital grows with 
experience, but when you monetise it it’s actually the other way around. Those with the 
greater human capital – or earnings potential – are those who are going to work 
throughout their working life.… if your human capital leaves the market, which it’s likely 
to when you’re 65, then your human capital is then valued at zero. It just felt wrong to 
me that once they leave the labour market, their human capital goes from something to 
zero. (Interview DW). 
 
Since human capital assets are valued based on discounting their future flows, the human 
capital of the elderly and the retired becomes close to zero, with obvious political 
implications regarding – for example – the value of investing in adult education, lifelong 
learning policies or re-skilling programmes. 
 
To summarise, neatly isolating the economic value of knowledge within labour market 
returns to formal qualifications has proved conceptually and practically problematic. 
Firstly, it has been difficult to disentangle the productive aspects of education from its 
broader intrinsic value to the student and society; secondly, valuing human capital based 
on the future labour market returns of the employed generated a number of problematic 
results. Moreover, the attempt to understand human capital as an investment in a capital 
stock which then depletes has made it impossible to conceptualise the informal skills 
acquired outside of formal qualifications, or the various social and cultural factors that 
are linked with the labour market gains of education. 
 
6.3 Substantivism and Extended Capital Valuation: Special Purpose 
Monies in Natural and Human Capital Accounting 
 
We have seen how the attempt to extend the accounting treatment of capital to nature 
and knowledge is forcing a recognition of the impossibility of reducing the economic 
value of these assets to their role in market exchange. This section outlines how, in 
response to these problems, accountants and statisticians are increasingly accepting the 
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need, firstly, for a decoupling of money from markets and, secondly, the co-existence of 
multiple and more contextual monetary values for environmental resources and 
knowledge. In Polanyian terms, these point to an emergent rejection of the exchange 
view of money and an embrace of what he referred to as ‘special purpose money’ 
(Polanyi 1968, 178) in post-GDP accounting practice, which recognises the distinct and 
independent role of money as an accounting unit. Thus, the formalist conflation of 
capital value with market exchange is breaking down, leading to a more political, 
heterogeneous, contextual and ‘substantive’ conception of the economic value of people 
and the natural world.  
 
Natural Capital  
 
Regarding natural capital accounting, the issues with establishing a single unitary 
macroeconomic measure of the market-based component of nature have led to the 
emergence of multiple values and prices for natural assets, used in different contexts, 
and to an increasing willingness to derive these prices from non-exchange factors such 
as political targets or scientific understanding.  
 
Administered Pricing of Pollution: Carbon Pricing beyond Markets 
 
One example which clearly illustrates this shift is the embrace of target-driven prices for 
carbon in the UK in recent years. There has long been a recognition that market prices 
fail to price in the effects of the future damage of climate change caused by carbon 
emissions. This is a problem for attempting to factor emissions reduction into the design 
of policies and cost-benefit analyses. After initial guidance was issued in 2002, this 
problem was dealt with in the UK government using a modelling approach known as 
the ‘Social Cost of Carbon’ (SCC), which was based upon offsetting the damage caused 
by a unit of carbon emissions over its lifetime (DEFRA 2002). This approach was 
further consolidated by the recommendations of the Stern review into the economics of 
climate change, in 2007 (DEFRA 2005; HMT 2006; DEFRA 2007). 
 
Social Cost of Carbon methods attempt to calculate the price of carbon used in 
policymaking from the ‘bottom up’, based upon modelling the price of repairing the 
harm that a unit of pollution will cause over its lifetime. This meant that carbon’s price 
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was still fundamentally linked to its effects upon utility – the need to compensate for the 
disutility of carbon emissions. As the government states: 
 
The social cost of carbon (SCC)…measures the scale of the externality that needs to be 
incorporated into decisions on policy and investment options in government. The SCC 
matters because it signals what society should, in theory, be willing to pay now to avoid 
the future damage caused by incremental carbon emissions (DEFRA 2007, 1-2). 
 
As we can see, the line of authority here runs from ‘price’ to ‘society’: the objective price 
of an additional unit of pollution should, by this method, inform political calculations 
and policymaking on the environment; they reflect, in the words of the 2009 report, 
‘how a rational policy-maker with perfect information might approach the problem of 
optimising an emissions reduction strategy’ (DECC 2009, 10).  
 
However, in the late 2000s the UK changed its approach to pricing carbon to a ‘target-
consistent approach’ following a review of the matter (ibid). In these methods, the 
political targets for emission reduction are taken as a starting point, with the price 
derived from the reductions ‘required to meet a specific emissions reduction target’, and 
the value those targets placed on the emissions of carbon. This move was drive partly 
be the adoption of legally binding carbon budgets, containing emissions reductions 
targets. However, it was also related to the scientific uncertainties surrounding the future 
modelling scenarios which underpinned damage-based SCC pricing methods (ibid).  
 
These models require that the future damages of a unit of emissions must be modelled 
across the entire duration of their presence in the atmosphere, along with their 
interactions with wider emissions pathways and the projected harm these do to the 
environment and human society. Such complexity makes such projections highly 
sensitive to the parameters and assumptions made. As the 2009 report explains, SCC 
relies on ‘a chain of modelling and assumptions over several layers – both economic and 
scientific – and a series of complex projections over more than a hundred years’ (DECC 
2009, 15). These valuations are also impacted by assumptions made about critical 
climactic thresholds and tipping points, and the complex array of damages these may 
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produce.67 As a result of these uncertainties, ‘estimates of the social cost of carbon range 
from zero to over GDP 1000/tC’ (DECC 2009, 18). Furthermore, there is no guarantee 
that prices arrived at through this method would be consistent with meeting national 
and internationally agreed emissions targets. The report argued that ‘as a result of this 
uncertainty, emissions reductions targets may be informed by a variety of factors not 
limited to the economic and scientific modelling evidence’ (ibid, 11).  
 
The adoption of target-driven pricing of carbon represents a potentially important shift 
in thinking about the relationship of market exchange to the valuation of nature and 
political reasoning. Here, rather than objective values informing political calculations 
over environmental policy, political judgements drive the accounting prices assigned to 
natural resources. As the DECC’s 2009 report states: 
 
Given the significant uncertainties in estimates of the social costs of carbon based on 
integrated impact assessment modelling, such modelling should only be one input into 
the target-setting decision-making process. In particular, decisions on targets will also take 
other scientific information, and the associated uncertainties, into account and will be 
supplemented by other judgements – e.g. regarding the acceptable level of risk that we 
wish to bear of potentially catastrophic events owing to extreme temperature rises…[T]he 
target-consistent approach to policy appraisal outlined above clearly marks a departure 
from standard social cost-benefit analysis in which, as under previous SPC, the value of 
an externality is based on estimates of its social cost (DECC 2009, 18; 24). 
 
Price, in other words, will now be derived from political and social judgements over the 
use of resources, the risks associated with this use, and the levels of caution and error 
margins we should build into our interactions with the worlds ecosystems, rather than 
supposedly objective values derived from marginal utility modelling, which then drive 
these judgements (see also Radermacher and Steurer 2014). Along with this is the further 
acknowledgement that there may be different prices for carbon as a result of this 
decision: ‘the reality is that the existence of different targeting regimes is likely to entail 
                                                 
67 The DECC report explains: ‘its recommendation that future emissions should only allow a very low 
probability (less than 1%) of a global temperature increase of 4°C was based on the recognition that 
exceeding 4°C could have potentially catastrophic, but very difficult to value, outcomes. The possibility 
of such tipping points is one key argument for a move away from marginal damage cost estimates in 
appraising individual policies, and towards a target-consistent approach’ (DECC 2009, 21)  
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different implied target consistent prices across the economy, at least in the short term’ 
(DECC 2009, 29). 
 
This move to a target-set approach to valuing carbon emissions decouples money from 
its exchange function, allowing for the possibility of a pure accounting use for monetary 
values, and for politically-administered prices around key resources such as the 
biosphere. It also shows the necessity of a political understanding of the economic value 
of nature as a means of dealing with the sorts of uncertain trade-offs climate change 
poses. In Polanyian terms, this represents an example of a shift to more substantive 
mode of reasoning about the natural world than the attempts to generate a 
macroeconomic measure of sustainability purely based on market returns. 
 
Ecosystem Service Accounting: Multiple and Contextual Valuation of Nature 
 
A second example that evidences this shift to a more complex valuation landscape for 
natural resources is the development of ecosystem accounting. As noted in the previous 
section, measuring the economic and social value of ecosystems was considered too 
complex to be covered by the central SEEA framework, and was dealt with in a set of 
follow-up experimental guidelines (UN 2014b). However, in the years since there have 
been significant moves to implement  ecosystem accounts, especially within the EU 
(European Commission 2015a, 2016). A regulation was passed by the Commission in 
2011 (updated in 2014), legally requiring member states to ‘map and assess the state of 
ecosystems and their services in their national territory by 2014, assess the economic 
value of such services and promote the integration of these values into accounting and 
reporting systems by 2020’ (Peterson and Gocheva 2015, 8). Furthermore, the UK 
government has created a dedicated unit, the Natural Capital Committee, which has 
done extensive work on ecosystem accounting (ONS 2012a; NCC 2013; ONS 2015c). 
 
Three things are especially interesting about the implementation of ecosystem accounts: 
firstly, they accept the possibility of monetising the collective and complex services that 
ecosystems provide, even in the absence of a market price from which these might be 
derived; secondly, in the process they acknowledge the heterogeneous, multiple and 
complex interactions between these services, the different functions of ecosystems 
(including non-use values), and the difficulty of drawing a line around their ‘economic’ 
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aspects; thirdly, there are serious moves to embed these valuations in spatial 
representations and their geographic context, which disrupts the unitary and abstract 
view of the economy constructed through the national accounts. 
 
Turning to the first of these points, there is an increasing recognition that many of the 
values ecosystems render to human societies are relevant to ‘economic’ processes, but 
their monetary value cannot be derived from market prices (ONS 2012a). As discussed 
in section 2, in the mainstream view of environmental accounting these broader welfare 
benefits are hived off as ‘social’ and left unmonetized. Yet the greater acceptance of 
monetary valuation, even in contexts where there is no obvious market return or 
transaction, is potentially breaking down the distinction upheld in the central SEEA 
accounting framework between the private ‘economic’ and collective or ‘social’ benefits 
of nature. These are now put together in a common analytical and decision-making 
context in debates over resource use. Consider an answer given by Dieter Helm, chair 
of the NCC, to the UK parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee:  
 
I don’t quite accept your premise that there are several assets that are not economic, and 
there are several assets that are and we should think about them differently…These all 
have benefits to people, and those benefits are what we are interested in. Some of them 
have direct market prices and some of them do not, but from a resource allocation point 
of view, it is precisely about wanting to make sure that those that do not have prices in 
markets at the moment are not given, effectively, a value of zero…Many benefits that 
people derive from having access to forests that are of the kind that you put in your 
category of almost noneconomic…they should influence the way we make decisions 
(EAC 2014, 7-8). 
 
In place of an attempt to isolate the economic component of nature, which can be 
monetised because of prices taken from market transaction, all interactions with the 
natural world are included in a political decision-making process over the use of these 
resources. Thus, in the process of implementing ecosystem accounting, the link between 
money and markets is being destabilised through attempts to value non-market 
phenomena; this challenges the distinction between the accounting value of nature and 
the ‘social’ or political value. 
 
Secondly, this move to monetising the various non-market benefits of ecosystems has 
been accompanied by an acknowledgement that the complex values of ecosystems are 
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nevertheless heterogeneous, discrete and incommensurable. Often, these are categorised 
as ‘provisioning’ services, the material products appropriated by humans, ‘regulating’ 
services, important to the broader stability of the climate and ecological systems, and 
‘cultural’ services such as the recreational, symbolic and spiritual values of nature. The 
EU natural capital accounting framework explicitly states that the process of establishing 
their values may be distinctive in each case and that they cannot be meaningfully 
aggregated into a single macroeconomic figure which could provide a value for 
ecosystem assets as a whole: 
 
Most provisioning services are, or will be, valued using market prices. Most regulating 
services using methodologies based on costs, where possible. Monetary valuation of 
cultural ecosystem services, which are mainly valued using stated valuation methods, is 
much more complicated…[we] should not aggregate these different techniques (Peterson 
and Gocheva 2015, 24). 
 
Radermacher has similarly argued: ‘while valuation is useful for assessing an incremental 
change, the total value of all ecosystems of the planet has no meaning’ (Radermacher 
and Steurer 2014, 8). This challenges a core assumption of national accounting, which 
is that the economy should be represented as a unitary system of flows and stocks, where 
every transaction is balanced by another item in the framework, and where one unit of 
‘money’, representing prices established via exchange, is substitutable with any other. 
 
Thirdly, the various non-market and market values of ecosystems are increasingly linked 
to a specific geographical location and spatially embedded into plural territorial 
representations of economic value. There are widespread moves to develop ‘spatially 
disaggregated accounts’ for ecosystems that can inform decision making processes at 
different scales, including local and regional. The EU reference document states that: 
 
Given that the flows of natural capital are not limited to a particular scale, spatially-
referenced natural capital accounting needs to allow for multi-scale 
assessments…Different types of natural capital assets and associated service flows, 
managers and users of natural capital assets, and the territorial focus of relevant policies, 
all exist or operate at various spatial scales The ability to use a common spatial reference 
frame for “multi-scale” assessments and analyses will therefore be an essential issue in the 
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development of any natural capital accounting approach’ (Peterson and Gocheva 2015, 
41).68 
 
This is partly supported by technological changes to the data infrastructure used to 
assess ecosystem conditions, which is increasingly draw from satellite imaging and 
Geospatial Information Systems.  
 
An interesting aspect of this change is how it interacts with the spatiality performed by 
accounting frameworks. As Timothy Mitchell has argued, cadastral land surveys were 
crucial to the construction of the nation state as a unified territorial space, a spatial 
imaginary which later became the locus of macroeconomic management and 
development thinking (see also Law and Mol 2001; Mitchell 2002). In the EU, however, 
there are developments which are potentially undermining this link between accounting 
and the unified territorial construction of the national economy. EU projects such as 
KIP-INCA (European Commission 2016) and Mapping and Assessing Ecosystem 
Services (MAES) increasingly draw upon granular land-use classifications and tagging 
systems, such as LUCAS, COPERNICUS and INSPIRE (European Commission 
2015b).69 Furthermore, the development of ecosystem habitat accounts, which map the 
economic values associated with cross-cutting ecological zones such as forests or 
wetlands, also holds potential to disturb the assumption that ‘the economy’ is an entity 
contained within the nation, naturalised by the SNA and most macroeconomic indicators 
drawn from it. These developments are permitting newly localised, fragmented and 
spatially embedded representations of the economic values of nature.  
 
As an example, illustrative of these tendencies, consider the visual representation of the 
various values associated with forestry in Wales developed by the UK’s natural capital 
committee (NCC 2013). This highlights the effects of the three developments 
mentioned on the ‘formalist’ conception of the economy that is emerging through the 
                                                 
68 An ESSC document on the EU environmental accounting strategy similarly recommends that ‘the 
increasing role of geo-referenced and small area data should help the statistical system provide relevant 
spatially resolved socio-economic and other data’ (ESSC 2014b, 13). 
69 An EU document on the project states: ‘at the core of the project is to combine existing geo-spatial 
data layers related to ecosystems and to generate initial (primarily bio-physical) indicators and accounts 
on a regular basis and which could then be used to derive estimates of the value of ecosystems and their 
services’ (European Commission 2015b, 3). 
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development of ecosystem accounting. Firstly, market and non-market values are 
considered together as equally relevant to the economic management of this ecosystem. 
Secondly, however, these different vectors of value are not aggregated into an aggregate 
macroeconomic value, but rather displayed as discrete and incommensurable factors 
which weigh on political calculations over the use of this environment.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Spatially Disaggregated Representation of the Multiple Values of Forestry in Wales (from NCC 2013, 37) 
 
 
Figure 7: The Abstract Space of the National Economy as Represented in the SNA (from Eurostat 2014, 22) 
 
Lastly, we have switched from the abstract mathematical space of the economy in the 
national accounts to the embedding of heterogeneous values in a specific place, re-
rooting economic resources in a territory. In contrast with accounting identities such as 
GDP or the balance of payments – but also with the macroeconomic extended wealth 
indicators envisaged in the mainstream approach to sustainability measurement under 
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the capital stocks approach – these values are placed somewhere. They are no longer 
posited as macroeconomic identities to be factored in as additional variables to existing 
models; they effect a switch to a more local and disaggregated spatial economic 
imaginary. 
 
Many critical scholars have critiqued the monetisation of nature in this way. This is 
usually in the context about fears it may encourage the commodification of nature 
(Robertson 2006; Lohmann 2009; Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 2011). Through 
rendering diverse uses of natural resources commensurate, it is feared valuation may 
facilitate the development of markets in ecosystem services or biodiversity offsetting. 
Certainly, this is a very real danger, and in some contexts the development of accounting 
values may encourage political discourses focusing on ecosystems as a new source of 
enclosure and marketisation. However, as was argued in chapter 3, the recovery of 
diverse money uses and ‘special purpose monies’ (including the recognition of the 
accounting function of money for political deliberation) was, in Polanyi’s work, a 
necessary corollary of the recovery of a substantive conception of the economy (Polanyi 
1968, 175-203). Polanyi’s perspective was not that monetisation was a problem per se, 
rather is was how prices were arrived at: ‘behind the backs’ of people through the market 
mechanism or via a more conscious political process (Polanyi 2016 [1922]). The 
development of public ecosystem accounts potentially encourages the treatment of money 
prices as a unit of account, for use in public deliberation over the use of resources. 
However, whether it achieves this will ultimately depend upon the methods through 
which non-market values are formed. This is the subject of the next chapter and will not 
be elaborated on here.  
 
Human Capital 
 
Human capital accounting has developed less along this trajectory than natural capital. 
This is partly because human capital is a less developed field of statistical production, 
linked less explicitly to international political frameworks than those that govern 
environmental policy. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several tendencies that point 
in a similar direction: a decoupling of the value of human capital from a narrow focus 
on market returns. 
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Firstly, we saw in section 2 how valuing education purely based on the labour market 
status of the individual it is embodied in produces a number of paradoxical results. This 
narrow focus is partly justified by the policy concerns of governments. Specifically, 
human capital is often measured in the context of assessing the ability of the working 
population to support an aging population and the long-term sustainability of welfare 
systems. It is interesting to note the political implications of this methodology: they 
naturalise the assumption that more sustainable welfare systems must come through the 
generation of additional employment and jobs. For instance, policies aimed at employing 
the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of retired people in volunteering, child care or 
community contexts (Eurofound 2014; Zwickl et al. 2016) would not be able to arrest 
or offset a decline in human capital that resulted from an economic downturn. Likewise, 
policies aimed at redistributing work more evenly across the population to make space 
for unpaid economic activity could only serve to massively depreciate the value of 
human capital stock. Thus, the means of measuring progress towards sustainability pre-
suppose the means by which it is to be achieved: commodified solutions are, by the very 
way in which the valuation methodology is constructed, the only way to increase the 
human capital base of a nation and place welfare on a ‘sustainable’ footing.  
 
However, official human capital accounting practice is increasingly recognising the flaws 
of this narrow conception of human capital. This has partly come in response to the 
concerns of those working on these methods, outlined in section 2. But what has 
ultimately proved decisive has been political resistance. The ONS, for instance, 
consulted on their valuation methodology and encountered opposition to the restriction 
of human capital to the employed population: 
 
Previous estimates have valued the human capital of those people not in employment as 
zero. This is consistent with the OECD’s guidance on the measurement of physical capital 
which states that, “be counted as part of the capital stock all that is required is that assets 
are present at production sites and capable of being used in production or that they are 
available for renting by their owners to producers.”. However, following the responses to 
the consultation on measuring human capital, from the 2013 estimates of human capital, 
ONS will also produce estimates of ‘full’ human capital, including the unemployed, which 
will be published alongside the human capital of those in employment (ONS 2012c, 10). 
 
As a result, what has emerged is a dual set of values for human capital in the UK, 
published in parallel. These shifts, firstly, allow a decomposition of the extent to which 
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apparent destruction of human capital may simply represent people dropping out of the 
labour market due to cyclical fluctuation in the market economy. It also has the effect 
of decoupling its value from the direct market benefits its owners are receiving, and of 
accepting that knowledge has multiple values depending on what aspects of its value are 
being captured. 
 
 
Figure 8: ‘Employed’ and ‘Full’ Human Capital Values (from: ONS 2015b, 3). 
 
Even in these full human capital measures, however, the value of knowledge is linked 
purely to labour market returns, which are taken as the ultimate arbiter of its money 
value. All that has happened is that the skills and qualifications of the unemployed are 
imputed as having a prospective or potential labour market value and so are included in 
the estimates.  
 
Nevertheless, some more fundamental methodological changes are being explored by 
statisticians, both nationally and by international working groups, including the OECD 
and the UN statistical committee. Firstly, there is some evidence of moves to include 
on-the-job training as well as formal qualifications. In its ‘further work’ section, the ONS 
human capital methodology guidance suggested that ‘the discounted lifetime income 
framework only considers formal education in its estimates …This could be combined 
with the stock estimates to produce a capital accumulation account’ (ONS 2012c, 14). 
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More radically, it suggested the development of valuations which factor in non-market 
production as an additional income flow when capitalising the value of human capital: 
 
These experimental estimates of human capital are calculated using market factors only. 
Human capital is also important for non-market activity…Future work could incorporate 
imputations of the value of non-market labour activity, including household production 
and leisure into the measures of human capital (ibid, 14). 
 
Therefore, the agenda on extended wealth measurement explored in this chapter 
interacts in important ways with the development of accounts for non-market activity 
explored in chapter 5. If non-market production is included as an additional measure of 
income, reflecting the collective value of social reproduction and other non-market 
services, then the accounting value of knowledge must also be extended to include the 
skills and attributes that help people perform non-market functions. The political 
implications for how the economic value of knowledge production is considered are 
radical: forms of learning that help citizens perform non-market duties effectively would 
potentially enter monetary valuation processes as an economic return on knowledge 
production.  
 
Finally, in response to criticism of the gendered nature of human capital measures, there 
have also been attempts to correct them to take account of the gender asymmetries in 
labour market outcomes. The move to include non-market work would of course itself 
have a gender dimension, given that women disproportionately contribute to unpaid 
work and social reproductive labour. But it has also been noted that, due to the gender 
pay gap in labour market earnings, measures of human capital based on existing and 
expected labour market returns will undervalue the knowledge and skills embodied by 
women and their potential economic contribution. If the market incomes paid to employ 
these skills are undervalued, so will the value of the stock measure of this embodied 
‘capital’, but ‘one cannot conclude that male human capital is more “valuable” to society 
than female human capital’ (ibid, 14). A problematic nature of these moves is that they 
frame the problem in terms of market failures and the sub-optimal pricing of female 
labour in the marketplace, which arguably naturalise the idea that gender equality merely 
equates to more rational allocation of economic resources. However, in recognising the 
existence of power structures within the labour market and accepting the need to correct 
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asset values to reflect these power symmetries, they potentially reflect a move to a more 
substantive understanding of the economy.  
 
Summary 
 
A major component of the beyond GDP statistical agenda is the attempt to better 
measure the sustainability of current levels of economic growth. As this chapter has 
shown, increasingly this question has been approached through the lens of capital 
theory, with sustainability reconstituted as a question of whether current levels of growth 
are compatible with the maintenance of human, natural and social – as well as produced 
and financial – capital. Thus, the negative externalities of GDP growth for nature and 
society will register in accounting frameworks through their impacts on the depletion of 
total capital stocks, allowing for the assessment of the sustainable levels of growth 
compatible with preserving these resources for future generations. This chapter has 
explored how global accounting experts are grappling with the methodological 
implications of this view of sustainability. Contributing a further case study which helps 
to answer the central research question, it has provided an assessment of the challenge 
that integrating nature and knowledge into national accounting methodologies presents 
to a core aspect of formalist reasoning: the reduction of money to its exchange function.  
 
Firstly, it traced the history of neoclassical capital theory, through the influential work 
of Irving Fisher. We saw how Fisher defined capital in conceptually expansive terms: as 
the stream of utilities produced by any physical object subject to property rights. This 
paved the way for the conceptual proliferation of capital to nature, knowledge and 
society in the post-war period. However, Fisher’s approach to establishing the 
accounting value of capital objects was much narrower, with this derived from the market 
incomes which the asset yielded its owner. It was argued this represents a ‘formalist’ 
understanding of wealth, in that it links the economic value of resources to their use in 
markets, and in doing so conflates money with its exchange function. As we saw in 
chapter 3, this was a key tenet of the formalist view of economy as understood by 
Polanyi, as it does not allow for the heterogeneous functions money may play in political 
deliberation. Moreover, this has been imported into accounting treatments of natural 
and human capital, which have revolved around the conceptual separation of the 
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‘economic’ components of these assets – relating to the private market services they 
generate for the owner – from their wider ‘social’ value in generating collective welfare. 
 
Sections two and three analysed how this formalist understanding of the accounting 
value of assets has been destabilised by practical attempts to operationalise 
macroeconomic measures of natural and human capital. These rest upon the ability to 
disentangle and isolate the commodity-like aspects of these resources from their wider 
values for individuals, society and the biosphere. However, such separations have 
proved to be increasingly problematic and difficult to sustain in practice. Knowledge, 
for instance, is mixed up with intrinsic benefits and the social life of an individual; it 
appreciates with use and experience; it is acquired through everyday interactions and 
often context-specific. The bits of nature that yield resource inputs into the market 
economy are hard to separate from the wider ecological and social processes the market 
economy is embedded in. As a result, it is increasingly acknowledged that the quest for 
a macroeconomic measure of extended capital which can be derived purely from market 
returns is elusive. In place of this, there is an increasing openness to monetising the 
values associated with these capital goods in the absence of market prices, and a 
recognition that non-market values cannot be neatly isolated from ‘economic’ benefits. 
 
This analysis has further helped answer the overall research question: to what extent are 
beyond GDP reforms challenging market-centric understandings of the economy? It 
has illustrated how the limitations of implementing this agenda using market-derived 
values has led to the rejection (by accountants and statisticians) of the idea that the 
exchange use of money is its essential criteria. Moreover, this is leading to the 
proliferation of what Polanyi described as ‘special purpose monies’ in global accounting 
practice: politically-administered prices for different national resources, which recognise 
the multiple uses money may serve outside of markets (including as a unit of account) 
and its intrinsically political character. We can thus identify a similar pattern in attempts 
to extend the asset boundary as the attempts to extend the production boundary 
observed in chapter 5. Efforts to implement these reforms using formalist conceptual 
resources have encountered practical and epistemic limits, prompting accountants and 
statisticians to move beyond this view of the economy and explore more substantive 
alternatives. This is leading, as elsewhere in this agenda, to the co-existence of 
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approaches underpinned by very different assumptions about what the economy is, with 
potentially very different political and normative implications.  
 
In this chapter we explored how the failure to neatly contain the value of nature and 
knowledge within markets has led to a decoupling of money from exchange. However, 
the different methods through which these values are practically arrived at are diverse 
and construct the concept of ‘value’ and its relationship to price and utility in very 
different ways. In the next chapter, we will investigate more closely the specific 
monetisation methods developed to assign accounting prices to phenomena in the 
absence of market exchange, exploring the differential challenge these present to the 
psychological underpinnings of orthodox consumer theory and welfare economics.  
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7. Value after GDP: Monetising Non-Market Goods 
and the Limits of Homo Economicus 
 
 
In a market economy…society is separated by the market into a pre-market process determining 
prices and a post-market process depending on them – prices themselves being the result of an 
inscrutable process…Thus, individuals are not only isolated from each other, but they are in a 
manner also separated from themselves.…The moral value of social organisation depends upon 
the degree to which it helps individual responsibility to be realised in the social sphere – Karl 
Polanyi 
 
If we want a better society with better wellbeing, governments must have the data on wellbeing, 
and then use it. And so must individuals…Efficient markets, and lives well led, rest on people 
making informed decisions. But often this information is not present…wellbeing data should be 
made widely available to help de-shroud everyday choices – Legatum Institute ‘Wellbeing 
and Policy’ Report 
 
 
In 2008, an economic study found that our friendships are worth £85,000 to us annually 
(Powdthavee 2008); a 2010 report by the UK’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
calculated the value of playing regular sport as equivalent to £11,000 in additional 
income per household (DCMS 2010, 37); several years later, analysis commissioned by 
the British Library concluded that its mere continued existence is worth £412.8m to UK 
citizens every year, even if none of them visit or use its services (Tessler 2013, 46-51). 
Each of these studies draws upon an emerging suite of valuation methods that attempt 
to monetise the value of goods which are not exchanged in markets. The refinement of 
such techniques and their incorporation into economic policy analysis has become a key 
strand of the wider beyond GDP agenda (Stiglitz et al. 2010, 153-155; Dolan and 
Metcalfe 2012; Hicks et al. 2013); in particular, data on subjective emotions, which have 
been standardised and added to official population surveys as part of this agenda, are 
promoted as a means of valuing and comparing the diverse non-market impacts of 
policy options, invisible in traditional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) calculations (European 
Commission 2011; Cabinet Office 2013; OECD 2013c; O'Donnell et al. 2014). 
 
This chapter analyses the growing use of non-market valuation techniques (HMT 
2011b), and the different methodologies that underpin them. In keeping with the 
conceptual framework developed in chapter 3, it evaluates the challenge their growing 
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use poses to the foundational assumptions of ‘formalist’ market-centric economic 
theory. In particular, it assesses how the understanding of value and its relationship to 
price is being reconfigured by these methods. The aspect of formalist reasoning at stake 
in this instance is the homo economicus vision of human nature underpinning post-
neoclassical economic psychology. As shown in chapter 3, Polanyi’s critique of 
formalism was based in part upon its foundational separation of the political and the 
economic components of human beings. Behaviour within markets was seen to be 
‘economic’, oriented to maximising individual utility by choosing between bundles of 
goods in response to price signals (Polanyi 1968, 60-77). By contrast, ‘politics’ was 
posited as a deliberative exercise conducted in dedicated state institutions and exogenous 
to price formation – where collective values and ideals were negotiated (Polanyi 2001 
[1944], 231-234). Such a conceptual separation meant the economy appeared as an 
autonomous realm of objective prices, seen as the momentary outcome of the individual 
pursuit of utility. Market prices therefore stood above individuals, preventing them from 
gaining internal ‘overview’ of the economic relationships and processes they were part 
of, impoverishing the development of ethical and political agency (Polanyi 2016 [1922]).  
 
Assessing this question therefore helps build an answer to the central research question. 
It is especially relevant given that proponents of wellbeing valuation explicitly emphasise 
its democratising credentials, presenting it as a radical challenge to revealed preference 
assumptions which can better inform individuals and governments about the full 
implications of decisions (OECD 2013c; O'Donnell et al. 2014). Non-monetary 
valuation, it is argued, thus holds the potential to overcome the reductionist equation of 
value with markets that characterises orthodox consumer theory. In this chapter I argue 
that, while often presented as a radical and democratic challenge to economistic 
thinking, wellbeing valuation retains the homo economicus view of human nature 
popularised by neoclassical theory, even while decoupling price and utility from market 
exchange. However, the practicalities of implementing these techniques have exposed 
the shaky image of human nature and psychology which underpin them, stemming as it 
does from the utilitarian apparatus upon which market-based consumer theory is based. 
 
The first section of the chapter provides a conceptual history of the status of non-market 
goods in cost-benefit analysis and welfare economics, and the increasing use of valuation 
methods to price these goods since the 1990s. It shows how the large-scale collection of 
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official wellbeing data has proliferated as part of the wider Beyond GPD agenda after 
2009, highlighting the role of positive psychology theory in formulating and delineating 
this critique. Section 2 presents a critique of the ability of wellbeing data to provide 
conceptually meaningful valuations on which political decisions might be grounded, 
highlighting how they tend to reify the result of historical socialisation processes and 
present these as universally valid values. It shows how these limitations are increasingly 
recognised in official policy literature, with their use encountering increasing resistance. 
The closing section demonstrates how this is leading to the exploration of alternative 
forms of valuation. Multi-criteria analysis methods, for instance, treat price formation as 
itself a site of political and ethical deliberation, allowing for the active, critical formation 
of preferences in a given time and place. Empirical sources are drawn upon to illuminate 
how these philosophical differences in approach have been reflected in the uptake and 
use of these methods within UK government departments. It identifies an emergent 
epistemic politics around whether – and how – non-market goods are turned into 
monetary prices; different views of human nature are inextricably bound up with these 
apparently technical or methodological debates.  
 
7.1 Formalist Reason and Non-Market Valuation: Positive Psychology 
and the Partial Critique of Revealed Preference  
 
This section provides a brief history of the problem of pricing non-market goods in 
cost-benefit analysis, the parallel emergence of positive psychology, and more recent 
moves to solve the former through valuation techniques based upon the latter, as part 
of wider beyond GDP accounting reforms. The first section gives a history of the 
emergence of economic, stated preference and choice modelling techniques to impute 
non-market values over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. The rise of positive 
psychology is then reviewed, before a discussion of how survey data based on wellbeing 
has increasingly been folded into a critique of the revealed preference theory that 
underpins conventional CBA, as a novel solution to the problem of pricing non-market 
phenomena.  
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Non-Market Values in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Cost-benefit analysis originated in the 1840s, in Jules Dupuit’s work on the placement 
of railways (Ekelund 1968; Pearce 1998). It was associated with the development of 
proto-marginalist analysis and the concept of consumer surplus, as formalised in the 
work of Alfred Marshall. (Currie et al. 1971; Persky 2001). Over the course of the 20th 
century CBA was integrated into public planning and decision making– initially by the 
US Army Corps of Engineers in the interwar years, but spreading in the post-war years 
to other industrialised states and international organisations (Porter 1996, 148-190). 
Reflecting its engineering origins, the technique was associated early in its post-war 
history with the assessment of large infrastructure such as flood control and hydrology 
projects. As such, from the beginning it persistently ran up against problems associated 
with the valuation of complex bundles of environmental and market goods and services, 
issues associated with risk in projects constructed over long time periods, and the 
problem of distribution, inequality and interpersonal comparison. These were dealt with 
within the framework of welfare economics and social choice theory using the work of 
Kaldor and Hicks (Persky 2001, 200-202). Eckstein’s work was crucial in this respect, 
laying the applied welfare economics framework in which later use of CBA in public 
policy would evolve (Eckstein 1958; Florio 2014).70  
 
The use of CBA within the state became both much more expansive and also much 
more contested throughout the 1980s, as the restructuring of the state along market-
based lines and the rise of New Public Management philosophies in government 
departments (see e.g. Shamir 2008, 6). The Reagan and Thatcher governments saw in 
CBA a means of constraining an inherently expansionist state, trimming government 
activity by subjecting it to rigorous economic assessment. CBA allowed these ideological 
moves to be justified on objective, technical grounds (Porter 1992; Shapiro 2011), and 
its use was increasingly written into secondary legislation governing public spending 
decisions. Crucial to its effectiveness in these terms was the exclusion of the sorts of 
non-market, public goods the provision of which neoliberal statecraft in general viewed 
                                                 
70 The consequence of Kaldor and Hick’s work was to loosen Pareto optimality criteria so as to decouple 
distributional issues from CBA, as long as at least hypothetically the gains to the richest could be used to 
compensate those left worse off (see Persky 2001) – and thus to expel normative concerns from CBA and 
reconstitute it as a technical policy tool. 
 205 
 
with suspicion, and its professed agnosticism regarding distributional issues. This also 
furnished the political context in which emergent critiques of CBA were framed: the 
tool was viewed on the left as having an inherently ‘anti-regulation’ bias (Shapiro 2011). 
From the outset this critique was related to exclusion from CBA methods of public 
goods or externalities not captured in market prices. Ironically, the very expansion of 
CBA also made these critiques harder to ignore.   
 
Conceptual innovations – such as the concept of option (Weisbrod 1964) and existence 
or ‘non-use’ values (Kerry Smith 1987) – to deal with these issues had been around in 
theoretical discussions of CBA for several decades. But a series of environmental 
catastrophes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as the broader post-Brundtland 
sustainable development discourse, prompted methodological responses by leading 
economists, with the view to actually monetising the value or these goods for use in 
CBA assessments. This was also influenced by the broader emergence of environmental 
economics and the ecological critique of orthodox development economics for its 
exclusion of the natural externalities of market activity (Interview PA). The Exxon 
Valdez disaster in 1989 was especially important in this respect, providing a striking 
demonstration of the ecological costs of market activity that suggested the 
methodological foundations of CBA were in urgent need of updating (Hanley and Spash 
1993; OECD 2015a). The disaster led to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which required 
the quantitative assessment of the damages of oil disasters.71 This prompted the 
formation of a high level economic panel convened by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), headed by Kenneth Arrow and other leading 
economists, to review and recommend solutions to the economic valuation of 
environmental costs (Arrow et al. 1993).  
 
The NOAA commission refined and developed methodologies already developed in 
academic literature to deal with the destructive costs of disasters such as Exxon Valdez 
that could not be captured in market prices.72 The ability to claim for such damages had 
                                                 
71 Legal developments earlier in the 1980s had paved the way for litigation to claim back damages for 
these sorts of goods – however these were rarely applied until later due precisely to difficulties in 
measurement – namely the ‘Ohio vs Department of Interior’ case of 1986. 
72 The concept of existence values (also called ‘non-use values’), as well as the contingent valuation 
methodology, had been around in academic literature prior to the 1980s. However, they had not been 
widely applied by public bodies before the 1993 NOAA report, following Exon Valdez. 
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been incorporated into legislation in the 1986, however before Exxon Valdez they had 
not been widely used in legal contexts precisely because of the difficulties of estimation 
(Arrow et al. 1993, 2). How were the sorts of diffuse, multi-faceted destructive 
consequences associated with vast oil spills – which include those not dependent on 
individual use of a resource – translated by economists into a methodological paradigm 
of Marshallian heritage, centred on the concept of consumer surpluses and individual 
utility functions? The panel suggested that hypothetical markets for such goods could 
be simulated artificially, by requesting them to state their willingness to pay for desirable 
economic outcomes in monetary units - ‘contingent valuation’ (CV) – or presenting 
people with a series of choices between environmental outcomes and a bundle of other 
traded goods.73  
 
These methodological innovations appeared during the 1990s to have partially addressed 
the omission of non-market goods from CBA, and such techniques were integrated into 
official guidelines used by government departments to assess the impact of different 
policy options or projects. In the UK, this shift was reflected in revisions to the 
Treasury’s Green Book, which details when and how CBA methods are to be used by 
central government, to specifically include a section on how to conduct contingent 
valuation studies (O'Brien 2010). However, over the course of the 2000s, the use of 
CBA techniques spread to an even wider array of policy areas, leading to contingent 
valuation methods to be applied outside of the context of environmental damages, for 
which they were primarily developed. In the UK, the use of these techniques in public 
policy was gradually ‘socialised’, as they began to be used firstly by transport ministries, 
and subsequently in the assessment the public funding of sports, the arts and cultural 
policy (ibid; Interview SM). This in turn led to additional criticisms of such methods.  
 
On methodological grounds, the criticism remained that the techniques did not 
sufficiently simulate the behavioural conditions of markets. As they did not represent 
choices over the disposal of private economic resources under market conditions, but 
merely the expressed opinions elicited over the disposal of hypothetical money, the 
valuations were not considered trustworthy or robust. It was also discovered that people 
may deliver ‘protest’ valuations in such studies, valuing goods based upon political or 
ideological beliefs rather than the real utility they delivered. The costs of such studies 
                                                 
73 These techniques are discussed more fully in section 3. 
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was also subject to criticism (O’Brien 2010; HMT 2011b). Somewhat ironically, given 
the role of fiscally conservative economists in formulating these methods and advocating 
their public use in policy assessment, dedicated contingent valuation studies – which 
involve running costly participatory experiments – proved prohibitive when extended 
to large or complicated policy issues (Interview SM). Thus, economists themselves 
increasingly began to call into question both the problematic intrusion of conscious 
deliberation into price formation and the costs of conducting expensive valuation 
studies to ascertain monetary values for non-market goods through contingent 
valuation. But the reality and significance of such goods was by now firmly established. 
By the late 2000s, non-market impacts had become a political problem in search of novel 
methodological solutions. 
 
Positive Psychology in the Beyond GDP Movement 
 
In parallel to economic discussions of non-market goods and the rise of contingent 
valuation and choice modelling methods in CBA in the 1990s, an apparently unrelated 
development was taking place in the psychology discipline: the emergence of the 
‘positive psychology’ school, constructed on neo-Benthamite philosophical 
underpinnings and focused on directly measuring population-wide subjective mental 
states using quantitative and self-consciously ‘scientific’ methods (Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi 2000; Layard 2011). This reformulation of the terms in which personal 
happiness and wellbeing were understood in the psychological literature is vitally 
important to contemporary policy discussions on non-market impacts and utility. It is 
this that both allowed positive psychologists to present themselves as possessing 
scientific credentials and methodological tools which could help solve the problems 
associated with valuing non-market goods in CBA (Dolan and White 2007; Dolan and 
Metcalf 2008) and also, as we will see in greater detail later in the chapter, to conditioning 
the nature of this challenge and the reception of these methods both within the 
economics discipline and by policymakers.  
 
The creation myth of positive psychology dates its emergence to a speech delivered by 
Seligman to the American Psychological Association in 1998 (see e.g. Gable and Haidt 
2005; Alex Linley et al. 2006, 4). Seligman declared that psychology had for too long 
been focused on ‘pathology’: reflecting its medical roots in psychotherapy, the emphasis 
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of the discipline had been correcting curing mental illness rather than exploring the 
sources and drivers of flourishing and happiness (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000). 
It was finally time for psychology to pay attention to these more positive phenomena. 
This was a selective reading of disciplinary history which has had interesting political 
consequences. For there had in fact been a sustained attempt to understand the sources 
of positive human development long before the 1990s (Taylor 2001).  
 
After the second world war, humanist psychology had flourished as a ‘third force’ 
(Bugental 1964) between Freudian psychoanalysis and the behaviourism of Burrhus 
Skinner (Skinner 1971) and Ivan Pavlov. The writings of Maslow, Rodgers and Fromm 
(from the 1940s to the 1960s) had focused on the conditions for self-actualisation and 
the development of the ‘whole individual’ (Bugental 1964). But the methods drawn upon 
within this tradition were hermeneutic and interpretivist (Waterman 2013): influenced 
by continental philosophical traditions such as phenomenology and existentialism (May 
1996), they viewed human nature not as a bundle of directly comparable subjective 
states, which could be isolated, ranked and measured, but rather as a holistic lifeworld 
(Rogers 1965).  
 
Crucially, this tradition firmly rejected methodological individualism and positivist 
epistemology, suggesting that people can reach their potential and find meaningful goals 
only within social relations (Rogers 1962). Its view of human nature was thus deeply 
relational, and correspondingly more historicist and political. Since people could only 
fulfil themselves within the historical social institutions they participated in and which 
gave their life meaning, these institutions must be changed if a sane and free life is to be 
made possible for the majority of people (Fromm 2002 [1956]). This was especially 
emphasised by Fromm’s work in his connection with the Frankfurt School and figures 
such as Marcuse and Adorno (Fromm 2001 [1942]).  
 
In the 1990s, however, positive psychology re-read humanist psychology as a precursor 
to new age anti-rationalism (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000) and set out to 
reconstruct the psychological study of flourishing on avowedly scientific grounds 
(Bohart and Greening 2001; Vázquez 2013). This gave rise to a more naturalistic and 
ahistorical approach to human nature and emotions. Abandoning humanist 
psychology’s opposition to behaviourism, these were now seen to originate in 
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objectively measurable brain signals in response to certain stimuli or drivers in the 
external world, which could be measured and compared between individuals.74 
Significantly, attempts were made to prove how these objective neural correlates 
corresponded to self-reports of happiness and wellbeing. If established, it was argued 
this could underwrite a quantitative, survey-based approach to measuring experienced 
utility at the population level. What had happened in this shift is that subject experience 
had been reconstituted as: a) cardinal; b) comparable between people; and c) measurable, 
since they had objective neural correlates which would be reflected in behavioural 
responses to surveys and self-assessments. This allowed it to be detached of the 
relational and political baggage of the earlier humanist tradition, and marketed as an 
individual property (Becker and Marecek 2008) which could be maximised by utilising a 
body of applied psychological knowledge about the lifestyle correlates and 
environmental drivers of personal wellbeing (Binkley 2011).  
 
Seligman’s dismissal of this earlier tradition as ‘unscientific’ merits attention, as it was 
crucial to the latter success of positive psychology and its embrace by business 
management, the self-help industry and economists during the 2000s (Davies 2015; 
Cederström and Spicer 2015).  It is also these changes which turned happiness into an 
object of interest to official statistical agencies and governments, as well as the contested 
embrace of subjective wellbeing by the movement to reform GDP-based measures of 
socio-economic performance over the course of the 2000s (Interview AS). Population-
wide data on subjective states seemed, in the wake of the positive psychology revolution, 
to be both possible and to contain important policy-relevant insights.  
 
Wellbeing and the Qualified Critique of Revealed Preference 
 
As we saw in chapter 2, the beyond GDP agenda has drawn heavily on the work of 
positive psychologists, and has precipitated the large-scale official collection of well-
being data. This data is increasingly used to inform a growing critique of the revealed 
preference underpinnings of orthodox CBA in public policy. These two trends are 
increasingly united: the generation of wellbeing data is posited as a potential solution to 
                                                 
74 This is not to imply that positive psychology doesn’t care about inter-personal relations. But these 
matter instrumentally to the individual, not as a more general structuring of the lifeworld in which 
individual action is oriented and becomes meaningful in the first place. 
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the issue of non-market valuation. One consequence of this is that the psychological 
underpinnings of positive psychology, and the political consequences of its reading of 
the humanist tradition, frame the terms in which this critique has been staked out in 
policymaking literature, as well as the substantive valuations which such methods 
generate.  
 
Critiques of revealed preference by the contemporary positive psychology movement 
can be situated within the wider behavioural revolution in economics (see also Sen 1977; 
Mullainathan and Thaler 2000; Kahneman 2003). This movement has in general sought 
to the challenge the model of the economic agent which underpins neoclassical analysis, 
by drawing upon psychological and neuroscientific evidence to demonstrate the 
numerous ways in which cognitive processes in practice diverge from the ideal of the 
rationalising, optimising homo economicus found in economic textbooks.  
 
Kahneman and others have demonstrated how human decision making is characterised 
by numerous biases, including loss aversion, framing effects, focussing effects and other 
heuristics. These mean that the rationality of economic decisions is heavily bounded and 
environmentally constrained. Behavioural economists offer a number of institutional 
fixes to these irrational cognitive processes, such as ‘nudging’ (Thaler and Sunstein 
2008): the ecological moulding of the ‘choice architecture’ (Thaler et al. 2012) in which 
decisions are taken, so as to yield more rational outcomes. This approach has become 
influential in policymaking, as teams of behavioural economists seeking to apply these 
insights to the problems of public policy designed have gained a prominent place at the 
heart of the executive in the UK, US and elsewhere.  
 
Behavioural economics seeks to challenge the rationality postulates found in 
conventional textbook microeconomics, while preserving the basic methodological 
individualism and ideal of rationality within which economic analysis is conducted. The 
influence of positive psychology in framing the critique of GDP runs along similar lines 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002; Dolan and White 2007). The behavioural revolution has opened 
the door for economists such as Layard and Dolan to use positive psychology to mount 
a critique of the revealed preference assumptions underpinning the dominance of GDP 
as a welfare metric (Dolan and Metcalf 2008; Dolan and Metcalfe 2012; O'Donnell et al. 
2014). Using subjective wellbeing data, positive psychologists have pointed out the 
various ways in which directly measured utility diverges from market outcomes or 
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incomes. These are posited as hedonic behavioural failures: individuals cannot be trusted 
to know what really makes them happy, and often pursue hedonically sub-optimal 
behaviour. Consequently, better data on actual hedonic outcomes can help individuals 
to make better decisions, and governments design policies which would help them to 
obtain better well-being outcomes (Frey and Gallus 2013b).75 
 
This has recently become an influential way of thinking about economic policy, 
particularly in the UK (Cabinet Office 2013). An all-party parliamentary group was 
founded to promote the use of wellbeing data in economic policymaking, publishing 
policy reports and organising regular events and workshops.76 The approach has gained 
the support of several influential think tanks – which notably also cut across party and 
ideological lines. The free market Legatum Institute, for instance, prepared a high profile 
report edited by Layard in 2014 (O'Donnell et al. 2014), while the left-leaning NEF has 
also been an influential norm entrepreneur in this field, publishing economic analysis 
with a wellbeing lens. It has also received buy-in from senior civil servants, most notably 
the former cabinet secretary Gus O’Donnell (ibid).  
 
More recently, this support led to the creation of a dedicated unit under the auspices of 
the Cabinet Office in 2015, with the mission to gather policy-relevant evidence on how 
wellbeing data can better be used to inform policy in several different areas, such as 
labour market policy (Interview DS).77 The rationale for this agency is to catalyse the 
uptake of wellbeing data into the work of policy departments by collecting evidence and 
data in one place, demonstrating its practical applicability to specific policy areas, actively 
disseminating it and promoting its use across government and legitimising the 
underlying scientific base (ibid).  
 
One interesting feature of these valuation methods is the explicit historical critique of 
economic psychology which its advocates claim for them. The methodological 
                                                 
75 An EU report suggests that: ‘individuals’ choices…will not necessarily maximise the utility of life as it 
is lived’, and that ‘The rationale for intervention lies in in either mis-prediction (individuals more work 
will be more pleasurable than it is, or that social activities won’t be as much fun as they are), or in some 
kind of externality’ (European Commission 2011, 10; 34). 
76 https://wellbeingeconomics.wordpress.com/.  
77 The ‘What Works Wellbeing Centre’ (slogan: ‘credible evidence for better decisions to improve lives’), 
https://www.whatworkswellbeing.org/.  
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documents and policy reports which discuss these methods clearly express the view that 
assessing wellbeing directly is a fundamental challenge to the psychological underpinning 
of economic theory (e.g. OECD 2013c; O'Donnell et al. 2014). This is worth discussing, 
as it suggests that wellbeing valuation represents a radical challenge to formalist 
economic views of human psychology. It is partly the strength of this claim which the 
remainder of the chapter assesses, thus helping to address the wider thesis concerns as 
to potential of the beyond GDP agenda to challenge the ‘market mentality’.  
 
Usually, in these accounts, a stylised history of the notion of utility in consumer choice 
theory is given. In early neoclassical work utility was originally understood as a cardinal 
property, which could and should be measured in order to provide scientific 
underpinnings for the marginalist analysis based on it (Moscati 2013). This is evidenced 
in the work of Jevons on the hedonic calculus, and in Edgeworth’s quest for a 
‘hedonometer’ (Backhouse 2002).78 With the later development of more formal and 
mathematical approaches to utility, happiness or utility was reconstituted as an ordinal 
property (Lewin 1996). In this model, all that was needed was the ability of people to 
rank and order different bundles of consumer goods and to demonstrate transitive 
preferences between them. This development was later formalised in the work of 
Samuelson (Samuelson 1938), who argued that it was not even required that these 
ordinal preferences be directly known. They would be revealed by the behavioural 
outcomes of market exchanges, and so market prices could be taken as a more or less 
perfect proxy of utility – now understood not as happiness in any psychological sense 
but simply as preference satisfaction (Samuelson 1948; Sen 1973). This in turn paved 
the way for the embrace of GDP as an accurate measure of the utility provided by an 
economy, and therefore its use as the central welfare metric in the post-war years. 
 
Happiness economists thus commonly present wellbeing valuation returning an original 
neoclassical project of measuring utility, but this time armed with scientific methods 
which can capture interpersonal psychological states (Layard 2011). Thus, it is argued 
such data can scientifically re-connect economic theory with its lost psychological 
foundations. In the process, it can also demonstrate how the behaviour orthodox 
                                                 
78 However, the standards of legitimate empirical investigation were rather different in the late 19th 
century, with internal introspection viewed as an adequate way of gathering knowledge as to internal 
psychological states; thus, interpersonal measurement was not viewed as a major problem (Hands 2009). 
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economic theory might assume to yield the greatest ‘utility’ – narrowly understood as 
behaviour which maximises command over monetary resources – can be counter-
productive in hedonic terms. Examples often given are the quest for status goods over 
experiences or leisure, which Layard and others argue have faster adaptation effects and 
yield less permanent hedonic benefits to the individual (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). 
What is interesting is where this narrative begins the psychological origins of economics: 
with the hedonic calculus of early marginalism. Left out of such accounts is the even 
older moral philosophy on which classical political economy was based. Writing before 
the utilitarians, Smith and others had grounded their account of human nature not upon 
cardinal utility but on a reflexive, socially embedded moral subject (Smith 2010 [1759]; 
Watson 2012). Therefore, the contemporary critique of revealed preference staked out 
by positive psychologists does not return to some foundational psychological starting 
point or year zero, but rather to a later reformulation – which was in any case often 
adopted gradually and in qualified terms. 
 
These distinctions may seem of purely academic interest, but they have important 
practical and political consequences for the sorts of valuations such methods will 
produce, and the specific recommendations which stem from the growing use of 
wellbeing measurement as a policy assessment tool. Most significantly, such assumptions 
result in a reification of the institutional and historical effects of market institutions. 
They normalise the contingent forms of status appraisal and hedonic outcomes 
associated with markets, through their transformation into apparently objective values. 
This fact can perhaps be best appreciated by studying the discourse surrounding the 
relationship between employment and wellbeing, and the policy recommendations that 
stem from this in wellbeing literature in beyond GDP documentation. The same finding 
is reiterated repeatedly in wellbeing economics literature and policy reports based upon 
it. A good summary of this evidence is found in a 2010 European Commission study on 
wellbeing data:  
 
Happiness research consistently finds a very large effect of unemployment, whether 
income is controlled for or not. In other words, most of the effect of unemployment on 
well-being is non-pecuniary, reflecting for example the loss of social contacts at work and 
self-esteem produced by working…[S]hort-term investment in policies to reduce 
unemployment may well yield substantial long-term wellbeing rewards (European 
Commission 2011, 34). 
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Or, elsewhere: 
 
The largest impact on in the field of work is of course unemployment – this has to be a 
priority…Although analyses were carried out for a range of factors – being married, 
volunteering, participation in social activities, and frequent face-to-face contact with 
family, friends and neighbours – none were significantly protective against the wellbeing 
impact of being unemployed. This finding in itself has important policy implications: if 
there is no way to temper the destructive impact of unemployment on well-being, then minimising 
unemployment must remain a priority in national and European employment policy (Eurofound 2013, 
59; 79 emphasis added). 
 
Here, the socialisation effects of the commodification of labour and its centrality to 
citizenship, status and social protection – which Polanyi identifies as historical features 
of market societies – are reified as trans-historical features of human nature in general. 
The consequence is policy recommendations which would act on these while retaining 
(and extending) the commodity fiction in relation to labour. When embedded into price 
through CBA calculations, this methodology thus precludes any wider strategy of de-
commodification as a rational or ‘cost-effective’ route to a more inclusive developmental 
model, and instead focusses on the extension of universal access to the historically 
specific type of work – wage labour – which predominates in market societies (Gorz 
1982, 1989). This has potentially debilitating effects on the ability of the beyond GDP 
agenda to inject a sense of political agency and imagination into the terms in which the 
discussion of economic governance and post-industrial citizenship can be framed. 
 
Instead, policy recommendations are likely to reflect the hedonic outcomes of the status 
regimes and socialization effects of market institutions. Elsewhere, for instance, similar 
conclusions are reached regarding the recipients of welfare benefits, with analogous 
political implications: 
 
While market-generated income (labour and property) is positively correlated with 
happiness, there is no such effect for the transfer component. The latter insignificant 
effect of transfer income is consistent with the positive consumption effect being 
cancelled out by a negative social stigma effect (European Commission 2011, 42). 
 
As is apparent from this, such data offers no basis or process through which to challenge 
the basis of this conclusion, again threatening to reify these institutional effects and 
embed them into policy thinking and the valuation of different political economic 
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strategies. This stems directly from the absence of a critical space in which preferences 
for such institutions can be reflected upon or challenged – in other words the 
perpetuation of a separation of economic and political aspects of human nature. 
 
Consequently, we see that in the methodological commitments of wellbeing 
measurement the behaviourist conception of human nature is retained, even while the 
ordinal and choice-based assumptions about utility are jettisoned. This makes wellbeing 
measurement unable to provide the fully socialised, rich conception of human nature 
which could underpin the politicisation of price-formation and the ethical overview of 
prices that Polanyi envisaged as essential to the emergence of a correspondingly 
'substantive' view of the place of the economy in society.   
 
To summarise: wellbeing valuation – grafted onto a modern critique of revealed 
preference buttressed by the behavioural revolution – is increasingly advocated as a 
means of addressing critiques of the focus on market growth in public policy within the 
wider umbrella of the beyond GDP agenda. It has found specific practical application 
as a solution to the problem of including non-market goods into CBA which appeared 
in the 1990s and 2000s. But such methods, while framed as a radical democratic critique 
of revealed preference, seek to delimit this critique by framing it within the basic 
language of neoclassical utility theory and the ‘formalist’, hedonic vision of human 
nature underpinning it. 
 
7.2 Non-Market Goods and the Limits to Formalism: Legitimacy 
Problems with Preference-Elicitation and Wellbeing Valuation  
 
This section analyses how the partial and differential challenge both preference-based 
and the newer wellbeing approaches (grounded in positive psychology) to escape homo 
economicus views of human nature have undermined their widespread adoption or 
acceptance. It is argued that they both represent partial departures from the maximising, 
choosing and behaviourist/automatic understanding of human nature which allows 
price formation to be severed from politics in modern economic theory. Preference-
elicitation and choice modelling methods (Bennett and Blamey 2001) retain the link 
between price and choice, by imposing artificial scarcity constrains in the absence of 
markets; however, in doing so, they are forced to jettison the notion of un-reflexive 
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behaviour: they offer ‘markets without behaviourism’. Wellbeing valuation has offered 
a corrective to this, based upon the idea that objective measures of happiness can be 
elicited free of the corrupting bias of political or ethical deliberation, and in the process 
jettison the necessity of linking price back to choice or scarcity (Ferreira and Moro 2010): 
they offer a form of ‘behaviourism without markets’.  
 
Thus, both these valuation methods problematise certain aspects of neoclassical homo 
economicus views of the link between human nature, utility and price formation. However, 
neither can affect the more fundamental shift to a socialised, historical-political 
understanding of human preferences and values envisaged by Polanyi (see chapter 3). 
Moreover, these partial commitments to the homo economicus paradigm – given that they 
continue to justify these through the equivalence of individual utility, value and price – 
means that their claims to scientific robustness are increasingly questioned. Their status 
within the wider justificatory discourse of scientific-naturalistic approaches to utility and 
value which they uphold therefore remains precarious.  
 
Preference-Based Approaches 
 
There are two main methodologies for assigning value for non-market phenomena 
developed within economic literature, which centre around the idea of preference-
satisfaction: revealed preference and contingent valuation (HMT 2011b, 2016).  
 
Revealed preference techniques use proxy prices found in actual markets – and the 
robust behavioural information they are held to contain – and attempt to isolate the 
effects of various non-market phenomena on these prices. A first example is the ‘travel 
cost’ method, whereby willingness to pay for a non-exchange good is inferred by data 
on the transport costs incurred to travel to a particular site or attraction – for instance, 
how many people travel to a national park per year for the purpose of recreation, from 
how far, and at what cost (HMT 2011b, 10). A second example is ‘hedonic pricing’, 
where effects of environmental or social phenomena on house prices are assessed 
through statistical regression techniques. For instance, the effect of living next to a large 
park or a clean river can be inferred by comparing the prices of similar houses which are 
near or far away from these features (ibid). These methods explicitly retain the revealed 
preference assumptions on which the use of GDP in CBA is based – in fact, in many 
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ways they extend claims about the informational content that market prices can contain 
over other means of eliciting values, holding these as superior even in the absence of 
markets for a certain good. However, these techniques are infrequently used as they are 
deemed applicable only to very specific phenomena.  
 
CV represents a more serious challenge to the behavioural assumptions underpinning 
orthodox consumer choice theory. This is because CV methods seek to simulate 
hypothetical and artificial markets in the absence of actual market behaviour from which 
utility might be inferred, generally using questionnaires to directly elicit preferences for 
bundles of goods which are not exchanged (Alpizar et al. 2003). This is not a monolithic 
set of techniques, however: there are many different ways of conducting contingent 
valuation, intended to elicit different sorts of results (O’Brien 2010). For instance, one 
may phrase questions in terms of ‘willingness-to-pay’ for the production or maintenance 
of a positive good, or ‘willingness-to-accept’ the loss or destruction of the good. 
Questions may be asked in a more open-ended way, by simply asking respondents to 
assign a price to these goods. But much more commonly, scarcity is enforced through 
methodological designs which necessitate choosing between different bundles of goods, 
or impose budgetary constraints through ‘bidding game, payment card, [and] 
dichotomous choice elicitation formats’ (HMT 2011b, 11).  
 
One interesting feature of these methods is the paradoxical way in which they interact 
with the assumptions underpinning revealed preference theory as outlined by Samuelson 
(1948). In some respects, these techniques represent an effort to salvage basic 
assumptions of this theory in a context in which they appear to be invalid. In particular, 
all these techniques are grounded in the formalist notion that choices made between 
alternative use of resources under conditions of scarcity represent the best means of 
getting at the utility a good represents for an individual (Polanyi 1977, 19-25). On the 
other hand, in trying to extend this notion of choice of use between fungible and scarce 
resources to goods for which monetary exchange is absent, such methods are forced to 
introduce these artificially; and since the techniques for doing this cannot simulate the 
disposal of actual private property, they introduce a problematic element of reflexivity 
into the valuation process.  
 
This contradictory interaction with consumer theory is the basis of both the success and 
continued criticism of contingent valuation. It underpinned the embrace of such 
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methods by governments – starting with the NOAA Panel headed by Arrow, and 
subsequently the addition of contingent valuation into official CBA guidance by 
governments from the late 1990s (O’Brien 2010). For these could claim to be based on 
sound economic principles and rational choice methodology. They therefore appeared 
to represent a robust economic method for pricing the problematic constellation of 
goods which had appeared as an increasingly visible problem.  
 
However, the fact that these methods allow scope for individual reflection and 
consideration, and that they therefore did not represent ‘real’ behavioural responses to 
price stimuli, remains the major threat to their legitimacy on the same grounds. For 
instance, the Panel worried that: 
 
Respondents in CV surveys may actually be expressing feelings about public spiritedness 
or the "warm glow" of giving, rather than actual willingness to pay for the program in 
question (Arrow et al. 1993, 10). 
 
The way in which this problem is approached methodologically are interesting – most 
of these revolve around the necessity of ‘external validation’ of such results by 
comparing to some form of behaviour that reflects assumptions about scarcity and 
choice. They thus accepted the force of the criticism that in willingness-to-pay studies 
‘respondents give answers that are inconsistent with the tenets of rational choice’ (ibid, 
5), but argued: 
 
One way to evade this difficulty, at least partially, is to construct experiments in which an 
artificial opportunity is created to pay for environmental goods. The goods in question 
can perfectly well involve passive use (ibid, 7). 
 
Thus, confronted with having to contribute actual money towards the goods evaluated 
hypothetically, the results of CV studies could be adjusted for the problematic tendency 
for people to ‘overstate "real" willingness to pay’ (ibid, 8). These could alternatively be 
validated by using the results of similar exercises for goods which are traded in markets 
– the panel cited studies done on willingness-to-pay for strawberries. 
 
These techniques therefore represent an attempt to solve the problem of non-market 
goods within the paradigm of consumer choice theory, by artificially extending it. 
However, this has been only partially successful. The basic tenets of revealed preference 
theory seem unable to survive in the absence of market institutions – for this was the 
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basis on which the theory was developed in the first place. Such methods uphold choice 
theoretical conception of utility as something unmeasurable, and that can only be 
grasped through choices made between scarce alternatives. They thus reproduce and 
naturalise an understanding of economics as the study of choice and scarcity (Robbins 
2008 [1934]), and the market as the ultimate arbiter of ‘real’ value through its role as the 
mechanism which encodes information about these preferences into prices. They remain 
predicated on a choosing subject, individual utility functions (even where dealing with 
non-use goods which are often by their nature public), the scarcity postulate, and 
methodological individualism. However, in breaking the link to behaviourism and 
injecting conscious, deliberative behaviour, they seem simultaneously inconsistent with 
the psychological commitments on which revealed preference is based. This is precisely 
the source of their failure to gain widespread acceptance from economists who embrace 
these commitments as items of disciplinary faith. 
 
Subjective Wellbeing Valuation 
 
Valuation of non-market goods based upon subjective wellbeing data has emerged more 
recently. As previously discussed, advocates have portrayed it as a more radical challenge 
to the ordinal and behavioural conception of utility which underpins revealed preference 
understandings of consumer choice and surplus. This claim is grounded on the notion 
that subjective wellbeing measurements can directly quantify experienced mental states, 
and thus avoid the assumptions which underpin ordinal, preference-based notions of 
utility (O'Donnell et al. 2014, 21-25). Subjective wellbeing valuation is presented as a 
mentalist and cardinal approach to utility, replacing the obsolete behaviourist and ordinal 
conception. Consequently, such methods escape the need to recreate the choice-based 
conditions of market exchange when valuing goods in the absence of market prices: 
simply, the only requirement is to directly assess the change in the mental states of 
individuals exposed to such goods, and to compare this with those produced by 
additional income (DCMS 2014).  
 
It is important to firstly note that the embrace of mentalism is not such a challenge to 
the foundations of consumer choice theory as perhaps indicated. As Hands has 
demonstrated, proponents of the ordinal revolution – such as Robbins – did not 
abandon the notion that utility must have hedonic psychological underpinnings (Hands 
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2009). Hence the break is not as sharp as often imagined – economics did not abandon 
psychology, but rather adopted a more critical attitude to the idea of mental states could 
be empirically studied through the sorts of introspection considered valid by neoclassical 
economists in the late nineteenth century.  
 
More fundamentally, if we analyse the official methodological literature on the 
measurement of subjective wellbeing, it becomes obvious that these claims to mentalism 
(in opposition to the behaviourism of revealed preference) at the ontological level have 
not translated into any wider embrace of a fully historicised or reflexive view of the 
economic subject, which Polanyi saw as essential to overcoming formalist ideas about 
human nature (see chapter 3). While this literature does accept empirically observed 
mental states, rather than preferences or market choices, as the source of value, there is 
no rich conception of preference formation or of the institutional and historical conditions 
which generate such hedonic outcomes (see Watson 2005). Their claims to scientific 
validity and informational content, in the absence of the scarcity conditions of market 
exchange, rest upon the elicitation of un-reflexive, automatic responses which will reflect 
objective hedonic states and can therefore form the basis of valuations. There are several 
senses in which this becomes clear. 
 
Firstly, mental states are frequently presented as an underlying pre-social property within 
the beyond GDP literature on wellbeing measurement. This precludes an understanding 
of preferences as formed and changed within historically specific economic institutions. 
An EU report on the application of wellbeing policy tellingly fretted that: 
 
Subjective wellbeing answers may be driven by cultural norms and “moral visions” may 
constrain individuals’ feasible answers. Thus measures may only reflect subjective 
wellbeing within a certain range (European Commission 2011, 14). 
 
Mental states are here posited as objective properties and the purpose of measurement 
techniques is understood as editing out the specific social and cultural conditions which 
inform these, often in quite explicit terms. A Eurofound report worried: ‘do these results 
represent genuine differences in the patterns of various aspects of wellbeing, or are they 
cultural biases?’ (Eurofound 2013, 26). Culture is here seen as an extraneous polluting 
influence, distorting the measurement of real (i.e. instinctual) emotions.  
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The purpose of valuation methods is consequently understood to be eliciting such 
emotions from the individual as accurately and objectively as possible: ‘with sound 
questionnaire design, bias due to priming and context effects can be significantly 
reduced’ (O'Donnell et al. 2014, 36). Methodological techniques deployed to edit out 
these polluting ‘moral visions’, which could detract from a true appreciation of pre-social 
mental experiences and thus distort valuations based upon them, include: question 
sequencing or randomisation, repeating surveys constantly, carefully standardising the 
impression given in the words used in questions across languages, and capturing 
concepts by using multiple survey items and aggregating the scores rather than asking a 
single question. These methods are reflective of what Gadamer identified as the 
‘prejudice against prejudice’ (Gadamer 2013 [1975], 283) in post-Enlightenment thinking 
more generally. 
 
Secondly, this underpins a marked suspicion of conscious reflection or deliberation, and 
a frequent lapse back into behaviouristic conceptions of human nature – at the 
methodological level if not as an ontological commitment. Mental states and hedonic 
outcomes are seen to occur mechanically as response to different external 'drivers' 
combined with an identifiable genetic component (sometimes even assigned an exact 
percentage) – and are also themselves drivers of predictable and observable patterns of 
behaviour (Van Hoorn 2018).  The European Commission observes that: 
 
Perhaps the evidence that is most persuasive to economists [sic] is that respondents seem 
to act on what they say, i.e. they behave as if they were maximising their subjective 
wellbeing. Many panel data studies have found that SWB at time T predicts future 
behaviour, in that people discontinue activities associated with low levels of 
wellbeing…[L]abour market studies have shown that job satisfaction is a strong predictor 
of job quits (European Commission 2011, 16). 
 
Great pains have consequently been taken to validate subjective wellbeing data either in 
relation to ‘objective’ physical outcomes such as neurological processes, blood pressure 
readings or facial expressions and other supposedly universal and transcultural external 
features.79 For instance the EU report, in a discussion of the validity of wellbeing data, 
reassures the sceptical reader that: 
 
                                                 
79 For a critique see Marsh et al. (2003). 
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People’s wellbeing scores can be examined in relation to various physiological and 
neurological phenomena. It is known that there is a strong positive correlation between 
emotional expressions like smiling and frowning, and answers to wellbeing questions. A 
recent literature has looked at the relationships between positive and mental states, on 
the one hand, and physical measures of brain activity, in particular pre-frontal brain 
asymmetry…more recently [this] has been explored using techniques to measure localised 
brain activity, such as electrodes on the scalp in Electro-encephalography or scanner in 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (European Commission 2011, 15). 
 
This is also confirmed by interviewees as crucial to establishing their legitimacy in 
policymaking. A senior statistician working in the OECD’s statistical directorate 
explained that, to better disseminate the wellbeing paradigm, they were actively seeking 
to draw upon forms of research which could penetrate past moral and ethical norms to 
people’s supposedly more real, instinctive feelings – to: 
 
Essentially try to elicit prejudices. It's not socially acceptable to say on a survey “I think 
the government is corrupt”, or “I distrust people of this race” … Where there's a strong 
social norm pushing you to respond to a survey in a certain way, are there other 
techniques that enable you to get under the surface of that? … So, it's not requiring 
somebody to give a scale of one to ten, it's actually about things that you're not under 
conscious control of…I think partly it comes down to this sense that to understand what’s 
going on you have to look at behaviours rather than just attitudes. So it comes back to 
the old kind of classical economics, in the sense that rather than trying to capture utility 
we’re going to see how people spend money, because of course that's going to – so I 
think it is partly tapping into still that traditional mind-set, of “you can't trust what people 
say, we want to see how they behave”, and I think big data is also part of this. You know, 
“tracking people’s mobile phone habits is more reliable than just asking them what's 
important.” (Interview CE). 
 
As we can see, both in the methodological literature and in the legitimation strategies of 
those working to promote the beyond GDP more widely in governance thinking, the 
implicitly behaviourist (though ostensibly ‘mentalist’) notion of utility which such 
methods make use of telescopes critical space in which social and moral questioning of 
institutions, values and preferences can take place. This works to ground the scientific 
credentials of wellbeing valuation approaches for economists committed to the utility 
paradigm as a way of thinking about value and its relationship to price. 
 
It must be stressed, however, that the very fact that wellbeing valuation attempts to 
ground its claims to robustness and validity through appeals to behaviourist and 
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hedonistic conception of human psychology is also the source of their continued 
marginality and lack of widespread adoption. Interestingly, in interviews statisticians 
themselves seemed somewhat bashful when pressed about the need to justify wellbeing 
data in scientistic and behaviourist terms as a route to uncovering an objective standard 
of utility. Despite the talk of neural and physiological correlates and experimental 
calibration, those interviewed highlighted were often uneasy with naturalistic and 
behaviourist bent of such research (Interview KS; Interview PA; Interview CE). Mostly, 
interviewees discursively diffuse this sense of cognitive dissonance by stressing the need 
for a plurality of approaches, ecumenical and interdisciplinary thinking, or stating for 
instance that there are ‘room for both approaches’ (Interview CE). 
 
Because they seek to return, not to the sort of socialised human nature that prevailed in 
the work of classical political economists such as Smith (2010 [1759]), but rather to the 
neoclassical view of utility as cardinal and measurable, they are hostage to all the 
immanent critiques which led to the emergence of ordinal, choice-theoretic revealed 
preference theory in the first place. For instance, the EU commissions’ review of the 
use of wellbeing in policy mentioned precisely the arguments of Arrow and other welfare 
economists as to the impossibility of inter-personal comparisons of utility and its 
cardinality, to suggest wellbeing can only ever be used in ad hoc contexts as a 
complement to other analysis. The report suggested that, consequently: 
 
The hope of the neo-Benthamites that use of subjective measures would provide the long 
sought after and elusive social welfare function…seems utopian, at least at this point.  
Identifying a single notion of social well-being is not, unfortunately, going to get 
significantly easier as a consequence of our ability to collect information on subjective 
wellbeing (European Commission 2011, 143). 
 
The UK’s Green Book expresses similar doubts, further illustrating the ambivalent status 
that wellbeing valuation continues to occupy in discussions of non-market goods: 
 
Because it is difficult to observe utility directly, it has traditionally been inferred by 
observing the choices that people make within related or hypothetical markets. More 
recently, economists have attempted to measure directly the impact of non-market goods 
on life satisfaction…[but] subjective wellbeing measurement remains an evolving 
methodology and existing valuations are not sufficiently accepted as robust enough for 
use in Social CBA (HMT 2016, 57). 
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Thus, in official guidance documents, the use of wellbeing as a monetisation technique 
is far from unqualified and remains marginal due to doubts about the direct 
measurement and cardinality of utility, echoing welfare economists in the mid-20th 
century.80   
 
Both techniques discussed in this section rely upon a notion of value as something 
discovered through gaining objective knowledge of the utility that goods render. In 
preference-based models, this is seen to require market-like choices and scarcity 
conditions, which must be simulated in the absence of markets. In wellbeing approaches, 
this is seen as measured directly through surveys and compared to the utility provided 
my monetary income. Neither of these offers a route to the more political, social or 
historical understanding of price formation which, as discussed in chapter 3, Polanyi saw 
as crucial to gaining the sort of social ‘oversight’ which can inform ethical action in 
complex market societies. Moreover, both techniques are facing legitimacy problems 
and limitations, stemming from this partial and incomplete exit from the formalist homo 
economicus paradigm of human nature and its connection to value and price. 
 
7.3 Substantivism and Non-Market Valuation: Multi-Criteria Analysis 
and the Politics of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis  
  
The limitations of preference-based and wellbeing valuation methods have created space 
for a more fundamental shift in thinking about value beyond markets. This section 
explores the rise of alternative valuation methods that have been emerging in recent 
years, partly in response to the doubts outlined above and the precariousness of their 
claims to scientific credibility. In particular, it examines the rise of Multi-Criteria Analysis 
(MCA) methods, using a case study of their development and use within UK 
government departments in recent years. I firstly review the development of these 
methods, arguing that, in jettisoning both the choice theoretic assumptions on which 
orthodox market analysis is predicated and the behavioural view of utility naturalised in 
                                                 
80 Another limitation which hinders the use of wellbeing valuation for this purpose is that, in breaking 
with the possibility of deliberation and choice which characterises preference-based approaches, they are 
by their very nature unable to offer valuations of non-use or existence goods, which were – as we saw in 
section 1 – fundamental to the original formulation of the problem of non-market goods in cost-benefit 
analysis in the first place. 
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wellbeing data, they offer a more ‘substantive’ view of non-market price formation. The 
use of MCA techniques offers a more radical escape from homo economicus understandings 
of human psychology and its relationship to price than the methods discussed in the 
previous sections, as they open space for the critical reflection on preferences as a 
historical social process. However, these prospects are hindered by the epistemic politics 
prevailing in UK government. The status of non-market goods in the economic analysis 
of public policy remains ambiguous and contested. 
 
Multi-criteria Analysis: A Substantive Alternative to Wellbeing Valuation 
 
A consequence of the limitations of both central methodological approaches to 
monetising non-market goods is an increasing acceptance that many incommensurable 
factors weigh upon any policy decision. There are two responses to this problem – 
firstly, monetary figures could themselves be arrived at via a deliberative process that 
takes all these various forms of evidence into account; alternatively, the goal of 
monetisation could itself be abandoned and decisions made via assigning weights to 
different objectives and incommensurable forms of (quantitative or qualitative) evidence 
which might reflect these (DCLG 2009; DEFRA 2011). Such responses overcome the 
limitations of the approaches discussed above by fully abandoning the notion that value 
is something rooted in an objective standard of utility, either revealed by choices under 
scarcity conditions or measured directly using wellbeing surveys.  
 
The radical nature of the shift in thinking about value implied by such methods can be 
seen in the official documentation surrounding their development. Here I will 
concentrate on the exploration of such methods in the context of the UK government’s 
work on non-market valuation, and especially its Social Impacts Taskforce (SIT). The 
SIT was an inter-departmental body created following the 2010 a recommendation on 
sustainable development by the central research division – the Government Economic 
Service (GES) – that ‘social impact assessment should be more systematic and consistent 
across government’ (DEFRA/GES 2010, 60). It was co-ordinated by a secretariat from 
DEFRA (SIT 2011). This reflects that fact that, as discussed in section 1, environmental 
impacts and the valuation of ecosystem services is the area in which these problems have 
the longest history.  
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The SIT was set up specifically with the aim of creating a framework for UK central 
government departments to take diverse forms of non-market goods into account when 
assessing social and environmental policies. Its mandate was to translate the broader 
beyond GDP work on measuring national wellbeing, catalysed by the Stiglitz report, into 
the analysis of specific policies:  
 
To improve social cost-benefit analysis; to embed social impacts more firmly into 
government decision-making; and to interpret the policy implications of the aggregate 
measures of wellbeing being developed by the UK’s national statistician (SIT 2011, 1). 
 
This work is attracting increasing interest, due to several developments. As discussed in 
section 1, the methods used to value environmental effects are increasingly applied to 
social and cultural policy outcomes, as departments are under increasing pressure to 
demonstrate value for money in a context of fiscal austerity. Furthermore, even in the 
sphere of environmental policy the focus is increasingly placed on the cultural, social 
and recreational value of the natural environment (DEFRA/GES 2010). This is 
especially the case within the framework of the UK’s 20-year biodiversity strategy.  
 
The SIT engaged with HMT’s work on the preference-based and wellbeing approaches 
discussed above, but determined that these were insufficient. They therefore explored 
an MCA framework for approaching non-market goods in cost-benefit analysis. This 
refers generally to more deliberative modes of assessing diverse and incommensurable 
non-monetary impacts and considering them in the analysis of policy options. What 
becomes clear from reading the SIT’s work on MCA is the stark difference in 
philosophical outlook on the nature of value, compared with the techniques discussed 
in section 2 (DEFRA 2011). They start from the assumption that values may be 
fundamentally uncertain, that they are incommensurable, and that they cannot be 
determined through a technocratic process of modelling the objective, fungible units of 
utility that each supply. Nevertheless, MCA emphasises how these values remain as 
important in evaluating a decision as market factors.  
 
Consequently, they embrace an explicitly political, social and deliberative approach to 
establishing the weight and value that different outcomes should be given. While the 
language of inaccuracy and bias is occasionally mobilised – ‘the manual acknowledges 
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that the subjective nature of this process including scoring can cause concern’ (DEFRA 
2011, 28) – SIT guidance nevertheless stresses how: 
 
Deliberation can help participants improve their understanding of the issues and evidence 
before assessing the performance of different options…participation and deliberation can 
therefore help produce a more complete and accurate valuation (ibid, 30). 
 
If we compare this to the language used in wellbeing methodological literature, where 
conscious thought and deliberation represent the distorting noise which biases accurate 
measurement of utility, it is clear we are working with an entirely different view of human 
nature, preferences and value. In these approaches the conscious world of politics 
becomes part of the valuation process itself – and value is understood in MCA as 
something to be created through deliberation and negotiation, rather than discovered 
through inferring objective utility. Furthermore, preferences in MCA are not considered 
to be pre-social or already formed ex nihilo in the minds of individual, of which value 
and price are reflections: they are held to be something developed in the process of 
valuation itself, through a confrontation of existing beliefs with diverse forms of 
evidence, expertise and the views of others (Wilson 2010). 
 
Referring to the discussion on Polanyi’s view of price as a site for the realisation of 
ethical and social ‘overview’ in market societies (Polanyi 2016 [1922] see chapter 3), we 
can therefore say that MCA techniques represent the possibility of a substantive solution 
to the dilemma of non-market goods. As Polanyi argued, price-formation was not in 
itself the problem – as money could serve diverse functions in society, including acting 
as a unit of account. The institutional and political conditions in which prices were 
arrived at were what was important – and particularly that this was seen as an explicitly 
normative and political process. MCA appears to offer the possibility that the price 
formation process itself is made into a sight of conscious negotiation of different forms 
of evidence and values between individuals – the very criteria Polanyi saw as essential 
for escaping from the formalist view of utility and value. Rather than stemming from an 
ideological position, however, these techniques are gaining ground mainly due to the 
practical failure of methods working within the formalist, ahistorical understanding of 
human psychology to adequately deal with non-market phenomena (Spangenberg and 
Settele 2010). 
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MCA in fact encompasses two central approaches, which themselves contain a diverse 
array of different variants (DCLG 2009). These are both interested in reaching decisions 
on issues whose impact is likely to be complicated and encompass many market and 
non-market effects, but approach this problem in different ways. The first method is to 
achieve this by weighing different outcomes or goals, with no attempt made to reduce 
these to a single commensurable unit (price of otherwise). This is achieved via the setting 
of weights for metrics representing these outcomes, assigning a relative importance, and 
either trying to predict the impact on these (if performing a ex ante appraisal of policy 
options) or collating evidence of actual effects (if performing an ex post evaluation of a 
policy’s actual impact). Deliberation can take place in the selection of the goals 
themselves, or the type of evidence to be used and weights assigned (DEFRA 2011; 
Kenter et al. 2016). The second method produces monetary values for these phenomena; 
however, it does so via an open process of discussion and debate. Within this set of 
methods, there is a further distinction between processes designed to elicit individual 
values as a result of the deliberative process and then aggregate these to reach an overall 
figure, and those which perform the valuation as a collective process (ibid).  
 
Assessing the challenge of these various methods to the formalist view of the economy 
is a complicated issue. The first instinct of many scholars sympathetic to Polanyian ideas 
might be to celebrate the refusal of non-monetary weighting methods to reduce the 
complexity of social and economic life to a single monetary figure, highlighting their 
uniqueness and incommensurability (Aldred 2006; Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez 
2011). This tends to be the reflex critical position on the whole question of monetisation 
– as discussed more thoroughly in chapter 7. However, this position itself risks 
reproducing the fallacy of assuming money and price to always be a market or exchange 
phenomena. It is on this basis that we fear monetisation, as it contains the threat of 
rendering uniquely precious or irreplaceable goods appear as fungible, tradeable and 
subject to the whims of market exchange.  
 
However, as was shown in chapter 3 the Polanyian position on accounting values is 
more complicated than this suggests. His interventions into the socialist calculation 
debate show a thinker that sees price formation as an essential site of political deliberation 
over what is valuable to us, that can provide us with the basis for a socialist accounting 
that can reveal to us ‘what we must pay for our ideals’ (Polanyi 2016 [1922], 389). This 
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suggests that in fact the second of these methods, which seeks to monetise through 
deliberative methods, is closer to the Polanyian ideal. Assigning a price to things gives 
them a weight that can enter economic calculation on equal terms as market goods. 
Furthermore, Polanyi’s functionalist notion of how the price formation process might 
work would tend to suggest that the individual formation of prices – either by individuals 
in their different roles in the relation to the good or issue in question, or collectively by 
distinct interest groups – and their confrontation might be closer to the system he had 
in mind, which he took from Cole’s guild socialism (Cole 1920). 
 
This is not to imply that MCA is a single magic bullet towards a substantive and enriched 
view of valuation and human nature. It has been subjected to various criticisms, which 
largely focus around the time and expense needed to conduct MCA and deliberative 
exercises, and also the way in which stakeholders are identified and the power this may 
hand to special interest groups in the process of deciding policy decisions (Dobes and 
Bennett 2009). What these criticisms highlight, however, is not so much inherent 
epistemic flaws in the MCA approach, but rather the radical implications of thinking 
about value and price in this way. Democratic and participatory institutions would 
indeed need substantial reform for MCA to become in any way mainstream business-
as-usual (Bunse et al. 2015; Bartkowski and Lienhoop 2018). In this respect, there is 
much fruitful work to be done on the connection between deliberative democratic 
theory and the problem of non-market valuation– as hinted at by experiments with 
citizen juries to inform valuations (DEFRA, 2011, p. 76).  
 
What the emergence of MCA and the failure of wellbeing approaches show, however, 
is that the logic implicit in valuing non-market goods implies a more fundamental shift 
in thinking about the relationship between human nature, value and price than implied 
by preference-based valuation of wellbeing methods provide: it implies a radical shift to 
a political and historical understanding of value as a social process. Of course, these 
methods currently focus on decision making by the state. But they could foreshadow, 
and provide a catalyst for, the greater use of democratic mechanisms within firms as part 
of a broader democratisation of the economy (see e.g. Cole 1920; Yeoman 2014). 
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The Epistemic Politics of Social Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Even though the failure of subjective wellbeing and choice-based approaches to non-
market values has prised open space for the rise of MCA methods, there nevertheless 
remains resistance to this more fundamental – if philosophically consistent – approach 
to managing non-market goods. One worry is simply that these will prove a fad, and 
governments will ultimately lapse back into GDP-centric traditional CBA. However, it 
appears that the genie is out of the bottle – especially given the ever more pressing need 
for analytical tools which can comprehend and confront the ecological and 
environmental challenges faced by contemporary societies, and the growing popular 
awareness of these issues.  Nevertheless, it has far from been the case that these methods 
have simply displaced or overturned those discussed above. What is in fact emerging is 
a complex valuation ecosystem in which the ‘formalist’ approaches discussed in section 
2, that continue to rely on objective notions of value grounded in a utilitarian and 
hedonistic view of human nature, co-exist with the deliberative MCA approaches 
discussed above. This is resulting in an intricate political ecosystem around the subject 
of non-market goods, which plays out both institutionally – between different 
departments informed by different forms of expertise and policy concerns – and 
temporally, whereby different techniques are assigned specific functions in the 
policymaking cycle so as to diffuse potential conflict between them.  
 
Regarding the first of these, there is emerging a divide between hard economic 
departments and those with a greater prevalence of economic training and expertise 
within their staff, and those with social or ‘non-economic’ policy competencies and a 
greater diversity of training and expertise. The Treasury, for example, publishes the Green 
Book, which is the standard set of cross-government guidelines on cost-benefit analysis 
(HMT 2016). The Green Book has evolved over the years to include non-market goods, 
however the recent additions have focused on choice-based methods and, to a more 
limited extent, wellbeing (HMT 2011b). On the other hand, departments such as the 
DCLG and DMCS, concerned with ‘social’ policy, have been more open, firstly, to the 
non-monetised use of wellbeing, and more significantly to MCA (Interview SM; 
Interview, DS).  
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It is in this context that SIT was significant, as it brought together Government Social 
Research (GSR) with GES, and contained staff seconded from DWP and other social 
policy departments (Interview SM). This is not just a matter of the attitude of entire 
institutions, but the backgrounds of those within those departments. As a DEFRA staff 
member seconded to the SIT observed:  
 
[I]t’s not just Treasury. In my view its economists more broadly, economists in DEFRA 
too, many of them are not particularly keen, to be perfectly honest, on some of the MCA 
techniques. So I know that some of the economists who produced that supplementary 
guidance on SWB approaches – understandably, they very much favour the techniques 
that they were developing, and were not that keen on these wider MCA techniques 
(Interview SM). 
 
This is further complicated by the fact that departments with a greater natural science 
blend are often closer to economic ways of thinking about value (EAC 2014). It is thus 
significant that the use of non-market valuation techniques has moved increasingly 
beyond environmental policy contexts – where natural scientists (biologists, climate 
scientists etc.) form the majority of analysts – and diffused into social policy realms 
where more social scientific expertise exists. DEFRA plays an interesting position in 
this, sitting at the intersection of natural science, social science and economics – with 
neither enjoying an overwhelming majority (Interview, SM).  
 
These preferences cannot simply be ascribed to the neutral effects of divergent 
departmental mandates and competencies. Copious scholarship has outlined the 
privileged place that the Treasury plays in agenda-setting within the British state (Ingham 
1984; Burn 1999). Thus, the continued marginality of MCA within the Treasury is likely 
to be significant, despite its growing support within social policy departments (DEFRA 
2011; SIT 2011). Institutions which mediate between these two constituencies (such as 
DEFRA) and cross-government taskforces and agencies (such as the What Works 
Centre) are likely to be especially important in determining how the epistemic politics 
around non-market valuation plays out. It is likely to determine the extent to which 
MCA penetrates mainstream government thinking, and what functions and roles it is 
ascribed. The Green Book is an especially important institution in this regard (HMT 2016), 
and Treasury gatekeeping of this centralised guidance manual (and its approach towards 
MCA) may prove vital to its influence in coming years.  
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Another way in which the epistemic politics of non-market valuation is managed is 
temporally: by assigning discrete phases of the policymaking cycles at which each is 
permissible and legitimate. Centrally, this has involved a close shielding of economic 
monetisation techniques from deliberative methodologies at the policy appraisal and 
decision-making stage – where CBA has traditionally been used to determine the cost-
effectiveness and impact profile of competing policy options – while policy evaluation has 
proved more open to MCA methods. This is policed partly through the use of separate 
guidelines and processes for each of these phases: the Green Book (HMT 2016), 
concerning policy appraisal (although also discussing elements of the entire 
policymaking cycle), and the Magenta Book (HMT 2011a) which concerns the 
retrospective evaluation of policy decisions. Quoting the same DEFRA source: 
 
The Magenta Book is guidance on evaluation, whereas the Green Book is appraisal 
guidance. I think this is a big issue in government, and I don’t fully know the reason for 
this, but evaluation and some of the wider techniques that are used in evaluation – I don’t 
see why they can’t be used at appraisal stage, and vice versa; but as I say, for reasons that 
I don’t fully understand, government economists tend to lead at appraisal stage and social 
researchers and other disciplines tend to lead at evaluation stage. So what you have is the 
Magenta Book methods not really being used to the extent that they could be at appraisal 
stage (Interview SM). 
 
As this suggests, there is a temporal as well as institutional dimension to the way in which 
deliberative MCA methods are positioned and their role carefully prescribed – and this 
again is related explicitly by civil servants to differences in disciplinary training and 
epistemic hierarchies.  
 
An interesting aspect of this temporal diffusion of the challenge to economic analysis 
represented by the valuation of non-market goods is the way in which it relates to the 
core formalist definition of what economics is about, and the epistemic niche it has 
carved out for itself in governance. Following Robbins, economics is the science of 
choice between alternative uses of scarce resources (Robbins 2008 [1934]) – exactly what 
Polanyi criticised as an inexcusable narrowing of the subject field (Polanyi 1977, 19). 
The placement of the deliberative assessment of non-market impacts after the decision-
making over how to spend scarce money ensures that these techniques are placed away 
from the proper function of economic analysis, which is to decide upon the optimal 
allocation of scarce resources. MCA is allowed to exist in the overall policymaking cycle, 
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but only as a means to assess what the fuller ‘social’ impacts of a policy has in fact 
produced, after the point at which economics can safely step off the stage. ‘Politics’ and 
‘society’ come in at this stage, as this is where policymakers reflect on the broader value 
and desirability of an event or phenomena. These are not, however, permitted to 
impinge upon economic analysis which allocates fungible monetary resources ex ante. This 
part of the process should remain predicated upon un-reflexive behaviour. 
 
As this section has outlined, MCA has emerged as an alternative to choice-modelling 
and wellbeing approaches to non-market valuation. Its tolerance of political deliberation 
in the price formation process reflects a more truly ‘substantive’ understanding of 
human nature, and thus provide a valuable resource promoting a more socially and 
historically embedded sense of the economic subject. However, the epistemic and 
institutional lines of authority within the UK government policy process have helped to 
frame its incorporation into mainstream policy analysis in carefully circumscribed ways: 
institutionally, as penetrating only certain ‘social’ policy departments; and temporally, via 
a delimitation of its proper role within the policymaking cycle to the evaluation phase. 
 
Summary 
 
The beyond GDP agenda has created new demands for techniques which can monetise 
non-market outcomes and bring these values into economic analysis. The rise of positive 
psychology and the large-scale, standardised collection of wellbeing data has produced 
new valuation methodologies based on direct measurement of the utility generated by 
non-market phenomena. Theses techniques appear to offer the promise of a truly 
substantive conception of economy, through incorporating a diverse array of non-
market goods into the heart of economic analysis. Moreover, they are heralded by 
advocates as offering a radically democratic alternative to traditional GDP-based cost-
benefit analysis. In valuing goods independently of market exchange, these valuation 
techniques appear to offer an anti-economistic challenge to market-centric views of 
value and welfare. 
 
In this context, this chapter has analysed how fundamentally non-market valuation 
techniques challenge and re-work the homo economicus conception of human nature and 
which underpin Polanyi’s critique of formalist reasoning. It has argued that CV methods 
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continue to rely upon the notion of choice and scarcity which underpins revealed 
preference theory. Starting from a critique of revealed preference, wellbeing 
methodologies instead seek to directly measure utility experienced by individuals and 
correlate this with various non-market experiences and phenomena. However, in doing 
so they fall back upon an atomistic, behavioural and ahistorical conception of the subject 
and display the same hostility to conscious deliberation and thought that Polanyi saw as 
the basis of the exchange-centric understanding of value in complex societies. 
Consequently, they produce valuations that reflect the hedonic effects of existing 
economic institutions and socialisation regimes. They constitute a ‘formalist’ attempt to 
bring non-market goods into economic analysis, whereby value is decoupled from ‘price’ 
but without necessitating a wider shift to a historicised or sociologically rich conception 
of human nature. Moreover, as they work within a theoretical paradigm that links prices 
with objective utility (even if decoupling this from preference-satisfaction in markets), 
they have failed to establish themselves as credible or ‘robust’. 
 
Nevertheless, these developments offer promising political resources, in that they have 
prised open the relationship between markets and prices. As shown in the final section, 
the limitations of these valuation techniques are prompting the rise of deliberative 
approaches to valuation, such as multi-criteria analysis. Adopting a more political and 
conscious approach to price formation and the trade-offs between complicated, 
incommensurable forms of evidence, these offer a more fundamental challenge to the 
homo economicus paradigm and the notion of value and price it underpins. This is further 
evidence that we cannot simplistically assume that beyond GDP is necessarily leading to 
a ‘substantive’ vision of economy replacing the formalist view of market-based cost-
benefit analysis. Rather, a complex ecosystem is emerging over different valuation 
approaches which offer a differential challenge to the psychological commitments of 
formalism. The proper role of these methods in the economic analysis of public policy 
remains contested and ambiguous: at stake in these apparently technical methodological 
debates are fundamentally different conceptions of the economic subject and the 
relationship of politics to value.  
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8. Conclusion: Accounting against the Economy 
 
This thesis has developed a novel, empirically grounded assessment of the ideational 
politics surrounding beyond GDP reforms to global statistical systems. In doing so, it 
has advanced understandings of the changing relationship between national accounting 
practice and economic theory in the governance of contemporary affluent societies. It 
has shown how statistical agencies and national accountants have attempted to reconcile 
this measurement agenda with the theoretical view of the economy as a system of inter-
locking market transactions, which was developed by the UN SNA framework in the 
mid-20th century and was informed by the economic theory of the neoclassical synthesis. 
However, it has demonstrated how the practical demands of implementing these 
measurement reforms are leading accountants to qualify this market-centric vision of 
the economy in significant ways. It has explored how this is leading to an increasingly 
complicated relationship between accounting practice and the theoretical vision of the 
economy inherited from industrial society. Accountants and statisticians are discovering 
that moving beyond GDP involves more than challenging the priority placed upon 
particular objectives in policy-making – rather, it necessitates the problematisation of a 
whole way of thinking about ‘the economy’ that grew up with market society.  
 
These findings contribute to answering bigger questions about the changing role of 
economic expertise in the politics of affluent, post-industrial societies, and the role of 
accounting and measurement systems in mediating this. In doing so, they also advance 
prevailing understandings in the literature. As was shown in chapter 2, two central 
perspectives on this statistical agenda and its relationship to economic theory can be 
distinguished. The first (‘managerialism’) assumes that measuring non-market 
phenomena is, in itself, sufficient to overcome the growth paradigm, by adjusting the 
incentives placed on non-economic (social, political and environmental) dimensions of 
progress and development; the second (‘de-growth’) advocates a wider re-thinking of 
what the economy is, beyond its conflation with exchange relations, but assumes the 
translation of beyond GDP concepts into accounting frameworks necessarily neutralises 
its challenge to market-based understandings of the economy. Against this, I have shown 
the numerous practical and conceptual difficulties which statisticians and accountants 
face in reconciling beyond GDP reforms with market-centric understandings of the 
economy and human nature. The analysis presented thus makes a novel contribution to 
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understanding the precise nature of the challenge that moving beyond market growth 
might entail to the exchange-based conceptions of the economy and its place in human 
society. 
 
In this brief concluding chapter, I summarise the central theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the thesis, offer some reflections on the wider implications of these 
findings and suggest future directions for research into the relationship between 
statistical reform and economic theory in contemporary political economic governance. 
 
Problem, Question and Theoretical Approach 
 
In the introduction, the central research question of the thesis was posed: 
 
• How significant is the challenge posed by the beyond GDP agenda to market-centric 
understandings of the economy? 
 
In the second chapter, this problem was clarified through a review of historical critiques 
of GDP, the central planks of the accounting agenda that has emerged since the Stiglitz 
commission in 2009, and a review of existing literature on this agenda. It showed how 
the beyond GDP agenda has emerged as a prominent global movement, in response to 
widespread critiques of the political prominence of GDP and its limitations as a metric 
of welfare and development. These include initiatives to embed inequality into national 
accounting frameworks, to estimate the economic value of unpaid work, to measure the 
sustainability of current levels of growth and the human and natural capital stocks on 
which it is based, and to estimate accounting values for non-market goods.  
 
It was shown how these reforms pose a challenge to the constitution of ‘the economy’ 
as a discrete statistical object as constructed in national accounting systems. However, 
in the existing literature there have been no sustained empirical investigations of the 
tension between the implementation of these accounting reforms and the theoretical 
assumptions that underpin this representation of the economy in practice. Thus, the 
precise nature of the challenge to economic theory that is posed by this measurement 
agenda, and how this challenge is managed by statisticians and accountants, previously 
remained unexamined.  
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To develop an answer to this question, the third chapter outlined a novel theoretical 
approach to researching the impact of beyond GDP statistical reforms on the theoretical 
vision of the economy inherited from the industrial era. To do this, it drew upon the 
work of mid-20th century political economist Karl Polanyi. Polanyi provides a 
sophisticated account of how the idea of the economy, and thus economic growth, was 
bound up with the emergence of a mode of economic thinking that equated the 
economy with a self-regulating and autonomous system of markets. Moreover, he 
argued that, while this theoretical construct was a historical response to the contingent 
conditions of early industrial capitalism, it had pathological consequences for societies 
in their attempts to solve the various problems that the commodity treatment of people, 
nature and money produces.  
 
I thus interpreted Polanyi specifically as a critic of market-based thinking and ideology, 
emphasising this aspect of his work over the historical argument about the dis-
embedding of the market economy and the protective double movement over the course 
of the 18th and 19th centuries. Specifically, I introduced the key distinction Polanyi drew 
between ‘formalist’ approaches to analysing and understanding the economy – which 
reduce it to means-end calculations in response to scarcity within markets – and 
‘substantive’ understandings of the economy, which understand the economy in open-
ended terms, as the way in which the provision of wants is instituted and co-ordinated 
in different places and times. Polanyi’s critique of formalism, we saw, was based upon 
the way in which it forced societies to understand their economic and social problems 
through the procrustean straitjacket of the market, and thus impoverished their political 
imagination in finding institutional solutions. 
 
The normative implication of Polanyi’s work is that if this ‘market mentality’, a historical 
mode of thinking inherited from industrial civilisation, is retained in our efforts to re-
thinking progress beyond the market-based growth paradigm, this is likely to foreclose 
and condition the potential this movement offers for a substantive re-construction of 
economic policy and citizenship. Moreover, recovering a ‘substantive’ vision of the place 
of economy in society implies more than simply measuring non-market phenomena; it 
means challenging the conflation of exchange relations with the economy as a whole, 
and thus problematising the very idea of a distinctively ‘economic’ dimension to 
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progress. A further empirical implication of this perspective is that efforts to measure 
and understand non-market economic phenomena using the conceptual apparatus of 
exchange-based formalist economics are likely to encounter limitations.  
 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
The remainder of the thesis applied this framework to assess the scale of the challenges 
this agenda presents to the foundational epistemic and ontological assumptions of 
market-centric (‘formalist’) economic thought, exploring how these challenges have 
been managed during the methodological implementation of this agenda by national 
accountants and statisticians. The central argument was that attempts have been made 
to implement these measurement reforms by translating beyond GDP issues into 
conceptual terms and categories derived from the market-based view of economy; 
however, the nature of these phenomena (inequality, sustainability, social reproduction, 
non-market goods) means that persistent practical and methodological problems have 
been encountered in reconciling their accounting treatment with formalist theoretical 
constructs. 
 
In chapter 4, we saw how initiatives to embed inequality into national accounting have 
been driven by the failure of macroeconomic modelling to forecast the financial crisis, 
which derives in part from absence of ‘agent heterogeneity’ (or inequality) from standard 
DSGE models. This was related to the post-war project to ‘micro-found’ 
macroeconomics and thus provide a single, overarching theoretical description of the 
economy. Thus, the measurement agenda on inequality has been framed in relation to 
the formalist macroeconomic ontology of the national accounts: it has come to be 
understood as a matter of reconciling the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ statistical pictures of the 
economy so that distributional questions can be brought into macroeconomic analysis. 
However, as we saw, this agenda has in practice revealed how ‘the economy’ as 
experienced by households is not the same object as that described by national accounts 
frameworks. This is because the economic experiences of households overflow the 
market system observed by banks, corporations and governments. Hence, the practical 
and technical demands of measuring inequality have revealed the problematic 
ontological assumptions underpinning macroeconomics and have led to a recognition 
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of the essential heterogeneity, multiplicity and context-dependency of accounting 
concepts like ‘income’ or ‘wealth’.  
 
In chapter 5, we saw how national accountants have approached the issue of estimating 
the value of unpaid activity outside formal labour markets. We saw how, since the 
emergence of neoclassical value theory, there has been an anxiety about where properly 
‘economic’ activity stops and ‘leisure’ and ‘society’ begins. Specifically, modern 
accounting theory draws upon the third-party criterion, developed by Margaret Reid in 
the 1930s, to distinguish ‘economic’ from ‘non-economic’ activity. This project is 
‘formalist’ in that it conflates the economic with the realm of scarcity and exchange. 
Practically, however, we saw how operationalising this framework involves measuring 
non-market time in ways which allow comparison with wage rates in labour markets. 
This results in a number of conceptual paradoxes and technical problems, which have 
exposed the fundamentally different logics by which non-market modes of economic 
integration operate. The response to these problems has been a growing recognition by 
national accountants of both the economic significance of such activity, and the 
impossibility of establishing its value with reference to the labour market.  Consequently, 
a more heterogeneous and social sense of economic value is emerging in national 
accounting methodology, with moves to value the overall provisioning needs of society 
independently of ‘labour’ inputs. 
 
In chapter 6, we saw how the issue of sustainability measurement has been increasingly 
conceived of through the accounting concept of capital. Specifically, sustainability has 
come to mean the preservation of an extended stock of national capitals, including 
natural resources and knowledge. Drawing on the neoclassical conception of the 
accounting value of capital, rooted in the influential work of Irving Fisher, beyond GDP 
accounting methodologies have focussed on drawing a precarious distinction between 
the component of these assets which yield market revenues – which is considered 
‘economic’ and subject to robust monetary valuation – and the ‘non-economic’ 
components, which do not yield market income and are to be left outside of the 
accounting valuations. However, in attempting to construct these valuations accountants 
have had to confront the essential embeddedness of nature and knowledge in wider 
social and ecological processes. Isolating the economic aspects of ‘capital’ from its non-
economic dimensions has proved a treacherous endeavour in practice. In consequence, 
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there have been moves to decouple the monetary value of these resources from the 
market returns they yield, and to embrace the independent social function money plays 
as a pure unit of account.  
 
Finally, chapter 7 explored the cross-cutting issue of establishing monetary accounting 
values for goods which are not traded on markets. We saw how methods used to value 
such goods historically rely on artificially simulating market-like conditions with choice-
based methods (such as contingent valuation), or deriving their values through indirect 
effects on market prices. Newer methods draw on the generation of large-scale 
subjective wellbeing surveys, which have proliferated as part of the beyond GDP agenda. 
While these methods are presented as a radical democratic challenge to the revealed 
preference underpinning of orthodox consumer theory, I showed how subjective well-
being methods re-inscribe the asocial, individualistic and hedonic model of human 
nature on which post-neoclassical economics has been constructed and which was a key 
target for Polanyi’s critique of formalist reasoning. However, valuations based on 
wellbeing data have been widely critiqued for their unrealistic epistemological and 
psychological underpinnings. One consequence of this is that more political and 
deliberative approaches to non-market valuation are emerging, which reflect a more 
social and historical approach to value, and the possibility of establishing accounting 
values for goods independently of modelling their objective effects on ‘utility’.  
 
Thus, these case studies have all revealed how the beyond GDP agenda is exposing the 
practical and empirical limitations of both the macroeconomic ontological assumptions 
of formalist economic theory and its microeconomic underpinnings. Across these 
various issues, the agenda is problematising, destabilising and undermining key 
ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the ‘formalist’ conception of the 
economy. This is happening as statisticians and national accountants grapple with the 
practical implications of post-GDP concepts and the paradoxes which emerge from 
trying to frame them using the conceptual language of exchange. A more substantive 
accounting representation of the economy is therefore emerging despite attempts to plug 
beyond GDP reforms into the market-based vision of economy. In the practical process 
of implementing these reforms, statisticians are having to confront the problems of 
dealing with non-commodity aspects of economic development. In this process, 
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statisticians and accountants are increasingly discovering and reaching limits of market 
theory to comprehend these values.  
 
As has also been demonstrated in these case studies, however, this is far from a linear 
or straightforward process. These more substantive accounting descriptions of the 
economy are emerging partially, gradually, in incomplete or submerged ways. They often 
represent pragmatic solutions to the problems of comprehending these issues through 
the lens of market-based theoretical concepts, rather than a positive embrace of more 
plural or heterogeneous ways of representing economic relations.  The chapters have all 
revealed how what is emerging from these accounting reforms is thus a complex and 
fragmented accounting and valuation ecosystem, in which ‘formalist’ understandings of 
beyond GDP issues co-exist with more substantive renderings. Awareness of the 
epistemic politics of statistical reform is important, both to understanding the theoretical 
and political significance of this agenda and to using the valuations and measurements 
that it is yielding in a reflexive and politically sophisticated way.  
 
These findings allow us to provide a clear answer to the central research question: across 
these key measurement initiatives, the beyond GDP agenda is increasingly incompatible 
with market-centric economic theory. But this has not led to the simple displacement of 
this vision with a more substantive one, but rather a complex valuation landscape in 
which accommodations to market-based theory co-exist with more fully ‘substantive’ 
and open-ended accounting treatment of non-market economic phenomena. This 
growing tension between accounting practice and economic theory is likely to condition 
in important ways the politics of beyond GDP reform in the coming years. 
 
Wider Implications and Themes  
 
Beyond the immediate empirical and theoretical contributions of the thesis, the 
arguments touch on several wider themes relating to the place of economic theory in 
democratic life. These have been woven in throughout the substantive analysis. Here, I 
merely reflect on two which strike me as being of especial significance. The first 
concerns the sort of economic reasoning that could align more closely with the logic of 
beyond GDP accounting practice; the second concerns possible shifts in the relationship 
between democratic politics and accounting that is implicit in many of these reforms.  
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An important outcome of beyond GDP statistical reforms has been the emergence of a 
more plural and heterogeneous conception of many core accounting concepts (for 
instance, context-specific and hybrid definitions of income and wealth; or the rise of 
satellite accounts for the household sector which accept the economic value of these 
activities and their distinctiveness from values observed in the market sector). This 
recognition of heterogeneity and incommensurability of accounting values is at odds 
with core tenets of market-centric economic theory that considers monetary values as 
substitutable and rendered commensurate through the process of exchange. There are 
two main ways in which an economic theory, which has been built on a unitary notion 
of exchange values, might respond to these developments in accounting practice.  
 
Firstly, we could imagine a more circumscribed role for economic theory in economic 
policymaking and political deliberation. In this scenario, there would be a humbler 
recognition on the part of economists that the theoretical toolkit drawn upon describes 
only a small sub-species of the genus ‘economy’. Consequently, the idea of a discrete 
‘economic’ dimension of policymaking that can be neatly isolated from (say) social or 
environmental policy could be jettisoned, and economics as it has been traditionally 
understood (as the science of choice and exchange) could occupy a more circumscribed 
and clearly delimited place in discussions of political economic phenomena.  
 
Secondly, we could imagine the rise to greater prominence of forms of economic analysis 
that can better tolerate heterogeneity and incommensurability. These forms of reasoning 
would have to find theoretical tools which can accommodate the co-existence of values 
which are at once understood as ‘economic’, but which also cannot be reduced to 
commensurate and fungible exchange values. There are already numerous developments 
in economics which point in this direction – complexity economics is a prominent 
example (Colander et al. 2004; Holt et al. 2011), along with the greater prominence given 
to heterodox schools of thought in some degree courses (see Fisher et al. 2018). Such 
theoretical developments might gradually align the mainstream of the economics 
discipline more closely with the grain of changes in accounting and statistical practice, 
helping to ease the growing tensions between the two.  
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These two developments could bring economic reasoning back into closer alignment 
with emerging accounting representations of the economy: either mainstream economic 
theory could evolve so as to better tolerate the multiplicity and incommensurability of 
non-market values; or its authority to speak about economic issues might be qualified 
and relativized so that it is understood as relevant only to the abstract description of 
hypothetical markets rather the economy in its substantive sense. If neither of these 
tendencies emerge, a third possibility seems likely: this is that the authority of market-
based economic theory will prevail despite the developments in accounting practice 
outlined in the thesis, and the accounting agenda could supress the methodological 
tendencies that beyond GDP reforms have unleashed. This is a very possible outcome 
and will depend on the institutional and ideational dynamics which shape the agenda in 
future years. These changes may thus hint at bigger shifts in the role of economic analysis 
in the governance of post-industrial societies that deserve more attention and study. This 
would allow a better understanding of how similar challenges manifest themselves in 
other fields and practices, and the response of economists – both academic and ‘in the 
wild’ (Callon et al. 2002, 196) – to such shifts.  
  
Turning to the second point, another key theme of the beyond GDP agenda has been 
the recognition of the economic significance of phenomena that are not traded on 
markets. One response to this problem is to (conceptually and discursively) exclude 
these values from ‘the economy’ proper, and thus shore up the conflation of money and 
markets. A second response (see chapter 7 in particular) is to develop technocratic 
methods for modelling the objective utility that such goods render, and thus to compute 
accounting valuations for these goods. Against perspectives which seek to banish non-
monetary values as external to ‘the economy’ proper and those which seek to ground 
non-monetary values in the objective modelling of the utility they render, we can perhaps 
glimpse a third possible option latent in many of the reforms discussed in the thesis. 
This could be grounded in a more deliberative and political understanding of price 
formation itself, in which the negotiation of prices for various goods and resources is 
seen as a site for the active negotiation and reconciliation of incommensurable values.  
 
This points to the second theme that the thesis raises: the relationship between 
democratic politics and accounting systems. Generally, the liberal model of the role of 
accounting systems in democratic life is to provide an objective source of facts and 
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valuations which can mediate democratic debates. In this scenario, the compilation of 
accounting values (representing the private market sector) precedes the process of political 
deliberation about economic policy (which takes place in the public sphere), and is used 
to referee the claims of the various parties about the effectiveness of different economic 
policy settings. But many contemporary developments in accounting theory potentially 
open the prospect of a reversal of this relationship. In this model, statistical and 
accounting systems could be a taker of values negotiated through democratic 
deliberation and engagement. These valuations could then inform political analyses of 
the trade-offs between different policies or investment decisions.  
 
Of course, this would be dependent on a much wider transformation in economic 
citizenship which would embed deliberating and democratic structures into the 
economic system itself. While this currently seems a distant prospect, this highlights how 
the problem of monetary valuation in the absence of markets – that lies at the heart of 
many of the most interesting problems of the beyond GDP agenda – could fruitfully 
connect with theories of deliberative democracy to advance more participatory forms of 
economic citizenship. This intersection between theories of economic and deliberative 
democracy and the accounting and valuation issues raised by the beyond GDP agenda 
may well be one of the most fruitful theoretical lines of enquiry going forward. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
This thesis assessed the first decade of beyond GDP reforms – however, this is still an 
agenda in its infancy. In the process of conducting this research, it became clear that 
many of the most interesting developments in this field have yet to be fully 
operationalised, and yet are set to radically change the statistical representation of the 
economy constructed by statistical agencies. Further research efforts will be needed to 
understand these dynamics and map their significance for political economic 
governance. 
 
Firstly, much more work is needed to understand the challenge posed by the information 
economy and ‘big data’ on national accounting representations of the economy. There 
are two dimensions to this problem. The first is the substantive changes to economic 
institutions and working life brought about by the rise of information as a key factor of 
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production, and how these changes challenge established national accounting concepts 
(Bean 2016; OECD 2016). This was touched on in chapter 5, which explored the 
implications of the increasing blurring of work and life, and the decoupling of 
productivity from wage labour. However, these trends are set to continue with the rise 
of platform-mediated work, the sharing economy, and the continued shift to immaterial 
and information-based assets (ONS 2016a). 
 
Secondly, these changes more directly impact the data architecture from which the 
national accounts itself are constructed. Data sources such as business surveys 
increasingly seem outdated, and many strategy documents from statistical and 
accounting agencies emphasise the need to integrate transactional data sources and 
digital databases to supplement national accounts data sources (ESSC 2014a). However, 
this raises several key problems for the unity of the national accounts. For instance, 
bringing ever more data sources into the construction of the statistical picture of the 
economy brings with it the challenge of reconciling the disagreements and discrepancies 
between them (ESS 2015). Moreover, doing so raises questions about the reliability and 
epistemic authority of different forms of data, many of which were produced for private 
purposes. Resolving these issues will be vital to holding ‘the economy’ together as a 
statistical object in the coming years.  
 
Another way in which ongoing technological change is impacting upon statistical 
production and accounting is the growing use of Geospatial Information Systems. This 
was explored briefly in chapter 6, where the emergence of spatially localised 
representations of the value of ecosystem services was explored. However, ambitious 
plans for the further development of ecosystem service accounting in the EU and UK 
contexts both place a great deal of emphasis on expanded use of GIS, involving the 
spatial tagging of economic and environmental data and the disaggregation of economic 
and environmental data at different scales (Peterson and Gocheva 2015; European 
Commission 2016). This has the capacity to significantly alter the spatial representation 
of ‘the economy’ as an accounting object, embedding the abstract and de-territorialised 
vision of the national economic system constructed by the SNA in specific places. This 
re-territorialisation of accounting data has the capacity to inform new forms of political 
contestation and political economic mobilisation; it will require future research to 
 246 
 
understand the impact and significance of these changes to the data infrastructure of 
national accounting systems and how these interact with economic analysis.  
 
Finally, further research could explore the temporal politics of socio-economic statistics 
and national accounts production. As indicated in chapter 5, in relation to the problem 
of time-use data and the valuation of non-market services, a significant barrier to greater 
adoption of beyond GDP measures is often the time it takes to produce data on non-
market issues. This can rarely match the quarterly production timescale of national 
accounting data and GDP estimates. To address this, one prominent trend in statistical 
agencies is towards the greater use of virtual simulation (or ‘nowcasting’) of social 
indicators, using computer modelling technologies (European Commission 2014). This 
creates new temporal interactions between social and economic phenomena – for 
instance, it allows statistical agencies to produce estimates of changes in poverty or social 
deprivation at the same time as data is released on the performance of the market 
economy. But these technologies create a complex politics around the issue of the 
‘reliability’ and robustness of such models, as well as raising issues about the 
performativity of virtual representations of the social on policymaking and political 
discourse.  
 
The image of the economy as it has been understood by economic theory is becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain under the pressure of new statistical and accounting 
projects and an increasingly complex information and valuation ecosystem. Yet this 
understanding of the economy as a unitary system of markets remains the dominant 
theoretical paradigm through which economic issues are analysed and discussed and 
continues to exercise considerable authority over democratic debate. Exploring how this 
tension manifests itself in the years ahead, as technological changes further interfere with 
the constitution of the economy as a statistical object, represents a major research 
agenda, vital to understanding the changing influence of economic ideas in the 
governance of the global political economy. As this thesis suggests, economic theory is 
encountering emerging practical limits to re-making the contemporary world in its 
image. Whether economics or the world gives first will define how the burning questions 
of the 21st century – climate change, inequality, automation and welfare – are 
understood. Moreover, it will determine which political and ethical responses to these 
problems are possible to imagine. 
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Appendix I: List of Interviews 
 
Meeting Transcripts 
 
Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounting (EG DNA), 2016 Meeting, 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
Working Party on Financial Statistics (WPFS), 2016 Meeting, Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
Working Party on National Accounts (WPNA), 2016 Meeting, Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
 
Interviews 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Paul Allin, Office for National Statistics (National Wellbeing; Former Director) 
Richard Tonkin, Office for National Statistics (Economic Wellbeing; Head of Economy 
and Environment) 
Abi Self, Office for National Statistics (National Wellbeing) 
Damian Whittard, Office for National Statistics (National Accounts; Human Capital) 
Chris Payne, Office for National Statistics (Economic Wellbeing; Household Satellite 
Accounts) 
Dominic Webber, Office for National Statistics (Economic Wellbeing; Household Satellite 
Accounts) 
Rachel O’Brien, Office for National Statistics (Economic Wellbeing; Social Capital) 
Dawn Snape, What Works Centre for Wellbeing  
Simon Maxwell, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Environment 
Analysis Unit; Secondee to the Social Impacts Taskforce) 
Members of the Independent Review of UK Economic Statistics, HM Treasury 
(Anonymity Requested) 
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OECD 
 
Alex Hjizen, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Economics Directorate; 
Employment Quality) 
Carrie Exton, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics Directorate; 
Wellbeing Division) 
Kate Scrivens, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics Directorate; 
Wellbeing Division) 
Peter van de Ven, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics 
Directorate; Head of National Accounting Division) 
Jorrit Zwijnenburg, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics 
Directorate; National Accounting Division) 
Fabrice Murtin, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics Directorate; 
Inclusive Growth) 
Miguel Rodriguez, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Environment 
Directorate; Green Growth Indicators) 
Paul Schreyer, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Statistics Directorate; 
Deputy Head) 
Paulo Veneri, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Governance 
Directorate; Regional Development Policy) 
Jan Rielaender, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Development Centre; 
Policy Analyst) 
Carine Viac, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Development Centre; 
Policy Analyst) 
 
European Union 
 
Juha Honkilla, European Central Bank (Expert Group on Linking Micro and Macro 
Wealth Data; Household Finance and Consumption Network)  
Pierre LaMarche, Eurostat and INSEE (National Accounts; Income, Consumption and 
Wealth Inequalities) 
Nicola Masserelli, Eurostat (Europe 2020 Indicators and Sustainable Development 
Indicators; Team Leader) 
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Jeroen Jutte, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (Head of Unit; 
Employment and Social Aspects of the European Semester) 
Kornelia Kozovska, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
(Economic and Social Policy Analysis; Member of Social Protection Committee) 
Jon Hyde, Department of Work and Pensions (UK Representative to Eurostat Social 
Protection Committee Indicators Sub-Group) 
Francis Green, University College London (Consultant for European Commission on Job 
Quality Measurement) 
Christian Stolk, RAND Europe (Consultant for European Union on Wellbeing in the 
Workplace) 
Katrin Gasior, University of Exeter (Consultant for Nowcasting of Poverty Indicators for 
Eurostat) 
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Appendix II: Description of Research Methods 
 
Research Design and Case Selection 
 
The research design and methodology of the study was informed both by the nature of 
the problem and by the underlying theoretical and philosophical orientations adopted. 
The puzzle it is seeking to explain is the apparent incompatibility or the aspirations of 
beyond GDP reforms with market-based forms of economic expertise and analysis. The 
answer it develops is grounded in a historicised, institutional and performative 
understanding of economic knowledge, grounded in a constructivist reading of Polanyi. 
This pointed towards a research strategy that was qualitative, inductive and interpretivist 
(Silverman 2016).  
 
The data drawn upon was necessarily qualitative, in that the research was interested in 
understandings the technical and methodological practices through which this agenda 
has been operationalised. Furthermore, it was interested in understanding how these 
played out in the elite institutional environments of official statistical agencies. It was 
not interested in generating rigid causal explanations or generalizable laws. Therefore a 
large-N quantitative study involving survey data or similar would not have been 
appropriate to answering the sorts of questions being investigated (Marsh & Stoker 
2010, pp. 255-257). Therefore, in-depth interviews with a few key experts was chosen 
as a key source of information underpinning the thesis. The study was also inductive in 
the sense that it did not set out to test a series of theoretical propositions built up from 
pre-existing bodies of theory or first principles (Clift 2014, 286-314). Rather, it sought 
to investigate an empirical puzzle which seemed insufficiently well understood, in an 
open-minded way. The categories and concepts used emerged tentatively from the 
process of data analysis and collection, and were then reflexively tested against further 
findings. 
 
The data in the thesis is drawn from fieldwork at three sites: the OECD, the EU and 
the UK state. The primary focus was on the statistical organs of these institutions – the 
OECD’s statistics directorate; Eurostat; and the Office for National Statistics, and this 
was where most of the interviews were conducted. However, these bodies do not have 
exclusive ownership of the agenda and occasionally the links with other bodies and 
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departments were explored where this seemed particularly relevant. These cases were 
selected based on preparatory desk research, which flagged these up as particularly active 
and influential in shaping the implementation of the beyond GDP agenda after the 
Stiglitz report.  
 
These cases also provided a lens through which to compare the interaction and interplay 
between different levels of economic governance: the nation state, regional 
supranational governance, and international standard setting bodies such as the OECD. 
In practice, however, in the course of my research I have also been struck by how inter-
connected, mobile and transnational the statistical and national accounting community 
is – in many ways it forms a discrete ‘epistemic community’ within wider governance 
networks (Haas 1989; Adler and Haas 1992). Frequently, I encountered people who had 
worked at both the OECD and either Eurostat or the ONS, and had worked on many 
joint projects between the organisations. Furthermore, the OECD, as an international 
standard setting body, borrows or seconds staff and expertise from both the ONS and 
Eurostat/ECB, and members of these bodies sit on its various taskforces and working 
groups. Important documents were produced as collaborations between institutions – 
for instance the UNECE/Eurostat/OECD joint taskforce on measuring sustainable 
development. Therefore, while these case studies were conducted as separate bodies of 
research at discrete stages in the project, there were myriad points of overlap between 
them.  
 
Data Collection and Source Material 
 
These research orientations informed the data collection strategy pursued and the source 
material drawn upon to develop the central arguments. The sources on which the 
arguments in this thesis are based fall into three main categories: semi-structured 
interviews; documentary analysis of statistical reports, methodological literature and 
working papers; and attendance of statistical working parties and expert groups.  
 
Analysis of documentary sources was conducted prior to interviewing – to help guide 
the questions asked and identify points specifically relevant to the research question. 
These were identified through a desk-based literature search in the first year of the 
project, in which relevant documents were identified until saturation point was reached, 
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where different searches online and the following up of references within the documents 
themselves began to return few new documents. Sometimes, if additional more technical 
or internal documents were flagged up by interviewees or reports were released after the 
initial search, these were fed back into the documentary base. After working through 
these and filtering several out which had limited relevance, a database of 140 
documentary sources were analysed. Notes were taken and quotes recorded from these 
documents. These were grouped into themes in the same way as the interviews.  
 
Overall, 30 semi-structured interviews were conducted (Baker et al. 2012). An initial long 
list of targets were identified using the document authorship and online searches. From 
this list, an appropriate number of initial targets were contacted via an introductory email 
detailing the project. The interviewees contacted were selected to provide a variety of 
seniority and job role and even distribution between different internal units and divisions 
of these agencies. A balance of expertise and disciplinary background was sought 
between economists, statisticians, national accountants and other social scientists. In 
practice, there was a fairly high level of non-response to introductory emails, and so not 
all targets selected could be interviewed. Snowball sampling played an important role in 
the selection of interviewees after the initial round had been conducted – as is necessary 
when studying a relatively discrete yet densely connected institutional network, such as 
the national accounting community (Noy 2008). Interviews were divided roughly equally 
between those conducted in person and those conducted via phone, but this heavily 
skewed between the cases: all OECD interviews were conducted in person during 
fieldwork, whereas 9 of the 10 EU interviews were conducted via telephone. All 
interviews were recorded in full on a Dictaphone, with the interviewee’s consent, and 
later transcribed verbatim.  
 
I deliberately resist any claim that the methodology adopted aims at producing interview 
data that is ‘representative’ of some wider totality or provides an unbiased window onto 
underlying organisational ‘reality’ or the internal motives and beliefs of interviewees 
(Roulston 2010). Indeed, the explicit aim was not in some way to edit context out, to 
reach generalizable conclusions, but rather to understand and recreate the specific 
dynamics of this reform agenda as it has been implemented, and how these are narrated 
by those tasked with enacting them (Halfpenny 1979, 802-803). I have therefore adopted 
what Alvesson has described as a ‘reflexive pragmatism’ (Alvesson 2003, 14; 25); in 
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relation to interviews, in which interviewing is understood as ‘a complex social 
event…existing in a field of tensions between different logics’ (ibid). This necessitates 
‘conscious and consistent efforts to view the subject matter from different angles and 
avoid or strongly a priori privilege a single, favoured angle and vocabulary’. It also 
involves ‘balancing endless reflexivity with a sense of direction and purpose’, prioritising 
‘epistemological awareness rather than philosophical rigour’ (ibid). 
 
All the interviews followed a similar structure and sequence. Firstly, which factors 
participants understood to be driving the moves to develop and implement the various 
beyond GDP reforms under discussion – where the pressure for reform originated from, 
who was felt to be pushing for them and for what reasons, how was their purpose and 
necessity understood. Secondly, the main methodological, technical and conceptual 
issues confronted, and various tensions or challenges raised by their implementation. 
Thirdly, interviewees’ understanding of how these were being confronted or resolved, 
the uptake and use of the new measures in policy analysis, as well as future priorities and 
expected developments. Thus, while the specific content of the questions asked varied 
considerably depending on the specific issue which the interviewee worked on – with 
plenty of scope allowed to follow up answers, clarify interesting issues which arose or 
push interviewees to provide further information on certain observations (Rubin and 
Rubin 2011) – the interviews all followed a broadly similar structure and sequence.  
 
Lastly, I was fortunate enough during my fieldwork to be invited to attend several expert 
statistical working parties at the OECD and observe their working practices first hand 
– specifically, the Expert Group on Disparities in National Accounting, the Working 
Party on Financial Statistics, and the Working Party on National Accounts. This was a 
largely unplanned source of data, which grew out of interviewing staff in the OECD’s 
Statistics Directorate. However, observing these meetings proved to be an invaluable 
source for understanding the nature of the technical accounting discussions on key 
issues relating to the beyond GDP agenda – particularly on the issues of inequality 
measurement and unpaid work in the national accounts, as well as attitudes towards the 
capitalisation of non-monetary assets. This adds a certain asymmetry to my data across 
the three case studies developed: while interviews and documentary analysis was carried 
out to a similar extent for all the cases, participant observation was only conducted at 
the OECD.  
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Data Analysis  
 
Following data collection, interviews were coded inductively into themes, which were 
then mapped onto the topics dealt with in the chapters. Themes were identified by 
working through the interview transcripts and the quotes copied from documentary 
sources (Roulston and Flick 2014). These banks of quotes, both confirmatory and 
contradictory, were used alongside notes from documents to develop the lines of 
analysis presented in the thematic chapters. While the case studies have an equal 
weighting in the thesis, individual chapters draw more or less upon each one. This is the 
result of the inductive nature of the analysis – in certain cases, certain themes had greater 
saliency. 
 
 
